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Abstract	
This	 thesis	 explores	 humanitarian	 actors’	 practices	 of	 triage	 implemented	 in	 the	
name	of	impartiality,	one	of	the	moral	principles	they	consider	as	being	at	the	core	of	
their	 action.	 It	 does	 so	 through	 the	 ethnography	 of	 three	 international	 NGOs’	
ongoing	projects	in	Pakistan	(2011-2012)	using	a	socio-anthropological	approach	that	
considers	 aid	 projects	 as	 ‘arenas’	 in	 which	 actors	 interact	 and	 negotiate	 their	
interests.	
The	dissertation	first	establishes	that	the	claim	to	impartiality	is	ubiquitous	in	
the	 humanitarian	 discourse,	 and	 presented	 by	 practitioners	 as	 a	 self-evident	
commitment	to	allocate	assistance	‘based	on	needs	only’,	i.e.	without	discrimination,	
and	proportionally	to	people’s	situations.	Yet,	in	practice,	given	limited	resources	and	
environmental	 constraints,	 humanitarian	 organisations	 have	 to	 perform	 operations	
of	inclusion	and	exclusion,	deciding	who	will	and	who	will	not	be	helped	and	of	those	
who	 will,	 who	 takes	 priority.	 This	 is	 conceptualised	 in	 this	 thesis	 as	 humanitarian	
triage.		
While	 aid	 practitioners	 describe	 humanitarian	 triage	 as	 an	 evidence-based	
and	 value-free	 process,	 scholars	 argue	 that	 the	 interests	 and	 prejudices	 of	 aid	
organisations’	 personnel,	 bureaucracies	 and	 donor	 institutions	 are	 the	 primary	
drivers	 behind	 the	 allocation	 of	 humanitarian	 resources.	 By	 unveiling	 the	 actors’	
explicit	 and	 implicit	 assumptions	 concerning	 who	 is	 a	 ‘good	 victim’,	 and	 what	
constitutes	 acceptable	 resources	 or	 environmental	 constraints,	 this	 thesis	 yet	
demonstrates	that	neither	sole	evidence	nor	crude	institutional	interest	alone	drives	
humanitarian	triage.	In	practice	impartiality	is	indeed	interpreted	and	translated,	first	
into	 policies	 and	 then	 into	 practices	 shaped	 by	 three	 main	 factors:	 the	 ability	 or	
inability	of	actors	to	challenge	major	internal	and	external	constraints	(organisational	
trajectory,	 insecurity,	 donor	 relationships);	 the	 normative	 assumptions	 of	 staff	 and	
institutions	 on	 what	 is	 ‘good’	 for	 the	 people	 they	 help;	 and	 the	 position	 aid	
institutions	take	about	the	pervasive	and	politically	blinding	exhortation	to	efficiency.	
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Chapter	1	
Anthropology	of	humanitarian	impartiality:	an	introduction	
“The	feeling	one	has	of	one’s	own	utter	inadequacy	in	such	
extraordinary	and	 solemn	circumstances	 is	unspeakable.	 It	
is	 indeed,	 excessively	 distressing	 to	 realize	 that	 you	 can	
never	do	more	 than	help	 those	who	are	 just	before	you	–
that	 you	must	 keep	 waiting	men	who	 are	 calling	 out	 and	
begging	 you	 to	 come.	 (…)	 Then	 you	 find	 yourself	 asking:	
‘why	go	 to	 the	 right,	when	there	are	all	 these	men	on	 the	
left	 who	 will	 die	 without	 a	 word	 of	 kindness	 or	 comfort,	
without	so	much	as	a	glass	of	water	to	quench	their	burning	
thirst?’”	(Dunant	1986,	72–73)	
	
Introduction	
One	 of	 the	 specificities	 of	 individuals	 and	 organisations	 acting	 under	 the	
humanitarian	 banner	 is	 to	 claim	 to	 be	 guided	 by	 moral	 principles.	 Humanity,	
impartiality,	 independence	 and	 neutrality	 are	 widely	 considered	 as	 “the	 core	
principles”	 of	 humanitarian	 action	 (Barnett	 and	Weiss	 2008,	 3),	 serving	 both	 as	 a	
statement	of	humanitarian	organisations’	 “common	 identity	and	purpose”	and	as	a	
“guide	for	action”.1	
The	 interpretation	 and	 translation	 of	 humanitarian	 principles	 into	 practice	
have	oftentimes	divided	aid	actors	and	fuelled	wider	controversies.	As	illustrated	by	
the	 debates	 over	 the	 role	 of	 the	 International	 Committee	 of	 the	 Red	 Cross	 (ICRC)	
during	the	Second	World	War	and	its	‘neutral‘	attitude	toward	the	extermination	of	
European	 Jews	 (Favez,	 Fletcher,	 and	 Fletcher	 1999),	 most	 controversies,	 however,	
have	 revolved	around	 the	meanings	and	 implications	of	 the	principles	of	neutrality	
and	independence,	leaving	other	principles	such	as	humanity	and	impartially	critically	
unexamined.	 Reflecting	 a	 commonly	 held	 view	 in	 the	 aid	world,	 Yves	Daccord,	 the	
general	 director	 of	 the	 ICRC,	 argued	 in	 2012	 that	 the	 one	 principle	 unifying	
humanitarian	action	was	impartiality,	“the	backbone	of	the	ICRC’s	work	and	the	one	
that	distinguishes	 it	 from	other	relief	actors”.	He	 insisted	that	 impartiality	“remains	
the	core	of	humanitarian	action”,	defined	as	“a	commitment	to	put	the	needs	of	the	
																																																						
1	http://www.ifrc.org/who-we-are/vision-and-mission/the-seven-fundamental-principles/		
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people	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 response”	 (Daccord	 2012),	with	 the	 implication	 not	 to	
discriminate	 against	 people	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 who	 they	 are,	 and	 of	 providing	 an	
assistance	that	is	proportionate	to	these	‘needs’.	The	claim	to	impartiality	or	needs-
based	assistance	is	explicitly	made	by	other	humanitarian	aid	actors,	be	it	the	United	
Nations	 (UN)	 agencies,	 the	 515	 non	 governmental	 organisations	 (NGOs)	 and	 Red	
Cross	and	Crescent	societies	who	are	signatories	of	the	International	Red	Cross	and	
Red	Crescent	Movement	Code	of	Conduct,	or	the	donor	governments	that	endorsed	
the	23	Principles	and	Good	Practice	of	Humanitarian	Donorship.	
However,	being	impartial	(assisting	people	‘based	on	their	needs	only’)	is	not	
more	self-evident	than	being	neutral	or	independent	as	the	epigraph	of	this	chapter	
illustrates.	 Writing	 about	 his	 experience	 of	 the	 Solferino	 battlefield	 after	 combat,	
Henry	Dunant,	one	of	the	founders	of	the	Red	Cross	Movement,	describes	a	common	
reality	of	 relief	workers	of	having	 to	prioritise	whom	to	assist	when	 the	number	of	
victims	 overrides	 the	 capacity	 of	 assistance.	 Humanitarian	 resources	 (financial,	
human,	 logistical)	 are	 always	 insufficient	 to	 comprehensively	 meet	 people’s	
shortfalls.	In	practice,	in	the	middle	of	a	disaster	or	a	crisis,	means	and	environment	
constraints	oblige	humanitarian	organisations	to	make	choices	about	whom	to	assist	
first,	if	at	all.		
This	reality	is	usually	masked	when	impartiality	is	described	as	the	‘selection’	
or	 ‘targeting’	of	people	according	to	their	needs:	 it	overshadows	those	who	are	not	
selected	or	targeted	in	the	process	of	only	designating	those	who	are	 included.	The	
rhetoric	of	 impartiality	de	 facto	hides	the	hierarchy	of	 life	 that	 is	established	 in	the	
process	of	assisting	people	impartially,	‘according	to	their	needs’.	In	fact	impartiality	
is	as	much	a	principle	of	inclusion	as	a	principle	of	exclusion.	
Moreover,	 ‘needs’	 is	 a	 hazy	 notion.	 While	 needs	 theorists	 like	 Abraham	
Maslow	 (1987)	 attempted	 to	 provide	 a	 descriptive	 framework	 establishing	 a	
hierarchy	 of	 needs	 “transcending	 local	 political	 and	 cultural	 differences”	 (R.	
Rubenstein	 2001,	 n.p.),	 Gilbert	 Rist,	 for	 instance,	 insisted	 that	 “the	 construction	 of	
universal	 or	 transcultural	 norms	 constitutes	 an	 aberration”:	 “men	 are	 never	 alone	
and	 are	 born	 in	 societies	 that	 in	 a	 way	 dictates	 their	 ‘needs’”2	 (Rist	 2007,	 273).	
																																																						
2	My	translation.	
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Assessing	 needs	 is	 not	 a	 neutral	 exercise,	 but	 conveys	 the	 value	 system	 of	 those	
evaluating	 them.	 In	 the	 same	vein,	 Jean-Pierre	Olivier	de	Sardan	describes	how	aid	
actors	in	the	development	arena	frequently	identify	needs	as	precisely	whatever	it	is	
that	 they	 are	 equipped	 to	 deliver.	 An	 organisation	 is	 tempted	 not	 to	 recognise	 a	
‘need’	 unless	 it	 fits	 with	 what	 it	 can	 actually	 supply.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 people	
declaring	their	needs	know	all	too	well	that	if	they	ask	for	something	the	organisation	
cannot	provide	 they	are	 very	 likely	 to	 get	nothing	 (Olivier	de	Sardan	2005,	85–86).	
The	 notion	 of	 need	 is	 indeed	 intrinsically	 relational;	 it	 is	 contingent	 on	 who	 is	
formulating	and	who	is	appraising	it.	The	purpose	of	my	dissertation	is	therefore	to	
describe	and	analyse,	through	field	ethnography,	the	practices	of	triage	conducted	in	
the	 name	 of	 impartiality	 by	 three	 international	 humanitarian	 NGOs	 working	 in	
Pakistan	between	2011	and	2012.	
The	expression	“humanitarian	triage”,	coined	by	Peter	Redfield	in	reference	to	
“the	 medical	 tradition	 of	 prioritization	 in	 crisis	 settings”	 (Redfield	 2008b,	 197),	
appears	 indeed	 more	 appropriate	 to	 account	 for	 the	 hierarchies	 humanitarians	
create	 among	 people	 and	 situations	 in	 the	 name	 of	 ‘needs’	 and	 ‘impartiality’.	
Originating	 from	 the	medical	 field,	where	 it	 designates	 the	 process	 of	 determining	
the	order	and	priority	of	treatment	for	patients	when	resources	or	conditions	do	not	
allow	treating	them	all,	the	notion	of	triage	provides	arguably	a	heuristic	concept	to	
analyse	 the	 practices	 of	 impartiality	 by	 humanitarian	 actors.	 As	 commented	 by	
Lachenal	et	al.,		
As	 a	 both	 indispensable	 and	 unbearable	 medical	 act	 (...)	
sorting	manifests	 the	 brutal	 and	 common	 fact	 that	 all	 lives	
do	not	have	the	same	value.	 (...)	 Instead	of	being	outraged,	
there	 is	a	need	 to	 take	 the	sorting	practices	 seriously,	 their	
strengths	and	weaknesses;	 to	describe	the	context	 in	which	
they	 take	place;	 to	 study	 their	 logics	and	 tools;	 to	question	
their	 values	 and	 to	measure	what	 room	 for	manoeuvre	 its	
subjects,	 doctors	 and	 patients	 have.	 (Lachenal,	 Lefève,	 and	
Nguyen	2014b,	3)3	
The	notion	of	triage	invites	us	to	look	at	the	practices	of	impartiality	(assisting	people	
according	to	their	needs),	 from	the	points	of	view	of	their	encompassed	promise	of	
fairness,	 of	 their	 sorting	 logics	 governing	micro	 and	macro	 allocation	 of	 resources,	
																																																						
3	My	translation.	
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and	 of	 the	 situation	 of	 scarcity	 of	 resources	 that	 makes	 the	 recourse	 to	 triage	 a	
necessity	in	the	first	place.	
Lachenal	 et	 al.	 argue	 that	 triage	 is	 “the	 ethical	 paradigm	 of	 contemporary	
medicine,	whose	 problems,	 debates	 and	 language	now	 seem	natural	 and	ordinary,	
but	 whose	 extraordinary	 normative	 presuppositions	 remain	 to	 be	 critically	
examined”4	(Lachenal,	Lefève,	and	Nguyen	2014b,	22	[emphasis	added]	).	 I	contend	
that	 impartiality	 (or	 humanitarian	 triage)	 is	 the	 ethical	 paradigm	 of	 humanitarian	
assistance,	 which	 can	 be	 studied	 through	 the	 ethnography	 of	 humanitarian	 triage	
practices.		
In	line	with	Didier	Fassin’s	work	on	moral	anthropology,	I	intend	to	apprehend	
humanitarian	actors’	morality	 “in	acts	and	discourses	 to	understand	what	men	and	
women	 do	which	 they	 consider	 to	 be	moral	 or	 good	 or	 right	 or	 generous”	 (Fassin	
2012,	 6).	 Using	 primarily	 the	 methodology	 and	 concepts	 developed	 by	 the	 socio-
anthropology	of	development,	as	well	as	by	the	sociology	of	medical	triage,	this	study	
considers	what	is	a	fair	allocation	of	resources	for	three	humanitarian	organisations	
working	 in	Pakistan.	Second,	 it	 identifies	and	analyses	 for	each	of	 them	 the	 sorting	
logics,	 i.e.	 the	“lines	of	coherence”	(Olivier	de	Sardan	1995,	127)	 influencing	who	 is	
assisted,	with	what	priority	and	how,	at	the	macro	and	at	the	micro	level	depending	
on	 the	 scope	 of	 their	 impact.	 Third,	 the	 situation	 of	 scarcity	 that	 constrains	 action	
and	 hence	 triggers	 the	 process	 of	humanitarian	 triage	 in	 each	 project	 is	 identified	
and	 analysed.	 The	 main	 research	 questions	 are:	 What	 rhetoric	 do	 aid	 workers	
mobilise	 to	 justify	 who	 will	 be	 assisted	 and,	 of	 those,	 in	 what	 priority	 and	 how?	
Which	daily	practices	of	aid	workers	contribute	to	the	sorting	mechanisms	identified	
and	how?	 In	particular,	how	do	they	explicitly	assess	 ‘priority	needs’?	How	do	they	
define,	produce	and	use	quantitative	and	qualitative	‘evidence’?	Which	internal	and	
external	resources	and	environmental	constraints	weigh	on	triage	practices?	How	are	
these	 constraints	 considered,	 accepted,	 and	 challenged	 by	 aid	 workers?	 To	 what	
extent	 does	 the	 relationship	 each	 organisation	 has	 with	 the	 other	 actors	 of	 the	
humanitarian	 arena	 and	 the	 vision	 it	 has	 of	 its	 social	 role	 influence	 its	 practice	 of	
triage?	 To	 what	 extent	 do	 people’s	 representations,	 beliefs	 and	 practices	 come	
																																																						
4	My	translation.	
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together	to	form	humanitarian	macro	and	micro	sorting	logics?	What	are	the	politics	
underpinning	these	sorting	logics?	
My	 study	 shows	 that	 while	 aid	 practitioners	 and	 experts	 describe	
humanitarian	 triage	 as	 a	 value-free	 process,	 they	 rely	 on	 a	 series	 of	 implicit	 and	
explicit	 normative	 assumptions	 on	 who	 is	 a	 ‘good	 victim’,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 what	
represents	 an	 acceptable	 resource	 or	 environmental	 constraint.	 It	 illustrates	 the	
variety	of	 internal	and	external	social	dynamics	framing	humanitarian	sorting	logics,	
as	 well	 as	 the	 diversity	 of	 triage	 ethics	 and	 policies	 that	 can	 result	 from	 them.	
Demonstrating	 the	heuristic	 value	of	 ethnographies	of	 aid	bureaucracies,	my	 study	
challenges	 the	positivist	view	of	 impartiality	as	an	apolitical	 ‘guide	 for	action’	while	
underscoring	the	need	for	public	deliberation	on	the	pros	and	cons	of	various	policies	
of	impartiality.	
My	research	focuses	on	humanitarian	actors	and	not	on	those	at	the	recipient	
end	of	assistance	for	practical	as	well	as	analytical	reasons.	First,	a	study	of	recipients	
would	 have	 realistically	 required	 more	 time	 than	 I	 had	 to	 conduct	 ethnographic	
research,	as	well	as	several	language	skills	to	engage	with	the	lives	of	those	affected	
by	 floods	 and	 conflict.	 Second,	 humanitarian	 impartiality	 exists	 essentially	 in	 the	
discourse	of	humanitarian	actors;	therefore	my	research	is	focused	on	how	some	of	
their	practices	embody	their	idea	of	impartiality.	As	often	as	possible	I	met	and	talked	
to	those	they	called	the	‘beneficiaries’.	I	used	these	encounters	the	same	way	I	met	
with	donors	or	Pakistani	authorities,	as	pieces	 that	contributed	to	my	ethnographic	
work	centred	on	the	International	NGOs	(INGOs).	Studying	how	those	at	the	recipient	
end	perceive5	 INGOs’	humanitarian	 triage	would	constitute	a	whole	other	 research	
endeavour.	
This	introductory	chapter	continues,	first,	with	a	section	explaining	how,	as	an	
ex-humanitarian	 practitioner,	 I	 came	 to	 this	 research.	 I	 describe	 how	my	 practical	
field	experience	incited	me	to	engage	in	an	anthropological	research	path	exploring	
the	diversity	of	aid	policies	and	practices	masked	by	the	 lofty	rhetoric	of	principles.	
Second,	 I	clarify	how	I	delineated	my	ethnographic	field	research.	 I	explain	why	the	
projects	run	in	Pakistan	by	three	INGOs,	each	with	a	different	relationship	to	the	aid	
																																																						
5	 For	more	 on	 the	 perception	 of	 those	 at	 the	 recipient	 end	 of	 humanitarian	 projects	 see	 Abu-Sada	
(2012)	and	Anderson	et	al.	(2012).	
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system,	 represent	 a	 relevant	 object	 to	 conduct	 an	 anthropology	 of	 humanitarian	
triage.	 In	 the	 third	 and	 fourth	 sections,	 I	 justify	 the	 use	 of	 an	 anthropological	
methodology.	 I	 describe	 how,	 in	 the	 field,	 I	 used	 the	 methodological	 approach	
developed	by	the	socio-anthropology	of	development	to	follow	the	thread	on	three	
ongoing	projects	through	a	seven	month	ethnographic	immersion	in	the	daily	life	of	
aid	workers	 of	 three	 INGOs	 in	 Pakistan	 between	October	 2011	 and	August	 2012.	 I	
then	 explain	 how	 the	 concepts	 of	 projects	 as	 ‘arenas’	 in	which	 actors	 interact	 and	
negotiate	their	interests,	and	in	which	‘logics’	of	humanitarian	triage	can	be	analysed	
helped	me	to	make	sense	of	my	ethnographic	observations	once	back	from	the	field.	
The	last	section	presents	the	outline	of	the	dissertation.	
The	path	to	research	
Experience	as	a	practitioner	
For	 five	 years,	 I	was	 a	 humanitarian	practitioner.	 I	 started	 in	 2005	 as	 an	 intern	 for	
nine	months	at	 the	head	office	of	 the	 international	non-governmental	organisation	
(NGO),	 Solidarités	 International	 in	 Paris,	 became	 a	 finance	 and	 human	 resource	
officer	(and	coordinator)	 in	Sri	Lanka	 in	2006	and	then	a	 ‘flying’	 finance	manager	 in	
2007	travelling	to	various	countries	in	Asia	and	Africa	to	end	up	in	2008	as	a	regional	
director	of	programmes	for	Asia	based	in	Paris,	a	position	I	left	to	start	this	research	
in	2010.	
	 The	relatively	small	size	of	the	INGO	I	worked	for	gave	me	the	opportunity	to	
do	 a	 bit	 of	 everything	 very	 early	 on	 and	 this	 first	 experience	 showed	me	 the	wide	
range	of	considerations	that	humanitarian	practitioners	face	on	a	daily	basis.	Even	as	
an	 intern	 I	was	 in	direct	contact	with	teams	 in	the	field,	supporting	them	in	getting	
what	 they	needed	 from	 the	head	office.	 I	was	 like	 their	 internal	 ‘lobbyist’	 in	 Paris,	
making	sure	that	their	requests	were	not	forgotten	because	of	all	the	other	requests	
coming	from	other	countries.	Together	with	the	Asia	desk	manager,	I	attended	long	
meetings	 with	 the	 human	 resources	 department	 about	 which	 profile	 or	 candidate	
would	fit	best	the	dynamic	of	the	team	on	each	field	base.	We	received	emails	and	
weekly	reports	detailing	field	constraints	as	various	as	issues	with	the	landlord	of	the	
office	or	unexpected	technical	issues	concerning	the	drilling	of	wells.	I	could	see	that	
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maintaining	 a	 good	 relationship	 with	 institutional	 donors	 was	 as	 important	 as	 the	
quality	of	 the	project	proposal	we	were	submitting	to	them.	 In	parallel,	 there	were	
important	discussions	with	country	directors	about	how	long	we	should	consider	the	
aftermath	of	the	December	2004	tsunami	to	be	an	‘emergency’	response	phase,	and	
whether	we	should	become	involved	in	a	longer	term	response	or	find	another	actor	
that	would	 take	over	our	 activities.	 I	worked	almost	night	 and	day	 to	 adapt	 to	 the	
field	rhythm,	but	I	lacked	the	first	hand	experience	of	it.		
I	was	hired	 in	2006	as	a	 field	administrator	and	sent	 to	 the	east	coast	of	Sri	
Lanka,	where	activities	 to	 facilitate	post-tsunami	access	 to	water	projects	were	still	
being	implemented	a	year	and	a	half	after	the	disaster.	This	was	my	first	experience	
of	what	I	 initially	perceived	to	be	a	‘humanitarian	bubble’	abroad,	i.e.	the	ensemble	
of	 international	actors	revolving	around	humanitarian	assistance.	 I	was	 in	Sri	Lanka,	
apart	from	the	people	with	whom	I	was	working	directly,	all	were	connected	to	the	
international	relief	apparatus,	and	it	felt	like	the	specificities	of	the	Sri	Lankan	context	
were	more	 like	 a	 blurry	 backdrop:	 I	 had	 Sri	 Lankan	 colleagues,	 and	was	 eating	 Sri	
Lankan	 food	but	we	were	speaking	English	and	our	 relationship	was	 framed	by	our	
respective	 responsibilities	 in	 the	 project	 implementation:	 to	 me	 they	 were	
accountants,	 logisticians	 and	 water	 engineers	 before	 being	 Sri	 Lankans,	 not	 to	
mention	 their	 Muslim	 or	 Singhalese	 identity.	 Compared	 to	 my	 professional	
responsibilities	 for	 managing	 humanitarian	 finances	 and	 accounting,	 and	 human	
resources,	 knowing	 about	 Sri	 Lanka	 appeared	 to	 me	 as	 less	 of	 a	 priority.	 It	 was	
different	 for	more	 senior	 colleagues,	 and	 also	 later	 on	 for	me.	My	 perspective	 on	
things	changed	on	August,	4th	2006	when	seventeen	Sri	Lankan	staff	of	Action	Against	
Hunger	were	killed	in	the	office	of	the	organisation	a	few	kilometres	north	of	where	
we	were	based	(BBC	News	2013).	This	event	pulled	me	out	of	the	‘bubble’	and	made	
me	 begin	 to	 think	 more	 about	 Sri	 Lanka,	 its	 recent	 history,	 its	 social	 and	 political	
tensions	and	its	political	crisis.		
After	 nine	 months	 in	 Sri	 Lanka,	 I	 became	 a	 member	 of	 the	 newly	 created	
‘emergency	 response	 cell’.	 I	was	 still	 an	 administrator,	 but	 had	 to	 develop	 a	 lot	 of	
other	 competencies	 different	 from	 the	 ones	 I	 had	 learnt	 so	 far,	 as	 we	 were	 five	
persons	managing	at	 least	 two	or	 three	country	 responses	at	 the	same	time.	 I	 flew	
from	one	emergency	to	the	other,	stayed	only	for	short	periods	in	countries	where	in	
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most	places	Solidarités6	did	not	yet	have	an	office.	Our	 job	was	 to	 set	up	an	office	
and	launch	an	emergency	response	in	these	countries	where	a	disaster	or	a	surge	of	
hostilities	 had	 just	 happened.	 In	 little	 more	 than	 a	 year	 I	 had	 worked	 in	 Kenya,	
Central	 African	 Republic,	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Congo	 and	 Bangladesh	 and	
supported	projects	from	a	distance	in	Somalia	and	Southern	Sudan.	These	‘missions’	
were	 essentially	 a	matter	 of	 action	 and	 reactivity.	 The	 projects	 we	 designed	were	
mostly	short-term	‘relief’	projects,	following	a	‘fire	brigade	model’.	
I	was	 asked	 to	 replace	 the	head	of	 this	 emergency	 response	 team	when	he	
left.	I	accepted,	but	decided	after	a	few	months	that	I	preferred	a	position	that	would	
oversee	the	implementation	of	projects	and	not	only	launch	them.	As	the	Asia	desk	
manager	 I	 was	 responsible	 for	 programmes	 in	 Afghanistan,	 Bangladesh,	 Thailand,	
Myanmar,	and	later	Pakistan.7	This	position	allowed	me	to	take	a	step	back,	to	spend	
less	 time	 in	 the	 field	 and	 hence	 have	 a	 slightly	 more	 distanced	 analysis	 of	
humanitarian	 action.	 These	 two	 years	 were	 the	 longest	 period	 I	 spent	 without	
changing	my	 job	 position,8	 and	 I	 used	 them	 to	work	 on	 strategic	 overviews	 of	 our	
presence	 in	Asia:	questions	 revolving	around	 relevance	and	 the	added	value	of	our	
action,	 or	 around	 the	negotiation	of	 access	 to	 ‘the	beneficiaries’	with	national	 and	
local	 authorities,	 as	well	 as	with	 other	 non	 state	 actors,	 and	 institutional	 donors.	 I	
faced	 constraints	 related	 to	 the	 life	 of	 the	 organisation:	 internal	 organisational	
dynamics,	work	style,	structural	issues	etc.	I	felt	quite	distinctly	that	I	lacked	the	time	
to	step	back	and	think	critically.		
The	principles	of	humanitarian	action:	 from	system	 level	analyses	 to	studies	 from	
the	actors’	perspective	
I	was	asked	to	contribute	to	the	five-year	strategy	of	the	organisation.	 I	delved	into	
readings	about	humanitarian	action.	I	started	by	reading	literature	published	by	the	
Overseas	Development	Institute,	the	Active	Learning	Network	for	Accountability	and	
Performance	(ALNAP),	or	the	Feinstein	 International	Center.	One	of	the	main	 issues	
																																																						
6	At	 the	 time	the	organisation’s	name	was	“Solidarités”.	The	name	was	only	changed	 to	“Solidarités	
International”	in	2010.		
7	I	also	temporarily	supervised	Central	African	Republic	and	Burundi.	Many	Solidarités’	projects	were	in	
African	countries,	and	for	the	sake	of	a	balanced	repartition	among	the	regional	desk	teams	I	had	to	
supervise	one	African	country	up	until	Solidarités	sent	a	team	to	Pakistan	again	in	May	2009.		
8	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	as	a	humanitarian	practitioner	I	considered	two	years	to	be	a	long	time.	
This	shows	that	the	time	space	of	humanitarian	action	and	research	differ	greatly.	
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addressed	by	this	literature	at	that	time	was	the	“dramatic	shrinkage	of	humanitarian	
space”	 (Donini	 et	 al.	 2008,	 15).	Aid	 actors	were	deploring	an	 increasing	 inability	 to	
access	 victims	 of	 conflicts	 and	 natural	 disasters,	 due	 to	 physical	 insecurity	 and/or	
increased	 control	 over	 their	 activities	 by	 governments	 eager	 to	 reassert	 their	
sovereignty.	 These	difficulties	were	described	as	 “blurring	 the	 lines”	 (Macrae	2000,	
51)	 between	political,	military	 and	humanitarian	 action.	On	 the	one	hand,	western	
states	were	often	accused	of	abusing	the	humanitarian	label	by	using	a	humanitarian	
narrative	 to	 justify	 going	 to	war	 in	 Afghanistan	 and	 Iraq,	 and	 by	 engaging	 in	 relief	
activities	 in	 order	 to	 conquer	 the	 hearts	 and	 minds	 of	 the	 population	 during	
pacification	campaigns.	On	the	other	hand,	some	humanitarian	actors	were	accused	
of	having	contributed	to	the	confusion	between	humanitarian	and	military	action	by	
accepting	 funds	 from	governments	at	war	 in	 Iraq,	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan,	and	to	
have	participated	in	the	pacification	efforts	of	their	donor	governments.	According	to	
this	 literature,	 the	 lack	 of	 respect	 for	 humanitarian	 principles,	 both	 by	 states	 and	
humanitarian	 agencies,	 had	 delegitimised	 the	 whole	 humanitarian	 enterprise,	
exposed,	 as	 a	 result,	 to	 a	 growing	 hostility	 emanating	 from	 armed	 groups	 and	
southern	governments,	considering	aid	agencies	as	tool	of	Western	or	United	Nations	
intervention	policies.		
I	felt	(I	use	this	word	deliberately	as	I	am	reporting	a	subjective	opinion	of	that	
time)	 there	 was	 a	 gap	 between	 what	 I	 was	 reading	 and	 what	 I	 had	 experienced	
professionally.	In	my	view	this	literature	was	not	presenting	the	diversity	of	aid	actors	
and	 policies.	 While	 I	 felt	 some	 NGOs	 had	 indeed	 abandoned	 any	 pretence	 to	 be	
neutral,	independent	or	impartial	(while	still	considering	themselves	‘humanitarian’)	I	
thought	others	managed	to	negotiate	their	 room	for	manoeuvre	with	 local	political	
forces,	as	well	as	to	navigate	their	institutional	donors’	financial	dependency	in	order	
to	implement	relief	projects	that	fitted	their	own	nongovernmental	and	not-for-profit	
agenda.	Solidarités	International	(hereafter	referred	to	as	Solidarités)	belonged	in	my	
view	 to	 the	 latter	 category.	 I	 started	 to	 realise	 that	behind	 the	 same	humanitarian	
discourse	 claiming	 allegiance	 to	 humanitarian	 principles,	 a	wide	 range	 of	 practices	
and	 policies	 could	 coexist.	 Yet,	 this	 diversity	 of	 views	 and	 practices	 was	
underrepresented	in	the	expert	literature.	I	started	to	think	about	ways	to	contribute	
to	 the	 debate	 and	 eventually	 chose	 the	 research	 path	 as	 a	 way	 to	 acquire	 the	
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necessary	analytic	and	research	skills	to	study	humanitarian	practices	and	enrich	the	
discussion.	
My	 first	 encounter	 with	 the	 academic	 literature	 on	 humanitarian	 aid	 was	
confusing.	 Prominent	 scholars	 such	 as	 Mariella	 Pandolfi	 and	 Zoe	 Marriage,	
considered	humanitarian	principles	as	a	façade,	hiding	what	was,	according	to	them,	
the	 real	 drive	 of	 humanitarian	 aid:	 “responding	 to	 the	 priorities	 of	 international	
donors	 and	 bureaucratic	 frameworks”	 (Pandolfi	 2003,	 376).	 While	 providing	 a	
stimulating	 reading	 of	 the	 asymmetrical	 power	 relationships	 between	 relief	 actors	
and	their	so-called	beneficiaries,	this	literature	depicted	the	humanitarian	“industry”	
(Pandolfi	 2000,	 n.p.)	 or	 “assistance”	 (Marriage	 2006,	 2)	 as	 a	 coherent	 whole	
organised	around	the	subjugation	and	control	of	indigent	people.	Overshadowing	the	
diversity	 of	 practices	 and	 situations,	 as	well	 as	 the	 power	 of	 local	 institutions,	 this	
reading	 presented	 in	 my	 view	 the	 same	 limit	 as	 the	 more	 practitioner-oriented	
literature	and	its	general	conclusions	about	the	‘shrinking	of	the	humanitarian	space’.	
In	 addition,	 in	 considering	 aid	 agencies	 as	 passive	 instruments	 in	 the	 hands	 of	
western	 governments,	 it	 did	 not	 do	 justice	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 processes	 at	work	
within	 aid	 bureaucracies.	 As	 a	 former	 practitioner,	 I	 had	 experienced,	 for	 instance,	
the	 interdependence	 between	 donors,	 institutions	 and	 implementing	 agencies,	 the	
weight	of	professional	logics	and	concurrency	(logistics,	accountancy,	hydrology,	etc.)	
in	decision-making	processes,	and	the	significant	freedom	managers	had	in	choosing	
whom	to	prioritise	for	assistance	and	how.		
I	 shared	 Peter	 Hoffman	 and	 Thomas	 Weiss’	 point	 of	 view,	 who	 wrote,	
reflecting	upon	the	importance	of	social	sciences	in	the	study	of	humanitarian	actors:	
“We	 know	 much	 more	 about	 aid	 work	 than	 we	 do	 about	 aid	 workers.	 The	 vast	
majority	of	 examinations	of	humanitarianism	concentrate	on	 system-level	 analysis”	
(Weiss	and	Hoffman	2008,	284).	What	were	needed,	in	my	view,	were	inside	studies	
of	 international	 humanitarian	 NGOs,	 comparable	 to	 the	 work	 anthropologists	 had	
produced	 on	 United	 Nations	 agencies	 (Atlani-Duault	 2007;	 Fresia	 2009),	 or	 on	
institutional	 donors	 (Mosse	 2005).9	 This	 is	 why	 I	 turned	 to	 sociology	 and	
																																																						
9	The	ICRC	is	an	institution	within	which	it	would	be	very	difficult	to	do	ethnography,	because	of	the	
confidentiality	 of	 its	 work,	 thanks	 to	which	 it	 secures	 its	mandate	 of	 advocating	 for	 the	 respect	 of	
international	 humanitarian	 law	 (Stillhart	 2010).	 The	 ICRC	 allows	 publications	 about	 the	 Red	 Cross	
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anthropology10	and	to	the	socio-anthropology	of	development	approach	in	particular,	
deciding	to	explore	the	diversity	of	humanitarian	policies	and	practices	hiding	behind	
the	rhetoric	of	principles	through	the	lens	of	the	least	controversial	one:	impartiality.	
Delineating	the	field	
My	 research	 considers	 the	 ‘humanitarian	 configuration’	 and	 its	 non-governmental	
actors	as	a	relevant	object	of	study	for	development	studies.	Within	this	 large	field,	
focusing	on	three	projects	in	Pakistan	between	2011	and	2012	run	by	different	NGOs,	
each	 of	 which	 have	 developed	 specific	 relationships	 to	 the	 aid	 system	 and	 its	
coordination	 mechanisms,	 appeared	 particularly	 relevant	 to	 grasp	 the	 diversity	 of	
humanitarian	triage	practices.		
The	‘humanitarian	configuration’	and	its	non-governmental	actors	
As	the	aid	actors	that	claim	to	uphold	the	principle	of	impartiality	are	actors	that	call	
themselves	 humanitarian,	 this	 research	 can	 be	 affiliated	more	 specifically	with	 the	
anthropology	of	humanitarianism	that	a	few	scholars	have	attempted	to	map	in	the	
past	 few	 years	 (Saillant	 2007;	 Dozon	 and	 Atlani-Duault	 2011;	 Redfield	 and	 Erica	
Bornstein	2011).	Defining	a	field	like	the	anthropology	of	humanitarianism	faces	the	
initial	challenge	of	delineating	the	boundaries	of	‘humanitarianism.	Since	it	is	almost	
impossible	 to	 find	 a	 universally	 applied	 definition	 of	 the	 word	 because	 of	 the	
diversification	of	its	uses	in	recent	years,	it	is	a	challenge	to	locate	and	study	it	from	
an	 anthropological	 perspective.	 To	 overcome	 this	 challenge,	 Laetitia	 Atlani-Duault	
and	Jean-Pierre	Dozon	rely	on	the	assumption11	that	“there	is	humanitarian	aid	quite	
simply	when	groups	claim	to	implement	humanitarian	action	and	organize	to	this	end	
an	intervention	apparatus	applying	to	other	social	groups”	(Dozon	and	Atlani-Duault	
2011,	400).	This	research	adopts	this	definition	as	it	escapes	the	normative	approach	
																																																																																																																																																												
movement,	 and	 even	 publishes	 together	 with	 Cambridge	 University	 Press	 a	 quarterly	 journal	 “on	
international	humanitarian	 law	and	humanitarian	action	and	policy,	during	armed	conflict	and	other	
situations	 of	 violence”:	 the	 International	 Review	 of	 the	 Red	 Cross	
(https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/international-review/).	Yet	articles	are	either	written	by	people	
external	 to	 the	 institution	 (Brauman	 2012),	 or	 by	 people	 working	 for	 the	 ICRC	 (Grombach	Wagner	
2005)	who	adhere	to	the	authorised	view	of	the	institution.	
10	My	research	is	more	inspired	by	anthropological	than	sociological	literature.	Yet	I	fully	acknowledge	
the	proximity	with	qualitative	 sociology	 in	 terms	of	methodology,	 and	 in	 terms	of	 the	nature	of	 the	
field	I	studied:	western	transnational	organisations	(Dodier	2012,	21–22).	
11	Borrowed	from	Jean-Pierre	Chauveau	who	applied	it	to	“development”	(Chauveau	1985).	
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of	defining	what	is	and	what	is	not	humanitarian	to	then	include	all	which	claim	to	be	
humanitarian	as	a	legitimate	object	for	anthropology	of	humanitarianism.12	
So	 just	 as	 ‘Development’	 is	 an	 object	 of	 study	 for	 social	 sciences,	
‘humanitarianism’,	 ‘humanitarian	 action’,	 ‘humanitarian	 projects’	 or	 the	
‘humanitarian	apparatus’	constitute	a	field	of	research	for	social	sciences	and	not	just	
an	 element	 of	 context	 or	 an	 abstract	 concept.	 Just	 as	 much	 as	 Olivier	 de	 Sardan	
speaks	 of	 a	 “developmentalist	 configuration”	 to	 describe	 “a	 complex	 set	 of	
institutions,	 flows	 and	 actors,	 for	 whom	 development	 constitutes	 a	 resource,	 a	
profession,	 a	market,	 a	 stake,	or	 a	 strategy”	 (Olivier	de	Sardan	2005,	2),	one	 could	
speak	of	a	‘humanitarian	configuration’	defined	as	a	complex	set	of	institutions,	flows	
and	 actors,	 for	 whom	 humanitarian	 action	 or	 relief	 constitutes	 a	 resource,	 a	
profession,	 a	market,	 a	 stake,	 or	 a	 strategy.	 The	 humanitarian	 configuration	 often	
emerges	 in	 countries	 affected	 by	 conflict	 or	 natural	 disasters,	 and	 may	 involve	
different	 actors	 than	 in	 the	 ‘developmentalist	 configuration’	 such	 as	 the	 military,	
specific	relief	donors	like	the	European	Union	Humanitarian	Aid	and	Civil	Protection	
department	(ECHO)	or	‘emergency	NGOs’,	but	can	in	principle	be	studied	in	a	similar	
way.	
Defining	what	NGOs	are	 is	a	challenge	too,	as	some	have	noted	(Vakil	1997;	
Martens	2002).	The	term	was	coined	in	1945	in	article	71	of	the	UN	Charter	referring	
to	 international	 “societal	 actors”	 (Martens	 2002,	 271)	 engaging	 with	 the	 UN	 and	
generalised	 in	 the	 1980s	 to	 any	 societal	 actor	 (national	 or	 international)	 engaging	
even	 outside	 the	 UN.	 Since	 ‘NGO’	 does	 not	 fit	 a	 particular	 legal	 status,13	 and	 can	
characterise	an	organisation	involved	in	any	kind	of	field,	its	main	feature	is	that	it	is	
a	 non-state	 actor.	 Unlike	 the	 ICRC	 or	 UN	 humanitarian	 agencies,	 NGOs	 are	 not	
mandated	by	states.	They	are	autonomous	in	as	much	as	they	define	their	own	raison	
d’être,	their	own	norms.	Yet,	while	claiming	their	autonomy	vis-à-vis	the	states,	NGOs	
are	 being	 simultaneously	 engaged	 in	 some	 forms	 of	 dependency	 (mostly	 financial)	
																																																						
12	 Francine	 Saillant	 offered	 another	 approach	 establishing	 that	what	 characterized	 humanitarianism	
best	was	its	capacity	to	embrace	so	many	actors,	and	situations,	and	hence	decided	to	study	what	was	
excluded	 from	 this	 embracing	 structure,	what	 fell	 in	 its	 interstices	 (“entre-lieux”	 in	 French)	 (Saillant	
2007).	
13	 Even	 though	 since	 1991	 there	 has	 been	 a	 European	 Convention	 on	 the	 Recognition	 of	 the	 Legal	
Personality	of	International	Non-Governmental	Organizations	that	“follows	Belgian	law	and	recognizes	
the	national	law	of	the	respective	state	in	which	the	NGOs	has	its	headquarters”	(Martens	2002,	276–
277)	
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either	vis-à-vis	donor-states,	multilateral	organisations	(mostly	the	UN	system)	or	vis-
à-vis	so-called	‘host	states’	where	they	operate	(Donini	2012b).		
This	 mix	 of	 autonomy	 and	 dependency	 appears	 all	 the	more	 interesting	 to	
study	 than	 most	 ethnographic	 studies	 of	 humanitarian	 aid	 actors	 have	 so	 far	
concentrated	 on	 United	 Nations	 agencies	 or	 donor	 institutions.	 Among	 the	
anthropological	accounts	of	NGOs	(Hilhorst	2003),	few	focus	upon	organisations	that	
have	 a	 history	 of	 providing	 relief	 in	 conflict	 settings.	 Peter	 Redfield	 did	 work	 for	
several	years	on	an	 institutional	ethnography	of	MSF,	partly	 relying	on	 fieldwork	 in	
Uganda	and	partly	on	interviews	of	numerous	MSF	staff	outside	Uganda	and	provides	
an	anthropological	 account	of	 issues	 specific	 to	 the	provision	of	 international	 relief	
like	 the	 emergence	 of	 sets	 of	 standardised	 relief	 kits	 (Redfield	 2013,	 78)	 or	 the	
problem	 of	 neutrality	 (Redfield	 2013,	 117).	 Like	 Redfield,	 my	 research	 focuses	 on	
humanitarian	NGOs	having	a	history	of	being	involved	in	relief	programmes	in	conflict	
settings	and	natural	disasters14	and	on	a	claim	specific	to	them.	It	does	so,	however,	
through	the	study	of	three	projects	of	international	NGOs	in	Pakistan.	
Three	projects	of	international	non-governmental	organisations	in	Pakistan	
The	 choice	 of	 the	 three	 INGOs	 was	made	 in	 a	 landscape	 of	 diverse	 organisations:	
Some	 humanitarian	 INGOs	 claim	 to	 be	 secular	 others	 to	 be	 faith-based15	 (from	
various	religions);	some	claim	to	be	engaged	solely	in	relief	work,	others	to	be	‘doing	
development’	as	well;	they	differ	in	size,	country	of	origin,	and	their	source	of	funding	
(private	 funds	 versus	 institutional	 funding);	 some	 prioritise	 expatriate	 staff,	 others	
local	 staff,	 some	have	a	 centralised	governance,	others	have	a	decentralised	one,16	
and	 ultimately	 (almost)	 none	 of	 this	 is	 static:	 many	 of	 the	 NGOs’	 characteristics	
(governance,	expertise,	human	resources	policies	and	size	etc.)	evolve	over	time.	
																																																						
14	Most	such	organisations	have	extended	their	relief	activities	to	natural	disaster	responses,	and	claim	
to	uphold	the	same	principles	as	in	conflict	settings.	
15	 “Faith-based	 NGOs	 are	 different	 from	 secular	 NGOs	 in	 that	 their	 ‘identity	 and	 mission	 are	 self-
consciously	 derived	 from	 the	 teachings	 of	 one	 or	 more	 religious	 or	 spiritual	 traditions”	 (Benedetti	
2006,	851).	
16	NGOs	with	‘centralised’	governance	take	key	strategic	decisions	at	their	head	offices,	and	attempt	to	
control	 country	 offices	 from	 there.	 In	 recent	 years,	 some	 very	 big	 NGOs	 have	 attempted	 to	
decentralise	 their	 governance	 to	 country	 offices,	 keeping	 only	 support	 and	 back	 office	 at	 the	 head	
office.	
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I	chose	the	three	NGOs	among	actors	having	a	history	of	working	 in	conflict	
settings	 according	 to	 their	 position	 at	 the	 time	 of	 fieldwork	 (2011-2012)	 towards	
western	 states	 and,	more	particularly,	 towards	 the	donor	 governments	 and	United	
Nations	 system	 that	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 macro	 allocation	 of	 humanitarian	
resources.	 In	 the	 2000s	 a	major	 trend	 emerged	 among	 actors	 of	 the	 humanitarian	
sector	to	structure	their	relationships	in	order	“to	improve	the	effectiveness	of	their	
collective	responses”.17	This	trend	was	initiated,	under	the	label	of	the	‘humanitarian	
reform’,	by	the	United	Nations	Emergency	Relief	Coordinator	in	2005	and	supported	
by	 the	main	 donor	 states.	 Aiming	 at	 “more	 effective	 partnerships	 between	United	
Nations	 and	 non-United	 Nations	 humanitarian	 actors”,18	 the	 reform	 involved	 new	
funding	mechanisms	as	well	as	a	whole	United	Nations	bureaucracy.	The	“clusters”	
were	 the	reform’s	most	visible	manifestation.	Clusters	are	sector-specific	 forums	of	
coordination	(food,	health,	water	and	sanitation,	shelter,	education,	protection,	etc.)	
set	up	at	the	local,	regional,	national,	and	international	levels	and	specifically	tasked	
with	 “informing	 strategic	 decision-making	 for	 the	 humanitarian	 response	 through	
coordination	 of	 needs	 assessment,	 gap	 analysis	 and	 prioritization”.19	 Clusters	 are	
supposed	to	play	a	key	role	in	defining	priority	needs,	orienting	and	coordination,	but	
they	are	mostly	headed	by	UN	agencies.	Although	INGOs	are	engaged	with	them,	not	
all	INGOs	have	the	same	level	of	involvement.	
For	 this	 research	 I	 chose	 three	 INGOs	 with	 a	 history	 of	 working	 in	 conflict	
settings	 and	which	 had	 developed	 different	 positions	 towards	UN-led	 coordination	
mechanisms.	 I	 did	 not	want	 to	 choose	 actors	 according	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	work	
they	implement	in	the	field:	development,	relief,	emergency,	reconstruction,	etc.	as	
the	extent	of	each	of	these	categories	can	be	debated	and	as	most	actors	do	several	
types	 of	 work.	 Rather,	 I	 intended	 to	 choose	 among	 actors	 who	 claim	 to	 be	
humanitarian	and	to	uphold	the	principle	of	impartiality:	these	are	characteristics	of	
actors	having	a	history	of	working	in	conflict	settings.	The	positions	of	NGOs	towards	
humanitarian	reform	are	related	more	generally	to	the	type	of	relationship	they,	as	
non-state	 actors,	 have	 developed	 with	 states	 over	 time.	 Save	 the	 Children	
																																																						
17	The	objectives	are	phrased	as	follows:	“to	improve	capacity,	predictability,	accountability,	leadership	
and	partnership”,	http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination		
18	http://www.unocha.org/annualreport/2006/html/part1_humanitarian.html		
19	https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/coordination/clusters/what-cluster-approach	
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International20	 and	 Médecins	 Sans	 Frontières	 International	 are	 two	 of	 the	 five	
humanitarian	 INGOs’	 federations	who	altogether	accounted	 for	38%	of	 to	 the	 total	
humanitarian	 expenditure	 by	 INGOs	 in	 2010	 (Taylor	 et	 al.	 2012,	 28–29).	 The	 relief	
ambitions	of	 Save	 the	Children	 International	 (SCI)	 in	 conflict	 settings	 can	be	 traced	
back	to	its	origin;	it	was	founded	in	1919	to	provide	food	for	child	victims	of	the	post-
war	blockades	in	Austria	and	Germany.	SCI	has	a	dual	mandate	and	in	2012	through	
its	 claims	 and	 budget	 allocations,	 the	 organisation	 prioritised	 its	 role	 during	
humanitarian	emergencies21	(Save	the	Children	International	2012b).	“Humanitarian	
programmes”22	 (Save	 the	 Children	 and	 Mariam	 Jamal	 2012,	 17)	 represented	 the	
biggest	 share	 (32%)	 of	 SCI	 expenditures	 by	 programme	 area	 in	 2011	 (next	 to	
education,	health	and	nutrition,	 child	protection,	 child	poverty	 and	 livelihoods,	HIV	
and	 AIDs,	 and	 child	 rights	 governance).	 SCI	 is	 an	 INGO	 that	 is	 additionally	 actively	
involved	 in	 supporting	 the	 structuring	 of	 the	 humanitarian	 sector.	 Historically,	
Eglantyne	Jebb,	one	of	the	founders	of	the	organisation,	was	involved	in	the	drafting	
of	 the	Declaration	of	 the	Rights	of	 the	Child	 for	the	United	Nations.	Additionally,	 in	
more	 recent	 years	 the	 organisation	 has	 been	 co-chairing,	 together	 with	 United	
Nations	 Children’s	 Fund	 (UNICEF),	 the	 education	 cluster	 at	 the	 international	 and	
sometimes	 at	 the	 national	 levels.	Médecins	 Sans	 Frontières	 (MSF),	 in	 contrast,	 has	
attempted	 for	 the	 past	 decade	 or	 so	 to	 distance	 itself	 from	 UN-led	 coordination	
mechanisms,	 especially	 in	 certain	 countries	 not	 participating	 in	 the	 coordination	
forums,	 driven	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 organisation	 relies	 almost	 entirely	 on	 private	
funding23.	MSF	adopted	progressively24	what	some	within	the	organisation	called	an	
“isolationist	position”	(Brauman	and	Neuman	2014,	12).	The	organisation	grew	out	of	
the	involvement	of	a	few	doctors	in	the	Biafra	war	in	Nigeria	at	the	end	of	the	1960s	
																																																						
20	It	used	to	be	called	‘Save	the	Children	Alliance’	until	2012.	
21	The	word	“humanitarian”	is	used	in	internal	documents	to	speak	about	what	is	related	to	relief.	
22	 Humanitarian	 programmes	 are	 not	 those	 that	 reached	 the	 biggest	 number	 of	 children,	 as	 SCI	
supported	 9	 million	 of	 them	 with	 critical	 emergency	 relief	 and	 recovery	 as	 well	 as	 preparedness	
training,	while	 it	 reached	39	million	children	with	HIV/AIDs	prevention	and	care	programmes	(which	
included	a	mass	media	campaign	reaching	25	million	children	in	Bangladesh)	(Save	the	Children	2013,	
3).	As	a	matter	of	fact	humanitarian	programmes	have	a	higher	cost	per	beneficiary.	
23	 In	 2002	 the	 “public	 institutional”	 income	 of	 MSF	 international	 (i.e.	 coming	 from	 state	 donors)	
amounted	to	19.2%	of	its	total	income	of	€365.7	million	(MSF	2003,	78);in	2012	it	was	11%	of	€937.7	
million	(MSF	2013,	98).	
24	Braumand	and	Neuman	(2014)	clearly	showed	that	MSF	had	had	different	positions	towards	other	
aid	actors	in	the	past.	
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(Taithe	2004;	Vallaeys	2004;	Davey	2014)	and	continued	over	time	to	be	involved	in	
all	 the	 major	 conflict	 settings	 around	 the	 world.	 Solidarités	 has	 an	 intermediate	
position:	according	to	its	founder,	the	organisation	has,	on	the	one	hand,	a	historical	
affiliation	with	the	“sans-frontiériste”	movement	(Davey	2014),25	and	as	such	aspires	
to	preserve	its	independence	from	states	in	particular.	On	the	other	hand,	the	INGO	
has	 always	 depended	 upon	 state	 donors’	 funding:	 88.2%26	 of	 the	 2012	 Solidarités	
budget	 came	 from	 institutional	 donors	 (Solidarités	 2012a,	 28).	 Therefore	when	 the	
major	 donors	 supported	 the	 ‘humanitarian	 reform’,	 they	 expected	 their	 ‘partners’	
(meaning	 the	 NGOs	 they	 funded)	 to	 participate	 in	 this	 new	 form	 of	 cooperation.	
Solidarités	 is	an	example	of	an	organisation	that	navigates	 the	 international	UN-led	
cooperation	 bureaucracy,	 participating	 in	 coordination	 forums,	 being	 funded	 by	
states,	 but	 not	 actively	 involved	 in	 the	 structuring	 of	 the	 relationships	 among	
humanitarian	actors.	
In	 2011,	when	 I	 started	 fieldwork,	 these	 three	 organisations	were	 (and	 had	
been	for	several	years,	even	if	sometimes	in	a	discontinuous	manner)	providing	relief	
to	 Pakistani	 people	 fleeing	 conflict	 or	 to	 victims	 of	 natural	 disasters.	 North	 West	
Pakistan	had	been	affected	by	conflict	since	2004,	and	Pakistan	saw	the	international	
aid	apparatus	deploy	following	a	massive	earthquake	in	2005.	By	2010,	the	attitude	of	
the	 Pakistani	 authorities	 towards	 international	 relief	 actors	 tended	 to	 be	
representative	of	what	was	described	more	generally	as	a	“resurgence	of	sovereignty	
or	 the	growing	confidence	 in	more	and	more	governments	 that	 they	can	 resist	 the	
prescriptions	 and	 perceived	 intrusions	 of	Western-oriented	 institutions	 and	 states”	
(Kent	2011,	952).	This	“resurgence	of	sovereignty”	would	allegedly	be	associated	with	
an	 “overall	 decline	 in	 host	 government	 respect	 for	 humanitarian	 principles”	
(Stoddard	et	al.	2010,	44).		
Pakistan	 was	 the	 first	 country	 where	 the	 ‘cluster	 approach’	 was	 tested,	
beginning	in	2005	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Kashmir	earthquake.	It	is,	as	well,	a	country	
																																																						
25	 Solidarités	 International	 was	 born	 as	 Solidarité	 Afghanistan	 in	 1980.	 It	 organised	 “Caravan	 for	
Afghanistan”	providing	relief	to	Afghans	inside	Afghanistan,	crossing	the	Afghanistan-Pakistan	border	
illegally	in	the	footsteps	of	Médecins	Sans	Frontières,	hence	distancing	itself	from	Anglo-Saxon	NGOs	
providing	 relief	 to	Afghan	 refugees	 in	 the	 camps	 in	Pakistan.	 Solidarités	deployed	assistance	only	 in	
conflict	settings	up	until	the	2004	Asian	tsunami.	
26	 Grants	 amounted	 to	 83.3%	 and	 in-kind	 donations	 to	 4.9%	 of	 an	 annual	 budget	 of	 €56.9	million	
(Solidarités	2012a,	28).	
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where	donor	governments	and	UN	agencies	have	key	strategic	and	political	interests	
due	to	their	 involvement	 in	what	they	called	the	 ‘pacification	and	reconstruction	of	
Afghanistan’,	 the	 role	 of	 Pakistan	 in	 the	 Afghan	 conflict	 and	 concerns	 about	 the	
export	of	terrorism.	Therefore,	Pakistan	appeared	a	relevant	context	to	study	some	
of	major	political	constraints	weighting	on	humanitarian	triage.	My	study	examines	
the	 various	 practices	 of	 triage	 adopted	 by	 three	 humanitarian	 NGOs,	 each	 with	 a	
different	relationship	to	the	aid	system,	in	a	country	eager	to	affirm	its	sovereignty.	
Inside	the	field	
My	 research	 follows	 the	 methodological	 approach	 developed	 by	 the	 socio-
anthropology	 of	 development,	 following	 the	 thread	 of	 an	 ongoing	 project	 in	 its	
planned	 and	 field	 version	 through	 a	 seven-month	 ethnographic	 immersion	 in	 the	
daily	life	of	the	workers	of	three	NGOs	in	Pakistan	between	October	2011	and	August	
2012.	
A	critical	anthropology	of	development	approach	
The	 anthropology	 of	 humanitarianism	 has	 inherited	 the	 rich	 legacies	 of	 the	
anthropology	of	development	subfield	as	it	uses	the	same	methodological	approach.	
The	anthropology	of	development,	with	which	my	research	is	affiliated,	 is	anchored	
in	field	research	and	“based	on	extended	fieldwork	and	participant	observation	of	the	
social	and	symbolic	transactions	of	communities”	(Mosse	2006,	938).		
These	 “communities”	 can	 be	 groups	 of	 aid	 workers,	 as	 much	 as	 groups	 of	
people	 at	 the	 recipient	 end	 of	 development	 projects,	 and	 the	 interaction	 between	
these	two	types	of	groups	is	at	the	core	of	most	of	the	works	in	the	anthropology	of	
development.	The	approach	is	non	normative	and	operates	through	the	fine-grained	
study	of	the	practices	and	discourses	of	actors,	as	well	as	the	critical	analysis	of	what	
these	practices	and	discourses	produce	for	those	at	the	recipient	end	of	the	projects.	
The	analysis	is	qualitative	by	nature	and	often	mobilises	a	comparative	analysis.	It	is	
inductive	as	it	builds	up	knowledge	from	field	observations	and	analyses	rather	than	
a	deductive	approach	that	tests	or	 illustrates	theoretical	hypotheses	thanks	to	data	
collected	in	the	field.	As	Didier	Fassin	puts	it,	an	inductive	approach	allows	the	study:	
to	be	more	attentive	to	the	complexity	and	subtlety	of	local	
arrangements	of	the	social	 than	scrupulously	 faithful	 to	any	
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grand	 theory	 that	 would	 possibly	 account	 for	 it.	 (…)	 as	 if	
human	 action	 and	 social	 life	 resisted	 being	 defined	 by	 one	
theory	or	another.	(Fassin	2012,	8)	
My	 research	 aims	 at	 a	 critical	 distance	 and	 does	 not	 claim	 to	 serve	
humanitarian	action	as	a	primary	objective.	Critical	anthropology	of	development	(or	
of	humanitarian	action)	can	be	contrasted	with	development	anthropology,	which	is	
a	 branch	 of	 anthropology	 that	 is	 aimed	 at	 the	 service	 of	 development	 projects.	
Development	anthropologists	are	often	called	 in	as	experts	 in	order	 to	 support	 the	
implementation	of	a	development	project	(Crewe	and	Axelby	2012,	40–42).	They	act	
as	“cultural	brokers”	(Atlani-Duault	2009,	24),	either	in	identifying	why	people	do	not	
react	 to	 the	 project	 activities	 as	 originally	 planned	 or,	 for	 instance,	 in	 helping	 the	
development	 agency	 to	 better	 understand	 local	 cultures.	 I	 relied	 instead	 on	 an	
analysis	 of	 the	 practices	 and	 discourses	 of	 humanitarian	 actors	 (their	 behaviours),	
understanding	 their	 motives	 from	 their	 perspective,	 and	 analysing	 representations	
that	emerge	from	their	behaviour	(the	meaning	they	give	consciously	or	not	to	their	
own	behaviour).	Such	an	approach	draws	particular	attention	to	 interactions	among	
the	 various	 actors	 involved	 and	 the	 ideological	 premises	 of	 project	 designs	 (Atlani-
Duault	2007,	10–11).	
The	thread	of	an	ongoing	project	
Following	the	thread	of	an	ongoing	project	appeared	to	be	the	best	way	to	overcome	
the	 complexity	 of	 scales	 and	 scopes	 of	 transnational	 organisations’	 activities	 –	 and	
therefore	 interactions	and	 representations.	 Studying	humanitarian	 triage	 of	 INGOs,	
hence,	consisted	in	the	study	within	organisations	of	the	various	logics	leading	to	the	
inclusion	 and	 exclusion	 of	 people	 in	 the	 process	 of	 providing	 relief.	 Within	 each	
organisation	the	research	followed	one	project.27	The	project	 is	generally	presented	
as	coherent,	at	 least	 in	 its	planned	version.28	This	coherence	 is	however	challenged	
during	 implementation	 in	 several	 ways:	 first	 when	 the	 project	 as	 it	 was	 planned	
‘meets	 its	 public’	 or	 the	 target-population,	 and	 second	 when	 the	 various	 agendas	
																																																						
27	 Each	of	 the	 three	NGOs	 studied	has	 a	different	definition	of	 “project”	or	 the	unit	within	which	a	
group	of	activities	make	sense	in	relation	to	each	other,	as	chapters	4,	5	and	6	show.		
28	 J-P	Olivier	de	Sardan	uses	the	expression	“the	project	 ‘on	paper’”	(Olivier	de	Sardan	2005,	141)	 in	
opposition	 to	 the	 project	 in	 practice	 or	what	 I	 call	 the	 ‘field	 version’	 of	 the	 project;	 however	 some	
project	management	tools,	which	can	be	“paper”	elements	of	the	project,	contribute	to	unveiling	the	
complexity	of	the	‘field	version’	of	the	project	just	as	much	as	field	observations	and	interviews.	
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concealed	 in	policy	documents	emerge	as	partly	contradictory.	As	demonstrated	by	
David	Mosse,		
policy	 discourse	 generates	 mobilising	 metaphors	
(‘participation’,	‘partnership’,	‘governance’)	whose	vagueness,	
ambiguity	 and	 lack	 of	 conceptual	 precision	 is	 required	 to	
conceal	ideological	differences	so	as	to	allow	compromise	and	
the	enrolment	of	different	 interests,	to	distribute	agency	and	
to	 multiply	 the	 criteria	 of	 success	 within	 project	 systems.	
(Mosse	2005,	230)	
Behind	 these	 metaphors	 the	 technical	 agenda,	 the	 donor	 agenda,	 the	 expected	
conformity	of	the	project	with	recognised	standards	in	the	sector	(see,	for	example,	
The	Sphere	Project	2011)	or	the	agenda	of	the	organisation	of	the	project	frequently	
produce	tensions	once	the	implementation	starts	(Olivier	de	Sardan	2005,	140–141;	
Mosse	2005).	In	Thomas	Bierschenk’s	words:	
Project	 implementation	 does	 not	 mean	 carrying	 out	 an	
already-planned	 programme	 but	 is	 a	 constant	 process	 of	
negotiation	 (…)	 The	 groups	 involved	 compete	 with	 one	
another	for	the	economic,	political	or	even	symbolic	resources	
provided	by	 the	project.	This	usually	means	 that	projects	are	
neither	 complete	 failures	 nor	 completely	 successful	 in	 the	
light	of	the	original	goals.	The	success	of	the	project,	rather,	is	
selective	 due	 to	 the	 differing	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 strategic	
groups	 involved	 or	 affected	 can	 appropriate	 resources	
resulting	 from	 that	 project,	 which	 depends	 on	 their	 political	
pull.	 But	 while	 the	 project	 presents	 a	 common	 arena	 of	
negotiation	for	all	groups	involved,	they	act	according	to	their	
own	 interests,	 using	 very	 different	 frames	 of	 reference	 for	
social	 interaction,	 rationalisation	of	 action	and	 cultural	 views	
of	the	world.	(Bierschenk	1988,	146)	
The	implementation	phase	is	therefore	key	to	understanding	logics	of	humanitarian	
triage	 at	 work,	 which	 is	 why	 it	 is	 an	 ongoing	 project29	 that	 delineates	 the	
ethnographic	 field	 within	 each	 organisation.	 Following	 ongoing	 projects	 implies	
consideration	of	elements	of	the	planned	version	as	well	as	of	the	field	version	of	the	
project.		
																																																						
29	Even	though	the	average	relief	project	lasts	from	between	a	few	weeks	to	twelve	months,	it	would	
have	been	impossible	to	manage	to	organise	fieldwork	so	that	the	projects	studied	ran	consecutively	
with	each	taking	a	maximum	of	four	months.	Therefore	it	would	have	been	practically	impossible	to	do	
three	ethnographies	of	entire	projects	(from	planning	to	end	of	the	implementation)	within	a	year	of	
fieldwork.	
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Each	INGO	had	several	ongoing	projects,	and	the	choice	about	which	project	
to	follow	was	made	according	to	their	stage	of	implementation:	I	chose	projects	that	
were	not	too	early	in	their	implementation	phase	and	not	too	close	to	the	end	so	that	
I	could	observe	ongoing	activities.	Two	projects	(the	MSF	and	SCI	ones)	were	related	
to	the	conflict	in	the	north	west	of	Pakistan	(see	chapter	4),	and	one	(Solidarités)	to	
the	 2011	 floods	 in	 North	 Sindh.	 All	 three	 were	 considered	 by	 the	 INGOs’	 top	
management	as	typical	of	their	positioning	in	Pakistan.	
Ethnographic	immersion	
Overall	this	research	is	based	on	close	to	eight	months	of	fieldwork,	and	most	of	the	
material	 was	 collected	 over	 seven	 months	 of	 intensive	 ethnographic	 investigation	
done	between	October	2011	and	August	2012,	as	the	following	figure	shows.30	
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My	fieldwork	was	multi-sited	(Marcus	1995),	not	only	because	it	was	situated	
within	 three	organisations	but	also	because	 it	 followed	 ‘the	 story’	of	a	project,	 the	
people	and	the	processes	related	to	that	project.	Spending	time	within	each	NGO,	as	
well	as	navigating	each	of	the	projects,	allowed	me	to	map	out	the	various	“groups	
involved”,	 and	 to	 explore	 their	 own	 “frames	 of	 reference	 for	 social	 interaction”	
(Bierschenk	 1988,	 146).	 I	 collected	 many	 elements	 of	 the	 planned	 version	 of	 the	
																																																						
30	 The	 first	 independent	 trip	 was	 dedicated	 to	 an	 overall	 analysis	 of	 the	 humanitarian	 sector	 in	
Pakistan	 since	 the	2005	earthquake	and	 relied	mainly	on	 interviews.	 These	preliminary	data	helped	
frame	the	initial	research	project,	build	local	contacts	and	prepare	for	the	ethnographic	work.	
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projects	 (mostly	electronic	documents,	but	some	paper)	 including,	 in	particular,	 the	
central	document,	sometimes	called	the	project	proposal,	sometimes	the	operational	
strategy,	 which	 detailed	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 project,	 the	 means	 invested	 to	 reach	
expected	results	and	the	 indicators	 that	could	be	used	to	 follow	up	progress	 in	 the	
implementation.	 Some	 interviews	 done	 with	 people	 outside	 of	 the	 organisation	
(donors	funding	the	project,	for	instance),	or	with	people	who	had	contributed	to	the	
design	 of	 the	 project	 but	 had	 not	 been	 updated	 on	 the	 ongoing	 implementation	
phase	contributed	to	illuminate	the	planned	version	of	the	project:	they	told	the	story	
of	how	the	project	proposal	was	negotiated	among	the	various	stakeholders	(experts,	
managers,	 donors,	 authorities,	 etc.).	 As	 each	 INGO	 has	 its	 own	 internal	 processes,	
documents	 related	 to	 the	 planned	 version	 of	 each	 project	 are	 presented	 in	 the	
chapters	dealing	specifically	with	the	analysis	of	each	case	study	 (chapters	5,	6	and	
7).	
The	 field	 versions	 of	 the	 projects	 could	 be	 analysed	 thanks	 to	 material	
gathered	while	immersed	with	teams	in	Islamabad	and	in	the	locations	where	project	
activities	 were	 implemented.	 Practically,	 I	 spent	 time	 on	 project	 sites	 with	 people	
implementing	project	activities	and	in	the	field	offices	when	possible	(in	Mehar	and	
Nawabshah	 in	 Sindh	 with	 Solidarités,	 and	 in	 Peshawara,	 Dargai	 and	 Timergara	 in	
Khyber	Pakhtunkwa	with	MSF	OCB),	in	the	coordination	offices	of	the	three	INGOs	in	
Islamabad,	and	at	the	head	offices	in	Europe	when	relevant.31	Overall,	I	spent	five	to	
eight	weeks	with	each	organisation	in	Pakistan	during	which,	whether	in	Islamabad	or	
in	 the	 field,	 I	 could	 live	and	work	at	 the	same	pace	as	 the	 INGO’s	 staff,	 share	 their	
daily	 life	 and	 professional	 routine,	 as	well	 as	more	 informal	moments,	 in	 order	 to	
understand	 their	 points	 of	 reference	 upon	 their	 work,	 the	 project,	 and	 what	
constituted	 priorities	 for	 them.	 I	 was	 accepted	 in	 most	 meetings,	 and	 even	
sometimes	 invited	 to	 join	 external	 meetings	 when	 those	 were	 related	 to	 the	
project.32	In	addition	to	these	thorough	observations	I	conducted	201	90-minute	(on	
																																																						
31	 Save	 the	 Children	 is	 very	 much	 decentralised;	 doing	 fieldwork	 at	 the	 head	 office	 appeared	
secondary.	Head	offices	in	the	US	and	the	UK	were	very	rarely	referred	to	by	interviewees	in	Pakistan	
and	most	decisions	seemed	to	be	made	in	Islamabad	and	some	upon	approval	of	the	regional	office	in	
Singapore.	Although	I	could	not	afford	to	go	to	Singapore,	I	carried	out	skype	interviews	with	people	
from	the	office	there.	
32	I	also	attended	some	more	general	meetings	in	order	to	observe	whether	and	how	elements	of	the	
project	were	mentioned.	
	 34	
average)	interviews,	169	of	them	in	Pakistan.	All	interviewees	were	formally	asked	for	
their	 agreement	 to	 be	 interviewed	 and	 the	 majority	 were	 recorded	 (again,	 with	
permission).	 Prior	 to	 meeting,	 all	 interviewees	 were	 given	 a	 two-page	 document	
presenting	my	research	purpose,	questions,	and	methodology.	I	interviewed	58	MSF	
staff,	 50	 Solidarités	 staff,	 and	 43	 SCI	 staff,	 selected	 and	 contacted	 via	 each	
organisation’s	 staff	 contact	 lists	 which	 I	 had	 been	 given.	 The	 rest	 were	 interviews	
with	 other	 actors	 in	 the	 humanitarian	 sector	 in	 Pakistan	 (donors,	 Pakistani	
authorities,	UN	agencies,	and	other	NGOs;	see	appendices	1,	2,	3	and	4	for	the	list	of	
interviews).	 Some	 interviewees	 had	 been	 previously	 known	 to	 me,	 some	 I	 was	
introduced	 to	 by	 other	 interviewees	 and	 some	 were	 chosen	 because	 they	 were	
publicly	listed	as	contacts	in	relevant	organisations,	for	example	on	the	Pakistan	page	
of	 the	 Humanitarian	 Response	 website.	 Within	 the	 three	 organisations	 the	 work	
language	was	English:	meetings	were	 in	English	and	 the	majority	of	 the	staff	 spoke	
English	(with	the	exception	of	a	few	watchmen	and	construction	work	supervisors).	I	
did	most	of	the	interviews	in	English	and,	as	I	speak	French,	some	in	French	when	it	
was	 easier	 for	 the	 interviewee	 (within	 Solidarités	 and	 MSF).	 When	 I	 interviewed	
Pakistani	non-English	speakers,	some	INGO	staff	speaking	the	language	of	the	person	
I	 interviewed	 kindly	 acted	 as	 a	 translator	 for	 me.	 Since	 a	 major	 element	 of	 this	
research	 is	 about	 unpacking	 internal	 organisational	 dynamics,	 I	 was	 particularly	
cautious	 about	 not	 doing	 any	 harm	 to	 the	 people	 interviewed	 and	 to	 the	
organisations	themselves.	For	the	first	issue,	people	were	always	cited	on	the	basis	of	
anonymity	 at	 all	 levels	 in	 the	 dissertation,	 situating	 them	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 clarity,	
however	only	with	elements	 keeping	 them	 in	a	 group	of	 several	people.	 The	 three	
INGOs’	 names	 were	 not	 changed	 as	 they	 did	 not	 request	 it,	 and	 there	 was	 some	
information	that	I	withheld	from	the	dissertation	on	the	grounds	of	confidentiality	or	
to	protect	the	informant.	
Following	 the	 project	 story	 made	 me	 interview	 people	 with	 different	
responsibilities	 from	 all	 departments	 (logistics,	 finance	 and	 accounting,	 security	
management,	programmes,	etc.),	and	from	all	hierarchical	levels	from	the	watchman	
to	the	country	director	in	Pakistan,	and	up	to	the	executive	director	at	the	head	office	
when	relevant.	A	 list	of	 the	key	questions	 I	wanted	to	cover	guided	the	 interviews.	
However	 they	 happened	 as	 discussions	 and	 I	 also	 adapted	 to	 what	 people	 were	
	 35	
telling	me.	I	was	interested	in	people’s	daily	activities,	as	well	as	their	knowledge	and	
opinion	of	their	organisation,	but	people	could	speak	about	these	in	many	different	
ways.	I	favoured	the	recent	life	story	style,	as	I	felt	it	was	easier	for	people	to	share	
their	experience	as	a	story	rather	than	answering	a	long	list	of	questions.	To	put	the	
rest	of	the	interview	in	perspective,	I	started	with	a	question	about	their	professional	
path	 before	 joining	 the	 NGO;	 then	 I	 asked	 them	 to	 tell	 me	 the	 story	 of	 their	
professional	 path	 since	 they	 had	 joined	 the	 organisation.	 This	was	 the	 core	 of	 the	
interview	and	what	they	chose	to	tell	me	spontaneously	was	also	subject	to	analysis.	
Depending	on	how	detailed	their	story	was,	I	asked	them	questions	about	their	daily	
activities,	their	work	routines	and	relationships	(internally	and	externally),	as	well	as	
the	tools	they	used.	I	asked	them	to	show	me	their	tools	(mostly	Excel	spreadsheets	
for	their	activities,	indicators	or	budget	follow-up),	which	sometimes	led	to	awkward	
situations	 of	 people	 not	 finding,	 in	 their	 own	 computer	 folders,	 files	 they	 had	 just	
described	as	 their	daily	 tools.	 It	was	 the	occasion	 for	 them	 to	 clarify	 that	 they	had	
told	me	about	how	they	should	in	theory	use	these	tools,	but	were	in	fact	using	only	
some	 of	 them.	 It	was	 a	way	 to	 verify	 the	 difference	 between	what	 they	 said	 they	
were	doing	and	what	they	did	in	practice.		
I	systematically	added	a	question	about	which	activity	took	most	of	their	time.	
Their	 answers	 sometimes	 surprised	 me	 and	 balanced	 back	 my	 bias	 as	 an	 ex-aid	
worker	 who	 used	 to	 do	 things	 in	 a	 certain	 way,	 prioritising	 certain	 activities	 over	
others.	 Sometimes	 people	 mentioned	 what	 they	 thought	 should	 have	 been	
prioritised	 but	 could	 not	 be	 for	 some	 reasons;	 they	 then	 explained	 to	 me	 the	
difference	between	the	ideal	and	the	real	prioritisation.	This	allowed	them	to	depart	
from	 their	 official	 job	 description.	 It	 happened	 frequently	 that	what	was	 lower	 on	
people’s	own	priority	list	should	have	been	prioritised	more	highly	according	to	their	
job	 description.	 These	 contradictions	 between	 how	 things	 should	 have	 been	
according	to	the	internal	bureaucracy,	and	how	they	actually	were	helped	me	identify	
certain	key	logics.		
The	second	part	of	the	interview	revolved	around	the	knowledge	and	opinion	
of	 the	 people	 of	 their	 organisation.	 My	 questions	 within	 the	 three	 INGOs	 were	
virtually	the	same	regardless	of	the	hierarchical	levels	and	the	departments,	and	did	
not	 revolve	 around	 ‘impartiality’	 as	 such	 –	 even	 though	 many	 mentioned	 the	
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principle	 spontaneously.	 Neither	 was	 I	 mentioning	 the	 word	 ‘triage’	 that	 is	 not	
familiar	 to	 nonmedical	 humanitarian	 staff.	 Each	 of	 the	 interviews,	 piece	 of	
observation	 or	 documents	 gathered	was	 like	 a	 piece	 of	 a	 puzzle	 that	 I	would	 then	
have	to	assemble	in	order	to	reconstitute	the	logics	underlying	humanitarian	triage.	
From	field	to	desk	
Even	 though	 the	 emphasis	 is	 very	 often	 put	 on	 the	 fieldwork,	 ethnography,	 as	 its	
etymology	shows,	is	as	much	about	the	writing.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	anthropology	is	
nothing	 without	 the	 intellectual	 journey	 of	 writing	 up	 once	 away	 from	 the	 field:	
Mosse	 clearly	 describes	 the	 challenge	 as	 well	 as	 the	 necessity	 of	 creating	 and	
maintaining	 a	 “boundary	 between	 social	 life	 and	 ethnographic	 analysis	 (field	 and	
desk)”	 (Mosse	 2006,	 948),	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 find	 “the	 truth	 of	 an	 ethnographic	
account”	 (Mosse	 2006,	 949).	 This	 applies	 as	 a	 general	 rule	 in	 anthropology,	 yet	 it	
counts	 even	 more	 in	 the	 field	 of	 development	 or	 humanitarianism,	 in	 which	
institutions	 produce	 their	 own	 stories	 of	 the	 projects	 under	 the	 form	 of	 various	
reporting	or	project	evaluations.	This	section	clarifies	two	main	concepts	used	for	the	
analysis	of	field	data:	the	‘arena’,	and	the	‘logics’.	
This	 research	 does	 not	 particularly	 emphasise	 the	 economic	 dimension	 of	
projects	 (as	 is	 often	 done	 by	 actors	 themselves	 who	 focus	 on	 the	 budget	 and	 on	
financial	 constraints	 or	 benefits),	 or	 its	 performance	 (as	 it	 is	 often	done	by	project	
evaluators	 and	 requested	 by	 donors),	 and	 does	 not	 attempt	 to	 describe	 it	 as	 a	
coherent	whole.	 Instead	the	project	 that	delineated	fieldwork	can	be	considered	at	
the	 analysis	 stage	 as	 an	 arena	defined	 as	 a	 “social	 space”	 (Olivier	 de	 Sardan	2005,	
189)	within	which	a	variety	of	actors	interact,	forming	groups	with	common	interests	
that	 compete	 for	 influence,	 and	 negotiate	 some	 form	 of	 room	 for	 manoeuvre.	
Analysing	 the	 project	 as	 an	 arena	 helps	 reveal	 its	 political	 dimension.	 The	 kind	 of	
politics	 at	 play	 relies	 upon	 the	 tensions	 and	 power	 relations	 among	 the	 various	
actors,	 which	 consider	 the	 project	 as	 “a	 system	 of	 resources	 and	 opportunities”	
(Olivier	 de	 Sardan	 1995,	 173)	 which	 can	 be	 used	 in	 various	 ways.	 For	 Olivier	 de	
Sardan,	the	arena	is	defined	precisely	by	the	intertwining	of	two	types	of	power:	the	
power	of	anyone	in	their	relationships	to	others	that	emerges	in	collective	action	and	
the	power	“instituted”	that	is	concentrated	and	used	by	a	few	people	(the	power	of	a	
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few)33	(Olivier	de	Sardan	1995,	174).	Data	collected	in	the	field	were	analysed	thanks	
to	this	double	view	of	the	politics	of	a	development	(or	a	humanitarian)	project.	The	
contradictions	 that	 exist	 among	 actors,	 or	 between	what	 is	 said/written	 and	 done	
were	used	to	understand	the	social	complexity	 that	 is	at	stake	within	humanitarian	
projects,	 beyond	 the	 consensual	 façade	 provided	 by	 documents	 and	 institutional	
rhetoric	 (Olivier	de	Sardan	1995,	177).	Disagreements	or	conflict	between	actors	of	
the	 project	 arena	 can	 emerge	 because	 of	 their	 social	 or	 professional	 position,	 but	
also	 because	 of	 certain	 strategies	 they	 adopt	 (sometimes	 counterintuitive	when	 in	
relation	 only	 to	 their	 position)	 (Olivier	 de	 Sardan	 1995,	 176).	 The	 methodology	
analysed	 both	 (the	 position	 and	 the	 strategy)	 in	 order	 to	make	 sense	 of	 the	 social	
fabric	 of	 the	 projects.	 Studying	 complexity	 involves	 not	 only	 the	 challenge	 of	
understanding	it,	but	also	of	presenting	it	in	an	ordered	way.	
This	 is	 where	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘logics’	 was	 useful.	 The	 concept	 is	 here	 again	
borrowed	from	Olivier	de	Sardan,	who	defines	it	as	follows:	
‘Logics’	 will	 simply	 mean	 lines	 of	 coherence	 which	 the	
observer	 can	 deduce	 based	 on	 empirical	 observation	 of	 sets	
and	of	specific	differential	practice,	without	casting	judgment	
on	 any	 particular	 sociological	 theory	 of	 the	 subject,	 of	
rationality,	 or	 of	 ‘habitus’.	 (Olivier	 de	 Sardan	 2005,	 151	
footnote	1)	
The	 analysis	 situates	 actors’	 logics	 in	 their	 current	 context	 (“synchronic	
context”)	 as	 well	 as	 in	 their	 historical	 trajectory	 (“diachronic	 context”)	 (Olivier	 de	
Sardan	 2005,	 139)	 structuring	 at	 least	 part	 of	 these	 logics.	 The	 institutional	 and	
geopolitical	 context	 and	 trajectory	 are	 introduced	 in	 chapter	 4	 and	 referred	 to	 in	
each	of	the	three	ethnographic	accounts	that	constitute	the	core	chapters	(5,	6	and	
7)	 of	 the	 dissertation.	 The	 way	 the	 logics	 emerge	 in	 the	 analysis	 is	 through	 the	
recognition	in	the	field	material	(interviews	as	well	as	observation	notes)	of	 lines	of	
coherence,	sometimes	emerging	from	the	analysis	of	contradictions,	and	sometimes	
from	consensual	 views	of	people	 interviewed	on	certain	 things.	These	chapters	are	
structured	around	key	logics	underlying	the	humanitarian	triage	of	each	project.	The	
comparative	 ambition	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 three	 INGOs	 and	 maintained	
																																																						
33	Olivier	de	Sardan	gives	a	few	examples:	“gaining	access	to	a	position	of	power	with	the	help	of	one’s	
network	of	social	relations,	gaining	personal	wealth	because	of	this	position,	distributing	a	part	of	this	
wealth	to	enhance	one’s	network	of	‘contacts’”	(Olivier	de	Sardan	2005,	186).	
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through	a	symmetrical	analytical	methodology.34	Chapter	8	bridges	elements	of	 the	
three	ethnographic	accounts	together,	in	order	to	draw	more	general	conclusions.	
Dissertation	outline	
Chapter	 2	 situates	 impartiality	 in	 humanitarian	 discourses.	 It	 demonstrates	 the	
centrality	of	this	operational	principle	 in	the	humanitarian	rhetoric,	and	shows	how	
actors	 use	 the	 impartiality	 banner	 to	 differentiate	 themselves	 from	 other	
stakeholders	 in	 crisis	 settings:	 they	 rely	 on	 the	 special	 status	 that	 international	
humanitarian	 law,	 and	 voluntary	 norms	 and	 charters	 provide	 to	 impartial	
humanitarian	 actors	 in	 conflict	 settings.	 The	 chapter	 shows	 that	 the	 claim	 to	
impartiality	 is	 ubiquitous	 in	 the	 humanitarian	 sector:	 it	 can	 be	 found	 in	 internal	
organisational	 doctrine	 documents,	 in	 international	 norms	 and	 standards	 widely	
shared	and	used	by	humanitarian	actors	 from	NGOs	to	donors	and	UN	agencies,	as	
well	as	in	advocacy	documents.	And	yet	impartiality	is	never	debated	among	actors,	
not	 even	when	 the	Red	Cross	 published	 its	 own	 comments	 about	 the	principles	 of	
humanitarian	 action	 showing	 that	 there	 are	 many	 practical	 obstacles	 to	 the	 strict	
application	of	impartiality	in	the	delivery	of	assistance.	Instead,	most	actors	agree	on	
the	 fact	 that	 impartial	 assistance	 must	 rely	 on	 solid	 evidence,	 collected	 with	 the	
greatest	possible	rigour.	They	have	in	fact	a	positivist	perception	of	impartiality	that	
echoes	the	practice	of	medical	triage.	
Chapter	3	develops	the	parallel	established	between	impartiality	and	medical	
triage	 and	 argues	 that	 impartiality	 can	 be	 studied	 through	 the	 ethnography	 of	
humanitarian	 triage.	 The	 chapter	 first	 explores	 the	 social	 sciences	 literature	 that	
critiques	humanitarian	moral	claims,	and	shows	that	this	literature	mainly	remains	at	
the	surface	of	what	is	behind	the	claim	of	impartiality	in	practice.	The	second	section	
shows	that	borrowing	 from	the	social	 sciences	 literature	 focusing	on	medical	 triage	
enables	 us	 to	 extend	 the	 critique	 of	 impartiality	 through	 the	 ethnography	 of	
humanitarian	 triage.	 In	 the	 third	 section	 I	 describe	 how	 I	 structured	 such	 an	
ethnographic	study	in	Pakistan	over	the	2011	and	2012	period.	
																																																						
34	 According	 to	 Olivier	 de	 Sardan,	 “comparing	 localized	 sites	 (whether	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 residence,	
profession,	status,	religion,	or	institution),	within	the	production	of	data	itself	and	away	from	the	old	
monographs,	seems	on	the	contrary	to	be	still	 largely	underused	in	socio-anthropology	and	to	come	
under	the	future	of	the	discipline	rather	than	its	past”.	(My	translation)	
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Chapter	4	tells	the	story	of	the	‘humanitarian	configuration’	in	Pakistan	mostly	in	
the	 recent	 period	 (2005-2012)	 and	 introduces	 the	 various	 actors	 at	 play,	 their	
relationships,	as	well	as	their	own	macro	humanitarian	triage.	It	shows	first	how	the	
newly	formed	Pakistani	state	prioritised	military	and	nuclear	investments	over	social	
services	ones,	rendering	its	population	particularly	vulnerable	to	natural	hazards	and	
conflict	consequences.	Second,	 it	describes	the	recent	and	progressive	formation	of	
the	humanitarian	‘configuration’	in	Pakistan	as	internal	war	and	a	major	earthquake	
affected	the	country	at	the	beginning	of	the	century.	A	third	section	elaborates	upon	
the	 tensions	 that	 emerged	 and	 settled	 between	 international	 humanitarian	 actors	
and	Pakistani	authorities	 showing	a	 state	 that	has	 the	ability	 to	maintain	a	 form	of	
sovereignty	 over	 what	 happens	 on	 its	 soil,	 and	 humanitarian	 actors	 who	 adapt	 in	
order	 to	 create	 their	 own	 room	 for	 manoeuvre.	 The	 three	 INGOs’	 trajectories	 in	
Pakistan	are	situated	throughout	the	chapter	providing	key	elements	of	background	
for	 the	 following	 chapters	 dedicated	 to	 the	 ethnographic	 studies	 of	 one	 project	 of	
each	INGO	implemented	in	Pakistan	in	2011-2012.	
Chapter	5,	6	and	7	analyse	the	humanitarian	triage	of	the	three	projects	studied.	
Chapter	 5	 presents	 a	 study	 of	 a	 hospital	 project	 implemented	 by	 Médecins	 Sans	
Frontières	Operational	 Centre	Brussels	 (MSF	OCB)	 at	 the	border	with	 the	 Federally	
Administered	 Tribal	 Areas	 (FATA)	 not	 far	 from	 Afghanistan.	 The	 analysis	 of	 this	
project	shows	in	a	first	section	how	its	humanitarian	triage	was	strongly	influenced	by	
a	strategic	logic	of	treating	the	wounded	of	the	‘Global	War	on	Terror’	and	hence	be	
operationally	 active	 in	 areas	 as	 close	 as	 possible	 to	 the	 Afghan	 border	 and	 to	 the	
conflict	 going	 on	 in	 the	 FATA	between	 the	 Pakistani	military	 and	Pakistani	 Taliban.	
The	second	section	of	the	chapter	argues	that	the	energy	invested	by	MSF	staff	to	be	
different	from	other	aid	actors	somewhat	maintained	the	macro	triage	described	in	
the	 first	 section.	MSF	 attempted	 to	 shape	 its	 image	 as	 being	 different	 from	 other	
humanitarian	actors,	and	appeared	in	practice	different	for	other	reasons	than	those	
the	 organisation	 developed	 rhetorically:	 providing	 secondary	 health	 care	 free	 of	
charge	 in	 a	 District	 Headquarter	 hospital	 of	 north	 Khyber	 Pakhtunkhwa	 (KPK)	 was	
indeed	distinctive	and	consistent	with	the	strategic	objective.	The	third	section	delves	
into	 the	 micro-triage	 of	 the	 project	 showing	 that	 three	 groups	 of	 staff	 sharing	
different	interests	had	three	types	of	influences:	the	support	staff	reduced	significant	
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external	 administrative	 constraints	 paving	 the	 way	 for	 the	 political	 staff	 who	
promoted	 the	 above-described	 strategic	 logic	 through	 thorough	 negotiations	 of	
acceptable	work	conditions	in	areas	often	considered	by	other	aid	actors	as	off-limits	
for	westerners.	The	section	then	describes	how	the	last	group,	the	medical	staff,	had	
a	very	 important	 influence	on	humanitarian	triage	on	a	daily	basis	 (micro-triage)	as	
they	had	the	latitude	to	expand	clinical	practices	in	the	hospital	even	if	they	were	not	
for	war	wounded.	In	this	chapter	I	finally	argue	that	the	interpretation	MSF	made	of	
impartiality	 prioritised	 Pashtun	 population,	 opposed	 the	 cost-effective	 logic	 widely	
promoted	by	aid	actors	(as	chapter	6	and	7	show)	at	the	cost	however	of	a	populist	
leaning	towards	a	certain	interpretation	of	the	Pashtun	‘culture’.	
Chapter	6	elaborates	on	a	version	of	 impartiality	 that	was	underpinned	by	a	
humanitarian	triage	mainly	influenced	by	a	narrow	and	field-based	interpretation	of	
the	project	proposal.	Solidarités	implemented	a	project	in	the	Sindh	province	(in	the	
south	of	the	country),	whose	ambition	was	to	provide	access	to	water	and	sanitation	
infrastructures	to	some	130,000	people	affected	by	the	2010	floods.	The	study	of	the	
project,	halfway	through	its	implementation	period,	shows	how	the	assumptions	the	
Solidarités	staff	made	of	their	organisation’s	capabilities	delineated	the	boundaries	of	
a	project	 that	 then	excluded	other	geographical	 areas	of	 the	 country	and	excluded	
offering	other	types	of	assistance	to	people	affected	by	the	2010	floods.	This	macro-
triage	 instead	 of	 being	 acknowledged	 and	 questioned	 was	 in	 fact	 taken	 as	 the	
starting	 point	 of	 Solidarités	 managers’	 daily	 work	 and	 hence	 micro-triage.	
Additionally	 even	 though	 the	 proposal	 stated	 ‘the	 most	 vulnerable’	 should	 be	
prioritised,	 social	 inequalities	 were	 not	 at	 the	 level	 of	 micro	 triage	 considered	 as	
relevant	 selection	 criteria	 during	 implementation.	 The	 chapter	 shows	 how	 the	
rhetoric	of	‘emergency	response’	and	of	prioritising	‘the	most	vulnerable’	concealed	
practices	 that	mainly	emphasised	meeting	 ‘the	 target’	 (number	of	people	 stated	 in	
the	 proposal)	 and	 the	 technical	 quality	 that	 the	 Solidarités	 field	 managers	
misinterpreted	 as	 being	 expected	 by	 the	 donor	 and	 non	 negotiable.	 This	 chapter	
shows	how,	in	the	absence	of	an	institutional	interpretation	of	policy,	the	field	team	
maintained	 the	 implementation	 of	 activities	 simply	 because	 they	 were	 in	 the	
proposal,	 even	 though	 they	 could	 see	 some	 were	 irrelevant	 (or	 not	 a	 priority	 for	
flood-affected	people).	
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Chapter	7	describes	a	humanitarian	triage	mainly	determined	by	the	security	
management	 of	 the	 organisation	 and	 its	 willingness	 to	 assist	 as	 many	 people	 as	
possible	 (which	 in	 the	 humanitarian	 jargon	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘coverage’).	 Save	 the	
Children	 International’s	 project	 was	 a	 multi-sector	 response	 to	 the	 internal	
displacement	 of	 people	 from	 the	 Khyber	 Agency	 in	 the	 FATA	 in	 2012.	 After	 the	
description	 of	 important	 elements	 of	 background,	 the	 chapter	 demonstrates	 that	
security	 management	 mostly	 implemented	 in	 line	 with	 the	 Pakistani	 authorities’	
interpretation	of	the	political	situation	acted	in	fact	as	a	significant	excluding	factor.	
The	chapter	 then	describes	 that	a	second	triage	 logic	was	the	perception	that	child	
education	and	protection	was	an	emergency,	and	hence	a	priority,	regardless	of	what	
the	Khyber	 Internally	Displaced	Persons	said.	This	relied	on	a	de-contextualised	and	
apolitical	 view	 of	 education	 part	 of	 a	wider	 approach	 of	 a	 response	 segmented	 in	
sectors	 of	 activities:	 education,	 health	 care,	 food	 aid	 and	 cash	 distribution	 were	
activities	 implemented	 by	 different	 teams	 each	 following	 their	 own	 logic	 and	
differently	influencing	the	micro-triage	of	the	project.	Overall	they	all	contributed	to	
maximising	the	number	of	people	assisted	following	the	logic	of	‘efficiency’	perceived	
as	 positively	 loaded.	 The	 chapter	 demonstrates	 that	 such	 a	 politically	 blind	
humanitarian	triage	ended	up	almost	siding	with	the	Government	of	Pakistan,	which	
through	its	military	was	a	party	to	the	very	conflict	triggering	the	displacement.		
In	conclusion	chapter	8	argues	 that	MSF,	Solidarités	and	SCI	displayed	 three	
different	interpretations	of	impartiality	through	three	versions	of	humanitarian	triage	
showing	that	a	universally	fair	version	of	impartiality	does	not	exist.	Yet	the	argument	
is	not	that	the	aid	practitioners’	claim	to	assist	people	‘on	the	basis	of	needs’	is	a	lie;	
it	 is	 a	 claim	 that	 can	 be	 interpreted	 in	 many	 different	 ways	 that	 are	 all	 but	 self-
evident.	 The	 chapter	 emphasises	 the	 complexity	 and	 intricacies	 of	 humanitarian	
triage	that	were	set	out	through	the	detailed	accounts	of	three	of	them,	and	argues	
that	 stepping	 back	 allows	 to	 identify	 six	 main	 factors	 that	 impact	 significantly	
humanitarian	 triage	and	 that	 could	apply	 to	any	kind	of	 international	humanitarian	
actor:	 first	 the	organisation’s	history;	 second	the	relationships	 the	organisation	and	
its	staff	have	to	other	actors	of	the	‘humanitarian	configuration’;	third	the	staff	daily	
practices	and	the	 influence	of	 ‘strategic	groups’	that	form	around	specific	 interests;	
fourth	the	ability	to	identify	and	challenge	the	invisible	rationing	often	regarded	as	a	
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de	facto	constraint;	fifth	the	influence	of	the	staff	normative	assumptions	on	what	is	
good	for	the	people	they	attempt	to	assist;	and	finally	the	position	taken	with	regard	
to	the	moral	 imperative	of	efficiency,	pervasive	 in	the	aid	sector.	References	to	the	
cases	 studied	 of	 this	 dissertation	 illustrate	 each	 one	 of	 these	 factors	 bringing	 the	
analysis	 together.	 A	 last	 section	 finally	 sketches	 out	 a	 future	 research	 agenda	 that	
would	tackle	related	 issues	not	covered	 in	this	research,	and	expresses	 implications	
of	this	research	for	humanitarian	practitioners.	
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Chapter	2	
The	practitioners’	rhetoric	of	impartiality	
Introduction	
The	 first	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 demonstrates	 that	 despite	 the	 principle	 of	
impartiality	 being	 so	 fundamental	 to	 humanitarian	 actors,	 they	 have	 never	
challenged	 its	meaning	or	 practical	 implications.	 Instead,	 actors	 have	 relied	heavily	
on	 its	 consensual	 definition	 of	 assisting	 people	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 needs	 only,	 a	
practice	 interpreted	by	practitioners	as	necessitating	norms	and	 rigour	 in	collecting	
evidence35	upon	which	choices	have	to	be	based.	The	first	part	of	this	section	starts	
with	a	historical	trajectory	of	the	use	of	the	principle	of	impartiality	by	humanitarian	
actors,	placing	the	Red	Cross	and	the	Geneva	Conventions	at	the	origins	of	its	use	as	
the	core	operational	humanitarian	principle.	The	second	part	employs	an	analysis	of	
the	discourse	of	 impartiality	 to	 show	that	 the	word	 is	used	widely,	and	 in	a	 largely	
consensual	manner	 by	 all	 types	 of	 humanitarian	 actors	 from	 non-governmental	 to	
governmental,	local	and	international.	The	third	part	demonstrates	that	in	spite	of	its	
wide	use,	the	principle	of	 impartiality	has	remained	unexamined	and	in	the	shadow	
of	 heated	 debates	 about	 other	 operational	 principles	 such	 as	 neutrality	 and	
independence.		
The	 second	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 surveys	 what	 impartiality	 entails	 for	 aid	
actors,	 beyond	 the	 stated	 commitment	 to	 non-discrimination	 and	 proportionality.	
Despite	 Jean	 Pictet’s	 work	 that	 shows	 that	 applying	 the	 principle	 of	 impartiality	
involves	many	practical	challenges	(Pictet	1979),	most	humanitarian	actors	describe	
the	 process	 of	 prioritising	 their	 beneficiaries	 as	 a	 value-free	 and	 technical	 process	
resulting	from	evidence-based	needs	assessment.	The	last	part	of	the	chapter	shows	
that	 this	 positivist	 perception	 of	 impartiality	 very	 much	 echoes	 the	 practice	 of	
medical	triage	and	supports	the	view	of	impartiality	as	a	form	of	humanitarian	triage.	
																																																						
35	 Defined	 as	 “information	 that	 helps	 to	 substantiate	 or	 prove/disprove	 the	 truth	 of	 a	 specific	
proposition”	(Knox	Clarke	and	Darcy	2014,	7).	
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The	rhetoric	of	impartiality:	ubiquitous	and	unexamined	
The	 reference	 to	 impartiality	 as	 a	 distinctive	 feature	 of	 humanitarian	 organisations	
can	be	traced	back	to	the	first	Geneva	Convention	(1949).	Since	then	impartiality	has	
appeared	 as	 a	 ubiquitous	 claim	 in	 contemporary	 humanitarian	 discourse,	 granting	
special	status	to	relief	organisations	according	to	international	humanitarian	law	and	
its	 commentators.	 It	 provides	 the	 Red	 Cross	 movement,	 NGOs,	 UN	 agencies	 and	
donors	with	a	 legal	and	moral	currency	to	ascertain	their	 legitimacy	and	autonomy.	
Yet,	 while	 the	 stated	 neutrality	 and	 independence	 of	 humanitarian	 actors	 have	
fuelled	heated	debates	among	practitioners	and	academics	since	the	end	of	the	Cold	
War,	 the	meaning	and	 implications	of	 the	principle	of	 impartiality	have	never	been	
critically	examined.	
At	the	origin	of	the	claim	for	impartiality:	the	Geneva	Conventions	
The	 definition	 of	 a	 ‘humanitarian	 organisation’	 as	 ‘impartial’	 emerged	 with	 the	
Geneva	 Conventions	 texts.	 The	 ICRC	 is	 cited	 in	 the	 Geneva	 Conventions	 (and	
additional	 protocols)	 as	 an	 “impartial	 humanitarian	 organisation”	 in	 charge	 of	
providing	 care	 to	 the	 victims	 of	 war	 (respectively	 wounded	 soldiers,	 shipwrecked,	
prisoners	 of	 war	 and	 civilians	 in	 Conventions	 I,	 II,	 III	 and	 IV).36	 While	 the	 ICRC	 is	
mentioned	as	an	example	of	a	humanitarian	organisation,	any	other	organisation	that	
would	be	“impartial”	could	legally	claim	the	same	status	as	the	ICRC	as	reinforced	by	
the	 phrasing	 “International	 Committee	 of	 the	 Red	 Cross	 or	 any	 other	 impartial	
humanitarian	organization”	 found	 in	 all	 four	 1949	Geneva	Conventions.	 The	 fourth	
Geneva	Convention,	 for	example,	 in	 relation	to	 the	protection	of	civilian	persons	 in	
time	of	war,	states:	
…	 the	 International	 Committee	 of	 the	 Red	 Cross	 or	 any	 other	
impartial	 humanitarian	 organization	 may,	 subject	 to	 the	
consent	of	the	Parties	to	the	conflict	concerned,	undertake	for	
the	 protection	 of	 civilian	 persons	 and	 for	 their	 relief.	 (Fourth	
Geneva	Convention	1949,	172)	
In	 the	 context	 of	 international	 humanitarian	 law,	 it	 is	 the	 word	 “impartial”	 that	
defines	the	humanitarian	relief	action	(Bouchet-Saulnier	2014,	218).	As	explained	by	
																																																						
36	For	example	in	Convention	I:	“The	wounded	and	sick	shall	be	collected	and	cared	for.	An	impartial	
humanitarian	body,	such	as	the	International	Committee	of	the	Red	Cross,	may	offer	its	services	to	the	
Parties	to	the	conflict”	(First	Geneva	Convention	1949,	37).		
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the	 commentary	 of	 the	 Conventions,	 “[t]he	 International	 Committee	 is	mentioned	
both	on	account	of	its	own	special	qualifications	and	as	an	example	of	a	humanitarian	
organization	whose	impartiality	is	assured”.	
“Impartial	 humanitarian	 organizations”,	 such	 as	 the	 ICRC,	 are	 recognized	 by	
international	humanitarian	law	as	having	certain	rights	in	conflict	settings	such	as	the	
ability	to	implement	humanitarian	activities	aimed	at	the	relief	of	victims	of	war	and	
their	protection	(First	Geneva	Convention	1949,	38),	also	referred	to	as	the	“right	of	
humanitarian	 initiative”	 (Bouchet-Saulnier	 2014,	 220).37	 This	 implies,	 according	 to	
Françoise	Boucher-Saulnier,	chief	legal	advisor	of	Médecins	Sans	Frontières	in	France	
and	the	author	of	a	practical	guide	to	humanitarian	law	that:	
Every	impartial	humanitarian	organisation	is	entitled	to:	
- free	access	to	victims	in	situations	of	conflict,	especially	to	the	
wounded	and	sick;	
- the	 right	 to	 freely	 evaluate	 the	 humanitarian	 needs	 of	 the	
victims;	
- the	 right	 to	 undertake	 relief	 actions	 when	 the	 civilian	
population	 is	 suffering	 undue	 hardship	 owing	 to	 a	 lack	 of	
supplies	essential	to	its	survival;	
- the	duty	to	monitor	that	such	assistance	is	supplied	without	any	
discrimination,	 except	 for	 that	 based	 on	 need,	 and	 that	 it	
reaches	the	most	vulnerable;	
- the	 right	 to	 treat	 the	 sick	 at	 all	 times	 and	 in	 all	 places	 in	
conformity	 with	 the	 principles	 of	 medical	 ethics.	 (Bouchet-
Saulnier	2014,	220)	
Among	 the	 four	 principles	 usually	 uphold	 by	 humanitarian	 organisations	
(humanity,	 impartiality,	neutrality,	 independence),	 impartiality	 is	the	only	one	to	be	
applied	 to	 relief	 organisations	 in	 the	 1949	 Conventions.38	 Neutrality	 and	
independence	apply	to	states,	military	facilities	or	 individuals	 instead.	The	following	
expressions	 are	 used	 several	 times:	 “neutral	 powers”,	 “neutral	 country”,	 “neutral	
government”,	“neutral	territory”	in	all	four	Conventions,	and	“neutral	port”,	“neutral	
warships”,	“neutral	vessels”	and	“neutral	military	aircraft”	in	the	Second	Convention.	
“Neutral	observers”	(Second	Geneva	Convention	1949,	74)	and	“neutral	physician	or	
doctor”	 (Third	Geneva	Convention	 1949)	 are	 also	mentioned	 to	 respectively	qualify	
people	checking	that	international	humanitarian	law		is	being	respected,	and	doctors	
																																																						
37	 The	 right	 to	 access	 is	 guaranteed	 only	 where	 parties	 to	 the	 conflict	 are	 unable	 or	 unwilling	 to	
provide	such	support.	The	first	line	of	responsibility	is	to	the	conflict	actors.	
38	Humanity	appears	as	somehow	contained	in	the	adjective	“humanitarian”.	
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appointed	by	 the	 ICRC	 to	 form	mixed	medical	 commissions	 in	 charge	of	 examining	
prisoners	of	war.	According	to	the	Third	Geneva	Convention,	these	doctors	must	also	
“be	 entirely	 independent	 of	 the	 Parties	 to	 the	 conflict,	 which	 shall	 grant	 them	 all	
facilities	in	the	accomplishment	of	their	duties”	(Third	Geneva	Convention	1949,	152)	
[emphasis	added].	This	is	almost	the	only	mention	of	“independence”	in	international	
humanitarian	law	and	it	applies	again	to	individuals,	and	not	to	organisations.	
The	word	impartiality	was	used	as	early	as	March	1864	in	field	reports	of	the	
International	 Committee	 delegates	 (Bugnion	 2000,	 33).	 It	 qualified	 activities	 of	 the	
Red	Cross,	notably	its	duty	to	provide	equitable	relief	(Bugnion	2000,	69).	According	
to	François	Bugnion,39	author	of	a	legal	and	historical	account	of	the	ICRC	(and	one	of	
the	 main	 biographical	 works	 about	 the	 organisation40),	 humanity	 and	 impartiality	
were	“the	 foundation	of	 the	Red	Cross	activities”	 (Bugnion	2000,	178).	 Indeed,	 two	
years	 earlier,	 non-discrimination	 among	 the	 war	 wounded	 was	 one	 of	 the	 main	
reasons	Henry	Dunant	put	pen	 to	paper	as	he	believed	all	wounded	deserved	care	
regardless	 of	 their	 nationalities.	 The	 importance	 of	 not	 distinguishing	 between	 the	
wounded	on	the	basis	of	nationality	appears	several	times	in	A	Memory	of	Solferino	
(Dunant	 1986	 [1862]).	 Dunant	 repeatedly	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 “showing	
the	same	kindness	to	all	these	men	whose	origins	were	so	different,	and	all	of	whom	
were	foreigners	to	them”	(Dunant	1986,	72	[1862]);	he	praises	some	French	doctors	
for	not	differentiating	among	nationalities	when	treating	the	wounded,	and	criticises	
some	 Italian	 doctors	 who	 showed	 no	 compassion	 for	 the	 Austrian	 wounded	 and	
considered	 them	with	 little	 care	without	 the	 slightest	 feeling	of	 guilt.	 Recalling	 the	
Christian	roots	of	the	Red	Cross	values,	Dunant	reports	as	exemplary	the	testimony	of	
a	countess	who	allegedly	“gave	exactly	the	same	attention	to	the	Austrians	as	to	the	
Allies,	 and	made	 no	 difference	 between	 friends	 and	 enemies.	 ‘For’,	 she	 said,	 ‘Our	
Lord	 Jesus	 Christ	made	 no	 such	 distinctions	 between	men	 in	well	 doing’”	 (Dunant	
1986,	100	[1862]).	
In	 1965,	 after	 a	 century	 of	 experience,	 the	 National	 Red	 Cross	 and	 Red	
Crescent	Societies,	 the	 ICRC	and	the	 International	Federation	of	Red	Cross	and	Red	
																																																						
39	François	Bugnion	worked	for	the	ICRC	from	1970	to	2006	and	has	been	a	member	of	the	assembly	of	
the	ICRC	since	2010.	
40	For	another,	see	(Pictet	1985).	
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Crescent	 Societies,	 (together	 forming	 the	 ‘Red	 Cross	 Movement’),	 proclaimed	 the	
fundamental	 principles	 of	 the	 Red	 Cross	 during	 the	 XXth	 International	 Conference:	
“The	 Fundamental	 Principles	 are	 at	 once	 operational	 and	 aspirational.	 They	 serve	
both	as	a	guide	for	action	and	as	the	Movement’s	common	identity	and	purpose”.41	
Aimed	at	establishing	a	“guide	for	action”	and	a	“common	identity”	for	all	Red	Cross	
actors	whatever	their	background,	the	discourse	of	principles	appears	to	have	been	
stimulated	by	a	quest	for	unity	and	coherence	throughout	the	Red	Cross	movement.	
The	 proclamation	 emphasises	 humanity	 and	 impartiality.	 For	 the	 Red	 Cross	
Movement,	 an	 impartial	 organisation	 “makes	 no	 discrimination	 as	 to	 nationality,	
race,	 religious	 beliefs,	 class	 or	 political	 opinions.	 It	 endeavours	 only	 to	 relieve	
suffering,	giving	priority	 to	 the	most	urgent	cases	of	distress”.	 Five	other	operating	
principles	 were	 added:	 neutrality,	 independence,	 voluntary	 service,	 unity	 and	
universality.	 Impartiality	 is	 mentioned	 second	 after	 humanity,	 and	 precedes	
neutrality	 and	 independence,	 establishing	 a	 form	 of	 hierarchy	 among	 these	
principles.	 Jean	 Pictet,	 theorist	 and	 commentator	 on	 the	 Red	 Cross	 Movement	
doctrine,	 confirmed	 this	 hierarchy	 by	 explaining	 that	 both	 humanity42	 and	
impartiality	 were	 “substantive”	 principles	 whilst	 the	 others	 were	 “derivative”	
principles.	 For	 Pictet,	 “substantive”	 principles	 qualify	 the	objective	 of	 humanitarian	
action,	 they	 “stand	 above	 all	 contingencies	 and	 particular	 cases;	 they	 inspire	 the	
organization	and	determine	its	acts”	(Pictet	1979,	8),	whereas	“derivative”	principles	
qualify	the	ways	and	means,	which	will	“assure	the	Red	Cross	of	the	confidence	of	all	
parties”	(Pictet	1979,	31).	
Humanitarian	actors’	rhetoric	of	impartiality	
Other	organisations,	which	claim	to	be	“humanitarian”	–	be	they	NGO,	UN	agencies	
or	donor	agencies	–	 include	 impartiality	or	part	of	the	Red	Cross	definition	at	some	
stage	in	their	own	institutional	discourse.		
																																																						
41	http://www.ifrc.org/who-we-are/vision-and-mission/the-seven-fundamental-principles/		
42	For	more	details	on	the	origin	of	the	 idea	of	humanity	see	(Fiering	1976;	Senarclens	1999,	31–32;	
Barnett	2011,	49–56).	
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The	NGO	consensus	
The	 diversity	 of	 humanitarian	 NGOs	 has	 been	 described	 in	 various	 ways	 in	 the	
academic	literature,	mainly	in	the	form	of	typologies	differentiating	“classicists”	from	
“Solidarists”	 (Weiss	 1999)	 or	 European	 from	 American	 including	 a	 subdivision	 of	
religious,	 “Dunantists”,	 and	 “Wilsonians”	 (Stoddard	 2003),	 or	 again	 French	 versus	
Anglo-Saxon	 (Blanchet	 and	 Martin	 2006);	 or	 finally	 “principled”,	 “pragmatists”,	
“Solidarists”,	 and	 “faith	 based”	 (Donini	 et	 al.	 2008).	 Arguably,	 whatever	 their	
categorisation,	none	of	these	organisations	engaged	in	relief	would	deny	respecting	
the	 principle	 of	 impartiality.	 Most	 of	 them	 stand	 behind	 the	 main	 reference	 and	
normative	 documents	 of	 the	 humanitarian	 sector,	 which	 endorse	 and	 put	 forward	
impartiality	 and	 other	 humanitarian	 principles	 as	 aspirational	 and	 operational	
principles,	i.e.	the	Code	of	Conduct	for	The	International	Red	Cross	and	Red	Crescent	
Movement	and	NGOs	in	Disaster	Relief	(hereafter	called	the	‘Code	of	Conduct’)	and	
the	 Sphere	 Handbook.	 Furthermore,	 some	 NGOs	 include	 impartiality	 (among	 the	
three	other	main	principles)	 in	their	organisations’	mandates,43	while	others	do	not	
but	regularly	use	it	(often	next	to	the	principle	of	humanity)	in	their	self-narrative	and	
advocacy	campaigns.	
In	the	Code	of	Conduct,44	a	self-policing	document	developed	 in	1994	 in	the	
aftermath	 of	 the	 response	 to	 the	 victims	 of	 the	 genocide	 of	 Tutsis	 in	 Rwanda,	 the	
second	principle	 is	that	“[a]id	 is	given	regardless	of	the	race,	creed	or	nationality	of	
the	 recipients	 and	 without	 adverse	 distinction	 of	 any	 kind.	 Aid	 priorities	 are	
calculated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 need	 alone”.	 None	 of	 the	 four	 aforementioned	 main	
principles	were	named	as	 such	 in	 the	Code,	but	 their	definition	or	key	 implications	
were	 used	 instead	 as	 some	 actors	 “preferred	 less	 prescriptive	 terminology”	 (Peter	
Walker	cited	in	Hammond	2015,	94).	
Even	 though	 the	 Code	 of	 Conduct	 drafted	 by	 Red	 Cross	 members	 has	 a	
Christian	trajectory	(Dunant	1862),	it	is	viewed	by	aid	practitioners	as	consistent	with	
																																																						
43	 Unlike	 the	 ICRC	 or	 UN	 humanitarian	 agencies,	 NGOs	 are	 not	mandated	 by	 states.	 They	 are	 self-
mandated	and	define	their	own	raison	d’être	in	documents	variously	titled	mission	statement,	charter,	
constitution,	etc.	which	for	reasons	of	simplicity	I	will	refer	to	as	their	“mandate”.	
44	For	more	information	about	the	genesis	of	the	Code	of	Conduct,	as	well	as	its	legitimacy	ten	years	
later	see	(Walker	2005;	Hilhorst	2005).		
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Muslim	values,	in	particular	on	the	basis	of	the	principle	of	impartiality,	as	expressed	
by	the	Humanitarian	Forum:45	
The	1994	Red	Cross/NGO	Code	of	Conduct	was	formulated	in	
the	 spirit	 of	 neutrality	 and	 impartiality,	 taking	 into	 account	
Christian	and	Muslim	perspectives	amongst	others.		
	
Whilst	the	1994	Red	Cross/NGO	Code	is	an	impartial	and	non-
religious	document,	the	principle	of	aid	without	discrimination	
echoes	 the	 Islamic	 Five	 Fundamentals	 of	 Protection,	 which	
similarly	state	that	vulnerable	people	must	be	helped	without	
prejudice.46		
A	few	years	after	the	launch	of	the	Code	of	Conduct,	in	an	attempt	to	provide	
humanitarian	actors	with	technical	guidance	and	a	set	of	minimum	standards	in	the	
delivery	of	relief,	the	Sphere	Handbook	was	developed.	In	the	introductory	“charter”,	
impartiality	(sometimes	equated	to	“non-discrimination”)	is	by	far	the	principle	most	
often	 referred	 to:	 there	 are	 thirty-two	 occurrences	 of	 the	 words	 “impartial”	 or	
“impartiality”	against	 thirteen	of	“humanity”,	 two	of	“neutrality”	or	“non-partisan”,	
and	twenty-four	of	the	words	“independence”	or	“independent”	(The	Sphere	Project	
2011).	 The	 text	 of	 the	 Sphere	 Humanitarian	 Charter	 is	 also	 in	 line	 with	 the	
fundamental	principles	of	the	Red	Cross,	and	states	that:		
Assistance	 must	 be	 provided	 according	 to	 the	 principle	 of	
impartiality,	which	 requires	 that	 it	be	provided	 solely	on	 the	
basis	 of	 need	 and	 in	 proportion	 to	 need.	 This	 reflects	 the	
wider	principle	of	non-discrimination:	 that	no	one	 should	be	
discriminated	against	on	any	grounds	of	status,	including	age,	
gender,	 race,	 colour,	 ethnicity,	 sexual	 orientation,	 language,	
religion,	 disability,	 health	 status,	 political	 or	 other	 opinion,	
national	or	social	origin.	(The	Sphere	Project	2011,	22)	
The	Sphere	Handbook	has	become	a	common	reference	for	the	vast	majority	
of	 humanitarian	 actors.	 In	 addition,	 as	 of	 February	 2014,	 522	 organisations	 were	
signatories	 to	 the	 Code	 of	 Conduct	 including	 all	 of	 the	 biggest,	 building	 de	 facto	 a	
large	consensus,	at	least	rhetorically,	for	respect	for	the	principle	of	impartiality.	
																																																						
45	 The	 Humanitarian	 Forum	 defines	 itself	 as	 “a	 network	 of	 key	 humanitarian	 and	 development	
organisations	 from	 each	 of	 Muslim	 donor	 and	 recipient	 countries,	 the	 West	 and	 the	 multilateral	
system	 (…)	 [that	 creates]	 dialogue	 and	 understanding	 between	 humanitarian	 and	 development	
organizations	 from	 Muslim	 countries	 or	 denominations,	 and	 their	 Western	 and	 multilateral	
counterparts	 from	 the	 West	 and	 multi-lateral	 system”.	 -	 See	 more	 at:	
http://www.humanitarianforum.org/pages/en/about-us.html#sthash.mumhdQem.dpuf.		
46	Now	only	available	via	the	'waybackmachine'	site	at	https://archive.org/web/.	
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Among	 (and	 beyond)	 the	 Sphere	 signatories,	 one	 group	 of	 NGOs	 include	
humanity,	impartiality,	neutrality	and	independence	in	their	mandates	and	use	them	
in	 press	 statements	 or	 policy	 documents	 to	 assert	 their	 specific	 positioning	 as	
humanitarian	 organisations.	 MSF,	 for	 instance,	 commits	 itself	 in	 its	 charter	 to	
“offering	assistance	to	populations	in	distress,	(…)	without	discrimination”	as	well	as	
observing	“neutrality	and	impartiality	in	the	name	of	universal	medical	ethics”	(MSF	
1971).	 The	 details	 of	 the	 organisation’s	 operating	 principles	 are	 introduced	 by	 the	
following	sentence:	“MSF’s	actions	are	guided	by	medical	ethics	and	the	principles	of	
independence	 and	 impartiality”,	 putting	 an	 emphasis	 on	 impartiality	 and	
independence.	 While	 the	 reference	 to	 neutrality	 has	 fuelled	 heated	 controversies	
within	the	organisation	(Terry	2000),	impartiality	appears	as	a	consensual	principle.	In	
a	policy	document	defining	 the	common	 interpretation	of	 the	MSF	charter,	all	MSF	
sections	reaffirmed	in	1996	that	impartiality	was	a	“founding	principle”	(MSF	1996),	
adding:	
Impartiality	 is	defined	by	the	principles	of	non-discrimination	
and	proportionality	:	
-	non-discrimination	in	regards	to	politics,	race,	religion,	sex	or	
any	other	similar	criteria,	
-	 proportionality	 of	 assistance	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 degree	 of	
needs	-	those	 in	the	most	serious	and	 immediate	danger	will	
receive	priority.47	
MSF	is	not	the	only	non-governmental	organisation	that	refers	to	the	principle	
of	 impartiality	 in	 its	 mission	 statement.	 Solidarités	 included	 in	 Article	 Three	 of	 its	
Charter	 that:	 “Aid	 is	 provided	 impartially	 and	 always	 tailored	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 the	
threatened	 populations”	 (Solidarités	 1980).	 The	 idea	 of	 impartial	 or	 needs-tailored	
assistance	is	emphasised	in	the	organisational	values,	and	then	restated	on	occasions	
to	reaffirm	their	 intentions.	As	an	example,	Solidarités	was	one	of	the	sixteen	relief	
organisations	 that	 was	 forced	 by	 the	 Sudanese	 Government	 to	 close	 its	 offices	 in	
Sudan	in	March	2009	after	the	International	Criminal	Court	issued	an	arrest	warrant	
for	 President	 Omar	 el-Bashir	 on	 war	 crimes	 charges	 (IRIN	 2009).	 The	 implicit	
accusation	against	these	organisations	was	that	they	had	supplied	the	 International	
																																																						
47	Contradictory	definitions	of	“proportionality”	circulated	later	in	internal	policy	documents.	In	2006,	
an	 updated	 document	 complementing	 the	 Chantilly	 Principles	 stated	 that	 MSF’s	 priority	 was	 to	
“provide	medical	assistance	to	the	most	vulnerable	people	in	crisis”	and	“to	contribute	to	the	survival	
and	relief	of	as	many	people	as	possible”	(MSF	2006).	
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Criminal	 Court	 with	 information	 that	 compromised	 the	 Sudanese	 president.	
Solidarités	 denied	 the	 accusation	 in	 a	 press	 statement,	 reiterating	 that	 it	 “strongly	
emphasize[d]	 its	 principles,	 in	 particular	 the	 provision	 of	 impartial	 aid	 on	 the	 sole	
basis	 of	 the	 populations’	 humanitarian	 needs,	 whilst	 retaining	 full	 independence”	
(Solidarités	 2009).	 For	MSF	 or	 Solidarités	 International,	 principles	 are	 presented	 as	
constitutive	 of	 their	 raison	 d’être	 and	 apply	 regardless	 of	 the	 operational	 context.	
Impartiality	 is	 frequently	 emphasised	 as	 the	 fundamental	 operating	 principle	
differentiating	 them	 from	 other	 types	 of	 actors	 in	 conflict	 settings	 (Pictet	 1979;	
Brauman	and	Louarn	2011;	Daccord	2012).		
A	second	cluster	of	humanitarian	NGOs	tend	not	to	include	principles	in	their	
mandates	 or	 mission	 statements,	 but	 regularly	 use	 them	 in	 public	 statements	 or	
policy	 papers.	 The	 adherence	 of	 Save	 the	 Children	 International	 (SCI)	 to	 these	
principles	 is	 addressed	 at	 length	 in	 a	 report	 the	 organisation	 published	 about	 the	
state	 of	 the	 humanitarian	 apparatus	 and	 agenda	 in	 2010.	 The	 context	 of	 this	
publication	 was	 the	 growing	 concern	 of	 humanitarian	 actors	 that	 the	 western	
international	 military	 engagement	 in	 Iraq	 and	 Afghanistan	 was	 compromising	 the	
image	of	western	international	relief	actors:		
The	 international	 security	 agenda	 stemming	 from	 the	 ‘War	
on	Terror’,	with	the	associated	drive	for	increased	coherence	
of	 international	 policy,	 is	 blurring	 the	 lines	 between	
humanitarian	activity	and	other	political	or	military	activity.	
Non-humanitarian	 actors,	 including	 the	 military	 and	 the	
private	sector,	are	being	used	 to	deliver	aid,	while	 in	many	
places	both	governments	and	non-state	warring	parties	are	
attempting	 to	 exercise	 greater	 political	 control	 over	
humanitarian	work.	(Dempsey	and	Kyazze	2010,	vi)	
The	 recommendations	 that	 followed	 relied	 heavily	 on	 the	 assertion	 that	
humanitarian	 actors	 had	 to	 behave	 according	 to	 the	 humanitarian	 principles	 they	
claimed	and	that	states	had	to	refrain	from	using	humanitarian	principles	rhetoric	to	
describe	and	justify	their	political	and	military	agendas:	
The	humanitarian	system	must	 respond	to	challenges	 to	 its	
neutrality,	 impartiality	 and	 independence.	 In	 doing	 this	 it	
must	 maintain	 a	 strong	 emphasis	 on	 humanitarian	
principles.	 If	 not	 based	 on	 principles,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 describe	
aid	 delivery	 as	 humanitarian;	 instead	 it	 becomes	 simply	 an	
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extension	of	the	wider	political	or	military	agenda.	(Dempsey	
and	Kyazze	2010,	19)	
SCI48,	 attempting	 to	 clarify	 its	 working	 framework	 for	 humanitarian	
emergencies	in	an	internal	policy	paper,	defined	its	principles	establishing	a	hierarchy	
of	 primary,	 secondary,	 and	 tertiary	 principles.	 Humanity	 and	 impartiality	 were	
presented	as	the	two	primary	principles,	impartiality	being	defined	as:	
providing	humanitarian	assistance	in	proportion	to	need	and	
with	respect	to	urgency,	without	discrimination	based	upon	
gender,	 age,	 race,	 impairment,	 ethnicity	 and	nationality,	 or	
by	 political,	 religious,	 cultural	 or	 organizational	 affiliation.	
(Save	the	Children	International	2011,	16)	
The	 definition	 recalls	 that	 of	 the	 Red	 Cross	 (Pictet	 1979)	 and,	 as	 historian	 Emily	
Baughan	 noted,	 from	 its	 beginning	 the	 organisation	 claimed	 not	 to	 discriminate	
according	to	“nationality,	religion	and	the	political	views	of	[the	children’s]	parents”	
(Baughan	 2013,	 117),	 evidence	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 non-discrimination	 (implied	 in	 the	
principle	of	impartiality)	belongs	to	the	organisation’s	founding	values.	
A	 few	years	 ago,	 some	NGOs	 such	 as	 the	 International	 Rescue	Committee49	
(Stoddard	 2003,	 3),	 had	 used	 principles	 in	 general	 and	 impartiality	 in	 particular	 in	
public	discourses	justifying	their	desire	to	preserve	an	operational	space	free	from	US	
foreign	 policy	 interference.	 The	 year	 after	 the	 US	 Agency	 for	 International	
Development	(USAID)	 issued	a	report	entitled	“Foreign	Aid	 in	the	National	 Interest”	
(USAID	2002),	 and	while	NGOs	were	 receiving	 funds	 from	USAID	 at	 the	 same	 time	
that	 the	US	military	 deployed	 troops	 in	 Iraq	 and	Afghanistan,	 International	 Rescue	
Committee	Vice	President	George	Biddle	told	a	US	Congress	subcommittee	on	May,	
13th	2003	that,	“Humanitarian	assistance	must	be	provided	on	an	 impartial	basis	 to	
ensure	that	all	civilians	in	need	have	fair	and	equal	access	to	aid	(Biddle	2003),	going	
on	 to	 say	 that	 “establishing	a	 close	and	 trusting	 relationship	with	 the	 communities	
																																																						
48	SC’s	US	branch	used	to	be	classified	among	the	Wilsonians	and	the	UK	branch	among	the	Dunantists	
(Stoddard	2003,	3).	All	Save	the	Children	recently	merged	their	international	programmes	and	created	
Save	the	Children	International	which	does	not	include	principles	of	humanitarian	action	in	its	“about	
us”	section	of	its	website.	It	is	therefore	classified	among	the	pragmatic	NGOs.	
49	The	International	Rescue	Committee	was	created	in	1933,	the	 initiative	of	Albert	Einstein	to	assist	
Germans	suffering	under	Hitler,	and	refugees	from	Mussolini's	Italy	and	Franco's	Spain.	
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that	aid	agencies	serve	and	being	seen	and	known	to	be	impartial	and	independent	
of	the	military	are	the	only	way	to	work	effectively	in	a	post-conflict	setting”.50	
United	Nations	agencies	and	(state)	donors	join	the	fray	
United	Nations	humanitarian	agencies	like	the	UNICEF	or	the	World	Food	Programme	
(WFP)	 do	 not	 explicitly	 state	 principles	 of	 humanitarian	 action	 in	 their	 mission	
statement,	 but	 they	 do,	 however,	 benefit	 from	 the	 endorsement	 of	 four	 main	
principles	 by	 the	General	 Assembly	 of	 the	United	Nations	 through	 the	 adoption	 of	
two	resolutions.	Resolution	46/182	was	passed	 in	1991	and	entitled	“Strengthening	
of	the	coordination	of	humanitarian	emergency	assistance	of	the	United	Nations”.	It	
stated	 that	 “[h]umanitarian	 assistance	 must	 be	 provided	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	
principles	of	humanity,	neutrality	and	impartiality”	(United	Nations	General	Assembly	
1991),	 to	 which	 independence	 was	 added	 in	 2003	 through	 Resolution	 58/114.51	
Definitions	of	the	principles	are	not	given	in	the	resolutions,	however	the	UN	Office	
for	Coordination	of	Humanitarian	Assistance	(OCHA)	gave	definitions	fitting	the	Red	
Cross	ones:	
Humanitarian	 action	 must	 be	 carried	 out	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
need	 alone,	 giving	 priority	 to	 the	 most	 urgent	 cases	 of	
distress	 and	 making	 no	 distinctions	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
nationality,	 race,	 gender,	 religious	 belief,	 class	 or	 political	
opinions.	(OCHA	2010)	
A	few	years	after	the	humanitarian	NGOs	and	UN	agencies,	donor	agencies	in	
charge	of	managing	emergency	foreign	assistance	on	behalf	of	their	government	or	
intergovernmental	 institutions	 also	 endorsed	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 the	 principles	 of	
humanitarian	 action	 through	 the	 “Principles	 and	 Good	 Practice	 of	 Humanitarian	
Donorship”	initiative	(often	referred	to	as	the	Good	Humanitarian	Donorship	(GHD)),	
which	 resulted	 from	 a	 meeting	 held	 in	 2003	 in	 Stockholm.	 The	 GHD	 contained	 a	
definition	of	humanitarian	action	including	its	objective,	guiding	principles	(humanity,	
impartiality,	neutrality	and	independence),	and	operational	range	of	activities	(food,	
																																																						
50	 http://www.rescue.org/news/congressional-hearing-irc-outlines-security-and-coordination-needs-
iraq-and-afghanistan-3736.	
51	 Resolution	 58/114	 recognised	 that	 “independence,	 meaning	 the	 autonomy	 of	 humanitarian	
objectives	 from	 the	 political,	 economic,	 military	 or	 other	 objectives	 that	 any	 actor	 may	 hold	 with	
regard	 to	 areas	 where	 humanitarian	 action	 is	 being	 implemented,	 is	 also	 an	 important	 guiding	
principle	for	the	provision	of	humanitarian	assistance”	(United	Nations	General	Assembly	2003).	
	 54	
water	 and	 sanitation,	 shelter,	 health	 services,	 etc.).	 The	GHD	also	 included	 general	
operating	 principles	 as	 well	 as	 good	 practices	 in	 donor	 financing.	 Lastly	 it	 was	
associated	with	an	implementation	plan	forming	the	basis	of	a	monitoring	plan.	The	
main	 idea	was	 that	 this	 text	would	 serve	as	 “a	 common	platform	 (…)	 to	assist	 [the	
donors]	in	forming	their	responses	to	humanitarian	crises”	(GHD	2003,	2).		
The	GHD	was	 launched	 in	the	context	of	a	massive	 increase	 in	humanitarian	
funding.	 The	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development	 (OECD)	
emergency	 aid	 intended	 for	 the	 immediate	 relief	 of	 victims	 of	 wars	 and	 natural	
disasters	had	doubled	between	1990	and	2000	(Macrae	et	al.	2002,	3),	representing	
more	than	10%	of	OECD	Official	Development	Assistance	as	opposed	to	less	than	3%	
at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War.	 Johan	 Schaar,	 head	 of	 division	 for	 humanitarian	
assistance	 of	 the	 Swedish	 International	 Development	 Cooperation	 Agency,	 which	
convened	the	Stockholm	meeting,	situated	the	context	of	the	initiative	as	follows:	
At	the	turn	of	the	millennium,	my	colleagues	and	I	found	donor	
behaviour	 to	 be	 dysfunctional,	 irrational,	 and	 sometimes	
arrogant.	 Whether	 people	 who	 were	 living	 in	 desperate	
conditions	 because	 of	 conflict	 or	 natural	 calamities	 would	 be	
assisted	at	a	level	guaranteeing	some	dignity	seemed	to	depend	
on	 no	 real	 assessment	 of	 what	 threatened	 their	 safety	 and	
survival.	 (…)	 And	 although	 a	 balance	 of	 sustenance,	 services,	
and	protection	must	be	provided	to	ensure	a	dignified	life,	this	
was	far	from	the	rule.	(Schaar	2007,	37)	
From	another	perspective	a	report	published	the	year	before	the	GHD,	which	had	an	
important	influence	on	it	(Schaar	2007)	established	clearly	that,		
The	1990s	saw	an	erosion	of	the	high	degree	of	trust	that	had	
previously	existed	between	official	donors	and	their	operational	
humanitarian	 partners.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 donors	 grew	
increasingly	 sceptical	 of	 their	 partners’	 operational	
competence,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 achieving	 technical	 standards,	
and	 in	 terms	of	 their	 ability	 to	navigate	 safely	a	 very	 complex	
political	environment	in	the	field.	On	the	other,	many	agencies	
sensed	 that	 official	 donors	 were	 using	 their	 humanitarian	 aid	
for	political	purposes.	(Macrae	et	al.	2002,	64)	
By	the	time	the	Stockholm	meeting	was	organised,	some	of	the	donor	states	
involved	 had	 troops	 in	 Iraq	 and	 Afghanistan.	 In	 2001,	 while	 military	 doctrine	 was	
counting	on	“civil-military	cooperation”	and	on	relief	activities	to	win	the	“hearts	and	
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minds”	of	the	population	in	Afghanistan,	US	Secretary	of	Defense	Colin	Powell	called	
on	humanitarian	NGOs:	
More	 than	 ever,	 governments	 and	 intergovernmental	
organizations	 must	 work	 in	 partnership	 with	 NGOs	 if	
compelling	problems	are	to	be	effectively	addressed.	(…)	
	
And	I	want	you	to	know	that	I	have	made	it	clear	to	my	staff	
here	and	to	all	of	our	ambassadors	around	the	world	that	I	am	
serious	about	making	sure	we	have	the	best	relationship	with	
the	 NGOs	 who	 are	 such	 a	 force	 multiplier	 for	 us,	 such	 an	
important	 part	 of	 our	 combat	 team.	 (Secretary	 Colin	 Powell	
2001)	
According	 to	 Schaar,	 for	 humanitarian	 donors	 agencies	 “it	was	 necessary	 to	
make	 a	 clear	 statement	 about	 the	 civilian	 nature	 of	 humanitarian	 action”	 (Schaar	
2007,	40).	Rallying	“some	well	established	and	accepted	language”	(Schaar	2007,	39)	
and	adopting	the	rhetoric	of	principles	of	humanitarian	action	served	that	purpose.	
Impartiality	 was	 defined	 as	 “the	 implementation	 of	 actions	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 need,	
without	 discrimination	 between	 or	 within	 affected	 populations”	 (GHD	 2003),	 and	
translated	 for	 donors	 in	 the	 operational	 general	 principles	 as	 follows:	 “Allocate	
humanitarian	funding	in	proportion	to	needs	and	on	the	basis	of	needs	assessments”	
(GHD	2003).		
The	GHD	was	 a	 self-legitimising	 initiative	 for	 donors’	 bureaucracies	 through	
which	they	adopted	the	humanitarian	doctrine	already	established	for	other	actors	in	
the	Code	of	Conduct	and	the	Sphere	Charter.	A	little	more	than	ten	years	 later,	the	
GHD	had	grown	from	sixteen	countries	plus	 the	European	Commission	to	 forty-one	
members.52	 The	 initiative	 gave	 the	 donors	 the	 opportunity	 to	 use	 the	 principles’	
rhetoric	 in	 their	 policy	 documents	 (European	 Commission	 2007;	 UK	 Aid	 2012,	 6;	
Office	for	Foreign	Disaster	Assistance	2014,	1)	and	potentially	improve	their	domestic	
public	 image	 towards,	 as	 well	 as	 among,	 implementing	 partners.	 It	may	 also	 have	
improved	 the	 negotiating	 power	 of	 humanitarian	 branches	within	 international	 aid	
																																																						
52 Australia,	 Austria,	 Belgium,	 Brazil,	 Bulgaria,	 Canada,	 Croatia,	 Cyprus,	 Czech	 Republic,	 Denmark,	
Estonia,	 ECHO,	 Finland,	 France,	 Germany,	 Greece,	 Hungary,	 Iceland,	 Ireland,	 Italy,	 Japan,	 Latvia,	
Liechtenstein,	 Lithuania,	 Luxembourg,	 Malta,	 Mexico,	 Netherlands,	 New	 Zealand,	 Norway,	 Poland,	
Portugal,	Republic	of	Korea,	Romania,	Slovak	Republic,	Slovenia,	Spain,	Sweden,	Switzerland,	UK,	and	
USA.	
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governmental	agencies	with	regard	to	securing	a	fair	share	of	the	overall	aid	budget	
for	relief	assistance,	as	a	study	based	on	a	donors’	survey	seemed	to	indicate:	
Many	 [donors]	 report	 that	 it	 [the	 GHD]	 has	 helped	 them	
defend	 principled	 positions	 in	 the	 face	 of	 pressure	 from	
influential	 actors	 at	 home	 –	 “we	 signed	 up	 to	 this	
international	 agreement,	 now	 we	 must	 abide	 by	 its	
provisions”	 –	 allowing	 donors,	 for	 example,	 to	 move	 ahead	
with	 reducing	 funding	 earmarks,	 increasing	 flexibility	 in	
financing	 arrangements	 and	 refusing	 to	 cut	 funding	 to	
ongoing	 crises	 in	 favour	 of	 new,	 heavily	 mediatised	 events.	
(Scott	2014,	9)	
The	 reference	 to	 impartiality	 is	 thus	 central	 to	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	 the	
humanitarian	sector,	as	it	grants	humanitarian	actors	a	special	status	in	international	
humanitarian	 law.	 It	 is,	 as	 well,	 ubiquitous	 in	 the	 humanitarian	 discourse.	 For	
humanitarian	NGOs,	UN	agencies	and	donors,	the	rhetoric	of	impartiality	provides	a	
legal	and	moral	currency	to	defend	their	legitimacy	and	autonomy	in	the	face	of	the	
politics	 of	 States	 and	 non-State	 armed	 groups.	 However,	 unlike	 the	 principles	 of	
neutrality	 and	 independence,	 the	 meanings	 and	 implications	 of	 the	 principle	 of	
impartiality	have	rarely	been	debated	among	aid	practitioners	and	academics.	
An	unexamined	principle	
Debates	 about	 the	 principles	 of	 humanitarian	 action	 and	 the	 politics	 of	 assistance	
have	been	ongoing	since	they	were	originally	claimed	by	humanitarian	organisations.	
Yet	 the	 principle	 of	 impartiality	 has	 not	 fuelled	much	 controversy.	 This	 absence	 of	
dispute	stands	in	stark	contrast	with	the	heated	debates,	which,	since	the	end	of	the	
Cold	 War,	 have	 challenged	 humanitarian	 actors’	 claim	 to	 neutrality	 and	
independence.		
	 In	 a	 famous	 paper	 issued	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 the	 Rwandan	 genocide,	 the	
organisation	 African	 Rights	 severely	 criticised	what	 they	 called	 “neutralism”	 or	 the	
“obsession	 with	 neutrality”	 (de	 Waal	 and	 Omaar	 1994,	 28)	 of	 humanitarian	
organisations	 in	 “political	 emergencies”	 or	 war.53	 The	 paper	 accused	 humanitarian	
																																																						
53	I	am	not	arguing	that	debates	on	neutrality	started	in	the	1990s;	it	is	common	knowledge	that	the	
ICRC	was	 accused	 of	 passive	 complicity	with	 the	 crimes	 committed	 by	 the	Nazis	 during	 the	 Second	
World	War,	 as	 the	 organisation	 strictly	 adhered	 to	 its	 principle	 of	 neutrality	 and	 did	 not	 denounce	
publicly	the	crime	its	delegates	witnessed	in	the	concentration	and	extermination	camps,	playing	the	
card	of	silent	diplomacy	instead	(Favez,	Fletcher,	and	Fletcher	1999).	
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organisations	 of	 being	 “integrated	 into	 processes	 of	 violence	 and	 oppression”	 (de	
Waal	and	Omaar	1994,	3),	as	in	certain	countries	they	were	“witnesses	to	atrocities,	
but	chose	to	be	silent	witnesses”	(de	Waal	and	Omaar	1994,	3).	According	to	African	
Rights,	organisations	who	choose	to	remain	neutral	risk	the	possibility	of	prolonging	
war	as	they	provide	material	assistance,	strategic	protection	(keeping	logistics	routes	
open	 for	 relief	 delivery	 and	 hence	 also	 for	 war	 logistics)	 and	 legitimacy	 for	 the	
controlling	authority	(by	giving	them	credentials	they	may	not	deserve	and	fulfilling	
their	 responsibility	 of	 ensuring	 care	 services	 for	 their	 population)	 (de	 Waal	 and	
Omaar	1994,	4–5).		
African	Rights	defended	the	primacy	of	the	principle	of	‘solidarity’	as	based	on	
human	 rights,	 on	 “consultation	 with	 and	 accountability	 to	 the	 people	 with	 whom	
solidarity	 is	expressed;	shared	risk	and	suffering	with	the	people;	concrete	action	in	
support	 of	 the	 people	 and	 their	 cause	 (…)”	 (de	 Waal	 and	 Omaar	 1994,	 27).	 It	
exemplified	 this	 with	 “community-implemented	 relief	 programmes	 in	 Eritrea	 and	
Tigray”	or	the	“array	of	 international	organisations	that	assisted	 in	the	fight	against	
apartheid	 in	 South	 Africa”	 (de	Waal	 and	Omaar	 1994,	 27).	 In	 African	 Rights’	 view,	
ultimately,	 neutrality	 makes	 organisations	 act	 politically	 blindly	 in	 “political	
emergencies”,	 and	 exposes	 them	 to	 “manipulation	 by	 cynical	 politicians,	 in	 both	
‘donor’	 and	 ‘recipient’	 countries,	 who	 use	 the	 resources	 and	 moral	 platform	 to	
further	their	own	ends”	(de	Waal	and	Omaar	1994,	39).		
For	 Hugo	 Slim,	 instead,	 “solidarity	 can	 all	 too	 easily	 become	 solidarity	 with	
excessive	 and	 uncoordinated	 violence”	 (Hugo	 Slim	 1997,	 348),	 as	 it	 is	 a	 “principle	
which	 was	 right	 for	 those	 who	 backed	 long-established	 (and	 often	 non	 violent)	
resistance	 movements	 like	 the	 civil-rights	 movement	 in	 the	 USA	 or	 the	 liberation	
movements	in	South	Africa	and	Eastern	Europe	(…)	but	in	wars	like	those	in	Somalia,	
Liberia,	and	Sierra	Leone,	the	‘good’	sides	are	not	so	clearly	identifiable”	(Hugo	Slim	
1997,	348).	A	few	years	later,	Thomas	Weiss	made	the	case	that	the	environment	in	
which	humanitarian	actors	operate	changed	after	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	and	that	
the	 time	 of	 “classical”	 or	 “minimalist”	 humanitarianism,	 “abiding	 strictly	 by	
traditional	 principles”	 (Weiss	 1999,	 6)	 was	 over.	 He	 hypothesised	 that	 “placing	
humanitarian	activities	within	a	conflict	resolution	framework	could	ultimately	work	
in	 favour	 of	 humanitarian	 interests,	 to	 bring	 substantially	more	 benefits	 to	 victims	
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than	 myopic	 or	 misplaced	 humanitarianism”	 (Weiss	 1999,	 17).	 To	 support	 his	
argument,	he	described	initiatives	from	donor	states	 including	the	Dutch,	Canadian,	
British	and	Swedish	governments	who	had	 just	 reorganised	 to	 foster	programmatic	
connections	between	humanitarian	assistance	and	conflict	resolution.		
The	brutality	of	events	 in	Bosnia,	 Somalia,	Rwanda,	 Liberia,	Afghanistan	and	
Sierra	 Leone	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Cold	War	 had,	 in	Weiss’	 words,	 had	 “shaken	
humanitarians	 to	 the	 core”,	 and	 triggered	 in	 particular	 “a	 collective	 identity	 crisis	
among	aid	workers	 in	war	zones	as	well	as	among	those	who	analyse	such	efforts”	
(Weiss	 1999,	 1).	 Should	 humanitarian	 actors	 tackle	 the	 root	 causes	 of	 people’s	
suffering?	Or	should	they	stand	by	the	principle	of	neutrality	and	refuse	to	engage	in	
peace-building	 initiatives?	 This	 was	 also	 debated	 keenly	 among	 practitioners,	 and	
some	argued	that	if	humanitarian	actors	had	been	able	to	feed	war	(Keen	1994),	they	
should	 be	 able	 to	 feed	 peace	 (Anderson	 1999),	 paving	 the	way	 to	 what	 was	 then	
labelled	“new	humanitarianism”	(Macrae	2002),	seeking	to	 link	relief,	development,	
conflict	resolution	and	societal	reconstruction	(Duffield	2001a).		
The	North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organization	(NATO)	intervention	in	Kosovo	(1999)	
as	well	as	the	US-led	invasions	of	Afghanistan	(2001)	and	Iraq	(2003)	proved	to	be	an	
opportunity	for	proponents	of	the	“new	humanitarianism”.	Some	NGOs	actively	took	
part	in	peace-building	activities	(Goodhand	2006)	and	relief	programmes,	feeding	the	
Western	 “stabilisation	 strategies”	 (Collinson,	 Elhawary,	 and	 Muggah	 2010).	 As	
illustrated	by	Duffield	 (2001a),	 this	move	was	encouraged	by	western	governments	
such	as	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom,	which	had	used	a	humanitarian	
rhetoric	 to	 justify	 their	military	enterprise	–	with	Tony	Blair,	 for	example,	using	 the	
expression	“humanitarian	war”	to	describe	the	NATO	intervention	in	Kosovo	in	1999.	
Donors	such	as	the	UK	Department	for	International	Development	were	encouraging	
humanitarian	organisations	to	“work	with	states	and	international	organizations	that	
are	seeking	to	establish	a	democratic,	law-abiding,	rights-observing,	market-oriented,	
economically	 rational	 state	 that	provides	 improved	conditions	 for	all	of	 its	citizens”	
(Barnett	 and	 Snyder	 2008,	 151).	 Moreover,	 stabilisation	 doctrines	 relied	 on	 the	
premise	 that	 security	 and	 development	 were	 mutually	 reinforcing	 and	 that	 aid	
projects	 (and	 organisations)	 should	 be	 used	 in	 counter-insurgency	 strategies	 to	
‘stabilise’	areas	that	had	first	been	securitised	militarily	(UK	Stabilisation	Unit	2008).	
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As	Duffield	contended,	it	thus	became	more	and	more	difficult	for	NGOs	to	“separate	
their	 own	development	 and	humanitarian	 activities	 from	 the	pervasive	 logic	of	 the	
North’s	new	security	regime”	(Duffield	2001a,	16).	
In	 the	 post	 9/11	 era,	 NGOs	 were	 highly	 dependent	 on	 western	 donors’	
funding.	 Scholars	 therefore	 feared	 that	 “if	 a	 significant	 proportion	 of	 their	 income	
comes	from	official	government	channels,	NGOs	will	resemble	more	an	instrument	of	
foreign	 policy	 and	 less	 a	 force	 for	 change	 and	 advocacy”	 (Macrae	 2003).	 ‘New	
humanitarianism’	also	had	its	internal	critiques.	The	humanitarian	actors	contributing	
to	 the	 promotion	 of	 the	 liberal	 peace	 and	 democratic	 agenda	 in	 Iraq	 and	 in	
Afghanistan	“shouldn’t	be	surprised	to	be	made	responsible	for	any	possible	failure	
(…)	 and	 will	 also	 have	 to	 share	 responsibility	 for	 the	 loss	 of	 an	 independent	
humanitarian	space”	contended	some	MSF	members	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	2000s	
(Crombé	 and	 Lemasson	 2003).	 More	 generally,	 MSF	 denounced	 the	 “new	
humanitarianism”	 as	 fuelling	 a	 “deadly	 confusion”	 between	 humanitarian	 and	
military	action	(Weissman	2004).	
	 After	several	major	targeted	attacks	against	aid	workers	 in	 Iraq	(de	Torrente	
2004)	 and	 Afghanistan	 (Crombé	 2011)	 the	 idea	 that	 new	 humanitarianism	 had	
contributed	 to	 the	 ‘shrinking	 of	 humanitarian	 space’	 emerged	 (Groupe	URD	 2006).	
With	the	progressive	demise	of	the	liberal	peace	agenda	as	a	backdrop,	a	practitioner	
literature	developed,	promoting	a	return	to	neutrality	and	humanitarian	principles	as	
a	 remedy	against	a	perceived	growing	 insecurity	and	hostility	 toward	humanitarian	
organisations	 (Lara	 Olson	 2006;	 Thürer	 2007;	 Donini	 2009).	 Humanitarian	
practitioners	 held	 stabilisation	 initiatives	 responsible	 for	 a	 blurring	 of	 the	 lines	
between	western	military	and	western	aid	organisations,	and	opposed	the	following	
argument	to	those	in	favour	of	“new	humanitarianism”:	
a	 more	 modest	 humanitarian	 enterprise,	 closer	 in	 ambition	
and	 intent	 to	 classical,	 time-tested	 humanitarian	 principles,	
stands	 a	 better	 chance	 of	 saving	 and	 protecting	 larger	
numbers	 of	 lives	 than	 does	 today’s	 increasingly	 politically-
driven	and	militarized	forms	of	relief.	(Donini	2009,	8)	
For	 the	 past	 ten	 years,	 practitioner	 and	 academic	 literatures	 have	 been	
arguing	that	humanitarian	principles	are	now	to	be	‘respected’	(by	actors	involved	in	
the	conflict)	or	‘adhered	to’	(for	humanitarian	agencies),	but	with	very	few	attempts	
	 60	
to	 clarify	 what	 each	 of	 these	 principles	 entails	 (Harvey	 2013).	 The	 respect	 of	
humanitarian	 principles	 is	 described	 as	 a	 self-evident	 and	 straight-forward	 attitude	
(to	the	point	of	being	referred	to	as	“a	management	task	for	which	managers	need	to	
be	held	accountable”	(Leader	2000,	4))	supposed	to	automatically	guarantee	access,	
security	(Macdonald	2011;	Whittal	2011a)	and	quality.	
In	 parallel,	 others	 have	 argued	 that	 these	 principles	 are	 neither	 a	 shield	
protecting	 aid	workers	 from	 insecure	 environments	 (Hammond	 2008),	 nor	 a	magic	
key	 to	 open	 a	 physically	 non-existent	 humanitarian	 space	 (Elhawary	 and	 Collinson	
2012;	 Hammond	 and	 Vaughan-Lee	 2012;	Magone,	 Neuman,	 and	Weissman	 2011).	
They	have	pushed	the	argument,	saying:	
The	political	manipulation	of	humanitarians	 is	not	a	shift	away	
from	 their	 original	 courses	 or	 the	 reason	 for	 their	 recent	
difficulties	but	 the	primary	condition	of	 their	action.	The	main	
challenge	for	aid	agencies	is	not	to	preserve	a	space	free	of	all	
political	manipulation	but	to	negotiate	compromises	reflecting	
the	best	balance	possible	between	their	interests	and	those	of	
political	powers.	(Weissman	2013,	501)	
In	 all	 these	 debates,	 proponents	 and	 opponents	 of	 the	 new	 humanitarianism,	
practitioners	 believing	 in	 the	 power	 of	 principles	 or	 those	 arguing	 for	 negotiated	
compromise	 often	 refer	 to	 impartiality	 as	 a	 guide	 and	 identity	 marker	 for	
humanitarian	 action.	 But	 they	 do	 not	 examine	 it	 critically,	 assuming	 that	 being	
impartial	and	assisting	people	based	on	their	needs	only	is	a	straightforward	process	
that	is	hardly	debatable	–	except	from	a	technical	point	of	view.	
Impartiality	and	the	‘science	of	triage’		
All	 of	 the	 above-mentioned	 definitions	 of	 impartiality	 in	 the	 humanitarian	 context	
converge	on	the	idea	of	fair	resource	allocation	through	prioritisation	of	needs	(and	
its	implied	non-discrimination),	and	the	provision	of	assistance	that	is	proportionate	
to	these	needs.	Unpacking	the	notions	of	non-discrimination	and	proportionality,	the	
Red	 Cross	 doctrine	 commentator	 Jean	 Pictet	 has,	 however,	 pointed	 out	 the	
ambiguities	of	such	notions	and	the	dilemmas	raised	by	their	operationalisation.	For	
other	aid	practitioners,	assisting	people	according	to	their	needs	remains	primarily	a	
technical	 challenge,	 relying	 on	 scientific	 norms,	 protocols	 and	 evidence,	 and	 the	
ongoing	improvement	of	techniques	of	collection	and	analysis.	This	positivist	view	of	
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impartiality,	 as	 relying	 on	 a	 fair	 and	 objective	 ranking	 of	 needs,	 presents	 many	
similarities	 with	 the	 logic	 of	 medical	 triage	 that	 originated	 on	 the	 Napoleonic	
battlefield	and	has	since	been	extended	to	many	aspects	of	medical	and	public	health	
practices.	
Impartiality	as	non	discrimination	and	proportionality	
In	 his	 commentary	 on	 the	 fundamental	 principles	 of	 the	 Red	Cross,	 Pictet	 unpacks	
impartiality	 into	 three	 notions:	 non-discrimination,	 proportionality	 and	 impartiality	
(which	 I	 will	 call	 ‘personal	 objectivity’	 to	 avoid	 confusion	 in	 our	 discussion).	 He	
stresses	 that	 non-discrimination	 has	 extended	 over	 time	 to	 prevent	 other	 types	 of	
discrimination	 identified	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century:	 race,	 religious	 beliefs,	 class	 or	
political	opinions.		
While	Pictet	defines	it	as	an	“absolute”	requirement	“that	authorities	accord	
the	same	humane	treatment	to	all	victims”	(Pictet	1979,	25),	he	recognises	the	limit	
of	 the	 principle,	 adding	 that	 “however,	 in	 exceptional	 circumstances,	 it	 may	 be	
necessary	 to	 make	 a	 choice”	 (Pictet	 1979,	 25).	 Pictet	 acknowledges	 that	 when	 it	
comes	 to	 choosing	among	people,	 several	 logics	 can	be	 followed,	 and	he	gives	 the	
following	examples:	
I	 know	of	 several	cases	where	doctors	have	only	 treated	 the	
sick,	wounded	or	 starving	who	 still	 had	a	 chance	of	 survival,	
leaving	those	for	whom	there	was	no	longer	any	hope	to	die.	
(…)	 Red	 Cross	worker	 (…)	may,	 for	 example,	 give	 priority	 to	
those	 who	 have	 family	 responsibilities	 rather	 than	 to	 those	
who	 do	 not;	 to	 the	 young	 instead	 of	 to	 the	 old;	 to	 women	
instead	of	men.	It	may	also	be	left	to	chance.	(Pictet	1979,	25)	
Pictet	argues	that	the	logic	followed	can	be	based	upon	“personal	reasons,	so	
long	as	they	are	exempt	from	self-interest”	and	adds	“who	has	the	right	to	reproach	
him?	Who,	after	all,	can	claim	to	hold	the	scales	of	perfect	justice?”	(Pictet	1979,	25).	
He	clearly	differentiates	between	non-discrimination	and	equality	but	would	 rather	
seek	 equity	 or	 giving	 “to	 each	 individual	 not	 the	 same	 thing	 but	 that	 which	 is	
appropriate	to	him	personally	because	of	his	nature	and	particular	situation”	(Pictet	
1979,	26).	He	notes,	however,	that:	
Such	 a	manner	 of	 distribution	 is	 not	 impossible	when	we	 are	
concerned	 with	 a	 small	 number	 of	 persons,	 but	 it	 is	 not	
practical	 in	 terms	of	 the	whole	community.	For	one	thing,	 the	
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individual	 cases,	 which	 are	 inevitably	 complex,	 are	 then	 so	
numerous	that	we	would	soon	be	totally	lost.	(Pictet	1979,	26)		
While	 not	 always	 possible	 at	 the	 individual	 level,	 proportionality	 should	 be	
sought	 at	 the	 level	 of	 a	 given	 population,	 Pictet	 suggests.	 The	 principle	 of	
proportionality	 means	 that	 assistance	 should	 be	 given	 to	 people	 according	 to	 the	
“degree	 of	 their	 suffering”	 and	 priorities	 should	 be	 established	 according	 to	 the	
“degree	of	urgency”.	In	other	words,	prioritisation	should	be	“based	upon	degrees	of	
needs”	 (Pictet	 1979,	 27).	 Proportionality	 relies	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 there	 is	
pressure	on	available	resources.	Pictet	asserts	that	people	tend	to	donate	to	a	cause	
to	which	they	can	easily	relate,	and	gives	this	example:	
Let	 us	 consider	 the	 magnificent	 display	 of	 solidarity	 which	
followed	the	catastrophe	in	Frejus,	a	little	town	in	the	south	of	
France	virtually	destroyed	by	the	collapse	of	a	dam.	The	sum	
received	was	enormous,	some	millions	of	 francs,	 for	 the	two	
or	 three	 thousand	 victims	 for	whom	new	homes	were	 built.	
Very	 good,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 an	 ICRC	 delegate	 returned	
from	 the	 Far	 East	 with	 a	 report	 on	 the	 misery	 suffered	 by	
hundreds	 of	 thousands	 of	 displaced	 persons.	 An	 appeal	was	
launched	on	 their	behalf	 at	 the	 same	 time	as	 the	appeal	 for	
the	Frejus	victims	–	but	only	a	ridiculously	small	amount	was	
collected.	(Pictet	1979,	29)	
The	 assumption	 is	 that	 people	 donating	money	 select	 on	 personal	 grounds	
rather	 than	 according	 to	 the	 degree	 of	 needs.	 Pictet	 does	 not	 blame	 them,	 and	
argues	that	the	ICRC	exists	precisely	to	“restore	the	balance,”	seeking	donations	and	
caring	“for	those	who	otherwise	receive	nothing”.	He	therefore	implicitly	admits	that	
proportionality	applies	not	only	to	individual	cases,	but	also	to	populations.	
The	 third	 component	 of	 impartiality,	 according	 to	 Pictet,	 applies	 at	 the	
individual	level	and	can	be	labelled	as	personal	objectivity.	He	rates	this	component	
as	secondary	to	the	previous	two.	It	is	defined	as	“a	personal	quality	of	an	individual	
called	 upon	 to	 make	 a	 judgment	 or	 choice”,	 which	 “sets	 aside	 the	 subjective	
distinctions”.	 In	other	words	“he	 is	 impartial	who,	 in	taking	action,	does	so	without	
prejudice”	(Pictet	1979,	32).	As	clearly	identified	in	this	commentary,	a	person	has	to	
have	sufficient	freedom	to	act	without	prejudice.	Pictet	speaks	about	freedom	from	
external	 influences	 but	 also	 what	 he	 calls	 “internal	 freedom”	 or	 freedom	 from	
“passion,	 psychic	 complexes	 and	 preconceived	 ideas”	 (Pictet	 1979,	 32).	 Also	
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according	to	this	dimension	of	impartiality,	someone	who	could	potentially	be	guilty	
of	a	serious	crime	should	not	be	excluded	from	humanitarian	assistance	if	they	need	
it.		
	 While	 identifying	 impartiality	 with	 the	 commitments	 to	 non-discrimination,	
proportionality	and	objectivity	in	the	delivery	of	assistance,	Pictet	implicitly	points	to	
the	ambiguity	and	limits	of	those	principles	when	it	comes	to	their	operationalisation:	
on	the	one	hand	 it	may	be	necessary	to	discriminate	between	victims	who	have	the	
best	 chance	of	 survival	and	others,	between	 those	who	have	 family	 responsibilities	
and	 those	who	 do	 not,	 between	 the	 young	 and	 the	 old,	women	 and	men.	On	 the	
other	 hand,	 it	 may	 be	 impossible	 to	 assist	 any	 individual	 in	 proportion	 to	 his/her	
specific	needs,	to	supply	what	is	“appropriate	to	him	personally	because	of	his	nature	
and	 particular	 situation”.	 While	 raising	 these	 issues,	 Pictet	 does	 not	 provide	 any	
guidance,	except	in	calling	on	humanitarian	actors	to	be	“exempt	from	self-interest”,	
to	neutralise	their	own	subjectivity	and	personal	 inclination	and	to	counter-balance	
the	emotionally	driven	response	of	the	public.	Thanks	to	Pictet’s	comments,	the	Red	
Cross	movement	is	the	organisation	that	has	elaborated	the	most	on	the	definition	of	
impartiality,	 yet	 this	 has	 never	 triggered	 debates,	 either	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	 or	
among	organisations,	about	 the	different	ways	of	understanding	and	 implementing	
impartiality.	
Impartiality	as	evidence-based	programming	
Within	 other	 organisations,	which	 claim	 to	 be	 humanitarian	 and	 impartial,	 there	 is	
not	such	a	reflexive	approach.	The	main	discussion	that	can	be	linked	to	impartiality	
has	 indeed	 focused	 on	 the	 quality	 of	 needs	 assessment	 and	 evidence	 used	 in	 that	
process.	 Peter	 Walker,	 who	 was	 part	 of	 the	 group	 which	 designed	 the	 Sphere	
standards,	said	in	2013:	“if	you	believe	in	impartiality,	you	have	to	be	evidence	based.	
You	 can’t	 be	 impartial	 if	 you	 don’t	 know	 what	 the	 range	 of	 choices	 are”54	 (Peter	
Walker	 cited	 in	 Knox	 Clarke	 and	 Darcy	 2014,	 5).	 According	 to	Walker,	 reflecting	 a	
																																																						
54	Even	François	Grünewald	who	strongly	criticised	the	Sphere	Project	partly	designed	by	Peter	Walker	
said:	“To	reply	in	the	best	possible	manner	to	the	needs	of	each,	not	in	a	standardised	way	but	in	an	
adapted	way;	 there	 lies	 the	foundation	of	 the	principle	of	 impartiality”	 (Grünewald	and	de	Geoffroy	
1999,	2).	Both	would	agree	that	using	evidence,	assessment,	and	evaluation	is	necessary	to	uphold	the	
principle	of	impartiality.	
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widely-held	 view	 in	 the	 aid	 sector,	 the	 assurance	 that	 a	 response	 is	 impartial	 or	
needs-based	 can	 only	 rely	 on	 evidence	 solidly	 collected	 and	 used.	 For	 aid	
practitioners,	 real	 impartiality	 depends	 on	 the	 quality	 of	 evidence	 used	 to	 identify	
and	quantify	needs.	
The	 humanitarian	 practitioners’	 literature	 calling	 for	 evidence-based	
programming	 fits	 in	 a	 greater	 context	 of	 the	 promotion	 of	 evidence-based	 policy	
applied	 to	 the	 public	 sector	 that	 emerged	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1990s,	 resulting	
from	a	number	of	factors	including:	
the	 growth	 of	 an	 increasingly	 well-educated	 and	 well-
informed	public;	the	explosion	in	the	availability	of	data	of	all	
types,	fuelled	by	developments	in	information	technology	(IT);	
the	growth	in	size	and	capabilities	of	the	research	community;	
an	 increasing	 emphasis	 on	 productivity	 and	 international	
competitiveness,	and	an	 increasing	emphasis	on	scrutiny	and	
accountability	 in	 government.	 (Davies,	 Nutley,	 and	 Smith	
2000,	2)	
All	 these	factors	were	relevant	to	the	aid	sector	and	constituted	the	general	
societal	and	institutional	context	in	which	the	first	sector-wide	assessment	promoting	
the	role	of	evidence	for	needs-based	assistance	was	conducted.	A	Joint	Evaluation	of	
Emergency	Assistance	to	Rwanda	was	produced	in	the	aftermath	of	the	genocide.	It	
was	 undertaken	 by	 twenty-one	 people	 with	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 backgrounds	 and	
assessed	 assistance	 to	 victims	 of	 the	 genocide	 and	 civil	 war	 inside	 Rwanda	 (April	
1994-late	 1994),	 as	 well	 as	 assistance	 to	 those	 who	 fled	 to	 Tanzania,	 and	 Zaire	
(evaluation	extended	until	July	1995)	(Borton	1996,	1).	Study	III	of	the	evaluation	was	
the	 first	 to	 look	 at	 how	 the	 whole	 humanitarian	 sector	 had	 performed,	 and	 its	
conclusions	 promoted	 the	 role	 of	 evidence	 in	 humanitarian	 policy	 and	 practice	 to	
specifically	 improve	 actors’	 preparedness	 (evidence	 enabling	 the	 predictability	 of	
disasters),	 performance	 (evidence	 on	 actors’	 effectiveness),	 and	 accountability	
(based	on	the	transparency	of	evidence).	The	report	was	highly	critical	of	the	‘lack	of	
professionalism’	of	certain	NGOs	(not	all)	in	the	midst	of	what	was	at	the	time	one	of	
the	largest	refugee	outflows	with	some	of	the	highest	mortality	rates	ever	recorded	
in	a	refugee	population	(Borton	2014).	
Since	the	1990s,	the	humanitarian	sector	has	progressively	developed	norms,	
and	 standardised	 practices	 defining	 which	 affected	 population’s	 needs	 were	 to	 be	
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looked	 after	 and	 how.	 While	 organisations,	 attempting	 to	 depart	 from	 a	 certain	
amateurism	 (Dodier	 2011,	 204–209),	 developed	 their	 own	 tools55	 and	 emergency	
kits,56	 some	 norms	 and	 standards	 were	 also	 developed	 for	 the	 entire	 sector.	
Following	 the	 aforementioned	 Sphere	 Humanitarian	 Charter,	 a	 handbook	 of	 more	
than	 four	 hundred	 pages	 fixed	 indicators	 and	 minimum	 standards	 for	 “activities	
which	meet	the	urgent	survival	needs	of	disaster-affected	populations”	(The	Sphere	
Project	 2011,	 9),	 in	water	 supply,	 sanitation	 and	 hygiene	 promotion,	 food	 security	
and	nutrition,	shelter,	settlement	and	non-food	Items	and	Health	Action.	The	Active	
Learning	 Network	 for	 Accountability	 and	 Performance	 in	 Humanitarian	 Action	
(ALNAP)	 was	 established	 in	 1997,	 (in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Joint	 Evaluation	 of	
Emergency	Assistance	to	Rwanda)	as	a	“mechanism	to	provide	a	forum	on	learning,	
accountability	 and	 performance	 issues	 for	 the	 humanitarian	 sector”.57	 The	 Joint	
Evaluation	 of	 Emergency	Assistance	 to	 Rwanda	 had	 “led	 to	 demands	 for	 increased	
professionalization	of	 the	humanitarian	 sector”58	hence	ALNAP’s	 focus	on	assessing	
practices	 and	 producing	 regular	 recommendations	 to	 improve	 assessment,	
effectiveness	and	accountability	techniques.	According	to	ALNAP,	efficiency	–	defined	
as	“a	measure	of	how	economically	resources/inputs	(funds,	expertise,	time	etc.)	are	
converted	 to	 results”	 (OECD	 2002,	 21)	 -	 exists	 through	 its	 measurement,	
accountability	 through	 the	 ability	 to	 communicate	 and	 act	 upon	 achievements	 and	
failure	and	impartiality	through	the	ability	to	identify	and	rank	needs.	
At	the	turn	of	the	century,	however,	practitioners	of	the	humanitarian	sector	
concluded	 that	 evidence	 was	 not	 collected	 systematically	 enough	 (Darcy	 and	
Hofmann	2003):	
In	many	of	the	most	serious	humanitarian	situations,	the	study	
found	 a	 dramatic	 lack	 of	 crucial	 information	 available	 to	
decision-makers,	 in	 particular	 relating	 to	 mortality,	 morbidity	
and	malnutrition	 –	 and	 the	 risk	 factors	 contributing	 to	 these.	
																																																						
55	MSF,	for	instance,	created	Epicentre,	its	epidemiological	centre	in	1987	in	an	attempt	to	produce	its	
own	health	statistics.	
56	See	the	history	of	the	logistics	within	Médecins	Sans	Frontières	and	in	particular	the	emergence	of	
emergency	kits	(Vallaeys	2004,	334–336;	Redfield	2008a;	Redfield	2013,	78–90;	Vidal	and	Pinel	2011,	
29–31),	but	also	the	creation	of	Epicentre,	its	epidemiological	centre	in	1987	(Vidal	and	Pinel	2011,	31–
33)	that	implements	“multi-centred	trials”	or	“meta-analysis”	of	several	geographical	locations	(Dodier	
2011,	209–213).	
57	http://www.alnap.org/who-we-are/our-role		
58	Ibid.	
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The	 kinds	 of	 needs	 assessment	 required	 to	 generate	 this	 are	
being	 conducted	 only	 sporadically.	 While	 the	 ability	 to	 gain	
access	 for	 assessment	 has	 some	 bearing	 on	 this,	 it	 cannot	
explain	 the	 discrepancies	 in	 practice	 between	 different	
contexts.	 In	 many	 cases,	 it	 appears	 that	 information	 is	 not	
available	because	its	collection	has	not	been	prioritised.	(Darcy	
and	Hofmann	2003,	64)	
After	2010,	 the	 literature	moved	on	 to	 the	conclusion	 that	 there	was	enough	
“evidence”	 collected,	 but	 that	 it	was	not	being	used	 for	 decision-making	 (including	
decisions	 on	 priority	 setting)	 (Darcy	 et	 al.	 2013).	 The	 issue	 identified	was	 the	 poor	
quality	of	“evidence”	triggering	a	failure	to	use	it:	“many	humanitarian	evaluations	do	
not	use	academically	 recognised	qualitative	methods,	and	 fail	 to	meet	basic	quality	
standards	 related	 to	accuracy,	 representativeness,	and	relevance”	 (Knox	Clarke	and	
Darcy	 2014,	 39).	 Strong	 criticism	 continued	 on	 the	 general	 low	 consultation	 of	 the	
potential	 “beneficiaries”	 in	 assessing	 their	 needs	 (Knox	 Clarke	 and	Darcy	 2014,	 40;	
Binder,	Koddenbrock,	and	Horváth	2013,	8).	
The	humanitarian	practitioners’	literature	debates	at	length	the	technicality	of	
how	 to	 gather	 and	 make	 accessible	 information	 in	 order	 to	 form	 an	 impartial	
judgement.	 Recommendations	 underline	 that	 “[e]vidence	 should	 be	 packaged	 in	
ways	 that	 make	 it	 easily	 accessible:	 short	 reports	 in	 jargon-free	 language,	
infographics,	 and	 searchable	 ‘portals’	 (…)	 and	 available	 in	 a	 timely	 manner”(Knox	
Clarke	and	Darcy	2014,	51	and	70;	see	also	ACAPS	2012).	The	underlying	assumption	
is	 that	 promoting	 “evidence”	 will	 prevent	 or	 reduce	 decisions	 being	 based	 on	
political,	or	 fundraising	grounds	 (Knox	Clarke	and	Darcy	2014,	55)	perverted	by	 the	
necessity	 “to	 meet	 the	 needs	 of	 international	 organisations,	 rather	 than	 those	 of	
affected	people”	 (Knox	Clarke	and	Darcy	2014,	69).	“Performance”,	“effectiveness”,	
“quality	 of	 assistance”,	 “evidence”	 and	 “professionalisation”	 are	 all	 presented	 as	
interrelated	in	this	literature	and	overall	the	objectivity	of	“evidence”	collecting	and	
analysing	 techniques	 is	 presented	as	 the	 key	 to	 impartial	 assistance.	 This	 literature	
conveys	 a	 positivist	 view	 of	 humanitarian	 action	 whose	 impartiality	 would	 be	
sustained	by	a	greater	recourse	to	science	(Dijkzeul,	Hilhorst,	and	Walker	2013).	
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Impartiality	as	triage	
The	positivist	view	of	 impartiality	as	 implying	an	evidence-based	process,	relying	on	
recognised	 norms	 and	 standardised	 procedures,	 and	 leading	 to	 quantification	 and	
ranking	 of	 needs	 by	 order	 of	 priority,	 is	 very	 similar	 to	 the	 logic	 of	medical	 triage	
described	by	Lachenal	et	al.	There	are	 indeed	many	parallels	 to	be	drawn	between	
biomedical	practices	and	 international	 relief	practices,	 as	both	 take	care	of	people.	
Both	have	a	practice	that	is	often	described	as	‘asymmetrical’	as	the	doctor	possesses	
technical	knowledge	and	the	power	to	cure	while	the	aid	worker’s	hand	that	gives	is	
metaphorically	above	the	hand	that	receives.	Both	claim	to	help	or	treat	impartially,	
without	 discriminating	 among	 patients	 or	 beneficiaries,	 even	 when	 scarcity	 of	
resources	obliges	 them	 to	 choose	whom	to	assist	 first	 from	among	a	priori	 equally	
deserving	people.	
The	 medical	 practice	 of	 triage	 was	 inherited	 from	 Dominique-Jean	 Larrey,	
chief	 surgeon	 in	 command	 in	 Napoleon’s	 army	 (Blagg	 2003;	 Mitchell	 2008).59	
Traditionally	 upper	 ranks	 were	 treated	 first	 and	 lower	 ranks	 as	 well	 as	 enemy	
prisoners	 last.	 Larrey,	 in	 line	with	 his	 direct	 involvement	 in	 the	 French	 Revolution,	
believed	 that	 the	wounded	 should	 be	 taken	 care	 of	 according	 to	 the	 severity	 and	
urgency	 of	 their	 condition	 rather	 than	 their	 rank.	 He	 famously	 wrote:	 “the	 most	
dangerously	wounded	should	be	prioritised,	disregarding	ranks	and	distinctions.	The	
less	 wounded	 can	 wait	 that	 their	 brothers	 in	 arms,	 horribly	 mutilated	 have	 been	
bandaged	and	operated”60	(Larrey	1812,	 III:4).	Larrey’s	 innovation	was	to	claim	that	
on	the	battlefield	people	should	be	equal	in	their	access	to	health	care	and	prioritised	
if	 critically	wounded.	At	 the	 time	non-discrimination	was	not	 yet	 a	 commonality	of	
medical	ethics:	Hippocrates	himself	had	denied	care	to	the	Persians	when	they	were	
stricken	by	a	plague,	because	he	saw	them	as	enemies	(Pictet	1979)	and	 it	was	not	
until	 1948	 that	 the	 World	 Medical	 Association	 officially	 endorsed	 non-
discrimination.61		
																																																						
59	Although	Lachenal,	Lefève,	and	Nguyen	(2014a,	6)	note	that	the	linearity	of	the	historical	trajectory	
of	the	idea	of	triage	is	debatable,	I	rely	here	on	the	consensus	in	the	triage	literature	that	the	medical	
practice	of	sorting	patients	in	emergency	can	be	traced	back	to	Dominique-Jean	Larrey,	even	though	
he	never	used	the	word	himself.	
60	My	translation.	
61	 In	 the	 Geneva	 Declaration	 which	 was	 ratified	 three	 months	 before	 the	 Universal	 Declaration	 of	
Human	Rights	by	the	United	Nations	General	Assembly,	and	then	amended	several	times.		
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Fifty	 years	 after	 Larrey,	 Henry	 Dunant	 was	 advocating	 for	 indiscriminate	
access	 to	 relief	 for	 all	 wounded	 on	 the	 battlefield.	 This	 later	 gave	 birth	 to	 the	
principle	of	impartiality,	and	echoed	Larrey’s	idea	of	triage,	even	though	there	were	
no	direct	connections	between	the	two	men	and	their	initiatives.	Larrey	was	inspired	
by	 the	 values	 of	 the	 Enlightenment	 and	 the	 French	 Revolution,	 in	 which	 he	 was	
actively	 involved.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 French	 Republican	 motto	 ‘Liberty,	 Equality,	
Fraternity’,	he	applied	the	abolishment	of	social	privileges	to	access	to	health	on	the	
battlefield	 (Nestor	 2012)	making	 the	 origin	 of	medical	 triage	 a	 political	 statement.	
Dunant	spoke	of	“compassion”	or	“Christian	devotion”	 (Dunant	1986,	109)	showing	
the	 influence	 of	 Christian	 values	 in	 his	 fight	 for	 an	 egalitarian	 consideration	 of	 the	
wounded	during	warfare.62	Both	innovated	an	ethical	drive	towards	fairness	of	relief	
on	 the	 battlefield,	 believed	 that	 there	 should	 not	 be	 any	 social	 or	 political	
discrimination	 regarding	 access	 to	 relief	 and	 that	 people	 should	 be	 taken	 care	 of	
according	to	their	health	condition	only.		
However	 the	 two	 men	 provided	 no	 guidance	 as	 to	 what	 should	 be	 the	
distributive	 commitments	 if	 choices	 had	 to	 be	made	 among	 the	worst-off.	 Dunant	
ambiguously	put	forward	“the	moral	sense	of	the	importance	of	human	life”	as	well	
as	 the	 “energy	 which	 gives	 one	 a	 positive	 craving	 to	 relieve	 as	many	 as	 one	 can”	
(Dunant	1986,	73),	which	refers	to	two	different	distributive	logics:	the	first	is	a	duty-
based,	 placing	 the	 value	 of	 human	 life	 above	 all	 else,	 and	 the	 second,	maximalist,	
placing	the	optimisation	of	the	number	of	lives	saved	above	the	individual	interests.	
Larrey	mentioned	only	 two	categories	of	people:	 those	who	could	not	wait	as	 they	
had	 been	 “horribly	mutilated”	 and	 those	who	 had	 been	 “lightly	wounded”	 (Larrey	
1812,	 III:4)	 hence	 providing	 an	 oversimplified	 picture	 of	 the	 reality.63	 Larrey	 and	
Dunant,	through	their	claims	and	practices,	make	a	promise	of	fairness,	however	the	
ethical	basis	remains	undetermined.	
																																																						
62	 Incidentally	 these	 characters	 embody	 two	 of	 the	 main	 genealogical	 origins	 of	 western	
humanitarianism:	 the	 Enlightenment	 and	 Christianity	 (Brauman	 2000,	 29).	 Missionaries	 and	
colonialism	are	two	other	major	ancestors	of	modern	humanitarianism,	historians	agree	(Taithe	2004;	
Lachenal	and	Taithe	2009).	
63	The	idea	of	resource	maximisation	emerged	explicitly	only	later	in	the	genealogy	of	the	concept	of	
triage,	 and	 still	 in	 the	 military	 context.	 After	 the	 Crimean	War,	 Russian	 military	 medicine	 manuals	
formalised	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 objective	 of	 triage	was	 to	maximise	military	 troops,	 hence	 prioritising	
those	who	would	be	able	to	return	to	the	frontlines	(Lachenal,	Lefève,	and	Nguyen	2014b,	6).	
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	 The	use	of	the	notion	of	triage	was	generalised	during	World	War	I	following	
the	 logic	of	the	“greatest	good	of	the	greatest	number”	(Iserson	and	Moskop	2007,	
277).	It	was	not	until	much	later	that	civilian	uses	of	triage	techniques	in	emergency	
departments	of	hospitals	were	developed:64	 triage	was	applied	as	 a	priority-setting	
technique	 to	provide	 fair	 access	 to	 care	 for	all,	on	 the	basis	of	one’s	health	 status.	
Today	in	many	countries	medical	triage	is	systematically	implemented	in	emergency	
rooms	of	hospitals.		
When	 described	 by	 medical	 practitioners,	 triage	 is	 treated	 as	 a	 scientific	
technique.	 The	 World	 Health	 Organization	 (WHO)	 defines	 medical	 triage	 as	 “the	
sorting	out	of	patients	into	priority	groups	according	to	their	need	and	the	resources	
available”	 (WHO	 2005,	 3).	Medical	 triage	 is	 framed	 by	 protocols.	 It	must	 be	 swift:	
according	 to	 the	 American	 Simple	 Triage	 and	 Rapid	 Treatment	 people	 should	 be	
triaged	in	less	than	sixty	seconds.	According	to	the	WHO,	children	should	be	triaged	
in	 less	 than	 twenty	 seconds	 (WHO	 2005,	 4).	 Medical	 triage	 must	 be	 rigorous:	
checklists	of	emergency	signs	such	as	the	“ABCD	method”,65	for	instance,	frames	the	
classification	of	patients	 into	phases	or	 levels.	 Each	emergency	 level	 is	 attributed	a	
colour:	 often	 it	 is	 red	 for	 “immediate”	 care,	 yellow	 when	 care	 can	 be	 “delayed”,	
green	when	it	 is	“minor”	and	black	for	a	deceased	or	dying	person.	The	WHO	has	a	
three-level	 scale:	 red	 for	 “emergency”,	 yellow	 for	 “priority”	 and	 green	 for	 “queue”	
(WHO	2005,	5).	The	South	African	system	has	a	five-level	scale	with	target	times	for	
care	for	patients:	red	patients	should	be	sent	immediately	to	the	resuscitation	room,	
orange	patients	should	be	taken	care	of	 in	 less	than	ten	minutes,	yellow	patients	 in	
less	 than	 an	 hour,	 blue	 patients	 should	 be	 sent	 to	 a	 doctor	 within	 two	 hours	 for	
certification,	 and	 green	 patients	 are	 considered	 non-urgent	 (Western	 Cape	
Government	 2012,	 7).	 In	 guidelines,	 triage	 scales	 are	 presented	 as	 “scientific”	
(Western	Cape	Government	2012,	3),	triage	algorithms	are	developed	and	patients’	
physiology	is	scored	(Western	Cape	Government	2012).	
The	same	formalism	is	widely	used	in	the	humanitarian	sector.	Set	up	by	the	
Food	 and	 Agricultural	 Organisation	 and	 World	 Food	 Programme,	 together	 with	
																																																						
64	Weinerman,	Rutzen,	and	Pearson	(1965)	quoted	in	Iserson	and	Moskop	(2007).	
65	Airway,	Breathing,	Circulation/Coma/Convulsion	and	Dehydration	are	 successively	evaluated	as	 to	
determine	the	degree	of	urgency	of	care	that	must	be	delivered	to	the	person.	
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several	NGOs,	the	Integrated	Food	Security	Phase	Classification,	for	 instance,	claims	
to	be	an	“evidence-based	approach”	that	can	classify	“the	severity	and	magnitude	of	
food	 security	 (…)	 to	 provide	 decision	 makers	 with	 a	 rigorous	 analysis	 of	 food	
insecurity	along	with	objectives	of	response”.66		
Figure	2	The	Integrated	Food	Security	Phase	Classification	Table	and	maps	
	
Source:	(IPC	Global	Partners	2006,	4)		
	
																																																						
66	http://www.ipcinfo.org/.	
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Source:	(ACAPS	2011,	1)	
Figure	3	A	medical	triage	tag	
	
Source	1:	http://www.sosproducts.com/product-p/45795.htm	
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The	 Integrated	 Food	 Security	 Phase	 Classification	 publishes	 regular	 reports	 that	
include	severity	ranking	mapped	out	according	to	a	colour	scale	from	green	to	dark	
brown	 -	 green	 being	 the	 “minimal”	 level	 of	 severity	 and	 dark	 brown	 signalling	
“famine”,	which	requires	immediate	and	significant	relief	provision.	These	maps	are	
the	 basis	 of	 assistance	 priority	 settings,	 and	 resemble	 a	 form	 of	 macro	 triage	
operated	by	humanitarian	actors.	The	visual	 similarities	 (see	 figure	2	&	3)	between	
the	 classic	 triage	 tag	 used	 in	 emergency	 department	 of	 hospitals	 to	 visualise	 who	
should	be	treated	first	(1)	and	the	humanitarian	practitioners’	mapping	of	categories	
about	the	levels	of	access	to	regions	of	a	country	(2)	or	the	level	of	food	insecurity	(3)	
illustrate	the	common	aspiration	to	create	scientific	categories.	
Conclusion	
This	chapter	established	the	importance	in	the	humanitarian	rhetoric	of	the	principle	
of	impartiality,	conceived	as	a	distinctive	and	entitling	quality	granting	humanitarian	
organisations	 certain	 rights	 and	 privileges.	 It	 also	 showed	 that	 in	 spite	 of	 its	
importance,	 the	 principle	 of	 impartiality	 was	 never	 the	 object	 of	 debates	 among	
practitioners	and	remained	unexamined	by	scholars.	Humanitarian	actors	did	and	do	
rely	on	a	consensual	working	definition	of	an	impartial	assistance	as	assistance	based	
on	 needs	 only,	 the	 latter	 being	 understood	 as	 a	 fair	 and	 rational	 allocation	 of	
resources	relying	on	scientific	norms,	evidence,	and	protocols	comparable	to	medical	
triage.	
Medical	 and	 humanitarian	 triage	 are	 both	 presented	 as	 a	 technical	 exercise	
guaranteeing	 a	 fair	 allocation	of	 limited	 resources	 thanks	 to	 scientific	 protocol	 and	
the	quality	of	evidence	underpinning	the	assessments	of	needs.	Yet	anthropologists	
and	 sociologists	 have	 questioned	 this	 positivist	 view	 of	 triage,	 highlighting	 the	
unquestioned	normative	assumption	they	rely	upon	as	well	as	the	crucial	influence	of	
non-clinical/non-technical	factors	on	sorting	logics	as	the	next	chapter	demonstrates.		
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Chapter	3	
From	radical	critiques	of	‘needs-based’	assistance	to	the	study	
of	triage	practices	
Introduction	
The	 positivist	 view	 of	 impartiality	 is	 challenged	 in	 two	ways	 by	 the	 social	 sciences	
literature.	 In	 the	 first	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 I	 consider	 how	 researchers	 from	 the	
fields	 of	 anthropology	 and	 development	 studies	 argue	 that	 the	 allocation	 of	
humanitarian	assistance	that	I	include	in	humanitarian	triage	as	explained	in	chapter	
2,	is	not	guided	by	concern	for	the	life	and	wellbeing	of	its	so-called	beneficiaries,	but	
is	 primarily	 driven	 by	 the	 interests	 and	 prejudices	 of	 aid	 organisations’	 personnel,	
bureaucracies	 and	 donor	 institutions.	 Section	 two	 discusses	 how	 social	 scientists	
researching	medical	practices	show	that	triage	techniques	that	have	the	appearance	
of	 scientific	 rigour	 are	 actually	 eminently	 dependent	 on	 non-clinical	 considerations	
and	encompass	a	whole	 range	of	ethical	 logics	and	social	drivers.	The	 third	 section	
explains	 how,	 following	 on	 from	 these	 lines	 of	 enquiry,	 my	 research,	 through	 an	
ethnography	of	the	daily	practices	of	aid	workers,	explores	the	diversity	of	the	logics	
underpinning	 humanitarian	 triage	 practices	 that	 determine	who	 they	 prioritise	 for	
assistance	and	how.	I	describe	how	I	conducted	this	ethnography,	first	unpacking	the	
challenges	of	negotiating	access	inside	three	international	NGOs	to	study	their	daily	
practices	of	triage,	and	then	detailing	the	benefits	and	challenges	of	being	a	former	
aid	worker	and	a	woman	doing	fieldwork	in	Pakistan.	
The	 academic	 critique	 of	 the	 humanitarian	 prerogative	 to	 decide	 on	
who	to	include	(and	who	to	exclude)	in	the	assistance	web	
As	noted	in	chapter	1,	anthropologists	and	development	studies	scholars	have	shown	
interest	 in	 international	 humanitarian	 action,	 considering	 groups	 and	 institutions	
which	 claim	 to	 be	 humanitarian	 legitimate	 objects	 of	 study.	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	
moral	principles	and	 impartiality	 in	particular	 is	 central	 to	humanitarian	actors,	 the	
anthropology	 of	 humanitarianism	 does	 not	 directly	 address	 this	 theme,	 rather	
showing,	 from	various	angles,	 the	 impact	of	humanitarian	assistance	on	 those	who	
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receive	it,	emphasising	the	power	asymmetry	between	the	humanitarian	actors	and	
those	they	claim	to	help.	This	section	separates	two	types	of	critiques:	the	domino-
centric	 critique	 of	 anthropologists	 and	 the	 radical	 critique	 of	 development	 studies	
scholars.	
Anthropologists	and	the	domino-centric	critique		
Considering	 the	 literature	 on	 topics	 related	 to	 humanitarianism	within	 the	 field	 of	
political	 anthropology,	 Laetitia	 Atlani-Duault	 and	 Jean-Pierre	 Dozon	 identify	 three	
main	 branches	 of	 work.67	 The	 first	 includes	 anthropologists	 who,	 having	 mainly	
worked	on	development	and	its	effects,	then	extended	their	field	of	investigation	to	
humanitarian	aid	(Atlani-Duault	2007;	Atlani-Duault	and	Vidal	2009;	Olivier	de	Sardan	
2011;	Apthorpe	2012).	These	anthropologists	followed	a	rhetorical	shift	of	the	actors	
themselves	who	 had	 changed	 their	 designation	 of	 types	 of	 projects	 and	 situations	
from	‘development’	to	‘humanitarian’	aid.	
The	second	branch	includes	anthropologists	who	work	on	refugees,	displaced	
people	 and	migrations	 in	 general,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 the	 assistance	 that	 is	 provided	 to	
them	 by	 humanitarian	 actors	 (Harrell-Bond	 1986;	 Malkki	 1996;	 Hammond	 2004;	
Agier	2002;	Agier	2008;	Fresia	2009).	They	shed	light	on	the	experience	of	those	who	
migrate,	 and	 how	 they	 survive	 and	 adapt	 to	 their	 situation	 as	 well	 as	 on	 the	
assistance	that	is	part	of	their	daily	equation.	This	literature	also	develops	a	critique	
of	 the	 humanitarian	 apparatus	 imposing	 itself	 as	 a	 form	 of	 “humanitarian	
government”	(Agier	2010,	34).68		
A	 third	 branch	 includes	 researchers	 coming	 from	 a	 medical	 anthropology	
perspective	who	often	focus	on	the	power	of	humanitarian	action	on	the	bodies	of	
the	recipients,	referring	to	the	work	of	Michel	Foucault	or	Giorgio	Agamben	(Pandolfi	
2003;	 Fassin	 2007a;	 Fassin	 2007b;	 Pandolfi	 2008).	 This	 category	 echoes	 the	 one	
described	by	Bornstein	and	Redfield	as	having	an	“interest	 in	 the	political	 status	of	
life”	 (Redfield	 and	 Erica	 Bornstein	 2011,	 23)	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 some	 speak	 about	
																																																						
67	As	 their	overview	 identifies	mainly	 francophone	 literature,	 I	use	 their	 categories	and	enrich	 them	
with	Anglophone	references.	
68	This	analysis	echoes	the	work	of	Mark	Duffield	who	writes	about	western	states	as	“Metropolitan	
states	 (…)	governing	 the	borderlands”	 through	various	aid	 “technologies”	 (Duffield	2001b,	308);	 see	
also	Duffield	(2001a)	and	Duffield	(2007).	
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“therapeutic	citizenship”	when	people’s	political	voice	emerges	only	in	their	access	to	
treatment	in	“a	world	where	sometimes	the	only	way	to	survive	is	by	having	a	fatal	
illness	called	HIV”	(Nguyen	2010,	182).		
A	 fourth	 category	 could	 be	 added,	 to	 include	 ethnographies	 of	 natural	
disasters	like	famines,	landslides,	earthquakes	or	floods	(Oliver-Smith	1996;	de	Waal	
1997;	 Fassin	 and	Vasquez	 2005;	 Revet	 2007;	 Revet	 and	 Langumier	 2013),	 exposing	
the	social	and	political	causes	and	consequences	of	these	events.	This	literature	relies	
on	the	 idea	that	disasters	are	particularly	 interesting	situations	 in	which	to	observe	
how	a	society	 is	structured	and	how	its	members	react	to	such	events	(Revet	2007,	
13).	Relief	actors	are	part	of	what	 these	ethnographies	 study	 in	 the	aftermath	of	a	
disaster.	 Sandrine	 Revet’s	 ethnography	 of	 the	 1999	 landslide	 in	 Venezuela	
emphasises	everything	that	this	disaster	produced	–	as	opposed	to	the	intuitive	idea	
that	disasters	mainly	cause	destruction.		
Even	 though	 the	 topic	 of	 impartiality	 is	 not	 directly	 addressed	 in	 this	
literature,	 some	of	 the	above-cited	scholars	approaching	humanitarianism	from	the	
perspective	 of	 camps	 set	 up	 by	 aid	 organisations	 and	 ‘bare	 life’	 have	 incidentally	
produced	 a	 radical	 critique	 of	 humanitarian	 rhetoric	 and	 of	 the	 dehumanising	
practice	of	categorising	people.	They	contend	that	 the	claim	to	assist	people	based	
on	“need	alone”	(Sphere	Project	2011,	37)	serves	merely	as	a	façade	for	a	variety	of	
logics	 mainly	 driven	 by	 aid	 bureaucracies’	 institutional	 self-interests	 and	 western	
donors’	political	agendas.	
Mariella	 Pandolfi,	 a	 Canadian	 anthropologist	who	worked	 on	 the	 Balkans	 in	
the	 post-communist	 period,	 describes	 choices	 about	what	 to	 do,	 and	who	 to	 help	
first,	as	both	messy	and	driven	by	the	bureaucracy	of	aid,	rather	than	based	on	what	
people	 might	 request.	 She	 relies	 especially	 on	 Giorgio	 Agamben’s	 notion	 of	 “bare	
life”	 (see	 Agamben	 1998)	who	 defines	 it	 as	 the	 isolation	 of	 “the	 absolute	 political	
substance	that	(…)	allows	the	total	definition	of	the	subject’s	identity	in	demographic,	
ethnic,	 national	 or	 political	 terms”	 (Pandolfi	 2003,	 374)	 to	 criticise	 the	 power	 of	
“humanitarian	 management”	 (Pandolfi	 2003,	 374)	 to	 categorise	 individuals	 as	
“refugees,	 legal	 or	 illegal	 immigrants,	 or	 traumatized	 victims”	 (Pandolfi	 2003,	 374)	
and	 thus	 reduce	 “subjective	 trajectories,	 of	 individuals,	 of	 men	 and	 women,	 to	
bodies”	(Pandolfi	2003,	374).	She	argues	that	where	the	“humanitarian	apparatus”	is	
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set	 up,	 “individuals	 become	 a	 ‘population’	 to	 be	 numbered,	 ethnicized,	 and	
catalogued”	(Pandolfi	2003,	376).	She	adds	that:	
human	 beings	 are	 pigeonholed	 [into]	 labels	 by	 means	 of	
which	it	is	possible	to	activate	procedures	such	as	fundraising,	
protocols,	 the	establishment	of	 transversal	and	transnational	
institutions	 and,	 ultimately,	 of	 a	 business	whose	 importance	
and	 amplitude	 is	 concealed	 by	 charitable	 pietas.	 (Pandolfi	
2003,	381)	
For	 Pandolfi	 this	 humanitarian	 “state	 of	 exception	 is	 legitimised	 by	 the	
category	of	emergency”	(Pandolfi	2003,	376),	which	is	in	fact	constructed	and	which	
sets	the	institutional	framework	within	which	humanitarian	actors	follow	a	“logic	of	
action”	 (Pandolfi	2003,	376).	Without	mentioning	 impartiality	explicitly,	she	at	 least	
implies	 that	 other	 logics	 are	 driving	 the	 allocation	 of	 assistance.	 She	 describes	 the	
“logic	 of	 action”	 as	 “responding	 to	 the	 priorities	 of	 international	 donors	 and	
bureaucratic	frameworks”	(Pandolfi	2003,	376)	and	implies	that	humanitarian	choices	
on	whom	to	assist	(first)	and	how	to	assist	them	are	rather:	
Emotional	 (…)	 multiple	 and	 confused,	 and	 are	 often	
experienced	 in	 contradictory	ways	by	 single	 individuals,	who	
may	experience	a	mixture	of	pietas	and	cynicism,	of	the	desire	
for	 adventure	 and	 the	 necessity	 to	 be	 present	 in	 the	
mediatised	 arena,	 of	money	 and	 emergency,	 of	 bureaucracy	
and	anti-ideology.	(Pandolfi	2003,	377)	
Based	on	her	observations	of	the	aid	landscape	in	Albania	in	1999,	she	argues	
that	 the	media	drive	actors	 in	and	out	of	a	“humanitarian	disaster”	 (Pandolfi	2003,	
378),	and	that	there	is	a	“supply-effect	of	emergency”	(Pandolfi	2003,	380)	according	
to	 which	 organisations	 provide	 what	 they	 have,	 rather	 than	 what	 people	 need.	
Furthermore,	 the	 imperative	 to	 act,	 which	 she	 refers	 to	 as	 the	 “do	 something	
syndrome”	(Pandolfi	2003,	380),	promotes	action	–	any	action	–	often	at	the	expense	
of	questioning	its	relevance.	In	short,	the	author	pictures	humanitarian	assistance	as	
based	on	many	things	other	than	the	“needs	of	the	population”.	Pandolfi	does	not,	
however,	 give	detailed	descriptions	of	 the	 logics	of	 aid	 allocation	and	delivery;	 she	
does	not	describe	humanitarian	organisations	 from	 the	 inside,	 nor	does	 she	depict	
their	perspectives	on	how	and	why	they	do	what	they	do.	
	 Michel	Agier	also	critiques	the	moral	claims	by	humanitarian	actors	that	they	
assist	people	based	on	needs	only.	There	is	for	him	“a	functional	solidarity,	‘organic’	
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in	the	Durkheimian	sense,	between	the	humanitarian	world	(the	hand	that	cares)	and	
the	police	and	military	ordering	(the	hand	that	strikes)	on	the	part	of	the	world	as	a	
whole”	 (Agier	2011,	5).	He	nuances	his	view,	however,	by	saying:	“I	do	not	see	this	
connection	 as	 an	 institutional	 one,	 and	 certainly	 not	 a	 manipulating	 intentionality	
that	 need	only	 be	 denounced	 for	 the	 critique	of	 humanitarianism	 to	 be	 complete”	
(Agier	2011,	5).	 In	this	context	he	analyses	the	meaning	and	effect	of	humanitarian	
categories	used	in	the	allocation	of	aid.	He	argues	that	terms	like	“displaced	person”	
or	 “refugees”	 do	 not	 tell	 us	 anything	 about	 the	 violence	 people	 may	 have	
encountered	 to	 be	 pushed	 into	 one	 of	 these	 categories	 (for	 example,	 escaping	 a	
bombing	of	their	village	or	mass	massacres)	(Agier	2002,	31).	For	Agier	“emergency	is	
only	 interested	 in	 victims,	 and	according	 to	humanitarian	principles,	 victims	do	not	
have	 any	 political	 or	 social	 affiliation,	 and	 hence	 no	 voice”69	 (Agier	 2002,	 123).	
However	he	shows	very	clearly	that	considering	people	as	victims	only	is	a	truncated	
vision	 of	 a	 complex	 reality.	 He	 describes	 the	 social	 complexity	 that	 exists	 behind	
classic	 humanitarian	 categories.	 In	 Colombia,	 for	 example,	 he	 explains	 that	 among	
those	 who	 are	 labelled	 “desplazado(a)”	 (Spanish:	 displaced	 person)	 there	 are	
guerrillas,	paramilitary	and	their	supporters,	delinquents,	and	ordinary	farmers	(Agier	
2002,	59).	For	Agier,	establishing	categories	(and	figures)	is	a	political	act:	
It	 is	 based	 on	 simple	 tautologies,	 i.e.	 on	 closed	 circuits	 of	
reasoning	 in	 which	 figures	 can	 only	 confirm	 the	 arbitrary	
definitions	 given	 a	 priori	 in	 specific	 political	 contexts	
according	to	the	‘devastating	logic	of	categorizations’	(Varikas	
2007,	 181).	 Definitions	 of	 this	 kind	 are	 not	 based	 on	 any	
universal	 and	 fixed	 scientific	 framework,	 they	 have	 only	 the	
appearance	of	scientific	rigour.	(Agier	2011,	33)	
He	 backs	 up	 his	 argument	 by	 showing	 how	 fluid	 and	 negotiable	 these	
categories	are.	First,	he	demonstrates	 that	 the	same	person	can	successively	be	an	
“internally	 displaced	 person”,	 a	 “refugee”,	 an	 “illegal	 immigrant”,	 and	 an	 “asylum	
seeker”	 (Agier	 2008,	 53–54;	 Agier	 and	 Lecadet	 2014,	 21).	 Second,	 he	 gives	 several	
detailed	 descriptions	 of	 situations	 in	 which	 people	 categorised	 as	 “vulnerable”	
																																																						
69	My	translation.	
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organised	themselves	politically	and	negotiated	their	rights	using	the	very	categories	
created	by	their	caretaker	(often	an	international	organisation).70	
Agier’s	 approach	makes	 an	 important	 point:	 humanitarian	 organisations	 do	
not	escape	politics	despite	the	“totalitarian	fiction”	(Agier	2010,	33)	they	believe	in,	
according	to	which	all	people	should	be	equal,	and	that	makes	them	act	as	if	they	had	
“the	power	of	life	(to	make	live	or	survive)	and	the	power	of	death	(to	let	die)	over	
the	individual	it	considers	the	absolute	victim”	(Agier	2010,	33).	The	power	of	Agier’s	
critique	 resides	 in	 the	 subtle	 balance	 between	 a	 critical	 perspective	 on	 the	
humanitarian	 apparatus	 and	 a	 thorough	 empirical	 study	 of	 various	 humanitarian	
situations	(of	people	living	in	camps	in	particular).	On	one	hand,	Agier	considers	the	
humanitarian	 apparatus	 as	 a	 locus	 of	 power	 “where	 control	 and	 assistance	 are	
entangled”	(Agier	2010,	43).	He	therefore	understands	priority	setting	not	only	as	a	
technical	act	 to	 identify,	analyse	and	classify	 the	needs	of	 the	worst-off	 in	order	 to	
optimise	 scarce	 resources,	 but	 also	 as	 the	 expression	 of	 the	 power	 asymmetry	
residing	at	 the	 core	of	humanitarianism,	whose	primary	 function	 is	 to	manage	 ‘the	
undesirables’	(Agier	2011)	on	behalf	of	governments.	On	the	other	hand	he	provides	
very	rich	empirical	material	which	shows	that	humanitarian	practices	are	challenged	
by	their	recipients	and	are	constantly	renegotiated	among	the	various	stakeholders.	
The	radical	critique	of	development	studies	
Zoë	Marriage	investigates	why	NGOs	adopt	objectives	of	humanitarian	principles	and	
human	 rights	 in	 violent	 contexts.	 Her	 critique,	which	 is	 described	 in	 detail	 here,	 is	
representative	of	 a	 type	of	 critique	 also	made	by	other	 academics	 such	 as	Alex	de	
Waal,	who	asserts	that	“Western	charities	are	guilty	of	philanthropic	imperialism”	(de	
Waal	 1995).	 Marriage	 develops	 a	 radical	 critique	 of	 international	 assistance	 to	
countries	at	war,	relying	on	interviews	done	along	what	she	describes	as	“a	journey”	
through	Sierra	Leone,	Congo,	Rwanda,	Sudan	and	Kenya.	She	contends	that	despite	
the	 humanitarian	 discourse	 of	 principles,	 assistance	 is	 distributed	 “unevenly”	 to	
“people	 who	 substantiate	 the	 dominant	 ideology	 by	 stoking	 its	 moral	 credibility”	
																																																						
70	 See	 Robins	 (2009)	 for	 another	 enlightening	 example	 of	 how	humanitarian	 norms	 can	 be	 used	 as	
tools	for	emancipation	of	those	initially	seen	and	categorised	as	victims.	
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(Marriage	2006,	177),	as	opposed	to	their	claim	of	a	 fair	prioritisation	of	assistance	
based	on	people’s	“needs	only”.	For	Marriage,		
Certain	 forms	 of	 violence	 are	 abhorred,	 and	 assistance	 is	
bestowed	 symbolically	 on	 its	 victims.	 Other	 forms	 (or	
locations)	 of	 violence	 are	 ignored,	 depending	 on	 how	 the	
morality	activity	reflects	on	the	aid	provider.	(Marriage	2006,	
183)	
She	 gives	 the	 example	 of	 Sierra	 Leone	 which	 did	 not	 attract	 international	
attention	 (and	 hence	 funding)	 until	 the	 Revolutionary	 United	 Front	 started	
amputating	hands,	kidnapping	people	and	 forcing	children	 to	enlist	as	 soldiers.	She	
also	states	the	example	of	Rwanda	where	the	funding	flowed	after	the	1994	genocide	
and	argues	that	international	interest	was	aroused	by	the	moral	question	“how	could	
they	(the	mostly	Hutu	who	perpetrated	genocide)	do	that?”	rather	than	driven	by	a	
political	 analysis	 of	 state	 coercion	 and	 control	 (Marriage	 2006,	 185).	 For	Marriage,	
the	logic	is	institutional;	she	observes	that	NGOs	used	categories	to	describe	people’s	
situations	but	that	there	was	no	evidence	that	they	had	considered	their	needs:		
NGOs	used	terminology	that	was	endorsed	by	their	donors,	
and	rescued	the	official	line	by	overlooking	some	people	and	
labelling	 others	 ‘inaccessible’.	 More	 formal	 processes	
included	 introducing	 categories	 that	 redefined	 particular	
groups,	using	existing	 terminology	 to	 connote	 the	worth	of	
interventions,	 and	 introducing	 new	 objectives	 (such	 as	
peace).	(Marriage	2006,	94)	
Marriage	 asserts	 that	 in	 reality	 assistance	 is	 provided	 to	 the	 “politically	
backwards”	(Marriage	2006,	177)	and	the	“victims	of	moral	outrage”	(Marriage	2006,	
183)	as	it	is	these	groups	that	serve	humanitarian	institutional	purposes.	She	pushes	
the	critique	to	the	extreme	and	argues	that	“there	is	no	causal	link	between	the	rules	
and	the	delivery”	(Marriage	2006,	212)	and	that	“assistance	does	not	ensure	survival,	
basic	needs	are	not	fulfilled,	and	any	goods	transferred	are	more	pitiful	than	charity”	
(Marriage	2006,	192).	
Such	a	critique	is	all	encompassing.	It	defines	“assistance”	as	taking	the	form	
of	 “relief,	 development	 and	 peace	 projects,	 pursued	 through	 material	 or	 service	
provision,	 income	generation,	 infrastructural	support	or	advice”	 (Marriage	2006,	2),	
the	word	used	to	refer	to	projects,	actors	or	money	flow.	Marriage	provides	a	macro	
analysis	 of	 international	 assistance,	 taking	 into	 account	 views	 of	 all	 kinds	 of	 aid	 as	
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well	as	the	recipients	of	projects.	She	does	not	focus	on	one	type	of	actor,	nor	does	
she	provide	a	detailed	account	of	their	perspective	or	descriptions	of	practices	from	
inside	those	actors,	be	they	assisted	or	assisting.	
All	 these	 social	 scientists	 thus	 challenge	 the	 humanitarian	 practitioners’	
narrative,	which	identifies	the	provision	of	relief	on	the	basis	of	needs	as	a	technical	
and	 value-free	 process	 grounded	 in	 the	 objectivity	 of	 scientific	 evidence	 and	
protocols.	The	social	scientists	identify	in	particular	the	issue	of	asymmetrical	power	
relationships	 between	 relief	 actors	 and	 their	 so-called	 “beneficiaries”.	 This	
asymmetry	is	manifest	in	the	arbitrary	power	of	aid	actors	to	define	the	categories	of	
victims	and	needs	in	their	own	terms.	
The	 limit	 of	 the	 anthropological	 and	 development	 studies	 critiques	 of	 the	
humanitarian	 “industry”	 (Pandolfi	 2000),	 “apparatus”	 (Agier	 2011)	 or	 “assistance”	
(Marriage	2006)	is	that	it	does	not	unpack	the	humanitarian	apparatus	as	much	as	it	
focuses	 on	 the	 so-called	 “beneficiaries”.	 Humanitarian	 actors	 are	 depicted	 as	 a	
coherent	 whole	 organised	 around	 the	 domination	 and	 control	 of	 deprived	
populations.	The	nuances	about	the	daily	practices	of	people	ending	up	in	‘camps’,	as	
thoroughly	observed	and	described	by	Agier,	 indicates	that	there	might	be	as	much	
nuance	 to	 be	 observed	 on	 the	 side	 of	 aid	 workers	 and	 encourages	 further	 critical	
scrutiny.	What	are	the	various	logics	affecting	aid	allocation	and	delivery	at	the	level	
of	 aid	 agencies	 and	 practitioners?	 How	 do	 humanitarian	 bureaucracies	 function?	
What	are	the	perspectives	of	aid	actors	on	what	they	do	and	why?	These	questions	
have	 been	 explored	 by	 social	 scientists	 working	 on	 medical	 triage	 which	 presents	
many	similarities	with	humanitarian	triage	as	described	 in	chapters	1	and	2,	and	as	
further	detailed	in	the	following	section.	
A	social	scientist	perspective	on	medical	triage	
Both	 impartiality	 and	 triage	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 a	 fair	 and	 rational	 way,	 based	 on	
scientific	 norms,	 protocols	 and	 evidence,	 to	 allocate	 limited	 resources	 when	
conditions	 do	 not	 allow	 treating	 or	 assisting	 all	 deserving	 or	 needy	 people.	 Social	
scientists	 researching	 medical	 practices	 have	 shown,	 however,	 that	 even	 though	
triage	 techniques	 have	 the	 appearance	 of	 scientific	 rigour,	 they	 are	 eminently	
dependent	on	non-clinical	considerations.	
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In	a	multi-disciplinary	book	attempting	to	thoroughly	grasp	what	is	at	stake	in	
the	 notion	 of	medical	 triage,	 Lachenal	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 critically	 examine	 the	 scientific	
claim	of	triage	in	the	medical	context.	As	rigorous	as	each	emergency	triage	system	
may	be,	there	is,	as	mentioned	above,	room	for	a	diversity	of	methods,	implying	that	
there	is	no	one	universal	medical	triage,	scientifically	recognised	as	the	most	effective	
in	saving	 lives.	Nor	has	any	study	ever	compared	 the	different	mass	casualty	 triage	
algorithms	regarding	ease	of	use,	reliability	and	effectiveness	(Jenkins	et	al.	2008).		
Moreover,	triage	does	not	begin	and	end	in	the	emergency	room.	As	Lachenal	
et	al.	points	out,	it	implies	debates	related	to:71	
choices,	 ahead	 of	medical	 practices,	 among	 pathologies	 and	
populations	 about	 collective	 health	 resources	 allocation	
(macro	 allocation)	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 to	 ethical,	 social	
and	medical	criteria	used	to	define	individual	patient’s	access	
to	scarce	resources	(micro	allocation).72	(Lachenal,	Lefève,	and	
Nguyen	2014b,	8)	
As	mentioned	 in	 chapter	 1,	 the	 notion	 of	 triage	 implies	 a	 promise	 of	 fairness,	 and	
involves	 sorting	 logics	 that	 are	 macro	 and	 micro	 allocations	 of	 resources	 made	
necessary	by	a	situation	of	scarcity.	This	literature	points	to	two	types	of	dimensions	
underpinning	medical	triage:	ethical	logics	and	social	factors.	I	show	in	the	following	
paragraphs	 that	 both	 echo	 realities	 of	 the	 humanitarian	 practice	 touched	 upon	 by	
two	scholars	in	particular.	
Diversity	of	ethical	logics	
The	ethical	debate	on	triage	 in	 its	wider	meaning	emerged	 in	 the	medical	 sector	 in	
the	1960s	from	an	attempt	by	the	Swedish	Hospital	of	Seattle	to	allocate	as	fairly	as	
possible	a	newly	developed	and	extremely	expensive	technique	for	people	with	renal	
failure:	dialysis	(Lachenal,	Lefève,	and	Nguyen	2014b,	13).	The	hospital	elected	seven	
members	 to	 form	 the	 “Admissions	 and	 Policies	 Committee	 of	 the	 Seattle	 Artificial	
Kidney	Center	at	Swedish	Hospital”	 (hereafter	 ‘the	Committee’)	as	a	“microcosm	of	
society	at	large”	(Alexander	1962,	106).	The	Committee	had	to	decide	upon	the	first	
ten	patients	who	would	be	granted	access	to	a	medical	trial	involving	this	technique	
and	 an	 article	 of	 Life	 magazine	 described	 in	 details	 a	 series	 of	 meetings	 of	 the	
																																																						
71	See	also	Scheunemann	and	White	(2011)	who	use	the	expression	“macro	triage”	and	micro	triage”.	
72	My	translation.	
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Committee	to	choose	two	out	of	 five	patients.	The	purpose	of	 this	 initiative	was	to	
create	a	 “buffer	 for	 the	medical	profession”	 (Alexander	1962,	117),	 freeing	doctors	
from	 the	 moral	 burden	 and	 emotional	 pressure	 of	 these	 life-or-death	 choices.	 As	
none	 of	 the	 patients	 considered	 by	 the	 Committee	 would	 survive	 until	 another	
treatment	 facility	became	available,	 their	health	situations	were	considered	equally	
urgent.		
The	 members	 of	 the	 Committee	 established	 a	 list	 of	 non-medical	 criteria	
including	 the	 number	 of	 dependents,	 past	 work	 performance	 and	 future	 potential	
service	to	society	as	well	as	“emotional	stability”	also	referred	to	as	“character	and	
moral	 strength”	 (Alexander	 1962,	 110)	 and	 debated	 until	 they	 reached	 a	 decision	
about	whom	to	choose.	This	triggered	a	vivid	debate	in	the	United	States,	and	started	
discussions	on	 the	ethics	of	 rationing	 in	medicine:	given	 that	 there	 is	a	 limit	 to	 the	
amount	of	public	money	available	to	fund	treatment,	how	is	it	possible	to	allocate	it	
in	 the	 most	 ethical	 way?	 Should	 scarce	 public	 resources	 be	 allocated	 so	 that	 the	
treatments’	outcomes	are	maximised,	prioritising	their	efficiency?	This	would	make	it	
a	 consequentialist	 (or	 utilitarian)	 approach.	 Or	 should	 this	 allocation	 be	 driven	 by	
medical	 principles	 that	 the	 society	 guarantees	 to	 all,	 regardless	 of	 particular	
circumstances	 and	 cost?	 This	would	 correspond	 to	 a	 deontological	 (or	 duty-based)	
approach.		
From	 a	 deontological	 perspective	 some	 actions	 are	 seen	 as	 intrinsically	 right,	
regardless	of	their	end	result.	Within	the	deontological	approaches,	some	distinguish	
between	 egalitarian	 (treating	 individuals	 equally)	 and	 “prioritarian”	 (favouring	 the	
worst	off)	conceptions	of	justice	(Scheunemann	and	White	2011),	and	introduce	the	
less	rational	“rule	of	rescue”	describing	“a	powerful	psychological	impulse	to	attempt	
to	 save	 those	 facing	 death,	 no	matter	 how	 expensive	 or	 how	 small	 the	 chance	 of	
benefit”	(Scheunemann	and	White	2011,	1628).		
In	 the	case	of	 the	Committee,	doctors	used	 their	medical	authority	 to	establish	
the	initial	selection	criteria:	children	and	patients	over	forty-five	years	of	age	should	
be	 excluded	 upfront.	 The	 justification	 for	 these	 exclusions	was	 that	 the	 treatment	
might	 torment	 and	 traumatise	 a	 child	 and	 the	 diet	 restrictions	 could	 compromise	
their	 growth,	 whereas	 people	 over	 forty-five	 were	 allegedly	 too	 likely	 to	 develop	
other	 complications	 (Alexander	 1962,	 106).	 The	 doctors’	 criteria	 followed	 a	 double	
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logic:	medical	deontology	not	to	harm	excluded	children,	and	a	consequentialist	logic	
excluding	 those	 over	 forty-five.	 Overall	 the	 consequentialist	 approach	 prevailed	 as	
they	tried	to	maximise	the	treatment’s	chance	of	success.		
The	Committee	then	alternated	with	a	second	criterion,	which	was	deontological	
but	 neither	 egalitarian	 nor	 prioritarian	 (as	 in	 not	 favouring	 the	 worst	 off):	 only	
residents	 of	 the	 State	 of	 Washington	 were	 considered,	 as	 they	 were	 the	 people	
whose	tax	had	paid	for	the	research	that	initially	developed	the	treatment.	The	group	
judged	that	these	patients	deserved	to	be	prioritised.73	Most	of	the	arguments	raised	
in	 the	 debate	 following	 the	 first	 layers	 of	 selection	 fell	 into	 the	 consequentialist	
category:	the	members	rated	men	“with	the	highest	potential	of	service	to	society”	
against	the	future	burden	on	society	of	the	family	of	the	deceased	depending	on	the	
level	of	their	financial	provisions	and	number	of	children	(Alexander	1962,	110).	They	
also	tried	to	rate	the	probability	that	the	people	selected	would	follow	through	with	
the	 treatment	 so	 as	not	 to	waste	 the	opportunity	 that	 could	have	been	offered	 to	
someone	 else.	 They	 determined	 that	 a	 doctor’s	 mentioning	 that	 his	 patient	 was	
active	in	church	work	was	a	sign	of	“character	and	moral	strength”	(Alexander	1962,	
110).		
Finally,	 an	 aircraft	 worker	 with	 six	 children	 and	 a	 small	 businessman	 active	 in	
church	 were	 selected,	 making	moral	 strength	 and	 number	 of	 dependents	 decisive	
criteria	–	together	with	an	evaluation	of	the	burden	unselected	people	would	 leave	
on	 society	 after	 their	 death.	 Had	 the	 committee	 refrained	 from	 choosing	 on	 the	
grounds	 that	 any	 choice	 was	 ethical,	 they	 would	 have	 re-established	 the	 arbitrary	
nature	of	 chance	 (or	 fate)	which	does	not	avoid	discrimination	 (Crozier	2014,	299).	
When	the	Committee	first	met	they	contemplated	the	idea	of	having	a	human	lottery	
by	 drawing	 straws	 (Alexander	 1962,	 123).	 This	 would	 have	 been	 the	 typical	
deontological	 egalitarian	 approach	 (equivalent	 to	 refusing	 to	 choose)	 based	on	 the	
idea	that	establishing	a	hierarchy	of	lives	is	morally	wrong.	Anticipating	this	difficulty,	
one	of	the	members	of	the	Committee	revealed	to	a	Life	magazine	journalist	that	he	
was	 initially	 hesitant	 about	 joining	 it	 but	 he	 said:	 “I	 knew	 I	was	 capable	 and	 felt	 I	
would	be	 impartial”	 (Alexander	1962,	 115).	 The	 intention	 to	be	 fair	 seems	 to	have	
																																																						
73	However	if	one	wanted	to	extend	the	logic,	they	should	have	prioritised	those	who	paid	more	taxes,	
which	the	Committee	did	not	do.	
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given	the	committee	its	own	moral	legitimacy	and	self-declared	responsibility	not	to	
let	 the	arbitrary	nature	of	chance	produce	unfair	 selection.	Finally,	members	of	 the	
Committee	 acted	 intuitively	 and	 pragmatically	 following	 diffuse	 arguments	 of	 cost-
efficiency	 mixed	 with	 their	 own	 moral	 judgments	 constructing	 the	 identity	 of	 the	
‘good.74		
Here	the	practice	of	triage	involved	several	ethical	logics	intervening	at	different	
steps	 of	 the	 process,	 and	 showed	 that	 ultimately	 the	 outcome	 of	 triage	 is	 almost	
certainly	bound	to	be	open	to	debate,	as	“no	principle	is	sufficient	or	fully	satisfying	
to	 take	 into	account	all	moral	questions	of	 triage.	 It	 relies	 therefore	upon	complex	
sets	 of	 principles	 oriented	 either	 towards	 utility	 or	 towards	 equality”75	 (Lachenal,	
Lefève,	and	Nguyen	2014b,	19).	This	dissertation	demonstrates	that	the	same	could	
be	said	about	humanitarian	triage,	and	describes	 in	detail	what	Jennifer	Rubenstein	
advances	in	her	article	on	the	distributive	commitments	of	international	NGOs.	
Rubenstein	argued	that	there	was	a	wide	range	of	distributive	commitments	
that	could	not	necessarily	be	assigned	to	one	or	other	of	the	consequentialist/duty-
based	 dichotomy.	 She	 showed	 that	 some	 commitments	 were	 explicit	 and	 others	
implicit.	 For	 instance,	 providing	 aid	 according	 to	 need,	 maximally	 reducing	 harm,	
being	efficient	(or	avoiding	waste)	or	involving	aid	recipients	in	distributive	decisions	
(democratic	ethics)	was	often	openly	 claimed,	whilst	other	 commitments	 remained	
rather	 implicit:	 promoting	 local	 and	 large-scale	 equality	 (the	 egalitarian	 approach),	
avoiding	 distributing	 aid	 on	 the	 basis	 of	who	deserves	 it	most	 as	 all	 have	 rights	 to	
access	 to	basic	necessities,	or	providing	aid	 in	 a	diverse	array	and	 large	number	of	
countries	 “to	 show	 that	 they	 [NGOs]	 do	 not	 discriminate	 against	 anyone”	 (J.	 C.	
Rubenstein	2008,	227).		
In	the	same	way	that	Lachenal	et	al.	did	with	medical	triage	(Lachenal,	Lefève,	
and	Nguyen	2014b,	19),	Rubenstein	argued	that	most	of	the	time	NGOs’	distributive	
																																																						
74	The	costs	 that	were	discussed	by	 the	committee	were	 the	direct	costs	of	 the	 treatment	spent	on	
each	patient,	as	well	as	 the	burden	on	society	 resulting	 from	the	death	of	 those	who	would	not	be	
chosen.	Those	who	would	cost	society	more	dead	than	alive	(and,	presumably,	once	again	contributing	
to	society)	were	thus	prioritised.	
75	My	translation.	
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commitments76	 came	 about	 as	 the	 result	 of	 a	mix	 of	 several	 ethical	 postures	 and	
different	 trade-offs	 at	 different	 stages.	 While	 considering	 the	 moral	 and	 ethical	
reasons	why	aid	is	allocated	the	way	it	is,	Rubenstein	interestingly	sets	aside	external	
constraints	 imposed	on	NGOs	 (such	as	donors’	 requests,	or	attacks	on	aid	workers,	
etc.)	 to	 concentrate	 exclusively	 on	 NGOs’	 distributive	 commitments.	 She	 contends	
that	clarifying	the	latter	“can	help	to	guide	decisions	about	which	external	constraints	
NGOs	should	most	forcefully	resist	or	try	to	alter”	(J.	C.	Rubenstein	2008,	217).	Within	
the	 academic	 corpus	 of	 literature	 about	 humanitarian	 action,	 Rubenstein’s	work	 is	
important	as	she	goes	beyond	institutional	discourses	that	NGOs	display	(in	the	Code	
of	 Conduct,	 for	 example),	 to	 give	 concrete	 examples	 of	 actors’	 practices	 and	 she	
elaborates	 a	 significant,	 even	 if	 not	 comprehensive,	 list	 of	 humanitarian	 actors’	
distributive	commitments,	such	as	“maximally	reducing	harm”	(J.	C.	Rubenstein	2008,	
221),	being	efficient	 (J.	C.	Rubenstein	2008,	222),	prioritising	“victims	of	 intentional	
violent	harm”	(J.	C.	Rubenstein	2008,	223),	promoting	 local	and	 large-scale	equality	
(J.	C.	Rubenstein	2008,	225–226),	providing	aid	in	a	diverse	array	and	large	number	of	
countries	 “to	 show	 that	 they	do	not	discriminate	against	anyone”	 (J.	C.	Rubenstein	
2008,	227)	or	avoiding	distributing	aid	“on	the	basis	of	desert”	or	“moral	worthiness”	
(J.	C.	Rubenstein	2008,	230).	
Plurality	of	social	factors	
Ethical	 logics	 are	 intertwined	 with	 social	 factors.	 As	 medicine	 made	 scientific	
progresses,	 it	did	not	appear	that	the	 logics	of	patients’	prioritisation	became	more	
scientific	or	less	influenced	by	non-medical	rationales.	Instead	most	of	the	literature	
on	 the	 topic	 (for	 example,	 Bizouarn,	 Fiat,	 and	 Folscheid	 2001;	 Ridderstolpe	 et	 al.	
2003;	 Walton	 et	 al.	 2007)	 converge	 to	 state	 that	 non-medical	 factors	 have	 a	
significant	influence	on	choices	made	on	patients’	prioritisation	–	in	accordance	with	
research	 undertaken	 on	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 social	 context	 on	 clinical	 decision-
making.	Starting	from	the	critique	of	medical	research	investigations	which	assumed	
that	physicians	took	decisions	in	“‘socially	insular	clinical	settings’”	(Clark,	Potter,	and	
McKinlay	quoted	in	Walton	et	al.	2007,	445),	these	studies	concluded	that	other	than	
																																																						
76	The	GPPI	report	builds	scenarios	with	recommendations	for	German	humanitarian	assistance	policy	
on	 how	 to	 allocate	 aid	 budgets,	 which	 mobilise	 mixed	 ethical	 categories	 such	 as	 “selective	 duty-
based”(Binder,	Koddenbrock,	and	Horváth	2013,	26).	
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clinical	factors,	decisions	were	influenced	by:	the	characteristics	of	the	patient	(age,	
gender,	 socioeconomic	 status,	 and	 race),	 the	 doctor’s	 professional	 and	 personal	
history,	 the	 doctor-patient	 interaction,	 and	 the	 doctor’s	 relationship	 to	 his	
profession,	to	the	health	care	system	in	general	and	the	medical	institutions	which	he	
has	a	relationship	with	(Eisenberg	1979;	Clark,	Potter,	and	McKinlay	1991).	
Access	 to	cardiac	surgery,	since	 it	 is	an	expensive	part	of	hospitals’	budgets,	
involves	prioritisation	of	patients.	Prioritisation	practices	have	been	researched	from	
an	ethical	perspective	 so	as	 to	evaluate	 their	 fairness	and	 legitimacy	 (Walton	et	al.	
2007)	and	results	of	qualitative	research	showed	that	despite	the	existence	of	a	tool	
to	assist	doctors	 in	priority	setting,	 the	Urgency	Rating	Score,	and	despite	decisions	
appearing	to	be	based	strictly	upon	clinical	criteria,	non-clinical	criteria	had	a	strong	
impact	on	decision-making.	According	to	one	interviewee	of	this	study,	
Even	 if	 an	 urgency	 score	 says	 a	 patient	 can	 wait,	 and	 the	
surgeon	 feels	 that	 this	 patient	 really	 can’t,	 they	 have	 that,	
again,	 intuitive	 knowledge.	 So	 they’re	 going	 to	 do	 a	 patient	
sooner,	even	if	their	score	says	that	they	can	wait.	(Walton	et	
al.	2007,	452)	
Many	 surgeons	 in	 this	 study	 claimed	 that	 the	 Urgency	 Rating	 Score	 was	 not	
“reflective	of	the	complexity	of	patients	who	they	are	assessing	and	the	reality	of	the	
system	in	which	they	work”	 (Walton	et	al.	2007,	452).	These	pieces	of	research	did	
not	conclude	that	those	who	have	the	power	to	decide	upon	other	people’s	critical	
situation	do	it	in	a	cynical	way,	however	they	showed	that	non-clinical	criteria	like	a	
patient’s	advanced	age	or	lifestyle	choices,	as	well	as	a	doctor’s	being	overly	fatigued	
or	pressured	over	resource	utilisation,	resulted	sometimes	in	“unfair	and	inconsistent	
decisions”	(Walton	et	al.	2007,	444).77	
In	 a	 similar	 way,	 Redfield	 argued	 that	 despite	 the	 aspiration	 humanitarians	
have	to	objectivity	when	it	comes	to	project	or	beneficiary	selection,	the	choices	they	
make	are	influenced	by	a	whole	set	of	heterogeneous	factors	such	as	the	individual	
biographies	of	people	involved	in	programme	implementation,	organisational	history,	
or	 funding,	 among	 others	 (Redfield	 2013,	 172–173).	 He	 pointed	 out	 that	 when	 it	
																																																						
77	Philippe	Bizouarn,	an	anaesthesiologist	 and	philosopher,	 conducted	a	very	 insightful	 study	on	 the	
decisions	 of	 a	 team	 of	 senior	 cardiologists	 and	 surgeons	 all	 working	 in	 the	 same	 department.	 He	
showed	 that	 despite	 being	 familiar	 with	 one	 another	 and	 working	 as	 colleagues,	 they	 decided	
differently	about	the	same	patients’	cardiac	surgery	possibilities	(Bizouarn	2014,	268).	
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comes	 to	 deciding	what	 cause	 to	 take	 up	 and	what	 to	 let	 go,	 “the	 position	 of	 any	
humanitarian	 organization	 grows	 more	 complicated	 at	 the	 level	 of	 operational	
practice”	 (Redfield	 2008b,	 197).	 And,	 in	 his	 view,	 “humanitarian	 triage”	 goes	 from	
prioritising	people	at	the	field	level	(micro	triage)	to	a	“global	triage”	(Redfield	2014,	
81)	that	is	operated	by	relief	agencies	among	various	crises	and	plagues	as	they	are	
confronted	by	the	question:	“Amid	a	world	of	endless	needs,	what	causes	should	be	
taken	up,	and	what	to	let	go?”	(Redfield	2008b,	196):	a	question	that	echoes	that	of	
macro	allocation	or	macro	triage	in	the	medical	sector.	
Inspired	by	the	 literature	on	medical	 triage,	and	 in	 line	with	Rubenstein	and	
Redfield’s	 work,	 my	 research	 conceives	 humanitarian	 triage	 as	 the	 visible	 side	 of	
impartiality.	 As	 such,	 impartiality	 can	 be	 studied	 ethnographically	 through	
observation	 of	 the	 daily	 practices	 of	 humanitarian	 actors	 that	 influence	 who	 they	
assist,	where	and	how.	Studying	 impartiality	beyond	 institutional	public	 statements	
implies	 access	 inside	 organisations,	which,	 as	 an	ex-practitioner,	 I	 deemed	 feasible.	
The	last	section	of	this	chapter	explains	how	I	accessed	my	field	inside	international	
NGOs,	and	how	I	dealt	with	my	position	as	an	ex-humanitarian	INGO	worker	and	as	a	
woman	 whilst	 collecting	 the	 data	 analysed	 in	 the	 following	 chapters	 of	 the	
dissertation.	
Conducting	ethnographic	study	of	humanitarian	triage		
Whereas	 most	 work	 in	 the	 critical	 anthropology	 of	 humanitarianism	 focuses	
ethnographically	 on	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 recipients,	 and	 does	 not	 describe	 the	
internal	dynamics	of	humanitarian	organisations,	most	of	my	research	relies	on	the	
ethnographic	 study	 of	 three	 INGOs’	 projects	 in	 Pakistan	 focusing	 on	 the	 actors’	
perspective	 from	 within	 their	 organisation.	 Attempting	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 how	
humanitarian	actors	upheld	the	principle	of	impartiality	in	practice	and	not	whether	
they	 were	 impartial,	 this	 non-normative	 approach	 required	 classic	 ethnographic	
methods	of	immersion	and	encounters.		
Negotiating	access	inside	non-governmental	organisations	
The	 first	 phase	 of	 fieldwork	 was	 negotiating	 access	 to	 three	 INGOs	 in	 Pakistan.	 I	
needed	both	to	raise	interest	and	to	get	people	to	trust	me.	In	order	to	raise	interest,	
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I	situated	my	research	within	practitioners’	concerns	and	phrased	my	objectives	in	a	
language	 that	 would	 not	 be	 too	 academic	 (but	 also	 not	 exclusively	 that	 of	 the	
practitioners	as	I	needed	to	position	myself	as	a	researcher).	For	example,	in	the	two-
page	 summary	 of	 my	 research,	 I	 did	 not	 use	 the	 word	 “triage”	 and	 referred	 to	 a	
literature	that	practitioners	can	easily	access.	Researching	the	theme	of	prioritisation	
of	 beneficiaries	 proved	 to	 be	 an	 important	 topic	 for	 practitioners,	 too,	 and	 the	
argument	that	there	was	a	need	to	know	more	about	daily	practices	and	the	reality	
of	the	humanitarian	job	in	academia	triggered	their	enthusiasm.	I	also	made	it	clear	
that	I	would	not	expect	to	take	up	too	much	of	their	time.	I	did	not	expect	my	work	
to	be	at	the	top	of	their	professional	priority	list,	and	rightly	so,	as	it	would	not	bring	
anything	 to	 them	 in	 the	 short	 term.	 I	 clarified	 that	 I	 was	 not	 going	 to	 deliver	
recommendations	 as	 consultants	 do,	 and	 shared	 with	 them	 that	 this	 was	 a	 point	
upon	which	I	had	to	be	careful	precisely	because	I	had	previously	been	a	practitioner.	
The	second	challenge	was	to	bring	them	to	trust	me	enough	to	let	me	in	to	their	daily	
professional	lives.	
As	mentioned	 in	 chapter	1	 I	 chose	 international	NGOs	 that	had	a	history	of	
working	 in	 conflict	 and	 disasters	 settings,	 as	 they	 were	 the	 ones	 that	 claimed	 to	
uphold	the	principle	of	impartiality.	From	among	them	I	chose	three	NGOs,	each	with	
a	 different	 relationship	 to	 western	 states	 and	 in	 particular	 to	 UN-led	 coordination	
(that	 was	 supported	 by	 those	 states):	 MSF	 was	 the	 ideal	 self-declared	 outsider	
(Brauman	 and	 Neuman	 2014),	 and	 Solidarités	 had	 an	 intermediate	 position	 as	
explained	 in	 chapter	 1.	 I	 sensed	 Solidarités	 would	 grant	 my	 request	 and	 invested	
more	work	in	convincing	the	two	others.	
I	knew	the	Solidarités	and	MSF	head	offices	had	a	strong	influence	over	their	
country	programme	and	so	I	made	sure	I	obtained	approval	from	managers	 in	Paris	
and	Brussels	first.	Of	course,	this	was	not	to	say	that	I	was	not	going	to	have	to	work	
on	 some	 form	 of	 acceptance	 of	 my	 presence	 in	 the	 field.	 For	 Solidarités,	 I	 knew	
people	 in	 the	 head	 office	 and	 they	 trusted	 me.	 Following	 my	 resignation	 as	 desk	
manager,	I	had	been	elected	as	a	board	member	and	I	decided	to	resign	this	position	
also	 to	avoid	any	 conflict	of	 interest.	 I	 knew	 the	Pakistani	 staff	 based	 in	 Islamabad	
(we	 had	 been	 colleagues),	 and	 they	 did	 not	 oppose	 my	 field	 visit	 in	 Pakistan.	
Solidarités	 even	 offered	 to	 cover	 my	 travel	 expenses	 to	 Pakistan,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
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insurance	costs,	 in	order	 to	 facilitate	 fieldwork.	The	organisation	did	not	ask	me	 to	
sign	a	different	contract	from	the	normal	one	they	needed	(a	volunteer	contract)	to	
trigger	all	the	administrative	procedures	(visa	and	insurance	requests).	I	clarified	my	
methodology	before	leaving	and	with	people	at	each	new	location	of	fieldwork.	We	
had	an	informal78	agreement	that	I	was	there	for	my	research	only	and	that	I	would,	
as	 much	 as	 possible,	 debrief	 them	 upon	 my	 results:	 I	 presented	 my	 preliminary	
results	 in	 Islamabad	 at	 the	 end	 of	 my	 fieldwork	 in	 Pakistan.	 Despite	 the	
contradictions	 I	pointed	out	between	what	 they	claimed	and	what	 I	observed,	 they	
did	not	try	to	influence	the	outcome	of	my	research.	
Approaching	MSF	was	not	as	easy	since	it	was	more	‘foreign	territory’	–	albeit	
not	 as	 much	 as	 it	 would	 have	 been	 for	 someone	 who	 had	 never	 worked	 in	 the	
humanitarian	sector.	Based	upon	people	I	knew	from	my	previous	practitioner	work,	I	
first	 got	 in	 touch	with	 the	MSF	 office	 in	 London,	 who	 put	me	 in	 contact	 with	 the	
person	 based	 in	 Brussels	 who	 was	 responsible	 for	 programmes	 in	 Pakistan.	 OCB	
(Operational	 Centre	 Brussels)	 was	 the	 biggest	 operational	 branch	 of	 the	 MSF	
movement79	 and	 at	 the	 time	 the	 one	with	 the	 greatest	 access	 to	 conflict-affected	
areas	in	Pakistan.	I	shared	a	summary	of	my	research	project	with	the	Brussels	MSF	
desk	manager	and	mentioned	a	 recent	briefing	paper	about	humanitarian	action	 in	
Pakistan	 that	 I	had	written	 (Péchayre	2011b).	 It	was	 June	2011	and	we	discussed	a	
departure	at	the	end	of	September	2011.	In	mid-September	he	sent	me	a	‘volunteer	
agreement’	 contract	 which	 I	 suggested	 modifying	 around	 copyright	 and	
confidentiality	issues	in	order	to	be	able	to	use	the	data	I	collected	without	exposing	
the	 interviewees,	and	to	be	able	to	keep	editorial	control	over	my	thesis	and	other	
publications	 related	 to	 this	 part	 of	 my	 field	 research.	 The	 director	 of	 operations	
approved,	 and	 the	 HR	 person	 put	 me	 in	 touch	 with	 different	 persons	 for	 all	 the	
administrative	 issues	 (mainly	 my	 visa)	 and	 pre-departure	 briefing.	 The	 country	
director	 was	 also	 copied	 on	 these	 emails	 at	 an	 early	 stage,	 and	 the	 Brussels	 desk	
manager	requested	I	send	them	a	work	plan	so	that	I	could	discuss	the	organisation	
and	feasibility	of	the	study	with	the	Pakistan	country	director	when	I	arrived	there.		
																																																						
78	I	had	formalised	and	provided	a	two-page	summary	on	my	research	objective	and	methodology.	
79	The	MSF	movement	includes	five	“operational	centres”,	which	supervise	international	programmes:	
in	 France,	 Belgium,	 Switzerland,	 Spain	 and	 the	 Netherlands.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 fieldwork,	 the	 Brussels	
operational	centre	was	the	largest	of	the	five.	
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The	choice	of	the	third	NGO	came	a	 little	 later.	When	I	started	to	think	that	
Save	the	Children	International	(SCI)	would	suit	the	criteria	of	my	third	case,	I	was	in	
Pakistan	 and	 had	 interviewed	 the	 SCI	 country	 director	 as	 one	 of	 the	 interviews	
external	to	my	case	studies.	Through	the	content	of	the	 interview,	and	from	what	 I	
knew	 about	 SCI	 already,	 I	 understood	 that	 the	 organisation	was	 decentralised	 and	
that	many	decisions	were	incumbent	upon	the	country	director	in	each	country,	even	
though	they	depended	upon	the	regional	office	 in	Singapore.	 I	decided	to	approach	
SCI	through	its	country	director	in	Pakistan,	seeking	approval	from	the	regional	office	
in	 Singapore	 only	 if	 needed.	 The	 country	 director	 and	 deputy	 country	 director	 for	
emergencies	responded	positively	 to	my	request	and	sent	me	a	contract	 from	Save	
the	Children	US,	based	on	their	template	for	interns.	Although	they	trusted	me	based	
on	our	meeting	in	Islamabad,	my	relationship	with	the	organisation	was	framed	by	a	
written	 “acknowledgment	 of	 obligations”	 contained	 in	 a	 contract	 that	 specified	
among	 other	 things	 that	 I	 should	 “not	 disclose,	 directly	 or	 indirectly,	 to	 any	 third	
party	 any	 portion	 of	 the	 Confidential	 Information	without	 prior	written	 permission	
from	Save	the	Children-USA”	(Save	the	Chidren	Federation	2012,	2),	with	the	widest	
possible	 definition	 of	 “Confidential	 Information”.80	 They	 attached	 to	 this	 contract	
under	the	rubric	“responsibilities/scope	of	work”	my	research	methodology	summary	
(which	 mentioned	 explicitly	 that	 it	 relied	 upon	 observations,	 interviews	 and	 the	
collection	 of	 internal	 documents).	 As	 such,	 I	 took	 this	 to	 mean	 that	 they	 did	 not	
consider	my	planned	research	to	fall	foul	of	their	confidential	information	clause.	As	
with	 the	 two	 other	 organisations,	 I	 offered	 to	 debrief	 them	 at	 the	 end	 of	 my	
fieldwork	but	 the	offer	was	not	 taken	up;	 they	 said	 they	 trusted	my	 judgment	and	
were	willing	to	facilitate	my	research	without	expecting	anything	particular	in	return.	
Within	international	non-governmental	organisations	as	an	ex-practitioner	
Once	in	the	field,	during	two	of	my	ethnographic	stays	(with	MSF	and	Solidarités),	 I	
lived	with	the	expatriate	staff	in	Islamabad	and	in	the	field	bases,	and	benefited	from	
																																																						
80	“Confidential	Information	means	written	(in	any	media),	graphic	or	pictorial	non-public	information	
that	 Save	 the	 Children-USA	 designates	 as	 being	 confidential,	 or	 any	 other	 information,	 whether	
written,	 oral	 or	 observed,	 which	 under	 the	 given	 circumstances	 would	 reasonably	 be	 deemed	 by	
someone	in	Save	the	Children-USA’s	position	to	be	confidential”	(Save	the	Children	Federation	2012,	
2).	
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daily	informal	conversations	with	them	at	home	or	during	social	events	outside	work	
hours.	 During	work	 hours,	 I	was	 accepted	 as	 an	 ‘office	 nomad’:	 I	moved	 from	one	
desk	to	another,	depending	on	where	there	was	space,	circulating	freely	in	the	office	
space.	 I	 could	 feel	 the	 atmosphere	 of	 each	 office	 space	 and	 fieldwork	 site	 when	
outside	the	office	visiting	projects.	I	also	spent	time	outside	the	organisation	spaces	
(field	and	office)	in	order	to	interview	donors,	UN	staff	and	people	from	other	NGOs.	
My	fieldwork	with	Solidarités	was	not	such	a	different	experience,	despite	my	
history	 within	 the	 organisation,	 once	 I	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 I	 had	 no	 affiliation	
whatsoever	with	 Solidarités	 anymore.	 On	 one	 hand	 I	 could	 not	 say	 that	my	 social	
links	 with	 the	 head	 office	 had	 no	 influence	 on	my	 relationships	 with	 the	 people	 I	
spent	time	with	in	the	field,	but	acknowledged	it	 in	my	analysis	of	the	data.	On	the	
other	hand	everything	seemed	a	little	more	familiar	than	when	I	stayed	with	the	two	
other	NGOs.	
My	 immersion	 within	 SCI	 was	 different	 for	 several	 reasons.	 First,	 there	 was	 no	
expatriate	 guesthouse,	 and	 most	 of	 the	 staff	 were	 Pakistani	 (there	 were	 three	
expatriate	employees).	The	organisation	housed	me	in	what	used	to	be	the	country	
director’s	 house,	 and	 I	 was	 offered	 a	 desk	 in	 the	 Islamabad	 office.	 As	 the	 only	
foreigner	in	the	open	space,81	I	socialised	easily	with	the	Pakistani	staff.	Second,	SCI	
did	not	allow	me	to	spend	time	in	Peshawar	where	the	project	activities	were	being	
implemented	 as	 they	 rated	 it	 “too	 dangerous”.	 My	 field	 observations	 were	 thus	
concentrated	 at	 the	 Islamabad	 level,	where	many	 discussions	 happened	 and	many	
decisions	were	taken,	but	I	was	able	to	adapt	my	field	methodology	to	carry	out	all	
my	 planned	 site	 interviews	 via	 Skype,	 ‘following	 the	 story’	 and	 ‘the	 people’	 of	 the	
project.	 During	 these	 interviews	 I	 covered	 my	 head,	 as	 I	 would	 have	 done	 in	
Peshawar	and	observed	 that	my	presence	 in	 the	SCI	 Islamabad	office	made	people	
relatively	 comfortable	 in	 speaking	 to	 me.	 Although	 I	 was	 far	 away	 and	 could	 not	
share	 informal	moments	 with	 the	 staff	 based	 in	 Peshawar,	 I	 managed	 to	 create	 a	
form	 of	 proximity,	 when	 I	 told	 people	 that	 it	 was	 the	 fifth	 time	 I	 had	 come	 to	
Pakistan,	that	I	had	worked	for	an	INGO	too,	and	that	I	had	already	gone	to	Peshawar	
and	even	further	north	 in	KPK.	Not	all	of	 the	Skype	 interviewees	were	Pashtun	so	 I	
																																																						
81	The	three	expatriate	employees	had	their	own	office	spaces.	
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also	mentioned	my	previous	visits	 to	other	provinces	 such	as	Sindh.	This	helped	 to	
break	the	 ice	before	 I	went	on	to	asking	them	about	their	daily	work.	 I	did	about	a	
third	of	my	interviews	by	Skype	(fifteen	in	total),	without	changing	the	framework	of	
the	interviews.	I	met	the	Communication,	Media	and	Advocacy	coordinator	based	in	
Peshawar	during	one	of	her	stays	in	Islamabad,	and	she	offered	to	provide	me	with	
visuals	 (pictures	 and	 films)	 of	 the	 activities	 implemented.	 She	 shared	 the	 pictures	
taken	for	fundraising	purposes,	but	these	were	of	 limited	value	to	me	as	they	were	
mostly	portraits	of	children	aimed	at	soliciting	the	donating	public.	I	asked	her	if	she	
would	 take	pictures	 for	me	of	 the	 SCI	 staff	 distributing	 food	or	 non-food	 items,	 or	
doing	promotion	sessions,	as	well	as	of	 the	Peshawar	office,	which	she	kindly	did.	 I	
knew	Peshawar	and	as	a	former	practitioner	was	familiar	with	the	type	of	activities	
implemented	 by	 SCI	 there	 and	 could	 easily	 visualise	 various	 descriptions	 given	 in	
interviews.	Without	claiming	that	as	a	former	practitioner	I	did	not	need	to	go	to	the	
field,	 I	 feel	 I	 could	 understand	what	 people	 were	 describing	 better	 than	 someone	
who	 would	 have	 never	 seen	 mobile	 clinics	 or	 distribution	 activities	 before,	 for	
instance.	 Visualising	 is	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	 ethnographic	 experience.	 To	 see	
people,	spaces,	locations,	and	interactions	helps	to	supplement	and	add	perspective	
to	what	people	recount	in	interview.	For	instance,	I	could	see	from	a	picture	that	the	
mobile	clinic	consisted	of	vast	open	spaces	under	tents	with	no	private	areas	–	this	
complementary	information	helped	me	understand	the	SCI	medical	approach,	which	
was	to	include	as	many	people	as	possible.	Being	able	to	visualise	a	distribution	being	
described	 in	 an	 interview	 allowed	 me	 to	 judge	 whether	 to	 ask	 more	 specific	
questions	or	just	not	ask	basic	questions	that	would	have	interrupted	their	story.		
The	project	is	an	object	of	study	that	is	not	reduced	to	the	implementation	of	
its	distribution,	construction	or	promotion	activities.	In	reality	quite	a	significant	part	
of	 what	 determines	 the	 nature	 of	 a	 project	 happens	 elsewhere	 from	 its	 place	 of	
implementation:	in	the	SC	case	conception,	writing	up	and	validation	of	the	project	as	
well	 as	 its	 follow-up	 involve	 people	 based	 in	 the	 Islamabad	 offices.	 The	 sector	
specialists,	for	instance,	validate	the	technical	approaches	and	the	MEAL	(Monitoring	
Evaluation	 Accountability	 and	 Learning)	 unit	 of	 SCI,	 independent	 from	 other	
management	 structures,	 had	 staff	 based	 in	 Peshawar	 who	 reported	 to	 Islamabad.	
Field	Monitoring	 Reports	were	 discussed	 in	 Islamabad	 as	well	 as	 in	 Peshawar.	 The	
	 93	
internal	 documents	 associated	 with	 the	 project	 were	 numerous	 and	 were	 not	
centralised.	I	collected	them	from	each	of	the	interviewees	by	email,	something	that	
would	 have	 been	 impossible	 had	 I	 not	 had	 access	 to	 the	 Pakistan	 SCI	 office	 in	
Islamabad.	
During	fieldwork	there	was	a	subtle	balance	to	be	found	between	the	need	to	
gain	the	trust	of	the	staff	of	these	organisations	and	the	risk	of	being	too	embedded	
and	not	having	 the	 critical	 distance	necessary	 to	observe	 things	 that	 are	 somehow	
invisible	to	practitioners	through	familiarity.	Maintaining	‘enough’	distance	to	secure	
a	 critical	 insight	 was	 a	 continuous	 process.	 I	 always	 introduced	 myself	 in	 a	
transparent	 way,	 as	 an	 apprentice	 researcher	 as	 well	 as	 a	 former	 practitioner,	
insisting	on	my	willingness	 to	depart	 from	my	practitioner’s	positioning.	 I	 refrained	
from	giving	my	opinion	about	operational	 issues.	 I	clarified	that	I	received	no	salary	
from	the	INGOs	to	do	this	research.	Educated	Pakistanis,	who	made	up	most	of	the	
Islamabad	staff	of	the	three	INGOs,	knew	what	a	PhD	was	and	perceived	it	as	being	
very	prestigious	and	were	more	 interested	 in	 this	aspect	of	my	 identity	 than	 in	my	
past	as	a	practitioner.		
Yet	 throughout	 fieldwork,	 many	 situations	 and	 discussions	 (in	 meetings	 as	
well	as	outside	work	hours)	felt	familiar.	I	could	feel	the	benefits	of	having	been	in	my	
informants’	 position	 before,	 as	 I	 understood	 the	 ‘humanitarian	 language’,	 and	
understood	 the	subtext	of	 certain	comments	 in	meetings.	Of	course,	 I	had	 to	 learn	
acronyms	 and	expressions	 specific	 to	 each	of	 the	NGOs	but	 I	 knew	many	 from	my	
previous	 experience.	 I	 knew	 what	 “WASH”	 or	 “FOODSEC”	 meant;	 I	 knew	 what	 a	
“sitrep”,	a	“BFU”,	the	“HIP”,	“IASC”	and	“ERWG”	were.	I	also	knew	from	my	previous	
experiences	 of	 Pakistan	who	 the	 NDMA,	 PDMA	 and	 FDMA	were.82	 I	 knew	 how	 to	
interpret	the	expression	“in	the	field”	depending	on	the	context	 it	was	used	and	by	
whom,	etc.	I	did	not	speak	Urdu,	Pashtu	or	Sindhi	but	I	spoke	‘humanitarian’	fluently.	
I	 also	 could	 share	 some	 of	 the	 humanitarian	 practitioners’	 habits,	 such	 as	 sharing	
one’s	 past	 experiences	 in	 the	 field	 (and	 not	 only	 in	 Pakistan).	 It	 is	 something	
humanitarians	commonly	do:	they	speak	about	their	experience	of	the	‘field’	like	war	
																																																						
82	Acronyms	 in	order	of	appearance:	Water,	Sanitation	and	Hygiene;	Food	Security;	Situation	report;	
Budget	 Follow-Up;	 Humanitarian	 Implementation	 Plan;	 Inter-Agency	 Standing	 Committee;	 Early	
Recovery	Working	Group;	National	Disaster	Management	Authority;	Provincial	Disaster	Management	
Authority;	Federal	Disaster	Management	Authority.	
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veterans	 speak	 about	 their	 experience	of	 combat	 (Dauvin	 and	 Siméant	 2002,	 142).	
The	 access	 I	 could	 gain	was	 not	 just	 about	 entering	 these	 three	NGOs	 in	 Pakistan,	
there	also	was	a	micro	access	related	to	the	degree	of	openness	people	would	have	
with	me	on	a	daily	basis.	On	this	point	I	felt	my	presence	was	all	the	more	accepted	
because	 people	 saw	 me	 doing	 things:	 interviewing	 people,	 going	 to	 the	 field,	
attending	meetings	of	all	sorts,	or	sitting	in	front	of	my	computer	writing	notes.	I	was	
not	 in	 the	 organisational	 chart,	 but	 I	was	working,	 and	 as	 such	 I	was	 part	 of	 their	
‘working	 community’.	 This	 experience	 was	 similar	 with	 the	 three	 NGOs.	 As	 time	
passed	I	became	more	and	more	comfortable	with	my	researcher	status	and	this	was	
mirrored	 by	 people	 asking	 fewer	 and	 fewer	 questions	 about	 my	 practitioner	
experience.	
As	a	woman	in	Pakistan	
The	 last	 element	 of	 positionality	 that	 deserves	 attention	 is	 that	 of	 doing	 field	
research	as	a	woman	in	Pakistan.	I	never	felt	undermined	by	my	position	as	a	woman	
in	Pakistan,	yet	I	have	to	say	I	probably	owe	it	to	my	position	as	a	foreign	non-Muslim	
woman,	yet	respectful	of	local	customs.	
As	a	foreigner	on	Pakistani	soil,	your	first	realization	of	the	different	attitude	
towards	 women	 comes	 at	 the	 airport	 immigration	 desk;	 you	 queue	 in	 the	
“unaccompanied	–	ladies	and	children”	line.	This	line	is	much	shorter	than	the	many	
others,	as	few	Pakistani	women	(and	hence	children)	travel	abroad.	It	was	some	sort	
of	privilege	I	owed	to	all	the	other	women	who	did/could	not	fly	outside	the	country.	
Except	 for	 the	 few	rich	Pakistani	 families	 that	send	their	children	to	 travel	or	study	
abroad	in	the	US	or	the	UK,	or	those	who	live	abroad,	most	Pakistani	women	never	
cross	the	national	border.	Also,	while	Pakistani	women	in	bigger	cities	like	Islamabad	
or	Karachi,	are	not	subject	to	a	strict	dress	code,	most	cover	their	head	with	a	simple	
coloured	 veil.	 In	 remoter	 places	 women	 do	 not	 leave	 their	 homes	 without	 their	
husbands	or	brothers,	usually	wear	traditional	salwar	kameez	and	cover	their	entire	
face.	
Many	European	men	shared	with	me	the	awkwardness	of	their	experience	of	
seeing	 so	 few	 women	 during	 their	 stay	 in	 Pakistan.	 Several	 friends	 of	 mine	
particularly	 disliked	 this	 situation,	 and	 while	 talking	 to	 them	 I	 realised	 I	 did	 not	
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experience	 this	 awkwardness	 as	 much	 on	 a	 daily	 basis.	 I	 did	 wear	 long	 sleeves,	 a	
traditional	salwar	kameez	and	most	of	the	time	covered	my	head	when	meeting	with	
Pakistani	people	outside	the	office	–	in	particular	with	government	officials,	as	I	did	
not	 know	what	 they	expected	and	preferred	 to	avoid	upsetting	 them.	They	usually	
only	 commented	 on	my	head	 being	 covered	when	 they	 found	 it	 funny,	 and	 I	 then	
uncovered	 it.	 I	 had	 been	 used	 during	 my	 previous	 work	 experience	 to	 adjust	 my	
clothing	on	the	basis	of	what	was	considered	as	acceptable,	taking	into	account	the	
usual	 greater	 tolerance	 towards	 foreigners	 for	 certain	 things.	 I	 never	 really	 gave	 it	
much	 thought,	 as	 it	 also	was	 a	 source	 of	 curiosity	 and	 amusement	 for	me.	 I	 liked	
understanding	 the	 codes,	 and	 ‘nosing	around’	 in	 local	 shops	or	 seeing	what	was	 in	
the	market.	It	also	was	a	way	to	start	connections	with	my	female	colleagues,	asking	
them	 about	 what	 was	 considered	 as	 appropriate,	 or	 for	 shop	 recommendations	
where	I	could	get	local	outfits.	
It	became	a	different	experience	when	I	was	told	that	I	would	have	to	cover	
my	face	fully	 in	order	to	be	able	to	do	ethnography	 in	north-west	Pakistan	close	to	
the	 Tribal	 Areas	 during	 the	 fieldwork	with	MSF.	MSF	 had	decided	 that	 outside	 the	
office	and	house,	foreign	women	had	to	cover	up	just	like	local	females	did.	I	looked	
at	it	as	an	experience:	I	learnt	how	to	tie	a	long	piece	of	fabric	over	my	head,	on	my	
hair	and	forehead,	behind	my	ear	and	back	on	my	mouth,	throwing	the	length	of	the	
scarf	over	my	shoulder	to	make	it	hold	over	my	nose.	 I	could	see	how	it	 felt	on	my	
skin,	and	how	I	breathed	with	a	piece	of	fabric	over	my	mouth	and	nose,	and	how	I	
needed	to	hold	it	when	getting	out	of	the	car	to	make	sure	it	would	not	fall	down.	I	
realised	how	much	peripheral	vision	was	lost,	and	how	I	looked	like	another	person	in	
the	mirror.	 In	all	honesty,	 it	 lasted	only	a	few	minutes	every	day	 in	the	vehicle	that	
took	us	to	and	from	the	house	or	the	hospital	and	was	therefore	not	such	an	extreme	
experience.	Inside	the	hospital	it	was	accepted	that	we	covered	only	our	hair,	and	we	
wore	what	we	wanted	inside	the	house.	
These	adaptations	allowed	me	 to	be	as	discreet	as	possible,	 in	order	not	 to	
become	the	centre	of	attention	but	 rather	 to	be	able	 to	observe	people	getting	on	
with	their	normal	daily	work	and	habits	as	much	as	possible.	I	adapted	partly	out	of	
respect,	 and	partly	out	of	 interest.	 These	adaptation	efforts	were	 tradeoffs	 against	
my	access	to	sharing	these	small	pieces	of	life	that	were	entirely	foreign	to	me.	
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During	 the	 entire	 ethnographic	 period	 only	 once	 did	 someone	 refuse	 to	 be	
interviewed	by	me	because	I	was	a	woman,	a	mullah	in	Dargai	who	was	described	to	
me	as	very	influential.	As	the	MSF	field	coordinator	had	a	good	relationship	with	him	
he	had	offered	to	ask	the	mullah	whether	he	would	agree	to	be	interviewed.	It	was	
reported	to	me	that	he	refused	in	a	very	respectful	manner,	saying	he	apologised	but	
explaining	 he	 was	 not	 allowed	 to	 meet	 with	 a	 woman.	 Otherwise	 I	 was	 able	 to	
interview	men	on	my	own	as	long	as	I	left	a	door	open,	or	I	was	in	an	open	space	(a	
courtyard	 or	 a	 garden).	 Finally	 I	 could	 meet	 and	 interview	 as	 many	 women	 as	 I	
wanted	which	would	not	have	been	possible	had	I	been	male.	Overall,	I	would	argue	
that	 being	 a	 (foreign	 non-Muslim)	 female	 allowed	 me	 more	 opportunities	 for	
interaction	than	if	I	had	been	a	male.	
Conclusion		
Social	 scientists	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 positivist	 perception	 that	 aid	
practitioners	 have	 of	 impartiality	 and	 its	 needs-based	 interpretation	 should	 be	
questioned,	 as	 humanitarian	 actors	 exercise	 power	 over	 those	 they	 claim	 to	 help.	
Some	 have	 pushed	 the	 critique	 as	 far	 as	 arguing	 that	 the	 humanitarian	 industry	 is	
serving	western	states’	foreign	policy	as	well	as	their	own	institutional	interests.	Yet	
these	 critiques	 do	 not	 rely	 on	 detailed	 and	 lengthy	 observations	 of	 humanitarian	
bureaucracies	 from	 the	 inside,	 as	 they	 have	 mostly	 set	 their	 focus	 on	 the	
consequences	of	assistance	 for	 its	 recipients.	Additionally,	 studies	of	medical	 triage	
showed	 that	 in	 practice	 it	 was	 underpinned	 by	 numerous	 ethical	 logics	 and	 social	
factors,	 which	 needed	 to	 be	 observed	 through	 fine	 and	 lengthy	 ethnographic	
methods.	 I	 therefore	chose	 to	delve	 into	 the	daily	practices	of	humanitarian	actors	
and	conduct	an	ethnography	of	humanitarian	 triage	 in	 three	 INGOs’	projects	 in	 the	
Pakistan	humanitarian	configuration	(as	defined	in	chapter	1)	in	order	to	unveil	what	
was	 behind	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 impartiality.	 My	 research	 speaks	 both	 to	 development	
studies	 scholars	having	an	 interest	 in	humanitarianism,	 and	 to	 the	anthropology	of	
development.	 It	provides	the	 former	with	empirical	material	 that	both	 furthers	and	
challenges	existing	macro	analyses	and	contributes	to	the	expansion	of	the	latter	 in	
conflict	 and	 natural	 disaster	 settings.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 deals	 with	 a	 field	 mostly	
researched	by	development	 studies	 (the	ethics	of	humanitarian	action),	but	utilises	
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an	 anthropological	 approach	 that	 unpacks	 the	 logics	 of	 the	 humanitarian	 triage	
within	 each	 project.	 The	 following	 chapter	 presents	 the	 actors	 and	 historical	
trajectory	of	this	humanitarian	configuration	and	unpacks	its	dynamics	at	the	time	I	
did	my	triple	ethnography	(2011-2012)	providing	key	elements	for	the	understanding	
of	chapters	5,	6	and	7.	
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Chapter	4	
The	‘humanitarian	configuration’	in	Pakistan83	
Introduction	
The	presence	of	foreign	humanitarian	actors	in	Pakistan	is	not	new.	However	it	is	only	
relatively	recently	that	these	actors	have	been	providing	relief	to	Pakistani	citizens.	In	
the	 early	 1980s,	 Pakistan	 witnessed	 the	 mass	 arrival	 of	 people	 from	 Afghanistan,	
fleeing	first	the	Soviet	 invasion	and	then	the	civil	war,	who	sought	shelter	 in	camps	
settled	 around	 Peshawar.84	 Many	 foreign	 actors	 came	 to	 Pakistan	 to	 assist	 these	
Afghans.	More	recently,	a	devastating	earthquake	in	2005,	the	emergence	of	internal	
conflict	 and	 floods	 in	 2010	 and	 2011	 have	 affected	 millions	 of	 Pakistani	 citizens85	
directly,	and	international	humanitarian	organisations	have	expanded	their	range	of	
activities	to	provide	assistance	to	them.	This	chapter	provides	an	account	of	how	the	
‘humanitarian	 configuration’	 formed	 throughout	 these	 various	 crises	 that	 attracted	
international	attention	and	actors.	Actors	in	this	humanitarian	configuration	are	from	
both	international	and	national	origins;	they	are	state	and	non-state	actors,	as	well	as	
armed	and	non-armed	groups.	As	far	as	possible	(i.e.	taking	into	account	security	and	
privacy	requirements)	they	are	identified	specifically	by	name	or	type	of	organisation	
in	order	 to	 show	 the	diversity	and	complex	entanglement	of	 relationships	 in	which	
the	three	INGOs	considered	in	the	next	three	chapters	are	working.	
The	chapter	 is	divided	 into	three	sections.	The	 first	provides	a	short	but	key	
overview	of	Pakistan	as	a	state	that	prioritised	the	military	protection	of	its	territory	
over	the	social	and	economic	care	of	its	population.	The	second	section	describes	the	
formation	 of	 the	 ‘humanitarian	 configuration’,	 i.e.	 the	 complex	 set	 of	 institutions,	
flows	 and	 actors	 for	 whom	 humanitarian	 action	 or	 relief	 constitutes	 a	 resource,	
profession,	market,	stake,	or	strategy	(see	Chapter	3).	Although	I	mention	the	1980s	
																																																						
83	This	chapter	is	based	on	and	expanded	from	a	chapter	published	in	Donini	(2012b).		
84	Peshawar	is	the	capital	city	of	a	province,	which	used	to	be	called	the	North	West	Frontier	Province	
(NWFP)	 until	 its	 name	 changed	 to	 Khyber	 Pakhtunkhwa	 (KPK)	 through	 the	 18th	 Amendment	 of	 the	
Constitution	of	Pakistan	passed	in	2010.	
85	The	earthquake	affected	3.5	million	people	and	resulted	in	the	loss	of	73,338	lives	according	to	the	
Pakistani	 Earthquake	 Reconstruction	 and	 Rehabilitation	 Authority	 (erra.pk/eq2005.asp).	 The	 2010	
floods	affected	about	20	million	people	in	the	entire	territory.	
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and	the	humanitarian	response	to	 the	 influx	of	Afghan	refugees,	 this	 section	draws	
mainly	upon	the	post-earthquake	2005-2008	period	which	saw	the	arrival	of	a	large	
number	 of	 international	 aid	 actors	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 Pakistani	 disaster	
management	 bureaucracy	 as	 well	 as	 the	 intensification	 of	 the	 war	 between	 the	
Pakistani	army	and	 local	 insurgent	groups.	The	third	section	deals	with	 the	political	
dynamics	 that	 framed	 the	 humanitarian	 configuration	 during	 three	 successive	 and	
overlapping	periods:	first,	the	peak	of	the	civil	war	between	the	Pakistani	army	and	
Islamist	 groups	 in	 2009;	 second,	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 2010	 flood,	 and	 third,	 the	
period	 of	my	 fieldwork	 (2011-2012)	when	 the	 humanitarian	 configuration	was	 still	
engaged	 with	 the	 ongoing	 conflict	 and	 displacement	 of	 populations	 in	 northern	
Pakistan	 and	 also	 dealing	 with	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 2010	 and	 2011	 floods.	
Throughout	the	chapter	the	three	 INGOs	 I	studied	are	situated	 in	order	to	describe	
their	involvement	in	the	wider	context	of	the	humanitarian	configuration	in	Pakistan.	
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A	state	that	protects	its	borders	more	than	it	cares	for	its	population	
It	 is	 important	 in	 grappling	 with	 the	 humanitarian	 configuration	 in	 Pakistan	 to	
understand	 its	 structural	 backdrop,	 in	 particular	 concerning	 the	 country’s	
prioritisation	of	military	over	 social	 services	 expenditures	 in	 relation	 to	Pakistan’s	
incapacity	 to	 redistribute	wealth	 through	 the	 taxation	 system	 and	 its	 reliance	 on	
foreign	aid	(mostly	from	the	US).	This	section	starts	first	with	a	short	political	history	
of	 Pakistan	 explaining	 the	 importance	 of	 its	 military	 power.	 It	 then	 shows	 how	
Pakistan	 has	 been	 tied	 to	 Western	 geopolitics	 through	 significant	 foreign	 aid	
funding	of	 the	 country’s	military.	 Finally,	 this	 section	 examines	 the	 state	of	 three	
key	social	service	sectors	corresponding	to	the	projects	I	studied:	access	to	health,	
education,	and	water	and	sanitation.86		
Territorial	threats	and	the	role	of	the	military	
Threats	 to	 Pakistan’s	 territorial	 integrity	 have	 been	 ongoing	 since	 it	 gained	
independence	in	1947,	as	disputes	emerged	with	India	over	Jammu	and	Kashmir,87	
and	with	Baloch	nationalists	over	the	province	of	Baluchistan	in	the	first	year	of	the	
state’s	 existence.	 These	 disputes	 remain	 unresolved.	 The	Afghan-Pakistani	 border	
brought	 its	 lot	of	 contentious	history:	 in	 1893,	 the	 government	of	 colonial	 British	
India	imposed	the	‘Durand	Line’	on	the	Emir	of	Afghanistan,	Abdur	Rahman	Khan,	as	
the	 official	 border	 between	 Afghanistan	 and	 the	 British	 Empire.	 Yet	 Afghanistan	
never	 officially	 recognised	 it,	 and	 Pashtuns	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 Line	 have	 never	
accepted	 the	 idea	 of	 their	 homeland	 being	 cut	 in	 half.	 Pakistan’s	 sense	 of	
nationhood	 has	 also	 been	 shaped	 by	 its	 loss	 of	 East	 Pakistan	 (where	 a	 Bengali	
majority	 was	 ruled	 by	 western	 Pakistan	 elites),	 after	 India	 recognised	 (and	 gave	
military	 aid	 to)	 the	 newly	 named	 and	 independent	 state	 of	 Bangladesh	 in	
December,	1971.	
Pakistani	state	formation	has	been	very	much	shaped	by	the	ubiquitous	role	
of	the	military	and	security	apparatus.	Since	the	country’s	first	Constitution	in	1956,	
																																																						
86	MSF	primarily	worked	on	health	 issues,	SC	on	education	and	Solidarités	on	access	 to	water	and	
sanitation.	 All	 three	 organisations,	 however,	 included	 people’s	 exposure	 to	 health	 risks	 in	 their	
assessment	of	the	situation.	
87	First	Kashmir	War	(1948),	Second	Kashmir	War	(1965),	Kargil	War	(1999).	
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there	have	been	three	military	coups	and	Pakistani	generals	have	governed	directly	
for	 more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 country’s	 history.	 Even	 Zulfikar	 Ali	 Bhutto,	 who	 was	 a	
declared	social	democrat	and	was	elected	in	1971	as	the	country’s	president	after	
fourteen	 years	 of	 military	 dictatorship,	 was	 obsessed	 by	 India’s	 nuclear	 progress	
and	 famously	 said:	 “If	 India	builds	 the	Bomb,	we	will	eat	grass	or	 leaves,	even	go	
hungry,	but	we	will	get	one	of	our	own”	(Russell	1985).	This	set	the	trajectory	of	the	
Pakistani	nation,	which	prioritised	its	nuclear	capabilities	over	many	other	pressing	
needs.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 fieldwork,88	 the	 country	 had	 the	 fastest-growing	 nuclear	
arsenal	 in	 the	 world	 and	 would	 soon	 be	 the	 fifth	 largest	 nuclear	 power	 (Riedel	
2011).	With	617,000	active	personnel	in	a	country	of	over	180	million,	the	Pakistan	
Armed	Forces	 is	 the	sixth	 largest	 in	the	world.	While	the	1973	constitution	clearly	
affirms	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	 democratically	 elected	 civilian	 government	 over	 the	
country’s	 armed	 forces,	 in	 practice	 the	 military	 establishment	 exercises	
considerable	 influence	 over	 major	 national	 policy	 decisions	 and	 their	
implementation.	
Pakistan	and	foreign	aid	
As	 reported	 by	 the	 International	 Crisis	 Group,	 foreign	 aid	 to	 Pakistan	 was	
characterised	by	“abrupt	swings	from	high	levels	of	aid	to	sudden	cut-offs,	with	aid	
patterns	determined	by	geo-strategic	policies	and	priorities	 rather	 than	the	needs	
of	the	people”	(ICG	2012a,	2).	
As	the	main	worry	of	the	Pakistani	military	has	always	been	to	contain	the	
Indian	threat,	Pakistan	sought	external	support	very	soon	after	 its	creation,	siding	
with	 the	 West	 in	 the	 Cold	 War	 (Jaffrelot	 2013,	 609).	 This	 initially	 brought	 the	
country	 substantial	 economic	and	military	 assistance	 (mostly	 from	 the	US),	which	
was	slowed	down	by	the	1965	and	1971	wars	between	Pakistan	and	 India	and	by	
the	 launch	of	the	Pakistani	nuclear	programme	in	1974	(ICG	2012a,	2–3).	Pakistan	
regained	 geostrategic	 importance	 when	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 invaded	 Afghanistan	 in	
1979.	In	1982	the	US	gave	$400	million	in	civilian	assistance	and	almost	$500	million	
in	military	 assistance	 (ICG	 2012a,	 3).	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	War,	US	military	 aid	
																																																						
88	 As	 far	 as	 possible	 the	 statistics	 about	 Pakistan	 in	 this	 chapter	 are	 dated	 around	 the	 period	 of	
fieldwork,	i.e.	around	2011-2012.	
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ceased	 and	 civilian	 aid	 dropped	 to	 $27	 million	 in	 1992	 (ICG	 2012a,	 3).	 The	
Government	 of	 Pakistan	 (GoP),	 unable	 to	 organise	 a	 redistribution	 of	 wealth	
through	 taxation,	 decided	 to	 take	 an	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 structural	
adjustment	package	in	1988	(ICG	2012a,	3).	In	2001,	the	Al	Qaeda	attacks	in	the	US	
triggered	an	American	release	of	“$600	million	in	emergency	cash	to	Pakistan”	(ICG	
2012a,	4),	as	well	as	extensions	of	grants	and	loans	from	the	EU,	Japan	and	Canada.	
Since	 then,	 the	 majority	 of	 aid	 has	 come	 from	 the	 US,	 channelled	 through	 the	
Coalition	 Support	 Fund	 dedicated	 to	 reimbursement	 for	 logistical	 and	 military	
support	 to	 US	military	 operations,	 such	 as	 the	 Shamsi	 Airfield	 and	 Dalbandin	 air	
bases	in	Balochistan.	On	the	civilian	side	the	US	allocated	direct	budget	support	to	
individual	Pakistani	ministries,	but	public	spending	to	the	social	sector	did	not	seem	
to	 increase.	 Instead	billions	were	diverted	 to	expand	military	budgets	 (ICG	2012a,	
4).	
Access	to	education,	health	and	water	and	sanitation	in	Pakistan	
Pakistan	has	experienced	constant	increases	in	its	per	capita	income	over	the	past	
decade,	but	indicators	such	as	infant	mortality	and	literacy	remain	among	the	worst	
in	the	world.	Studying	the	politics	of	service	delivery	in	Pakistan	in	the	1990s,	Zahid	
Hasnain,	economist	at	the	World	Bank,	argues	that:	
growth	 in	 Pakistan	 appears	 to	 have	 less	 of	 an	 impact	 on	
social	 sectors	 than	 in	 other	 countries—between	 1960	 and	
1998,	 as	 per	 capita	 GDP	 more	 than	 doubled	 in	 Pakistan,	
infant	mortality	 declined	 by	 43	 percent,	 as	 compared	 to	 a	
decline	 of	 73	 percent	 in	 a	 group	 of	 low	 income	 countries	
that	on	average	grew	at	the	same	rate.	
	
This	stagnation	was	particularly	disappointing	given	that	the	
1990s	was	also	 the	period	of	 the	Social	Action	Programme,	
which	 was	 up	 to	 that	 point	 the	 most	 concerted	 effort	 at	
improving	service	delivery	in	the	country’s	history.	(Hasnain	
2005,	132)	
State	investment	in	social	services	have	always	been	very	low	in	Pakistan:	less	than	
3%	of	Pakistan’s	GDP	is	spent	on	public	health	(see	Map	2	below	for	a	comparison	
with	other	states),	2.42%	on	education	(Rahman	2010,	236),	and	even	less	on	water	
and	 sanitation.	 Additionally,	 salaries	 have	 consumed	 the	 bulk	 of	 expenditures	
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whereas	 non-salary	 expenditures	 like	 medical	 equipment,	 medicine	 or	 textbooks	
and	blackboards	have	been	neglected	(Hasnain	2005,	134).		
Map	2	Total	expenditure	on	health	as	a	percentage	of	the	GDP,	2011	
	
Source:	http://www.who.int/health-accounts/expenditures_maps/en/	
Many	argue	that	health	has	never	been	a	high	priority	for	the	GoP,	and	as	in	
Pakistan	“78.08%	of	the	population	pay	out	of	pocket	at	the	point	of	health	care”	
(Nishtar	 et	 al.	 2013,	 2193)	 (three-quarters	 of	 the	 health	 services	 are	 provided	 by	
private	health	institutions)	,	“households	with	lower	incomes	are	increasingly	at	risk	
of	becoming	poor	 as	 a	 consequence	of	health	payments	even	 though	 they	 spend	
less	than	rich	households	and	generally	seem	to	have	less	access	to	care	and	forego	
health	care”	(Nishtar	et	al.	2013,	2198).	
Pakistan	
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Map	3	Private	expenditure	on	health	as	a	%	expenditure	on	health	(in	$),	2011	
	
Source:	http://www.who.int/health-accounts/expenditures_maps/en/	
The	 18th	 Constitutional	 Amendment	 (passed	 in	 2010)	 abolished	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Health	 to	 devolve	 the	 health	management	 budget	 to	 local	 governments	 and	 this	
resulted	 in	 a	 “fragmentation”	 of	 the	 health	 offer	 (Nishtar	 et	 al.	 2013,	 2195,	 see	
Table	1).	 In	 fact,	Pakistan’s	 levels	of	chronic	malnutrition	are	comparable	to	some	
Sahel	 countries:	 “Between	 2001	 and	 2010	 the	 levels	 of	 stunting	 among	 young	
children	 increased	 from	37.6%	 to	50%	 in	Punjab	and	 from	48%	 to	51.8%	 in	Sindh	
(World	 Health	 Organization	 2010;	 Sindh	 Department	 of	 Health	 2011;	 Punjab	
Department	of	Health	2011).	Among	the	main	structural	causes	of	stunting	are	the	
lack	 of	 access	 to	 enough	 nutritious	 food,	 to	 enough	 clean	 water	 and	 to	 health	
facilities”	(Péchayre	2011a,	131).	Together	with	Nigeria	and	Afghanistan,	it	is	one	of	
only	 three	 countries	 in	 the	world	where	polio	has	not	 yet	been	eradicated	 (WHO	
2012).	In	recent	years	other	major	epidemic	outbreaks	like	measles	have	exposed	a	
lack	 of	 vaccination	 coverage,	 attributed	 by	 some	 to	 insufficient	 trained	 medical	
personnel	 and	 vaccination	 resources	 (Riaz	 2013).	 Scandals	 over	 deadly	medicines	
contamination	 in	 2012	 also	 pointed	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 weak	 medicines	 regulation	
(World	Health	Organization	2013;	see	also	Dawn	2012).	In	another	indicator	of	the	
Pakistan	 health	 system’s	 weaknesses,	 in	 a	 2012	 report	 entitled	 Ending	 Newborn	
Pakistan	
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Deaths,	Save	the	Children	US	reported	that	Pakistan	had	the	highest	rate	of	first	day	
deaths	and	stillbirths	at	40.7	per	1000	births89	(Save	the	Children	USA	2014,	3).	
Concerning	 education,	 Hasnain	 argues90	 that	 “teachers	 were	 recruited	
primarily	on	patronage	grounds,	and	the	schools	built	were	of	poor	quality	because	
of	the	commissions	given	to	the	contractors”	(Hasnain	2005,	136).	The	literacy	rate	
in	 2011-2012	 remained	 low	 –	 58%	 overall	 (59%	 in	 Sindh	 and	 50%	 in	 KPK)	 (Omer	
Farooq	2012,	136).	The	coverage	of	private	schooling	has	been	rising	over	most	of	
the	past	35	years	(Nelson	2009,	591):	even	though	a	National	Education	Policy	was	
issued	in	2009	and	most	recent	education	statistics	show	that	64%	of	students	were	
enrolled	in	public	institutions	(Ministry	of	Education	2013,	5),	this	was	mostly	due	to	
relatively	high	levels	of	enrolment	in	primary	education	(6-10	years	old)	as	88%	of	
primary	 institutions	are	public	 (Ministry	of	 Education	2013,	8).	More	 than	60%	of	
middle	 (11-13	 years	 old)	 and	 high	 schools	 (14-15	 years	 old)	 as	 well	 as	 higher	
secondary	 level	 institutions	 (16-17	 years	 old)	 are,	 in	 fact,	 private	 (Ministry	 of	
Education	2013,	10–12–13).91	
	 Access	 to	 drinking	 water	 seems	 to	 be	 less	 of	 an	 issue	 than	 education	 in	
Pakistan.	The	WHO	lists	Pakistan	as	one	of	the	countries	in	2012	in	which	more	than	
90%	 of	 the	 population	 use	 improved	 drinking	 water	 sources.92	 Yet	 definitions	 of	
what	‘access	to	drinking	water’	means	vary	depending	on	the	source;	for	example,	
in	2009,	according	to	the	GoP	National	Drinking	Water	Policy,	only	around	65%	of	
Pakistan’s	 population	 was	 considered	 to	 have	 access	 to	 safe	 drinking	 water	
(Ministry	of	Environment	2009,	4).93	Additionally	international	NGOs	specialising	in	
																																																						
89	Followed	by	Nigeria,	Sierra	Leone,	Somali,	Guinea-Bissau	and	Afghanistan.	
90	Zahid	Hasnain’s	work	relies	on	an	analysis	of	the	1988-1999	period	even	though	it	was	published	in	
2008.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 his	 article,	 Hasnain	 comments	 on	 the	 devolution	 plan	 announced	 in	 2000	 by	
Pervez	 Musharraf’s	 military	 government	 and	 implemented	 in	 2001-2002	 aiming	 at	 transferring	
administrative	and	financial	power	to	local	governments.	The	theory	of	political	devolution	was	that:	
“bringing	government	closer	to	the	people	increases	the	accountability	of	elected	policy-makers	to	
the	 public,	 and	 creates	 the	 necessary	 incentives	 for	 these	 policy-makers	 to	 act	 on	 the	 public’s	
demands	 for	 improved	 service	delivery”	 (Hasnain	2005,	149).	 Yet	Hasnain	argues	 that	 “devolution	
has	 resulted	 in	 considerable	 political	 tensions	 between	 the	 provincial	 and	 local	 governments”	
(Hasnain	 2005,	 149)	 especially	 when	 they	 belonged	 to	 different	 political	 parties,	 hence	 assuming	
that	devolution	will	not	dramatically	change	the	patronage	dynamics	of	service	delivery	in	Pakistan.	
91	Universities	are	mostly	public	(57%)	(Ministry	of	Education	2013,	17).	
92	http://gamapserver.who.int/mapLibrary/Files/Maps/Global_water_2012.png		
93	The	definition	the	Pakistan	National	Drinking	Water	Policy	gives	of	safe	drinking	water	is	that:	“at	
least	 45	 and	 120	 liter	 per	 capita	 per	 day	 of	 drinking	water	 is	 available	 for	 rural	 and	 urban	 areas,	
respectively,	within	 the	 house	 or	 at	 such	 a	 distance	 that	 the	 total	 time	 required	 for	 reaching	 the	
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water	 access	 and	 donors	 have	 claimed	 that	 official	 data	 (both	 from	 the	GoP	 and	
WHO)	 is	 inaccurate	 (Water	 Aid	 2009,	 13)	 and	 that:	 “Pakistan	 faces	 a	
multidimensional	water	crisis	that	claims	hundreds	of	thousands	of	lives	every	year”	
(NOREF	2010,	1).	In	terms	of	access	to	sanitation	facilities,	Pakistan	again	falls	into	
the	world’s	worst	category	as	the	following	WHO	map	shows.	
Map	4	Proportion	of	population	using	improved	sanitation	facilities	(%),	2012	
	
Source:	http://gamapserver.who.int/mapLibrary/Files/Maps/Global_sanitation_2012.png	
The	 formation	 of	 an	 international	 ‘humanitarian	 configuration’	 in	
Pakistan	
As	noted	above,	only	a	 few	 international	 relief	actors	were	working	 in	Pakistan	 in	
the	1980s;	their	numbers	really	increased	after	the	2005	earthquake,	which	is	when	
a	‘humanitarian	configuration’	dedicated	to	Pakistani	citizens	started	to	form.	This	
section	is	divided	into	three	periods:	first,	a	rapid	overview	of	the	1980s	assistance	
to	the	Afghan	refugees;	second,	an	account	of	the	emergence	of	the	international	
humanitarian	configuration	for	Pakistani	populations;	and	third,	a	description	of	the	
transition	period	between	the	2005	earthquake	and	the	2009	Swat	offensive	which	
																																																																																																																																																									
water	 source,	 collecting	water	 and	 returning	 to	 home	 is	 not	more	 than	 30	minutes”	 (Ministry	 of	
Environment	2009,	3–4).	This	policy	cites	figures	asserting	that	around	65%	of	Pakistan’s	population	
is	considered	to	have	access	to	safe	drinking	water.	
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triggered	 a	 massive	 displacement	 of	 people,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 reactivation	 of	 the	
international	humanitarian	bureaucracy.	
Roots:	Peshawar	in	the	1980s		
Although	Pakistan	was	not	a	signatory	to	the	1951	Convention	relating	to	the	Status	
of	Refugees,	beginning	in	the	1980s,	the	country	became	host	to	millions	of	Afghan	
refugees.	 ICRC	 and	numerous	NGOs	 and	UN	humanitarian	organisations	 provided	
assistance,	 while	 Pakistani	 authorities,	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 Inter-Services	
Intelligence	 (Donini	 2012a,	 72),	 maintained	 tight	 control	 over	 the	 overall	 relief	
system.	Save	the	Children	was	among	the	(mostly	of	Anglo-Saxon	origin)	INGOs	that	
arrived	 in	 Pakistan	 in	 1980	 to	 assist	 Afghan	 refugees	 in	 the	 345	 “Afghan	Refugee	
Villages”	 of	 between	 5000	 to	 8000	 people	 each	 settled	 along	 the	 border	 with	
Afghanistan	 from	 Chittral	 in	 the	 north	 to	 Quetta	 in	 Balochistan	 (Centlivres	 2014,	
53).	 These	 INGOs,	 as	 well	 as	 UN	 agencies	 such	 as	 UN	 High	 Commissioner	 for	
Refugees	 (UNHCR)	 and	 WFP,	 had	 to	 work	 together	 with	 the	 Pakistani	
Commissionerate	 Afghan	 Refugees	 which	 was	 coordinating	 assistance	 to	 the	
refugees.	 As	 the	 Pakistani	 authorities	 supported	 the	 various	 Afghan	 political	
opposition	parties,	many	of	which	had	bases	 in	Peshawar,	 it	was	decreed	 that	all	
refugees	had	to	be	politically	affiliated	with	one	of	these	parties	in	order	to	receive	
an	identity	card	and	therefore	be	entitled	to	registration	as	a	refugee	and	to	receive	
assistance.	 Since	 international	 financial	 support	 to	 Afghan	 political	 parties	 was	
proportional	 to	 the	 representation	 they	 claimed,	 refugees	 were	 instrumental	 for	
these	 parties	 to	 gain	 influence	 and	 accumulate	 resources.	 Reciprocally,	 Afghan	
refugees	used	their	refugee	status	to	benefit	from	international	assistance	and	used	
their	 temporary	 status	 to	 be	 welcomed	 as	 guests	 of	 the	 Pakistani	 Pashtuns,	 to	
whom	they	were	often	related	through	distant	tribal	links	(Centlivres	2014,	55).	
Other	 INGOs	 (mostly	of	French	origin)	arrived	 in	Pakistan	 in	order	 to	assist	
Afghans	inside	Afghanistan,	and	to	organise	secret	cross-border	missions.	The	most	
famous	example	was	MSF,	whose	members’	stories	of	crossing	the	border	illegally	
under	women’s	traditional	blue	burkas	and	hiding	in	the	Afghan	mountains	with	the	
Mudjahidins	are	 told	 in	biographical	works	about	 the	organisation	 (Vallaeys	2004)	
and	 works	 of	 fiction	 based	 on	 true	 stories	 such	 as	 the	 comic	 series	 The	
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Photographer	 (Guibert	 2009).	 As	 already	 mentioned	 (see	 Chapter	 3),	 those	 who	
were	to	create	Solidarités	a	few	years	later	organised	‘caravans’	that	left	Peshawar	
to	 cross	 the	 border	 into	 Afghanistan.	 They	 were	 close	 to	 people	 from	MSF	 and	
other	 French	 INGOs,	 including	 Aide	Médicale	 Internationale94	 and	 Amitiés	 Franco	
Afghanes95,	 but	 had	 very	 few	 relationships	 with	 organisations	 working	 inside	
Pakistan	except	for	the	ICRC:	“We	didn’t	go	to	the	same	meetings,	we	didn’t	work	
the	same	way.	It	was	altogether	two	different	worlds”,96	Alain	Boinet	told	me	in	an	
interview.	He	went	on	to	say	that	all	 the	staff	 recruited	 in	Peshawar	were	Afghan	
except	for	the	security	company	and	the	cook-cleaner.	He	added	that	contact	with	
Pakistani	 authorities	 was	 made	 only	 to	 renew	 visas	 and	 obtain	 exit	 permits.	 He	
added	that	Pakistani	Intelligence	Services	were	probably	watching	them,	and	knew	
what	was	 going	 on	 but	 that	 they	 never	 got	 in	 their	way.	 From	his	 point	 of	 view,	
Peshawar	was	the	city	of	Afghans	in	exile	before	being	the	capital	city	of	the	North-
West	Frontier	Province	(NWFP)	of	Pakistan.		
During	 the	 1980s	 most	 foreign	 humanitarian	 organisations	 worked	 for	
Afghans,	assisting	them	as	victims	of	the	Soviet	invasion.	The	macro-triage	logic	that	
differentiated	 humanitarian	 actors	 was	 mainly	 their	 assistance	 modus	 operandi,	
insofar	as	some	would	take	assistance	across	the	border	and	others	worked	within	
Pakistani	Afghan	refugees	villages.	Another	key	difference	between	the	two	macro-
triage	 logics	was	that	relief	provided	across	the	border	was	significantly	smaller	 in	
terms	of	physical	volume	of	food,	medicines,	and	clothes	and	hence	in	the	number	
of	people	 reached.	This	assistance	was	 symbolic,	 and	attempted	 to	 show	political	
solidarity	against	what	the	organisations	saw	as	Socialist	oppression	in	the	Cold	War	
era.	Overall,	the	assistance	was	funded	by	western	foreign	aid	and	was	enshrined	in	
a	Cold	War	logic	of	opposing	the	Soviet	Union	(Terry	2002).	
Emergence:	2005	earthquake	
When	 the	 2005	 earthquake	 struck,	 regardless	 of	 their	 previous	 expertise,	
organisations	working	 in	Pakistan	mobilised	 to	assist	 those	affected.	 International	
																																																						
94	Medical	Assistance	International	(my	translation).	
95	Franco-Afghan	Friendship	(my	translation).	
96	My	translation	from	French,	(as	are	all	other	interviews	conducted	in	French	and	used	as	citations	
in	this	dissertation).	
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relief	 organisations	 stepped	 in	 alongside	 Pakistani	 development	 organisations,97	
benefiting	from	their	knowledge	of	local	networks	and	society.	Pakistani	civil	society	
played	a	major	role	 in	the	response,	which	was	eventually	considered	“the	largest	
philanthropic	 response	 by	 Pakistanis	 that	 the	 country	 [had]	 ever	 experienced”	
(Wilder	2008,	4).	
	 Pakistani	 state	 institutions,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 military,	 were	 ill-
prepared	for	major	emergencies;	the	army	rapidly	took	the	lead,	giving	rise	to	what	
was	rated	as	one	of	the	best	examples	of	international98	civil-military	cooperation	in	
a	 major	 disaster	 (Wilder	 2008;	 Andrabi	 and	 Das	 2010).	 Major	 General	 Farooq	
Ahmad	 was	 appointed	 to	 head	 the	 newly	 established	 Federal	 Relief	 Commission	
(FRC)	in	charge	of	coordinating	the	emergency	response	(mostly	distributing	tents,	
blankets,	food	rations	and	medicines)	and	talked	of	a	“non-interfering	coordination”	
(Nadeem	and	Mc	Leod	2008):		
The	 military	 has	 assets,	 mobility,	 means,	 organization	 and	
wherewithal,	 and	 can	 provide	 national,	 district	 and	 local	
coordination	 infrastructure	 for	 NGOs,	 civil	 society	 and	
international	support	to	“plug	in	to.”	Most	importantly,	they	
can	 work	 in	 distant	 areas,	 hard-to-reach	 and	 perhaps	
“insecure”	regions.	(Nadeem	and	Mc	Leod	2008)	
The	authors	noted,	however,	that	humanitarian	actors	were	better	equipped	than	
the	 military	 to	 assess	 ‘vulnerabilities’	 of	 the	 affected	 populations	 and	 prevent	
certain	groups	from	being	marginalised.	
The	 response	 to	 the	 disaster	 provided	 the	 United	 Nations	 with	 an	
opportunity	 to	 pilot	 its	 newly	 adopted	 Humanitarian	 Reform	 mechanisms	 (see	
Chapter	1),	including	the	‘cluster	system’	for	assigning	responsibilities	to	key	actors	
in	 disaster	 response.	 Cluster	 coordination	meetings	 took	 place	 in	 the	 emergency	
shelter,	 health,	 nutrition,	 water	 sanitation	 and	 hygiene,	 food	 security,	 education,	
protection,	emergency	telecoms	and	logistics	sectors	(Stoddard	et	al.	2007,	vii–viii).	
Clusters	and	the	FRC	were	aligned	as	the	FRC	had	“decided	to	structure	itself	using	
																																																						
97	Most	Pakistani	NGOs	were	created	in	the	1980s	and	the	1990s	and,	until	2005,	were	development	
organisations	working	at	grass-roots	level,	mainly	on	structural,	social,	economic,	and	health	issues.	
The	 Edhi	 Foundation	 appears	 to	 be	 somewhat	 atypical	 in	 its	 expertise	 on	 emergency	 assistance.	
Founded	 in	1951,	 it	provides	medical	aid,	 family	planning,	and	emergency	assistance	through	over	
three	hundred	centres	across	the	country,	in	big	cities,	small	towns,	and	remote	rural	areas.	
98	 It	 included	 US,	 British,	 NATO,	 and	 Australian	 military	 forces	 working	 together	 under	 Pakistani	
leadership.	
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the	 cluster	 approach	 as	 well”	 (Stoddard	 et	 al.	 2007,	 21,	 footnote	 36).	 Far	 from	
clashing	 with	 military	 initiatives,	 some	 have	 even	 argued	 that,	 ironically,	 “the	
military	 found	 it	 easier	 to	 adapt	 to	 the	 new	 Cluster	 system	 than	 did	 the	
humanitarian	 world”	 (Nadeem	 and	 Mc	 Leod	 2008).	 An	 evaluation	 conducted	 in	
February	2006	recommended	improvements	based	on	the	Pakistan	experience,	but	
overall	 assessed	 the	 clusters	 as	 having	 “successfully	 provided	 a	 single	 and	
recognizable	 framework	 for	 coordination,	 collaboration,	 decision-making	 and	
practical	 solutions	 in	 a	 chaotic	 operational	 environment”	 (Inter	 Agency	 Standing	
Committee	2006,	2).	The	FRC	was	set	up	with	United	Nations	Development	Program	
(UNDP)	funds,	and	used	the	clusters	to	facilitate	the	overall	coordination	of	national	
relief	 efforts.	 As	 a	 result,	 Pakistan	 is	 one	 of	 the	 rare	 cases	 where	 national	 and	
international	 coordination	 mechanisms	 were	 perceived	 as	 complementary	 and	
mutually	beneficial.	
Two	major	legacies	of	the	earthquake	response	included	the	development	of	
Pakistani	 infrastructures	 to	 deal	 with	 disasters	 and	 the	 dynamics	 that	 shaped	
relations	between	humanitarian	actors	and	the	Pakistani	military.	In	the	aftermath	
of	 the	 earthquake,	 the	 Pakistani	 government	 created	 institutions	 responsible	 for	
disaster	 preparedness	 and	 response	 at	 national,	 provincial,	 and	 local	 levels.	 The	
National	 Disaster	Management	 Authority	 (NDMA)	was	 defined	 as	 responsible	 for	
policymaking	 and	 coordination	 at	 the	 national	 level.	 Provincial	 Disaster	
Management	Authorities	 (PDMAs)	were	“mandated	 to	effectively	 set	up	a	system	
to	 look	 after	 disasters	 and	 calamities	 whether	 natural,	 man-induced,	 or	
accidents”.99	PDMAs	were	to	become	the	backbone	of	emergency	responses	at	the	
provincial	level.	
The	earthquake	response	was	considered	one	of	the	best	ever	implemented	
in	the	context	of	a	natural	hazard	event	of	such	a	scale.	Close	cooperation	between	
relief	 agencies	 and	 the	 Pakistani	 armed	 forces	 was	 a	 significant	 issue,	 and	
humanitarian	actors	came	to	accept	this	arrangement	as	the	most	effective	way	of	
addressing	 urgent	 needs,	 including	 the	 organisation	 of	 camps	 and	 providing	
earthquake	 victims	 with	 basic	 medical,	 water,	 sanitation,	 and	 food	 assistance.	
																																																						
99	http://www.pdma.gov.pk/About_PDMA.php		
	 112	
Notwithstanding	widespread	reports	of	relief	efforts	by	local	organisations	linked	to	
Islamist	groups	(termed	militant	organisations	by	the	GoP)	in	the	aftermath	of	the	
earthquake,	a	study	published	in	2010	showed	that:	
the	presence	of	militant	organizations	at	the	village	level	was	
extremely	limited	even	in	villages	close	to	the	fault-line—of	all	
organizations,	 these	 had	 the	 lowest	 coverage	 and	 even	 at	
their	highest	point	right	next	to	the	fault-line,	not	more	than	
ten	percent	of	households	reported	receiving	assistance	from	
such	an	organization.	(Andrabi	and	Das	2010,	22)	
MSF,	 already	 present	 in	 other	 areas	 of	 the	 country,	 started	 relief	 very	
rapidly,	 doing	 outpatient	 consultations,	 referring	 more	 severe	 cases	 to	 inpatient	
facilities,	 and	 distributing	 tents,	 blankets	 and	 hygiene	 kits	 to	 people	wounded	 or	
displaced	 by	 the	 earthquake.	 Over	 the	 following	 six-month	 period,	 MSF	 also	
vaccinated	 over	 30,000	 people	 against	 diseases	 such	 as	 measles	 and	 ran	 three	
hospitals	 to	 provide	 surgery	 and	 post-operative	 care	 in	 Mansehra,	 Bagh	 and	
Hattian.100	MSF	logisticians	also	constructed	latrines	and	shelters	as	medical	teams	
identified	their	lack	as	the	cause	of	many	illnesses.	
Solidarités	 decided	 to	 send	an	 assessment	 team	 to	Pakistan	 about	 a	week	
after	the	earthquake.	This	delay	was	the	result	of	internal	discussion	about	whether	
or	 not	 the	 organisation	would	 institutionalise	 its	 capacity	 to	 provide	 relief	 in	 the	
aftermath	of	hazards:	until	the	organisation	had	implemented	projects	in	Sri	Lanka	
and	 Indonesia	after	 the	2004	 tsunami,	 it	had	worked	exclusively	 in	 conflict/	post-
conflict	 settings.	 The	 team	 that	 supervised	 the	 2005	 assessment	 and	 response	 in	
Pakistan	 did	 not	 seem	 to	 benefit	 from	 the	 institutional	 memory	 of	 Solidarités’	
presence	there	in	the	1980s.	Peshawar	in	the	1980s	was	considered	rather	to	be	an	
annex	of	Afghanistan	 rather	 than	Pakistani	 territory.	 Solidarités’	 projects	 in	 2005-
2007	were	focused	on	the	urgent	provision	of	water	and	sanitation	to	earthquake	
victims	in	the	Mera	(Allai	Valley)	and	Batera	camps	(near	Manshera)	(see	map	5)	as	
well	as	the	reconstruction	of	destroyed	rural	water	networks	to	provide	sustainable	
water	and	sanitation	infrastructures.	
																																																						
100	www.msf.org/pakistan-activity-report-2006		
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Save	 the	 Children	 alliance’s	 response,	 by	 contrast,	 was	 significant.	 Its	
assistance	was	in	Bagh,	Muzzaferabad,	Allai	Tehsil,	Mansehra,	and	F.R.	Kala	Dhaka.	
It	offered	a	wide	range	of	assistance	from	distribution	of	drinking	water,	milk	packs,	
tents,	 tarpaulins	 and	 food,	 to	 the	 set	 up	 and	management	 of	 tented	 schools	 and	
safe	play	spaces	for	children	aged	four	to	ten.	It	also	constructed	livestock	barns	for	
people	who	had	come	down	from	the	Allai	with	their	cows,	buffalos	and	bulls.	The	
alliance	also	operated	the	Bana	Allai	Field	Hospital	and	supported	the	livelihoods	of	
people	 who	 were	 displaced	 –	 through	 “cash	 for	 work”	 activities	 or	 “vocational	
training”	for	women	in	camps	(Save	the	Children	2005).	
The	2007-2008	‘transition’	phase	
Within	two	years	of	the	onset	of	the	disaster,	the	relief	period	had	come	to	an	end	
and	the	majority	of	INGOs	that	had	arrived	in	Pakistan	to	help	in	the	aftermath	of	
the	 earthquake	 had	 left	 the	 country.	 For	 some	 NGOs	 such	 departures	 were	
encouraged	by	 the	 reduction	of	 funds	available	 for	 relief	work.	Relief	 funds	 came	
mostly	 from	 the	 US	 and	 the	 EU,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 donors	 from	 the	 OECD	
(Development	Initiatives	2008,	11).	Since	2001,	the	US	and	many	EU	countries	had	
been	 involved	 in	 Afghanistan	 reconstruction,	 yet	 relief	 funds	 coming	 from	 these	
countries	to	Pakistan	in	2005	were	not	so	tightly	linked	to	the	western	foreign	policy	
agenda	 (Wilder	 2008,	 43).	 Hence,	 funding	 of	 the	 Office	 of	 US	 Foreign	 Disaster	
Assistance	(OFDA)	by	the	US	and	the	European	Community	Humanitarian	Aid	Office	
(ECHO)	 by	 the	 EU	 dropped	 drastically	 in	 2007:	 OFDA	 from	 $69.4	million	 in	 2006	
(OFDA	 2007,	 64)	 to	 $1.9	 million	 in	 2007	 (OFDA	 2008,	 77),	 and	 ECHO	 from	 €10	
million	 in	 2005	 (ECHO	2005,	 1)	 to	 €1	million	 in	 2006	 (ECHO	2006,	 1)	 and	 zero	 in	
2007.	Solidarités,	 for	 instance,	at	 the	end	of	 their	 relief	 response	project	 in	2006,	
launched	 several	 new	 needs	 assessments	 in	 Kashmir	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 stay	 in	
Pakistan	but	failed	to	convince	donors	of	the	added	value	of	their	presence	and	had	
to	leave	the	country	when	they	ran	out	of	funds	at	the	beginning	of	2007.	In	some	
cases	 humanitarian	 organisations,	 like	 MSF’s	 Operational	 Centre	 Paris	 (OCP),	
decided	 that	 their	 mandate	 no	 longer	 applied	 to	 recovery	 and	 reconstruction	
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needs101	and	chose	to	leave.	Clusters	were	put	on	hold.	Those	NGOs	that	remained,	
like	 the	 Save	 the	 Children	 alliance,	 staffed	 their	 teams	 with	 development-
experienced	personnel	and	pursued	strategies	geared	towards	addressing	structural	
issues	and	long-term	recovery.	
	 The	Pakistani	 authorities,	which	 considered	 the	 cluster	 experience	 to	have	
been	a	successful	model	of	coordination,	volunteered	to	participate	in	the	One	UN	
approach	when	 this	 initiative	emerged	 in	2007.	The	One	UN	concept	was	geared,	
primarily,	 to	 post-conflict	 situations	 and	 was	 concerned	 with	 “more	 coherent	
programmes,	reduced	transaction	costs	for	governments,	and	lower	overhead	costs	
for	the	UN	system.”102	Paradoxically,	that	same	year,	internal	conflict	between	the	
Pakistani	Taliban	and	the	military	was	to	become	much	more	violent.	Pakistan	was	
selected	to	pilot	the	‘Delivering	as	One’	approach,	with	one	leader	(a	UN	Resident	
Coordinator),	one	budget,	one	programme,	and	one	office	for	all	UN	agencies,	but	
as	it	was	being	set	up	the	country	descended	into	internal	conflict	and	the	roll	out	
of	the	post-conflict	One	UN	apparatus	was	postponed.	
Even	though	Pakistani	military	attacks	against	insurgents	based	in	the	FATA	
region	were	reported	as	early	as	2004,	it	was	the	2007	attacks	by	the	Pakistani	army	
on	the	Red	Mosque	in	Islamabad	that	turned	certain	Pakistani	Talibans	against	state	
authorities.	 The	 Red	Mosque	 of	 Islamabad	 stood,	 according	 to	 journalist	 Carlotta	
Gall,	 “at	 the	 center	of	 Pakistan’s	 support	 for	 jihad	 in	Afghanistan	and	 throughout	
the	 Muslim	 world”	 (Gall	 2014).	 She	 added	 “Maulana	 Abdul	 Aziz,	 delivered	 fiery	
Friday	 sermons	 excoriating	 Musharraf	 for	 his	 public	 stance	 on	 the	 fight	 against	
terrorism	and	his	dealings	with	the	American	government.”	Students	of	the	mosque	
started	demonstrating,	and:	
Several	months	after	the	protest	began,	a	group	of	students	
made	 a	 midnight	 raid	 on	 a	 massage	 parlor	 and	 abducted	
several	Chinese	women.	
	
Remonstrations	 from	 China,	 Pakistan’s	 most	 important	
regional	ally,	pushed	Musharraf	to	take	action.	(Gall	2014)	
																																																						
101	MSF	OCB,	the	MSF	section	I	studied,	decided	to	stay	and	went	back	to	 its	 initial	aim	to	work	as	
close	as	possible	to	FATA	where	fighting	between	the	Pakistani	army	and	insurgents	was	taking	place	
(see	Chapter	5).	
102	https://undg.org/home/guidance-policies/delivering-as-one/	
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Elite	 Pakistani	 commandos	were	 sent	 and	 fought	 against	 Pakistani	 insurgents	 for	
ten	hours	–	a	battle	that	claimed	more	than	one	hundred	lives.	This	event	signalled	
the	 end	 of	 the	 ceasefire	 between	 the	 Pakistani	 Taliban	 (like	 the	 Tehrik-e-Taliban)	
and	 the	 Inter-Services	 Intelligence	 (ISI)	 that	 had	 been	 signed	 in	 2005	 when	 the	
military	was	facing	armed	resistance	in	the	FATA.	The	agreement	had	been	that	the	
Tehrik-e-Taliban	 Pakistan	 (TTP)	 would	 not	 attack	 government	 officials	 or	 allow	
foreign	 insurgents	 to	 operate	 on	 Pakistani	 soil	 in	 return	 for	 which	 the	 Pakistani	
military	would	stop	military	operations,	withdraw	from	areas	controlled	by	the	TTP	
and	financially	compensate	families	affected	by	the	operations.	
The	emergence	of	those	who	are	commonly	called	the	Pakistani	Taliban	was	
the	result	of	several	social	and	historical	factors,	three	of	which	are	discussed	here.	
First,	 sectarian	 tensions	 between	 Shias	 and	 Sunnis	 provided	 significant	 foreign	
resources	 to	 Sunni	 extremism	 particularly	 in	 the	 1970s,	 as	 Mariam	 Abou	 Zahab	
describes:	
The	Iranian	revolution	inspired	Shia	communities	in	Pakistan	
and	 to	 counter	 this	 trend,	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 Iraq	 and	 Kuwait	
started	 patronising	Wahabis	 and	 other	 non-Shias.	 Pakistan	
became	 a	 primary	 battlefield:	 it	 shares	 a	 border	with	 Iran,	
has	a	sizeable	Shia	population	(15	to	20%)	and	Zia	had	made	
it	 the	center	of	US	 sponsored	Sunni	 Islamism.	 (Abou	Zahab	
2002,	115)	
Saudi	Arabia	and	other	Gulf	states	are,	indeed,	often	quoted	as	major	providers	of	
financial	 as	 well	 as	 human	 resources,	 sending	 combatants	 to	 jihadist	 groups	 in	
Pakistan	 (Jaffrelot	 2013,	 564).	 The	 Pakistani	 support	 for	 the	 jihad	 in	 Afghanistan	
during	 the	 Soviet	 invasion	 in	 the	 1980s	 gave	 rise	 to	 a	 generation	 of	 Pakistani	
fighters	 (for	example,	 the	Lashkar-e	Taïba)	who	were	able	 to	export	 the	militancy	
style	 to	 support	 the	 struggle	 over	 Kashmir	 and,	 sometimes,	 to	 turn	 it	 against	 the	
Pakistani	 state	 institutions.	 The	 TTP	 led	 by	 Baitullah	 Mehsud,	 for	 instance,	 was	
formed	by	Al	Qaeda	members	and	had,	as	mentioned,	an	agreement	with	the	Inter-
Services	Intelligence	that	they	could	operate	from	Pakistani	soil	as	long	as	they	did	
not	 launch	 attacks	 against	 Pakistani	 authorities,	 or	 support	 foreign	 jihadists.	 They	
respected	 the	 agreement	 and	 mainly	 targeted	 NATO	 troops	 in	 Afghanistan	 from	
South	Waziristan	until	 the	military	attack	on	the	Red	Mosque	(Islamabad)	on	July,	
10th	 2007,	 but	 then	 redirected	 (together	 with	 the	 Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Muhammadi	
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(TNSM)	in	Swat	and	Buner)	their	energy	against	Pakistani	authorities	(Jaffrelot	2013,	
557–558).	 The	 setting	 for	 these	 political	 and	 historical	 opportunities	 was	 that	 of	
structural	weakness:	the	Pakistani	government	had	failed	over	the	years	to	improve	
social	 and	economic	 conditions	 for	 its	 population	 and,	 in	 particular,	 for	 its	 youth.	
Many	in	turn	chose	jihad	over	unemployment	and	feudal	oppression.	These	young	
people	from	modest	origins	(coming	from	minority	clans	or	tribes,	and	the	poorest	
social	classes)	who	engaged	in	militancy,	did	so	partly	because	the	insurgents’	claim	
to	be	fighting	for	an	Islamic	revolution	in	Pakistan	echoed	their	aspirations	for	social	
justice103	and	“a	rightful	share	in	national	resources”	(Abou	Zahab	2002,	116).	
Between	November	2008	and	February	2009	there	was	a	progressive	move	
by	the	TNSM/TTP	to	impose	Sharia	 law	upon	the	Swati	population,	which	the	GoP	
even	agreed	to	officially	as	a	way	to	attempt	to	settle	tensions.	Yet	as	the	rumour	
emerged	 that	 the	 group	 was	 planning	 to	 move	 even	 further	 south	 towards	
Islamabad,	 the	 GoP	 launched	 a	 major	 military	 campaign	 to	 eradicate	 those	 they	
called	“the	militants”	from	what	used	to	be	a	rich	Pakistani	holiday	destination.	This	
military	operation	pushed	millions	of	people	out	of	the	Swat	Valley.	Humanitarian	
actors	at	this	time	were	still	 in	a	post-earthquake	early	recovery	mode.	They	were	
not	 positioned	 or	mobilised	 to	 react	 swiftly	 and	 had	 little	 sensitivity	 to	 the	 risks	
faced	by	some	affected	populations	when	relief	was	organised	in	cooperation	with	
the	 Pakistani	 military,	 one	 of	 the	 parties	 to	 the	 conflict,	 as	 the	 next	 section	
demonstrates.	
The	politics	of	the	‘humanitarian	configuration’	(2009-2012)	
2009-2010:	politics	in	conflict	settings	
By	 the	 end	 of	 2009,	 fighting	 between	 the	 Pakistani	 army	 and	 non-state	 armed	
groups	 had	 triggered	 the	 displacement	 of	 up	 to	 4.2	million	 people	 (ICG	 2010,	 1).	
Although	 Pakistani	 army	 operations	 against	 insurgents	 in	 South	 Waziristan	 had	
started	as	early	as	2004	and	caused	significant	displacement,	prior	to	2008	almost	
																																																						
103	For	 Jaffrelot,	Pakistan	“was	created	by	an	elite	who	were	worried	about	protecting	their	status	
while	escaping	first	the	influence	of	the	Hindu	majority	in	India,	then	escaping	the	influence	of	the	
masses	in	Pakistan.	The	civil-military	establishment	prevailed	without	sharing	power	for	sixty	years,	
repressing	or	betraying	social	movements”	(Jaffrelot	2013,	570	my	translation).	
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no	 international	 aid	 actor	had	 investigated	whether	 their	help	was	needed	 in	 the	
KPK	and	FATA	areas.	 People	of	 the	 FATA	 in	particular	had	a	 long	history	of	being	
hostile	to	any	foreign	presence.	Even	while	under	British	colonial	rule,	mullahs	were	
armed	 to	 protect	 their	 territories	 and	Pashtun	populations	 from	 foreign	 intrusion	
(Jaffrelot	2013,	569),	and	until	2002	the	Pakistani	military	had	not	entered	the	FATA	
since	independence	in	1947	(Abbas	2010,	9).		
In	2008,	after	counter-insurgency	military	operations	in	FATA	had	displaced	
more	 than	 half	 a	 million	 people,	 some	 international	 aid	 organisations	 started	 to	
react.	 The	 ICRC,	 which	 until	 then	 had	 been	 mostly	 assisting	 Afghan	 refugees,	
expanded	 its	programmes	to	 include	Pakistanis	affected	by	 the	conflict.	 It	opened	
offices	in	Karachi,	Lahore,	Mingora	(in	the	Swat	Valley),	and	in	the	FATA.	Its	budget	
grew	 from	 approximately	 $20	 million	 in	 2008	 to	 $100	 million	 in	 2009	 and	 $130	
million	 in	2010	 (the	 figure	before	 the	onset	of	 the	 floods	which	would	propel	 the	
figure	 still	 higher);	 the	number	of	 its	employees	working	 in	 these	areas	 increased	
from	200	in	2008	to	1,300	in	2010.104	Many	NGOs	also	scaled	up	their	presence	to	
assist	 the	 conflict-affected	 population.	 In	 the	 south	 of	 KPK	 they	 were	 mostly	
Pakistani	NGOs,	whose	administrative	access	to	certain	areas	was	facilitated	by	the	
fact	 that	 they	 had	 had	 a	 field	 presence	 before	 the	 displacement.	 In	 the	 north	 of	
KPK,	in	the	Malakand	and	Lower	Dir	districts	(see	maps	in	Chapter	5),	MSF	had	been	
actively	building	networks	with	provincial	 authorities	 and	 local	mullahs	 since	May	
2004,	 anticipating	 regional	 instability	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Taliban	 withdrawal	
from	Afghanistan.	MSF	OCB	started	medical	relief	activities	in	Lower	Dir	for	people	
displaced	by	hostilities	in	Bajaur	(FATA)	in	August	2008.	
																																																						
104	Author’s	interview	with	the	head	of	the	ICRC	delegation	in	Pakistan,	August	24,	2010.	
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Map	 6	 Map	 of	 the	 Federally	 Administered	 Tribal	 Agencies	 and	 the	 Khyber	
Pakhtunkhwa	districts	
	
Source:	Detail	of	map	1	UNOCHA	
Humanitarian	actors	and	counter-insurgency	operations	
When	Pakistani	military	operations	intensified,	and	especially	when	the	so-called	by	
Pakistani	 authorities	 “stabilisation”105	 initiative	 started	 in	 Swat	 in	 April	 2009,	 the	
GoP	 asked	 many	 international	 humanitarian	 actors	 to	 assist	 in	 managing	 the	
massive	displacement	of	populations	induced	by	its	military	campaigns.	As	a	result,	
humanitarian	 agencies	 were	 embedded	 in	 the	 GoP’s	 “stabilisation”	 strategy.	 The	
Pakistani	 army’s	 counter-insurgency	 operations	 in	 the	Malakand	 division	 (KPK)	 in	
																																																						
105	See	“Malakand	Comprehensive	Stabilisation	and	Socio-economic	Development	Strategy”	(August	
2009),	available	on	the	pdma.gov.pk	website.	
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April	 2009	 had	 triggered	 the	 flight	 of	 more	 than	 2.8	 million	 inhabitants	 near	
Peshawar.	Three	months	later,	in	July,	the	Pakistani	military	initiated	a	mass	return	
of	 the	 displaced.	 By	 mid-August,	 the	 government	 announced	 that	 1.6	 million	
Internally	Displaced	Persons	 (IDPs)	were	back	 in	 their	 areas	of	origin,	 sending	 the	
message	 that	 it	 had	 accomplished	 a	 successful	 security	 operation.	 The	 GoP	 also	
made	it	clear	that	it	expected	aid	actors	to	help	returnees	reconstruct	their	lives.	
Throughout	 the	 crisis	 the	GoP	 called	 on	 international	 aid	 agencies,	 first	 to	
assist	 the	 people	 forcibly	 evacuated	 from	 its	 area	 of	military	 operations,	 then	 to	
support	their	return	and	reinstallation	after	the	completion	of	‘security	operations’.	
Once	 again,	 the	 emergency	 response	 was	 mostly	 coordinated	 by	 the	 Pakistani	
military,	through	its	Special	Support	Group	–	a	dedicated	military	unit	“constituted	
to	supplement	the	national	and	provincial	efforts	for	efficient	management	of	IDPs,	
especially	 those	of	Malakand	Division”.106	The	GoP	accompanied	 its	military	effort	
to	 rid	 the	Swat	Valley	of	 insurgent	elements	with	 state	of	 the	art	 communication	
campaigns	about	how	they	had	freed	the	people	from	“wildness”	and	“extremism”.	
For	instance,	a	video	posted	on	the	Special	Support	Group	website	on	8th	November	
2009107	 is	 introduced	 by	 a	 message	 saying	 “Swat	 –	 Switzerland	 of	 Pakistan”	 and	
beautiful	 pictures	of	 the	once	 touristic	 Swat	Valley.	 Phrases	 such	as	 “occupied	by	
extremists”	 and	 “wildness	 all	 around”	 follow,	 accompanied	 by	 violent	 images	 of	
turbaned	people	cutting	someone’s	leg	or	shown	with	heavy	weapons	and	carrying	
dead	bodies.	The	next	section	of	the	video	is	entitled:	“The	Government	of	Pakistan	
would	 never	 tolerate	 extremism”	 and	 shows	 pictures	 of	 the	 Pakistan	 Air	 Force.	
What	follows	under	the	heading	“The	world	stepped	ahead”	is	a	series	of	pictures	of	
all	the	relief	provided	by	the	Pakistani	military:	immense	neatly	set-up	camps,	food,	
medicines,	fans	and	helicopters,	as	well	as	a	picture	of	Pakistani	military	personnel	
together	 with	 what	 appear	 to	 be	 (from	 their	 clothing)	 people	 from	 Arab	 Gulf	
countries	and	from	the	US.	The	video	ends	with	images	of	colourful	Pakistani	trucks	
returning	smiling	people	to	their	homes.	
Yet	 little	 advocacy	 was	 done	 by	 aid	 agencies	 to	 prevent	 or	 denounce	 the	
circumstances	 in	 which	 IDPs	 were	 sometimes	 forced	 to	 return	 to	 their	 areas	 of	
																																																						
106	http://www.supportidps.blogspot.fr/.	
107	https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=x__F8PcFjao.	
	 121	
origin.	 Aid	workers	 who	were	working	 there	 then	 told	me	 in	 interviews	 that	 the	
Pakistani	authorities	would	turn	off	the	electricity	and	water	in	camps,	for	instance,	
so	 that	people	would	have	no	alternative	but	 to	 leave.	Additionally,	 collaboration	
with	the	Pakistani	military	meant	most	actors	were,	however	reluctantly,	complicit	
in	 the	 fact	 that	 relief	 would	 in	 some	 instances	 discriminate	 against	 families	
suspected	of	supporting	the	‘militants’.	Some	shared	their	beneficiary	lists	with	the	
army,	providing	them	with	information	they	could	use	to	track	some	families	down;	
others	 were	 given	 beneficiary	 lists	 by	 the	 army	 from	 which	 those	 suspected	 of	
supporting	 the	 insurgents	 had	 been	 excluded;	 and	 sometimes	 the	 military	
pressurised	NGOs	 to	 change	 their	 beneficiary	 list	 and	 exclude	 those	 suspected	 of	
supporting	the	insurgents.	
When	the	Swat	Valley	assault	started,	there	was	thus	a	certain	level	of	trust	
between	aid	actors	and	the	Pakistani	military,	and	a	low	degree	of	vigilance	on	the	
part	of	aid	actors	about	how	to	avoid	being	used	as	‘hearts	and	minds’	agents.	One	
of	the	first	critical	papers	on	the	topic	was	published	in	September	2009	and	spoke	
about	 “a	 clash	 of	 principles”	 (Humanitarian	 Policy	 Group	 2009)	 arguing	 that	
“humanitarians	 [had]	 not	 spoken	 out	 against	 the	 conduct	 of	 hostilities	 and	 the	
politicization	of	the	emergency	response”	and	“that	aid	agencies	[were]	faced	with	
the	 dilemma	 of	 engaging	 with	 and	 supporting	 government	 efforts	 to	 promote	
stability	 or	maintain	 a	 principled	 approach”	 (Humanitarian	 Policy	Group	 2009,	 1).	
The	 issues	 of	 violence	 against	 non-combatants	 and	 of	 relief	 operations	 partiality	
were	neither	on	the	agenda	among	humanitarian	actors,	nor	a	topic	of	debate	with	
their	 Pakistani	 interlocutors.	 The	 issue	 of	 access	 was	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	
compromises	humanitarians	were	to	make.	From	2009	onwards	the	GoP	restricted	
access	 to	 KPK	 and	 FATA	 in	 general.	 INGOs	wanting	 to	 implement	 programmes	 in	
Pakistan	had	 to	 submit	 an	application	 to	 the	Economic	Affairs	Department	of	 the	
Ministry	for	Finance	and	Economic	Affairs	for	each	project	and	obtain	a	project	“No	
Objection	Certificate”	 (NOC)	and	then	travel	NOCs	 for	 their	movements	 to	certain	
areas	of	the	country	 including	the	FATA,	Balochistan,	Kashmir	and	certain	parts	of	
KPK.	This	process	officially	was	supposed	to	take	seven	days,	but	in	practice	it	often	
took	 several	 months	 and	 could	 be	 “used	 to	 control	 access	 to	 pressure	 NGOs	 to	
accept	 instructions	 about	 providing	 assistance	 to	 particular	 beneficiaries”	
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(Cosgrave,	 Polastro,	 and	 Zafar	 2010,	 49).	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 south	 of	 KPK	 in	 the	
summer	of	2010,	access	to	areas	bordering	South	Waziristan	(Dera	Ismael	Khan	and	
Tank)	 had	 been	 denied	 to	 humanitarian	 actors	 for	 months	 when	 hundreds	 of	
thousands	of	people	had	been	displaced	and	there	was	limited	understanding	of	the	
impact	 of	 the	 war	 on	 these	 displaced	 civilians.	 When	 access	 was	 eventually	
permitted,	 it	 was	 restricted	 to	 Pakistani	 personnel,	 thus	 preventing	 international	
organisations	from	involving	expatriates	who	would	have	been	less	exposed	to	local	
pressure	 to	 share	 their	 beneficiary	 list	 with	 the	 military.	 Humanitarian	 actors	
developed	ad	hoc	strategies	of	sub-contracting	their	responses	or	sending	their	key	
local	staff	to	implement	programmes	in	order	to	reach	the	428,000	people	who	had	
fled	South	Waziristan	to	Tank	and	D.I.	Khan.	Pakistani	staff	were	strongly	pressured	
by	 the	 Pakistani	 army	 to	 operate	 under	 its	 umbrella.	 The	 Mehsud	 tribe	 (the	
dominant	 tribe	 in	South	Waziristan	and	also	 the	 tribe	of	Baitullah	and	Hakimullah	
Mehsud,	 successive	 heads	 of	 the	 TTP)	 were	 specifically	 accused	 of	 attacking	
Pakistani	 military	 personnel	 and	 infrastructure	 all	 over	 the	 country	 and	 were	
targeted	 in	 the	war	 effort	 by	 the	military	 (Amnesty	 International	 2010).	Mehsudi	
families	who	had	managed	to	flee	conflict-affected	areas	of	South	Waziristan	were	
mostly	denied	assistance.		
Since	 May	 2009,	 the	 Special	 Support	 Group	 had	 been	 responsible	 for	
security	 clearances	 and	 ultimately	 had	 the	 power	 to	 refuse	 access	 and,	 thus,	
assistance	 to	 at-risk	 groups	 in	 KPK/FATA.	 As	 one	 observer	 noted,	 “[t]he	 Pakistani	
armed	 forces	 not	 only	 decide	 where,	 when	 and	 how	 to	 conduct	 anti-Taliban	
operations,	 but	 also—primarily	 through	 the	 civil-military	 Special	 Support	Group—
largely	dictate	the	terms	of	the	humanitarian	response”	(Young	2010).		
When	 interviewed,	most	 INGOs’	 top	management	relied	on	the	rhetoric	of	
principles	 of	 independence	 and	 impartiality	 to	 explain	 their	work;	 however,	 facts	
proved	 that	 very	 few	 could	pride	 themselves	on	assisting	 conflict-affected	people	
regardless	of	which	tribe	they	belonged	to.	
In	 addition	 to	GoP	 access	 restriction,	 the	 deployment	 of	 aid	 operations	 to	
areas	 controlled	 by	 the	 Taliban	 was	 impeded	 by	 the	 difficulties	 of	 negotiating	
security	guarantees	with	Pashtun	local	authorities.	Pashtuns	living	in	the	tribal	areas	
where	the	Taliban	were	located	had	long	been	suspicious	of,	or	hostile	to,	contacts	
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with	the	Western	world.	The	co-optation	of	humanitarian	agencies	by	the	Pakistani	
military	probably	did	not	improve	the	perception	of	foreign	relief	agencies	amongst	
local	residents	and	NGOs.	Moreover	public	statements	by	the	UN	Special	Envoy	for	
Assistance	 that	 “aid	must	 follow	 Pakistan	military	 gains”	 and	 efforts	 to	 eradicate	
insurgents	 in	 the	 FATA,	 did	 not	 help	 (Georgy	 2010).	 In	 the	 face	 of	 such	 a	 highly	
politicised	 environment,	 some	 humanitarian	 agencies	 developed	 protective	 and	
deterrent	measures.	Without	necessarily	being	the	primary	targets,	humanitarians	
were	 indeed	 targeted	 several	 times.	 On	 October	 5,	 2009,	 the	 WFP	 office	 in	
Islamabad	was	 attacked	by	 a	 suicide	bomber,	 killing	 five	people.	On	 February	 18,	
2010,	four	aid	workers	working	for	Mercy	Corps	were	kidnapped	125	miles	north	of	
Quetta.	 One	was	 killed	 and	 the	 three	 others	were	 released	 on	 July	 15,	 2010.	On	
March	10,	2010,	seven	people	working	for	World	Vision	were	killed	in	their	office	in	
Mansehra	 district.	 In	 Islamabad,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 Peshawar,	 massive	 prison-like	 aid	
compounds	 mushroomed.	 Such	 “fortified	 aid	 compounds”	 (Duffield	 2010b,	 452)	
were	 designed	 to	 keep	 the	 local	 world	 out;	 while	 they	 may	 have	 served	 some	
protective	function,	they	were	intimidating	and	symbolic	of	the	recent	militarisation	
of	security	management	in	the	aid	sector	deemed	counterproductive	to	the	building	
of	trust	as	a	basis	for	access	to	vulnerable	populations.108	
The	ambiguous	role	of	the	UN	
The	UN	humanitarian	agencies	illustrated	how	siding	with	the	GoP	prevented	them	
from	accessing	some	of	the	conflict-affected	people.	In	2010,	the	very	existence	of	a	
UN	Special	Envoy	 for	Assistance	 in	Pakistan,	 in	addition	 to	a	Resident	Coordinator	
(RC)	and	a	Humanitarian	Coordinator	(HC),	demonstrated	the	ambiguity	and	in-built	
tensions	within	 the	UN’s	 coordination	machinery	 and	 the	 leadership	 challenges	 it	
faced.	On	 the	 one	 hand,	UN	 agencies	 belonged	 to	 the	One	UN	 arrangement	 and	
were	 therefore	expected	 to	support	Pakistani	 institutions.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	
UN	 humanitarian	 reform	 initiative	 had	 entrusted	 the	 humanitarian	 country	 team	
(HCT)	with	the	responsibility	of	coordinating	the	response	and	in	so	doing	to	uphold	
the	principles	of	neutrality	and	impartiality.	Some	UN	officials	 interviewed	in	2010	
described	 this	 as	 a	 “clash	 between	 the	 two	 reforms”	 (author	 interview	 2010).	
																																																						
108	 For	 a	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 security	management	 by	 aid	workers	 see	 Dandoy	 and	 Pérouse	 de	
Montclos	(2013)	and	Fast	(2014).	
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Historically	 close	 to	 the	 GoP,	 the	 United	 Nations	was	 blamed	 for	 not	 wanting	 to	
“confront	 the	 government	 and	 acknowledge	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 problem”	
(Humanitarian	Policy	Group	2009,	3),	that	is,	the	leading	role	of	the	Pakistani	army	
in	deciding	which	IDPs	from	FATA/KPK	aid	organisations	were	allowed	to	assist.	The	
long-established	 UN	 agencies	 in	 Pakistan	 were	 wary	 of	 jeopardising	 their	 good	
relationship	with	Pakistani	authorities.	Similar	criticisms	about	 the	UN’s	behaviour	
at	a	later	stage	of	the	response	were	formulated	as	follows:	
Instead	 of	 advocating	 for	 a	 more	 needs-based	 registration	
criteria	 or	 overcoming	 exclusion	 errors	 by	 supplementing	
government	 beneficiary	 lists	 with	 agencies’	 own	 lists	 of	
vulnerable	 individuals	 (as	 was	 done,	 for	 example,	 by	 the	
ICRC	 and	 several	 NGOs),	most	members	 of	 the	HCT	 simply	
continued	 to	base	 their	 response	on	what	 they	knew	to	be	
flawed	 registration	 lists	 [provided	 by	 the	 government].	
(Bennett	2009,	13)	
A	 view	 supported	by	 several	 people	 I	 interviewed	was	 that	 in	 2008–9,	 the	
UNHCR	and	the	UN	WFP,	by	working	closely	with	the	GoP,	which	was	a	party	to	the	
conflict,	essentially	 contributed	 to	making	negotiations	with	 the	GoP	very	difficult	
for	 other	 humanitarian	 actors.	 Some	 humanitarian	 agencies	 were	 striving	 to	
operate	 more	 independently,	 for	 instance	 without	 armed	 escorts,	 and	 to	 deploy	
expatriate	 staff	 to	 locations	 of	 greatest	 concern.	 The	 ability	 of	 the	HC	 to	 support	
humanitarian	 organisations	willing	 to	 challenge	 the	 control	 of	 the	 Pakistani	 army	
over	 the	 distribution	 of	 aid	was	 generally	 rated	 as	 very	 low,	 although	 it	 was	 not	
clear	whether	 this	was	 for	personal	or	 structural	 reasons.	 The	HC	was	 sometimes	
blamed	 for	 not	 being	 strong	 enough	 in	 “defending	 principles”	 in	 HCT	 meetings	
(Bennett	 2009,	 12),	 but	 also	 seen	 as	 having	 his	 hands	 tied,	 given	 the	 leverage	 of	
agencies	 that	 controlled	 the	 largest	 humanitarian	UN	budgets	 in	 the	 country	 and	
which	tended	to	align	with	the	government.	
Reported	tensions	within	the	HCT	reflected	a	 lack	of	unity	and	the	struggle	
to	make	 different	 responsibilities	 coexist.	 Several	 aid	workers	 referred	 positively,	
however,	to	the	role	of	the	UN	OCHA	as	the	main	entity	that	had	invested	in	efforts	
to	strengthen	the	autonomy	of	aid	organisations	from	the	Pakistani	authorities	with	
regard	to	whom	they	should	assist	and	how.	For	example,	in	February	2010,	OCHA	
managed	to	push	the	issue	of	the	sharing	of	beneficiary	lists	on	to	the	agenda	of	the	
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joint	 GoP/UN	 Policy	 and	 Strategy	 Committee	 and	 to	 have	 the	 committee	 agree	
“that	nominal	 lists	of	beneficiaries	 (i.e.,	beneficiary	names)	 [would]	not	be	shared	
with	 the	 civil	 or	 military	 authorities”.109	 In	 order	 to	 try	 to	 improve	 civil-military	
coordination	in	Pakistan,	OCHA	drafted	guidelines	in	2010	and,	while	waiting	for	the	
Pakistani	military	to	sign	them,110	circulated	them	within	humanitarian	actors.	The	
same	year	OCHA	also	 launched	a	pilot	vulnerability	assessment	of	people	affected	
by	the	Swat	displacement,	aimed	at	addressing	exclusionary	errors.	This	eventually	
became	 a	 multi-agency	 (NGOs	 as	 well	 as	 UN)	 effort	 to	 refine	 the	 targeting	 of	
beneficiaries	 by	 the	 humanitarian	 agencies	 after	 the	 Swat	 crisis,	 called	 the	 IDP	
Vulnerability	and	Profiling	Assessment	(IVAP).		
Attempts	 to	 overcome	 the	 access	 constraints	 imposed	 by	 Pakistani	
authorities	through	NOC	and	security	clearances	were	probably	the	least	successful.	
As	an	illustration,	OCHA	managed	to	obtain	authorisation	to	send	expatriates,	under	
armed	escort,	to	monitor	assistance	in	Dera	Ismael	Khan	and	Tank,	but	their	convoy	
was	stopped	at	the	entry	check-point	of	the	district,	and	the	mission	was	aborted.	
Despite	OCHA’s	effort	to	negotiate	operational	freedom	with	Pakistani	authorities,	
the	 UN	 experience	 in	 2008–10	 shows	 that	 its	 decision	 to	 stand	 by	 the	 Pakistani	
government	translated	into	its	agencies	prioritising	assistance	to	those	that	the	GoP	
identified	as	the	acceptable	and	priority	victims.	The	GoP	did	not	want	to	describe	
the	situation	as	one	of	“internal	 conflict”	and	 this	 impacted	negotiations	over	 the	
UN’s	response	framework,	which	had	to	be	approved	by	the	NDMA.	As	one	UN	staff	
member	 recalled,	 the	 negotiation	 process	 of	 the	 2010	 Pakistan	 Humanitarian	
Response	 Plan	 (PHRP)	 was	 long	 and	 arduous	 and	 the	 Pakistani	 authorities	
demanded	a	rephrasing	of	several	aspects	of	the	original	wording	as	Figure	4	shows.		
	
Figure	4	Table	of	contentious	words	for	the	PDMA	in	2009	
SN	 PHRP	original	wording	 Agreed	version	with	GoP	
1	 Areas	of	conflict	 Areas	of	origin/return	
2	 Army	 Security	forces	
3	 Armed	opposition	group/leadership	 Militants	
4	 Active	conflict	 Insecurity	
																																																						
109	Action	Points	of	the	Policy	and	Strategy	Meeting	held	on	June	23,	2010,	at	the	Civil	Secretariat,	
Peshawar.	
110	In	early	2012	the	military	had	still	not	signed	them.	
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5	 Conflict	 Crisis/insecurity	or	security	situation	
6	 Conflict	affected	areas	 Affected	areas	or	areas	of	origin	
7	 Conflict	related	needs	 Needs	of	affected	population	
8	 Conflict	Zones	 Areas	of	origin/areas	of	habitual	residence	
9	 Conflict	environment	 Insecure	environment	
10	 Conflict	and	displacement	crisis	 Security	situation/displacement	
11	 Conflict	areas	 Areas	of	origin	
12	 Cessation	of	hostilities	 Conclusion	of	security	forces’	operation	
13	 Counter-insurgency	 Security	activities	
14	 Complex	emergency	 Crisis/situation	
15	 Expansion	of	conflict	 Expansion	of	operations/insecurity	
16	 Militant	Groups	 Militants	
17	 Military	operations	 Security	services	operations	
18	 Military	actions	/	activities	 Security	services	operations	
19	 Insurgence	 Crisis/insecurity	
20	 Pakistan	Army	 Security	forces	
21	 Fighting	 Insecurity/operations	
22	 Ongoing	fighting	 Insecure	areas	
23	 Ongoing	military	operation	 Ongoing	crisis/operations	
24	 Fleeing	fighting	between	militants	&	
Pakistan	Army/forces/military	
Fleeing	generalized	violence	
25	 Fleeing	the	fighting	 Fleeing	insecure	areas	
26	 Growing	nature	of	humanitarian	
emergency	
Growing	humanitarian	needs	
27	 Taliban	groups	 Militants	
All	 words	 that	 referred	 to	 war	 (fighting,	 insurgence,	 conflict,	 hostilities,	 counter-
insurgency)	or	the	military	(army,	forces)	or	to	the	political	existence	of	the	Taliban	
(armed	opposition)	were	systematically	replaced	with	words	referring	to	(in)security	
or	 violence	 of	 “militants”.	 The	 GoP	 refused	 to	 communicate	 about	 war	 and	 its	
political	dynamics.	The	UN	officer	who	shared	this	information	with	me	insisted	that	
this	was	the	result	of	a	negotiation	process	and	not	just	simple	compliance	with	the	
Pakistani	authorities:	
There	are	other	words	that	the	GoP	was	not	happy	with	but	
we	insisted	and	managed	to	get	through	(for	example,	they	
wanted	 to	 replace	 'displaced'	 with	 'dislocated'	 but	 we	
argued	 that	 this	 is	 global	 terminology	 that	 we	 follow).	 (…)	
The	words	we	changed	to	did	not	affect	the	overall	nature	of	
what	we	were	saying.	
NGOs	and	the	donors	
International	 donors	 allocated	 significant	 funding	 to	 the	 assistance	 of	 IDPs	 from	
2009	onwards,	as	the	following	table	shows.	
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Figure	5	OFDA	and	ECHO	Funding	per	year	(2004-2012)	
	
Sources:	USAID/OFDA:	OFDA	Annual	Reports	per	Fiscal	Year	(October	1st	to	September	30)	
and	 ECHO:	 EDRIS	 (European	 Emergency	 Disaster	 Response	 Information	 System)	 per	
calendar	year	
Most	humanitarian	actors	were	pragmatic.	Some	accepted	US	funds	and	deployed	
significant	programmes	in	the	Swat	Valley,	assisting	people	to	return	to	their	home	
villages.	 Save	 the	 Children	 was	 one	 of	 them,	 and	 did	 not	 hide	 its	 US	 financial	
support.	A	page	on	the	organisation’s	website	from	that	time	(and	still	available	in	
2015)	contained	an	article	titled:	U.S.	Provides	Emergency	Food	Vouchers	to	Half	a	
Million	Flood-Affected	People	in	Pakistan	(Save	the	Children	USA	2010).	
	 A	few	humanitarian	actors	attempted	to	avoid	being	passively	manipulated.	
Some	could	afford	to	do	so	and	others	ended	up	not	doing	anything	at	all.	MSF	and	
the	ICRC111	both	made	explicit	efforts	to	avoid	association	with	the	United	Nations	
and	other	NGOs.	In	Pakistan,	MSF	and	ICRC,	for	instance,	shared	a	similar	approach	
thanks	 to	 which	 they	 could	 help	 people	 in	 the	 politically	 sensitive	 areas	 of	 KPK,	
FATA,	 and	 Baluchistan.	 They	 explicitly	 and	 loudly	 affirmed	 their	 will	 to	 remain	
‘independent’	and	‘neutral’	as	a	‘means	to	provide	protection	and	assistance	to	all	
affected	 by	 the	 conflict’	 –	 including	 those	 belonging	 to	 the	 tribes	 from	 which	
																																																						
111	It	is	worth	noting	that	other	NGOs	had	developed	acceptance	strategies	that	relied	on	a	principled	
approach	 and	 negotiation;	 see,	 for	 example,	 Ingrid	 Macdonald	 (Norwegian	 Refugee	 Council),	
“Securing	 Access	 through	 Acceptance	 in	 Afghanistan	 and	 Pakistan,”	 Humanitarian	 Exchange	
Magazine	49	(January	2011),	available	online.	
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insurgents	 originated	 (see	 Chapter	 5	 for	 more	 details	 about	 MSF	 organisational	
practices	in	Pakistan)	and	relied	upon	pragmatic	negotiations	that	entailed	a	search	
for	common	interests	and	acceptable	compromises.	One	characteristic	of	this	kind	
of	 approach	was	 that	 it	 took	 time	 and	 consumed	 a	 lot	 of	 resources	 and	was	 not	
seen	as	cost-effective	compared	to	programmes	of	other	organisations	embedded	
in	 the	 GoP’s	 stabilisation”	 strategy.	 For	 example,	 it	 took	MSF	OCP	more	 than	 six	
months	to	negotiate	access	locally	to	work	in	a	weapon-free	hospital	in	Hangu	(see	
map	 6).	 Neither	 MSF	 nor	 ICRC	 would	 claim	 that	 it	 had	 an	 exclusive	 recipe	 for	
negotiating	 and	 maintaining	 access;	 however,	 trying	 to	 escape	 the	 pressures	 of	
Western	donors	and	the	GoP	was	part	of	the	strategy	of	both	organisations	in	order	
to	reach	war-affected	people	in	areas	where	Taliban	were	present	at	a	time	when	
most	of	the	aid	actors	were	focused	on	government-held	areas.	
Finally	Solidarités,	which	had	run	out	of	funds	and	left	Pakistan	in	2007,	sent	
an	assessment	 team	to	Swat	 in	May	2009	but	was	never	able	 to	provide	 relief	 to	
Swat	displaced	people.	I	was	the	Asia	Regional	Director	sitting	at	the	head	office	in	
Paris	and	supervising	the	assessment	team	at	the	time.	In	Islamabad	the	head	of	the	
Solidarités	assessment	team	was	approached	several	times	by	the	OFDA	person	as	
they	were	 looking	 for	 implementing	partners	with	 field	 information	and	our	 team	
had	gone	 to	Mingora,	 the	 capital	 of	 the	 Swat	district,	 to	 assess	 the	 situation.	We	
decided	 to	 systematically	 refuse	 US	 funds	 to	 work	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 a	 military	
campaign	 we	 saw	 as	 largely	 supported	 by	 the	 US,	 which	 additionally	 had	 been	
launching	drones	attacks	in	the	FATA	since	the	mid-2000s	(Jaffrelot	2013,	548).	Our	
position	 was	 a	 principled	 one:	 I	 firmly	 believed	 that	 taking	 US	 funds	 was,	 in	 this	
specific	situation,	unacceptable	for	us.	Yet	we	could	not	find	other	funds	and	it	cost	
the	organisation	its	very	presence	in	the	country	as	Solidarités	did	not	have	enough	
private	funding	to	sustain	a	team	in	Pakistan	for	more	than	three	months.	
2010	floods:	politics	in	a	‘natural	disaster’	
Resulting	from	heavy	monsoon	rains,	the	floods	affected	the	Indus	River	basin.	This	
was	a	slow-moving	and	insidious	disaster	and	unfolded	over	several	weeks	starting	
on	22	July,	2010,	in	Baluchistan.	The	floods	then	hit	KPK,	which	ended	up	with	the	
highest	figure	of	casualties,	and	flowed	down	to	the	Punjab,	Pakistan’s	breadbasket.	
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Finally,	 they	 reached	 Sindh,	 where	 evacuations	 were	 better	 organised,	 and	 the	
impact	 less	 disastrous	 than	 elsewhere.	 Tremendous	 habitat	 and	 infrastructure	
damage,	however,	could	not	be	avoided.	On	14	August,	the	World	Bank	estimated	
that	 crops	 worth	 one	 billion	 dollars	 had	 been	 destroyed,	 threatening	 to	 cut	 the	
country’s	 economic	 growth	 by	 half	 (Batty	 and	 Shah	 2010).	 The	 floods	 swamped	
villages	stretching	from	the	Himalayas	to	the	Arabian	Sea,	affecting	about	20	million	
people	and	killing	close	to	2,000.	
The	 2010	 floods	 were	 a	 catastrophic	 experience	 for	 the	 Pakistani	 people,	
many	of	whom	were	already	struggling	to	survive	in	precarious	circumstances.	The	
scale	 of	 the	 flooding	 and	 attendant	 devastation	 was	 unprecedented.	 While	 the	
response	was,	in	many	respects,	a	race	against	time	to	rescue	and	provide	succour	
to	the	stranded	and	homeless,	it	was	also	a	competition	to	win	“hearts	and	minds”.	
Arriving	on	 top	of	 the	 crisis	 associated	with	 the	military’s	 counter-insurgency	and	
stabilisation	 efforts,	 the	 floods	were	 an	 opportunity	 for	Western	 donors	 and	 the	
GoP	to	enhance	their	image	in	Pakistani	society	and	in	the	local	and	global	media	as	
the	 biggest	 providers	 of	 relief.	 The	 rhetoric	 surrounding	 relief	 efforts	 served	 this	
purpose	while	 also	 actually	 helping	people.	Humanitarian	 actors,	 confronted	with	
the	unprecedented	nature	of	the	flooding,	coupled	with	security	restrictions,	had	to	
make	 drastic	 choices	 about	 whom	 to	 assist	 first,	 and	 whether	 fighting	 potential	
manipulation	by	Western	donors	and	GoP	was	a	priority.	
“Army	Zindabad!”	and	the	underlying	stabilisation	rhetoric112	
The	 Pakistani	 military	 played	 a	 critical	 and	 dominant	 role	 in	 orchestrating	 the	
provision	 of	 relief	 and	 it	 used	 this	 role	 to	 try	 to	 improve	 its	 public	 standing	 by	
‘winning	 the	 hearts	 and	 minds’	 of	 the	 people	 of	 Pakistan	 with	 the	 support	 of	
Western	 donors.	 Even	 though	 the	 Pakistani	 government	 was	 widely	 blamed	 for	
being	 slow	 in	 responding	 to	 the	 catastrophe,	 its	military	 institutions	 were	 at	 the	
fore	 of	 the	 response:	 sixty	 thousand	 troops	 were	 deployed	 in	 rescue	 and	 relief	
operations,	and	as	of	27	August,	2010,	they	had	rescued	800,000	people	and	set	up	
over	 100	 Army	 Relief	 Camps	 across	 the	 country	 (Inter	 Services	 Public	 Relations	
2010).	 As	 one	of	 the	main	 actors	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 the	 south	 of	 the	 country,	 the	
																																																						
112	Zindabad	means	“long	live”	in	Urdu.	See	Haider	(2010).		
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Pakistani	 military	 took	 part	 in	 UN	 coordination	 platforms.	 NATO	 and	 other	
international	military	 forces	provided	 resources	as	well	 as	 logistics	 support	 to	 the	
Pakistani	 authorities	 (Benitez	 2010).	 Never,	 before	 2008,	 had	 the	 United	 States	
provided	 so	 much	 foreign	 assistance	 to	 Pakistan	 during	 a	 period	 of	 civilian	 rule.	
Such	assistance,	 apparently,	was	not	 focused	on	buying	Pakistan’s	 support	 for	US	
foreign	policy	but	rather	“to	help	stabilise	Pakistan	itself”	(Wilder	2010,	407).		
Simultaneously,	the	GoP	enforced	a	restricted-access	policy	to	conflict	areas,	
especially	in	the	FATA.	Even	when	the	GoP	issued	an	NOC	waiver	in	mid-August	for	
certain	parts	of	the	KPK	to	speed	up	the	international	response,	the	most	sensitive	
districts	of	FATA	and	KPK	remained	effectively	‘no-go’	areas	–	allegedly	for	‘security	
reasons’.	Access	 for	 expatriates	 to	Dera	 Ismael	 Khan	and	Tank	 remained	blocked,	
even	 as	 the	 response	 needed	 to	 be	 scaled	 up	 swiftly	 and	 some	 INGO	emergency	
surge	protocols	required	the	presence	of	expatriates.	Similarly,	the	GoP	refused	to	
authorise	 the	 United	 Nations	 Humanitarian	 Air	 Services	 (UNHAS)	 to	 deploy	
helicopters	 in	KPK/FATA,	where	the	use	of	Pakistani	aircraft	by	humanitarians	was	
the	most	problematic.	
Local	 organisations	 linked	 to	 Islamist	 groups113	 and	political	 parties	moved	
quickly,	and	their	relief	efforts	benefited	from	their	proximity	to	local	populations.	
Although	 there	 should	 not	 be	 anything	 surprising	 about	 Islamic	 organisations	
working	at	the	grass-roots	level	in	a	Muslim	country,	once	again,	this	phenomenon	
raised	concerns	in	the	media	(Haider	2010)	as	to	whether	the	actions	of	such	groups	
would	spread	support	for	 Islamist	extremists.	At	the	time	of	writing,	there	was	no	
solid	 proof	 for	 such	 concerns.	 However,	 the	 fear	 that	 Islamist	 groups	 would	
manipulate	 assistance	 was	 widely	 used	 in	 the	 media	 to	 mobilise	 donations:	
“[u]nless	we	act	decisively,	large	parts	of	flood-stricken	Pakistan	will	be	taken	over	
by	 the	 Taliban”	wrote	 Ahmed	 Rashid	 in	 the	 British	Newspaper	Telegraph	 (Rashid	
2010).	 This	 line	 of	 argument	 became	 so	 pervasive	 that,	 even	 when	 trying	 to	
advocate	for	the	depoliticisation	of	humanitarian	aid,	the	director	of	Church	World	
Services,	used	the	same	underlying	argument	of	‘stabilisation’	strategies:		
																																																						
113	 Jamaat-ud-Dawa	 is	 a	 prominent	 example	 of	 an	 Islamic	 organisation	 thought	 to	 be	 a	 front	 for	
Lashkar-e	Taiba	 (LT,	Army	of	 the	Pure),	 founded	 in	 the	1990s	 in	Afghanistan	 for	 the	Kashmir	 Jihad	
and	operating	from	Pakistan,	near	Lahore.	
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If	the	international	community	does	not	come	up	with	support	
at	 this	 time	 of	 need,	 the	 flood-survivors’	 children	 will	 go	 in	
droves	to	the	madrassas	because	they	have	food	there.	If	you	
don’t	 send	 aid	 to	 where	 the	 need	 is,	 people	 will	 be	 more	
vulnerable	 to	 the	 militant	 organizations	 that	 believe	 in	
violence.	They	have	nothing	 left,	so	we	will	be	pushing	them	
into	 the	 arms	 of	 these	 militant	 groups	 whose	 the	
humanitarian	wings	are	providing	help.	(Fernando	and	Parvez	
2010)	
The	 ‘stabilisation’	 agenda	 had	 been	 an	 underlying	 rationale	 for	 the	 overall	
international	aid	strategy	in	Pakistan	since	at	least	2008.	The	floods	did	not	escape	
this	logic	and	along	these	lines,	Richard	Holbrooke,	the	US	administration’s	Special	
Representative	 for	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan	at	 the	 time,	 said:	 “If	we	do	 the	 right	
thing,	 it	will	 be	 good	not	only	 for	 the	people	whose	 lives	we	 save	but	 for	 the	US	
image	in	Pakistan.	The	people	of	Pakistan	will	see	that	when	the	crisis	hits,	it’s	not	
the	Chinese.	It’s	not	the	Iranians.	It’s	not	other	countries.	It’s	not	the	EU.	It’s	the	US	
that	 always	 leads”	 (cited	 in	Masood,	MacFarquhar,	 and	 Shanker	 2010).	 This	 logic	
attracted	 substantial	 resources	 for	 the	 response,	 and	 the	 United	 States	 was	 the	
swiftest	 to	 react	 after	 the	 start	 of	 the	 floods	 and	 eventually	 contributed	
approximately	$630	million.	 It	was	by	far	the	largest	donor,	accounting	for	33%	of	
the	total	amount	of	donations	recorded	by	the	United	Nations.		
Humanitarian	choices	
In	such	a	compound	crisis,	international	humanitarian	actors	were	faced	with	a	set	
of	 choices	 about	 the	 kind	 of	 funding	 used	 (private	 or	 from	 institutional	 donors	
attached	to	states,	some	such	as	the	US	having	a	direct	foreign	interest	in	Pakistan	
for	instance)	and	whether	a	partnership	with	military	forces	would	be	established,	
both	of	which	influenced	the	scope	and	nature	of	their	response.	
Most	 of	 the	 international	 funds	 that	 were	 allocated	 to	 international	
humanitarian	 actors	 for	 the	 floods	 response	 came	 from	 institutional	 donors.	
Despite	 their	 scale,	 the	 2010	 Pakistani	 floods	 attracted	 very	 little	 international	
public	attention,	and	therefore	very	 little	 in	private	donations	outside	Pakistan.	 In	
comparison,	 a	 Red	 Cross	 campaign	 in	 the	 United	 States	 raising	 funds	 via	 mobile	
phone	 donations	 raised	 $31	 million	 for	 the	 Haiti	 earthquake	 response	 but	 only	
about	$10,000	for	Pakistan	later	in	the	same	year	(Zaidi	2010).	The	vast	majority	of	
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humanitarian	 actors	 depended	 on	 institutional	 donors.	 Even	 if	 the	 Good	
Humanitarian	 Donorship	 principles	 required	 donors	 to	 “support	 humanitarian	
action	that	is	explicitly	neutral	and	impartial	in	its	intent”	(Collinson,	Elhawary,	and	
Muggah	2010,	293),	 the	perception	 in	Pakistan	 seemed	 to	be	 that	Western	 funds	
often	came	with	an	agenda	attached.	As	more	than	64%	of	the	funds	allocated	for	
the	floods	in	2010	came	from	countries	involved	in	the	war	in	Afghanistan,114	most	
humanitarian	actors	were	concerned	with	issues	of	perception.	On	one	hand,	funds	
were	 needed	 to	 assist	 flood-affected	 people.	On	 the	 other,	 donor	 funds	 exposed	
humanitarian	 implementing	 actors	 to	 a	 political	 dependency	 that	 might	 prevent	
them	 from	 gaining	 the	 trust	 of	 Pakistani	 people	 in	 certain	 areas,	 or	 over	 time.	
Eventually,	most	 humanitarian	 agencies	 provided	 assistance	 financed	 by	Western	
donors.	This	was	the	case	of	SCI	and	Solidarités,	which	this	time	managed	to	raise	
EU	 funds	 considered	 by	 the	 organisation’s	 members	 as	 less	 compromising	 in	
Pakistan	than	US	funds.	In	conflict-affected	areas,	however,	MSF	staff	reported	that	
they	 had	 come	 across	 people	 who	 did	 not	 trust	 assistance	 funded	 by	 states	
supporting	the	Pakistani	authorities	 (Whittal	2011a)	which	showed	that	the	ability	
of	a	humanitarian	actor	to	demonstrate	financial	independence	was	a	solid	tool	to	
gain	trust	and	access.		
The	other	major	question	humanitarian	actors	had	to	answer	was	whether	
they	would	cooperate	with	the	military.	As	already	described,	working	hand	in	hand	
with	 the	 military	 in	 2005	 had	 been	 considered	 a	 positive	 experience,	 ‘enabling’	
complementarities	 and	 enhancing	 effectiveness.	 However,	 in	 2010	 such	
collaboration	 could	 distort	 humanitarian	 priorities	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 military’s	
agenda.	 Logistics	 and	 access	 were	 two	 critical	 issues	 shaping	 the	 timeliness	 and	
effectiveness	 of	 the	 emergency	 response.	 Logistics	 were	 a	major	 challenge,	 with	
millions	of	people	 isolated	on	strips	of	 land,	unable	 to	move	 to	assistance	points,	
and	very	difficult	to	reach.	The	humanitarian	response	was	especially	slow	in	Sindh,	
Punjab,	 and	 Baluchistan	 for	 two	 main	 reasons:	 access	 to	 certain	 areas	 was	
physically	 impossible,	 and	 most	 humanitarian	 organisations	 had	 no	 pre-flood	
presence	in	Punjab	and	Sindh.	As	a	result,	some	humanitarian	actors	used	Pakistani	
																																																						
114	The	calculation	 is	derived	from	the	table	titled	“Total	Humanitarian	Funding	Per	Donor	 in	2010,	
available	online	on	the	fts.unocha.org	website.		
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military	 transport	 assets	 at	 the	onset	 of	 the	 emergency,	 invoking	 the	 ‘last	 resort’	
principle	of	the	guidelines	on	the	use	of	foreign	military	and	civil	defence	assets	in	
disaster	 relief	 (OCHA	 2006).	 The	 last	 resort	 principle	 states	 that	 “foreign	military	
and	 civil	 defence	 assets	 should	 be	 requested	 only	where	 there	 is	 no	 comparable	
civilian	alternative	and	only	 the	use	of	military	or	 civil	 defence	assets	 can	meet	a	
critical	 humanitarian	 need”	 (OCHA	 2006,	 4).	 The	 WFP	 used	 military	 planes	 and	
helicopters115	 to	 deliver	 food	 in	 remote	 areas	 of	 Punjab	 and	 Sindh	 until	 at	 least	
September,	2010.	The	issue	was	discussed	in	a	HCT	meeting,	and	WFP	obtained	an	
exceptional	validation	from	the	HC	on	the	grounds	of	‘last	resort’	until	UNHAS	was	
able	 to	 take	 over.	 Together	 with	 the	 military	 rescue	 operations,	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	
response	was	 provided	 by	WFP,	which	 in	October,	 2010	was	 reaching	 6.5	million	
people	 across	 the	 country	 and	 by	 January,	 2011	 providing	 food	 for	more	 than	 5	
million	people	a	month	(World	Food	Program	2011).	
There	was	a	lively	internal	debate	among	UN	agencies	on	whether	to	use	the	
NATO	 air-bridge	 requested	 by	 the	 GoP,	 considering	 the	 role	 of	 NATO	 in	
neighbouring	 Afghanistan	 and	 the	 US	 use	 of	 drones	 in	 Pakistan.	 The	 HCT	 finally	
ruled	out	the	option	of	using	the	NATO	air-bridge	on	the	basis	that	this	was	not	a	
last	 resort	 situation	 because	 non-military	 alternatives	 were	 available	 (Bennett	
2011).	
MSF,	 SCI	 and	 Solidarités	 all	 decided	 that	 they	 would	 not	 use	 any	military	
assets	to	deliver	assistance.	The	European	Aeronautic	Defence	and	Space	Company	
offered	a	$200,000	donation	to	Solidarités	in	the	aftermath	of	the	2010	floods	that	
the	organisation	declined.	The	initiative	had	emerged	from	the	Pakistani	European	
Aeronautic	Defence	and	Space	employees	who	collected	some	$100,000,	which	the	
organisation	 offered	 to	 double	 for	 a	 greater	 donation	 to	 a	 non-profit	 relief	
organisation.	 Solidarités	 refused	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 European	 Aeronautic	 Defence	
and	Space	was	selling	helicopters	 to	 the	Pakistani	military,	which	appeared	to	 the	
top	management	as	contradictory	to	Solidarités’s	mandate.	MSF	went	a	step	further	
and	 declined	 any	 kind	 of	 funds	 associating	 them	with	 donor	 governments	 or	 the	
																																																						
115	Both	the	Pakistani	and	other	governments	lent	assets.	
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United	Nations,	and	 refused	 to	be	mentioned	 in	any	UN	public	 reporting,	 such	as	
“who?	does	what?	where?”	data,	in	order	to	maintain	control	over	their	image.116		
Facing	the	volume	of	needs	and	the	complexity	of	the	political	background,	
organisations	 had	 to	 make	 choices	 about	 their	 operational	 positioning.	 Some	
decided	that	their	priority	was	to	reach	as	many	people	as	quickly	as	possible,	which	
often	 meant	 taking	 donor	 money,	 and	 sometimes	 using	 military	 assets,	 while	
respecting	the	Pakistan	civil-military	guidelines	in	order	to	mitigate	the	risk	that	‘aid’	
would	be	perceived	as	taking	sides.	Others	considered	that	in	the	age	of	the	‘citizen	
reporter’,	 information	on	what	agencies	do	and	data	on	 the	origins	of	 their	 funds	
travelled	fast.	For	these	actors,	preserving	an	‘impartial	space’	for	assisting	people	
in	 the	 long	 run	 demanded	 financial	 independence	 and	 not	 using	 military	 assets,	
even	if	this	resulted	in	helping	fewer	people.	
2011-2012	floods	and	ongoing	conflict:	Politics	in	low	intensity	disasters	
The	 2011-2012	 humanitarian	 configuration	 did	 not	 have	 fixed	 and	 immutable	
characteristics;	on	the	contrary,	in	tracing	its	short	historical	trajectory	I	attempt	to	
show	 that	 it	 is	 constantly	 evolving	 and	 that	 different	 actors	 speak	 about	 their	
relationships	or	view	of	the	context	in	various	ways	and	this	may	well	change	over	
time.	It	is	therefore	worth	attempting	to	describe	the	relationships	and	opinions	of	
actors	 I	 interviewed	 while	 I	 was	 doing	 the	 ethnographic	 studies	 of	 the	 three	
projects.	 The	 humanitarian	 configuration	 in	which	 I	 did	most	 of	 the	 fieldwork	 for	
this	dissertation	 resulted	 from	 the	above-described	2005-2010	 trajectory	and	was	
characterised	 by	 a	 radicalisation	 of	 the	 tension	 between	 certain	 international	
humanitarian	actors	and	Pakistani	authorities.	
Pakistani	sovereignty	reaffirmed	
When	the	international	humanitarian	actors	I	interviewed	between	November	2011	
and	July	2012	discussed	their	experience	in	Pakistan,	they	very	often	started	with	a	
mention	 of	 “external	 factors	 that	 really	 made	 the	 situation	 flip	 around”	 as	 one	
country	 representative	 of	 an	 international	 organisation	 described	 it.	 Like	 many	
others	interviewed	in	November	2011,	one	told	me:	“After	Raymond	Davies	and	the	
																																																						
116	So	did	the	ICRC.	
	 135	
CIA	 [US	 Central	 Intelligence	 Agency]	 vaccination	 scheme,	 everything	 changed”.	
Another	added:	“Now,	the	government	is	very	suspicious	of	NGOs”.	People	referred	
to	 two	key	episodes	 in	US-Pakistan	diplomatic	 relations	 that	had	happened	 in	 the	
course	 of	 2011.	 The	 first	 one	 started	 on	 27th	 January	 when	 the	 Pakistani	 police	
arrested	 Raymond	 Davis,	 an	 American	 citizen	 who	 had	 just	 killed	 two	 Pakistani	
nationals	on	the	streets	of	Lahore.	Davis	claimed	to	be	a	simple	American	diplomat,	
and	Barack	Obama	urged	Pakistan	 to	 free	him	under	 the	Vienna	Convention	 that	
granted	him	diplomatic	 immunity.	Davis	was	“charged	with	 two	counts	of	murder	
and	 one	 of	 illegal	 weapon	 possession”	 (Walsh	 2011a)	 and	 convicted,	 yet	 he	 was	
freed	after	“relatives	of	the	dead	men	pardoned	him	in	court”	(I.	Khan	2011).	The	
diplomatic	 incident	had	been	solved	thanks	 to	“’blood	money’,	or	diyat,	a	custom	
under	 Shariah	 that	 compensates	 the	 families	 of	 victims	 for	 their	 dead	 relatives”	
(Mazzetti	 2013).	 This	 episode	 triggered	 many	 protests	 in	 large	 cities	 across	
Pakistani:	
Demonstrators	 set	 tires	 ablaze,	 clashed	 with	 Pakistani	 riot	
police	 and	 brandished	 placards	 with	 slogans	 like	 “I	 Am	
Raymond	Davis,	Give	Me	a	Break,	I	Am	Just	a	C.I.A.	Hit	Man”.	
(Mazzetti	2013)	
According	to	Declan	Walsh,	the	Guardian	and	then	New	York	Times	correspondent	
for	 Pakistan	 from	 2004	 to	 May	 2013,	 “Pakistanis	 [saw]	 the	 episode	 as	 more	
evidence	of	imperialistic	arrogance”	(Walsh	2011a).	
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Picture	 1	 Jamaat-e-Islami	 protest	 after	 the	 Raymond	 Davies	 scandal	 in	 Lahore,	
February	2011	
	
Source:	Mazzetti	2013	
The	second	episode	foreign	humanitarian	workers	in	Pakistan	referred	to	as	a	‘game	
changer’	 regarding	 their	 situation	 in	 Pakistan	 revolved	 around	 a	 fake	 vaccination	
campaign	 organised	 by	 the	 CIA	when	 planning	 the	 killing	 of	 Osama	 bin	 Laden	 in	
Abottabad.	 Osama	 bin	 Laden	 was	 killed	 in	 Pakistan	 by	 an	 American	 Central	
Intelligence	 Agency	 operation	 on	 1st	 May,	 2011	 (Walsh,	 Adams,	 and	 MacAskill	
2011)	 and	 in	 July	 the	 media	 exposed	 a	 story	 related	 to	 the	 preparation	 of	 the	
operation:	 in	an	attempt	to	confirm	the	presence	of	Bin	Laden	and	his	 family	 in	a	
compound	 in	 Abbottabad,	 a	 highland	 town	 north	 of	 Islamabad,	 the	 CIA	 had	
organised	a	fake	vaccination	campaign	hoping	to	find	a	match	for	Bin	Laden’s	DNA	
(Shah	2011).	The	CIA	had	hired	a	Pakistani	doctor,	Shakeel	Afridi,	 to	supervise	the	
campaign	 who	 was	 arrested	 by	 the	 Pakistani	 authorities	 three	 weeks	 after	 Bin	
Laden’s	death.	Shortly	afterwards	allegations	surfaced	in	the	media	(Walsh	2011b)	
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that	 in	2008	an	official	from	Save	the	Children	had	introduced	Dr	Afridi	to	the	CIA	
(Leiby	2012).	These	allegations	were	never	proven	and	the	organisation	consistently	
denied	 any	 link	 with	 the	 fake	 vaccination	 campaign	 (Leiby	 2012).	 Yet	 the	
reputational	damage	was	done.	Pakistani	authorities	 intensified	 their	 scrutiny	and	
control	 over	 any	 foreign	 activity	 on	 their	 soil	 and	 international	 humanitarian	
workers	saw	the	successive	2011	episodes	as	making	their	relationship	with	the	GoP	
difficult.	Some	comments	made	by	the	Pakistani	authorities	I	interviewed	during	the	
same	 period	 confirmed	 the	 international	 humanitarian	 actors’	 feelings.	 Some	
alluded	to	the	fact	that	there	were	rumours	that	some	international	NGOs	had	been	
involved	in	terrorist	anti-state	activities,	and	as	one	said:	“If	NGOs	were	honest	then	
more	 than	 80%	 of	 our	 problems	 would	 have	 been	 solved”	 (Author’s	 interview	
2011).		
A	short	emergency	phase	after	the	2011	floods	
The	2010	floods	had	impacted	people’s	livelihoods	so	badly	that	at	the	start	of	the	
autumn	2011	many	international	actors	like	Solidarités	for	instance	(see	Chapter	6)	
were	still	working	on	the	post-2010	flood	response.	Then	in	2011	more	floods	came.	
These	were	not	as	bad	as	the	2010	ones,	but	they	still	affected	more	than	9	million	
people,	 mostly	 in	 Sindh,	 and	 came	 as	 an	 additional	 burden	 on	 relief	 agencies.	
Abnormal	 rains	had	started	to	 trigger	 floods	at	 the	beginning	of	August	2011,	but	
the	GoP	did	not	call	for	assistance	until	more	than	a	month	later,	announcing	at	first	
that	 it	could	respond	to	urgent	needs	on	 its	own.	At	the	district	 level,	however,	 it	
was	clear	 to	several	 interviewees	 that	people	were	asking	 for	more	help	 than	the	
government	 was	 able	 or	 willing	 to	 provide.	 Many	 NGOs	 told	 me	 they	 had	 sent	
assessment	 teams	 to	 Sindh	without	 authorisation,	 in	 order	 to	 assist	 an	 advocacy	
campaign	supported	by	a	group	of	NGOs	and	UN	agencies	to	try	and	get	the	NDMA	
to	officially	recognise	the	emergency.	The	President	of	Pakistan	eventually	called	for	
assistance	from	the	United	Nations	on	7	September,	2011	and	the	international	UN-
led	 humanitarian	 apparatus	 activated:	 this	 meant	 financial	 appeals	 could	 be	
launched,	 the	 emergency	 response	 cluster	 system	 could	 be	 reactivated,	 and	 aid	
actors	could	officially	assess	the	situation	of	the	people	on	the	ground.	This	was	one	
of	 many	 acts	 of	 passive	 resistance	 towards	 international	 aid	 actors	 by	 the	 GoP.	
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Pakistani	 authorities	 had	 always	 controlled	 foreign	 presence	 on	 its	 soil,	 as	 any	
sovereign	state	that	could	would,	but	delays	in	obtaining	any	kind	of	authorisation	
to	travel	or	work	in	the	affected	areas	increased.	 INGOs	have	always	been	subject	
to	 a	 long	 administrative	 process	 of	 registration	 with	 the	 Economic	 Affairs	
Division.117	During	the	emergency,	the	Pakistan	authorities	authorised	some	NGOs	
to	operate	without	their	registration	process	having	been	completed,	granting	them	
an	‘Interim	Permission’,	which	gave	the	same	entitlements,	but	for	shorter	periods,	
and	could	be	extended.	Many	of	the	INGOs	I	 interviewed	had	been	working	under	
Interim	 Permissions	 for	 several	 years,	 having	 renewed	 them	 repeatedly.	 Project	
NOCs	for	relief	and	early	recovery	projects	were	issued	for	a	six-month	period	after	
a	very	lengthy	process	involving	multiple	government	offices.	The	issue	of	the	travel	
NOC	 as	 already	 mentioned	 as	 difficulty	 to	 access	 certain	 areas	 of	 the	 country	
became	more	acute	with	the	2010	floods	that	affected	almost	all	provinces.	 I	was	
told	that	there	was	no	consistency	between	provinces	as	to	how	to	apply	for	a	NOC,	
which	 only	 increased	 delays.	 Obtaining	 NGO	 visas	 for	 international	 staff	 also	
became	 an	 increasing	 problem	 as	 the	 GoP	 attempted	 to	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	
international	 personnel.	 Some	 expatriates	 working	 in	 Pakistan	 were	 refused	 visa	
renewals	while	others	saw	their	visas	cancelled	without	a	clear	explanation;	some	
requests	 took	 so	 long	 that	 the	 organisations’	 head	 office	 had	 to	 reassign	 people	
recruited	abroad	to	another	country	instead.		
Following	the	2011	floods,	 in	 line	with	their	policy	 to	maintain	a	 tight	hold	
over	foreign	aid	initiatives	on	its	territory,	Pakistani	authorities	rapidly	declared	the	
emergency	phase	over	and	transitioned	to	an	 ‘early	 recovery’	phase	 from	January	
2012	onwards.	This	was	not	just	a	matter	of	words:	it	had	institutional	and	political	
implications.	OCHA	ensured	the	coordination	during	the	emergency	phase	and,	as	
already	 mentioned,	 it	 had	 a	 history	 of	 challenging	 the	 Pakistani	 authorities.	 The	
NDMA	asked	 the	UNDP	 to	 lead	 the	 early	 recovery	 phase	 as,	 in	 effect,	UNDP	was	
much	 closer	 to	 the	Pakistani	 authorities	 than	OCHA.	As	 already	mentioned	UNDP	
had	funded	the	Federal	Relief	Commission	coordinating	the	emergency	response	in	
2005	 together	 with	 the	 emerging	 cluster	 system,	 and	 had	 also	 seconded	 many	
																																																						
117	For	Pakistani	NGOs,	the	process	is	different.	They	have	to	register	within	their	province	of	origin	
at	the	Social	Welfare	Department,	and	sign	a	Memorandum	of	Understanding.		
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personnel	 to	 PDMAs.	 In	 2010	UNDP	 had	much	 less	 coordination	 experience	 than	
OCHA,	which	had	long	been	designated	at	the	global	level	as	the	agency	in	charge	of	
coordinating	other	humanitarian	actors.	Regardless,	Pakistan	asked	UNDP	to	set	up	
an	Early	Recovery	Working	Group,	 to	provide	 the	exact	equivalent	kind	of	 service	
that	 the	 clusters	 did	 during	 an	 emergency,	 but	 during	 the	 early	 recovery	 phase.	
UNDP	 was	 also	 the	 agency	 that	 had	 organised	 the	 ‘One	 UN’	 programme	 for	
Pakistan,	 and	many	 of	my	 interviewees	 did	 not	 see	 it	 as	 an	 independent	 agency	
with	regard	to	the	GoP.		
At	the	end	of	2011	the	Pakistani	military	launched	operations	in	the	Khyber	
Agency	(FATA)	and	ordered	civilians	to	leave	the	agency.	People	started	to	move	to	
the	Peshawar	district,	 as	 it	was	 the	 closest	one	outside	 the	 conflict	 area,	 and	 the	
Pakistani	authorities	claimed	that	civilians	and	flood	victims	did	not	need	additional	
relief	as	the	military	was	taking	care	of	them.	 In	March	2012	however,	they	could	
not	handle	the	number	of	people	and	authorised	international	actors	to	step	in	(see	
Chapter	5).	
A	humanitarian	sovereignty	under	the	radar?	
Humanitarian	 actors	 have	 developed	 a	 passively	 defiant	 attitude	 towards	 the	
Pakistani	authorities	over	the	years.	I	observed	this	during	informal	social	occasions	
when	staff	complained	repeatedly	about	the	arbitrary	refusal	of	a	visa	or	NOC.	They	
remained,	however,	relatively	low	profile,	and	compliant	with	Pakistani	rules.		
Several	 international	 donors	 I	 interviewed	 in	 2012	 expressed	 their	
frustration	 that	 NGOs	 did	 not	 advocate	 more	 openly	 for	 “the	 respect	 of	
humanitarian	 principles”.	 They	 felt	 they	 did	more	 than	NGOs	 themselves	 on	 that	
level.	One	donor	observed:		
We	work	in	the	coordination	mechanism	to	maintain	a	space	
for	 principled	 humanitarianism.	 We	 fund	 the	 principled	
humanitarian	actors	in	priority;	we	fund	the	unprincipled	ones	
to	 try	 and	 influence	 them;	 and	 we	 lobby	 the	 government	
directly	too.	(Author’s	interview	2011).	
Humanitarian	 actors	 had	ways	 other	 than	 advocacy	 of	 adapting	 to	 this	 situation.	
First	 they	 developed	 their	 own	 independent	 analyses	 of	 people’s	 needs	 and	
maintained	 a	 strategic	 distance	 from	 UN	 and	 PDMA-led	 comprehensive	
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assessments.	For	instance,	they	used	the	Multi	Sector	Needs	Assessment	(MSNA)118	
as	 an	 overview	 of	 what	 donors	 might	 fund,	 or	 cited	 them	 instrumentally	 when	
responding	to	the	UN	“Flash	Appeal”119	(the	guidelines	of	the	appeal	specified	that	
projects	 had	 to	 be	 consistent	 with	 the	 MSNA	 data).	 One	 Country	 Director	
commented	 on	 the	MSNA	 saying:	 “this	 is	 mostly	 communication,	 but	 not	 useful	
information	for	us.	It	is	probably	necessary,	but	definitely	not	sufficient”.	Although	
the	 GoP/PDMA	 validated	 the	 content	 of	 these	 assessments,	 many	 doubted	 the	
relevance	and	truthfulness	of	the	information	contained,	which	explained	why	they	
preferred	 to	 assess	 local	 situations	 themselves.	 Second,	 none	 of	 the	 NGO	 staff	 I	
interviewed	 used	 the	 ‘Beneficiary	 Selection	 and	 Targeting	 Guideline’	 designed	 by	
the	 ‘protection	cluster’.	 I	 interpreted	 this	as	a	 sign	of	 the	 independence	of	NGOs’	
activities.	 Third,	 the	 most	 significant	 signs	 of	 room	 for	 manoeuvre	 that	
humanitarian	 actors	 attempted	 to	 create	 for	 themselves	 were	 the	 many	 other	
coordination	 forums	 they	 created	 outside	 the	 official	 clusters	 and	 early	 recovery	
working	 groups	 (which	 were	 co-chaired	 by	 UN	 and	 PDMA	 staff).	 Some	 gathered	
similar	 types	of	actors	 like	 the	Pakistan	Humanitarian	Forum	(PHF)	 for	 INGOs,	 the	
Humanitarian	 National	 Network	 for	 Pakistani	 NGOs,	 the	 Muslim	 INGO	 Forum	
established	in	2011	or	the	Donor	Forum,	in	which	major	donors	shared	information	
and	 attempted	 to	 coordinate	 their	 appeals.	 Other	 coordination	 circles	 were	
organised	 thematically,	 for	 example,	 Paksafe,	 where	 NGOs	 shared	 information	
about	 security	 management.	 The	 Forum	 on	 Refugees	 was	 created	 as	 an	 ad	 hoc	
group	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	 PHF,	 its	 members	 international	 and	 national	 NGOs	
working	 with	 Afghan	 refugees	 as	 these	 organisations	 found	 the	 issue	 of	 Afghan	
refugees	 was	 not	 tackled	 in	 the	 cluster	 meetings	 dedicated	 to	 assistance	 for	
Pakistanis	affected	by	the	floods	or	conflict.	The	PHF	also	created	thematic	working	
																																																						
118	 The	 MSNA	 used	 to	 be	 called	 the	 Multi-cluster	 Rapid	 Assessment	 Mechanism	 (McRAM)	 and	
started	 in	 2008	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 a	 collaborative	 post	 disaster	 assessment.	 When	 PDMA	
attempted	to	take	the	leadership	of	this	macro	assessment	in	2011,	it	changed	its	name	to	the	Multi	
Sector	Needs	Assessment	(MSNA).		
119	“The	flash	appeal	is	a	tool	for	structuring	a	coordinated	humanitarian	response	for	the	first	three	
to	six	months	of	a	new	emergency.	The	UN	RC/HC	triggers	it	in	consultation	with	major	stakeholders	
within	two	days	of	a	major	disaster	or	in	response	to	an	ongoing	or	slow-onset	crisis.	It	contains	an	
analysis	of	the	context	and	of	humanitarian	needs	(citing	whatever	specific	needs	assessments	are	
available,	as	well	as	any	other	evidence	such	as	informal	reports,	remote	sensing,	background	data,	
and	inference),	response	plans	(at	the	general	strategic	level	as	well	as	sector	plans	including	specific	
proposed	projects),	and	information	on	roles	and	responsibilities.”	(United	Nations	2009,	3)	
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subgroups	 like	 the	 Advocacy	 Working	 Group	 for	 NGOs	 willing	 to	 contribute	 to	
advocacy	on	 issues	–	for	example,	 in	2012	the	new	NGO	guidelines	that	had	been	
issued	by	the	Economic	Affairs	Department	or	the	Disaster	Risk	Reduction	Working	
Group	(sharing	good	practice	about	disaster	risk	reduction).	The	Sukkur	Group	was	
formed	 during	 the	 2010	 floods	 response	 in	 Sukkur	 (Sindh)	 in	 order	 for	 NGOs	
(international	 and	 national	 but	 only	 present	 at	 the	 local	 level)	 to	 coordinate	 and	
share	information	in	meetings	to	which	Pakistani	authorities	and,	in	particular,	the	
Pakistani	army	was	not	 invited.	This	type	of	response	coordination	body	had	been	
tested	 in	 2009	 by	 the	 same	 NGOs.	 Staff	 explained	 to	 me	 that	 they	 needed	 this	
restricted	group	 in	order	to	“not	compromise	on	humanitarian	principles”.	One	of	
those	 who	 initiated	 these	 temporary	 coordination	 groups	 explained:	 “Nobody	
wants	to	formally	face	the	comments	of	the	army”.	As	Paul	Knox	Clarke	notes	more	
generally,	“coordination”	and	“leadership”	have	very	often	been	referred	to	“in	the	
same	 breath”	 (Knox	 Clarke	 2013,	 6),	 while	 it	 can	 be	 useful	 to	 consider	 the	 two	
separately:		
‘leadership’	 as	 relating	 to	 efforts	 that	 guide	 a	 single	 set	 of	
common	actions	 forming	a	 single	plan,	and	coordination	as	
relating	 to	 efforts	 to	 ensure	 complementarity	 and	 prevent	
overlap	 between	 diverse	 actions	 and	 diverse	 plans.	 (Knox	
Clarke	2013,	6–7)	
Using	these	definitions,	this	multi-layered	coordination	shows	a	general	willingness	
of	humanitarian	actors	in	the	humanitarian	configuration	in	Pakistan	to	collaborate	
in	 order	 that	 their	 responses	 not	 overlap.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 they	 displayed	 an	
exigency	 to	 preserve	 their	 independence	 over	 their	 own	 operational	 choices	 and	
avoid	being	constrained	by	a	“single	plan”,	especially	as	the	Pakistani	military	was	
increasingly	attempting	to	shape	this	plan.	
Conclusion		
The	humanitarian	configuration	described	 in	this	chapter	was	formed	 in	a	country	
whose	 authorities	 had	 decided	 ensuring	 territorial	 sovereignty	 was	 the	 highest	
priority.	 Historically,	 overall	 investments	 in	 the	 military	 and	 nuclear	 capacity	
preceded	 and	 overtook	 those	 in	 social	 services.	When	 Pakistan	was	 struck	 by	 an	
earthquake	in	2005	the	Pakistani	military	proved	to	have	a	strong	relief	capacity	and	
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to	be	able	 to	collaborate	with	newly	arrived	 international	humanitarian	actors	 for	
the	good	of	the	affected	people,	according	to	international	aid	agencies.	Yet,	when	
the	 same	 relief	 actors	 started	 to	 respond	 to	 the	displacement	of	populations	and	
other	 human	 damage	 caused	 by	 what	 the	 Pakistani	 authorities	 termed	 ‘law	
enforcement	 operations’	 against	 Islamist	 insurgents,	 tensions	 progressively	 grew	
between	the	GoP	and	some	aid	agencies,	as	well	as	among	aid	actors	with	different	
views	about	the	legitimacy,	extent,	modality	and	consequences	of	the	GoP’s	often	
successful	 attempts	 to	 subjugate	 international	 humanitarian	 aid	 to	 its	 counter-
insurgency	strategy.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	2010	floods,	the	relationships	between	
actors	of	the	humanitarian	configuration	had	become	more	complex	than	in	2005.	
Each	actor	(the	civilian	and	military	branches	of	the	GoP,	the	Pakistani	Taliban	and	
Pashtun	 local	 authorities,	 the	 UN,	 NGOs,	 donors,	 etc.)	 was	 more	 aware	 of	 the	
others’	priorities	and	attempted	to	secure	their	own	room	for	manoeuvre.		
It	 is	 in	 this	 complex	 humanitarian	 configuration	 of	 local,	 national,	
international,	state	and	non	state,	armed	and	non-armed	actors	with	relationships	
built	 upon	 a	 history	 of	 various	 types	 of	 interests	 since	 2005	 that	 the	 projects	 I	
studied	took	place	in	2011-2012.	In	Chapters	5,	6	and	7	I	unpack,	from	inside	these	
humanitarian	 organisations,	 how	 choices	 about	 how	 to	 assist	 people	 and	who	 to	
prioritise	 are	 shaped	 by	 their	 own	 organisational	 interests,	 opportunities	 and	
constraints	as	well	as	by	the	wider	humanitarian	configuration	described	here.	
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Chapter	5	
Médecins	Sans	Frontières:	a	strategic	and	populist	
interpretation	of	impartiality	
Introduction	
The	MSF	project	this	chapter	focuses	on	was	a	set	of	secondary	health	care	services	
provided	 in	 the	district	hospital	of	Timergara	 in	 Lower	Dir	 (Khyber	Pakhtunkwa)	–	
not	 far	 from	 the	 border	 with	 Afghanistan	 in	 the	 north-west	 of	 Pakistan.	 As	
mentioned	in	chapter	4,	since	2004	this	area	had	been	affected	by	growing	tensions	
between	the	Pakistani	military	and	Pakistani	Taliban	groups.	In	these	regions	people	
lived	 with	 the	 constant	 threat	 of	 bombings	 in	 public	 places,	 military	 operations,	
extra-judicial	killings	and	American	drones	targeting	Afghan	Taliban	rear	bases.	The	
MSF	 project	 I	 studied	 between	October	 2011	 and	 January	 2012120	 had	 an	 annual	
budget	of	approximately	€2	million	 (in	2011)	and	originated	 in	 the	aftermath	of	a	
massive	displacement	following	a	Pakistani	military	operation	in	the	Bajaur	Agency	
(FATA)	in	August	2008.	Between	200,000	and	300,000	people	had	crossed	the	FATA	
border	 to	 go	 to	 safer	 areas	 in	 the	 neighbouring	 districts	 of	 KPK,	 Lower	 Dir	 and	
Malakand,	and	MSF	started	to	provide	basic	medical	care	to	some	of	these	people	
in	 a	 camp	 called	Munda	 in	 Lower	 Dir	 (KPK)	 at	 the	 border	 with	 Bajaur	 (FATA).	 In	
March	2009,	MSF	moved	its	activities	about	30km	away	to	the	District	Headquarters	
Hospital	of	Timergara,	the	capital	city	of	Lower	Dir,	to	offer	emergency	and	surgical	
care.	
	 Before	 I	 arrived	 in	 Pakistan,	 I	 was	 briefed	 on	 the	 phone	 by	 the	 Brussels-
based	head	of	what	MSF	called	”Cell	4”	–	the	team	in	charge	of	MSF	‘operations’121	
in	Iraq,	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan.	According	to	him,	the	Timergara	project	was	the	
project	 that	 best	 fitted	 their	 overall	 ambitions	 in	 Pakistan:	 “The	 goal	 was	 (…)	 to	
treat	all	victims	of	bomb	blast	in	the	area	or	victims	of	the	conflict”.		
																																																						
120	 I	 spent	 two	months	 in	 Pakistan	until	December	 2011	 and	 visited	 the	head	office	 in	Brussels	 in	
January	2012.		
121	In	the	MSF	language	‘operations’	is	more	or	less	synonymous	with	activities,	response	or	projects.	
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This	 project	 was	 the	 product	 of	 a	 long	 negotiation	 process	 with	 various	
stakeholders:	 the	 Pakistani	 administration	 to	 obtain	 travel	 NOCs	 for	 international	
staff,	the	local	administrative	and	religious	authorities	to	get	their	support,	and	the	
Ministry	of	Health	to	negotiate	the	repartition	and	coordination	of	health	services	in	
the	 District	 Headquarters	 Hospital	 of	 Timergara.	MSF	 was	 the	 only	 humanitarian	
actor	who	had	expatriates	based	in	this	very	conservative	area	of	Pakistan.	For	the	
MSF	 teams,	 the	 exposure	 to	 attacks	 or	 kidnappings	 were	 real,	 but	 the	MSF	 OCB	
management	considered	these	risks	acceptable	 in	order	to	be	able	to	care	for	the	
“war	 wounded”:	 however,	 looking	 at	 internal	 medical	 data	 in	 2011,	 most	 of	 the	
patients	admitted	 to	 the	emergency	ward	had	cardiac,	obstetric	or	mental	health	
issues	and	only	25%	of	patients	admitted	to	the	resuscitation	room	were	“trauma	
patients”,	only	2%	of	which	could	be	attributed	to	war	episodes	(MSF	OCB	2011a;	
MSF	OCB	2011c)	–	the	others	being	related	to	traffic	or	domestic	accidents.	
	
Figure	6	MSF	Resuscitation	room	data	during	the	3rd	quarter	of	2011	
	
Source:	(MSF	OCB	2011d,	3)	
	
Additionally,	 the	 northwest	 of	 Pakistan	 was	 not	 particularly	 deprived	 of	 medical	
services	compared	to	the	rest	of	the	country,	as	an	MSF	internal	evaluation	report	
confirmed:	
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There	 is	 little	 in	 terms	 of	 medical	 data	 or	 analysis	 which	
suggests	that	the	needs	 in	KPK	are	 in	any	way	greater	than	
elsewhere	 in	 the	 country,	 except	 perhaps	 the	 cultural	
limitation	 on	 female	 access	 to	 health	 care	 due	 to	 highly	
conservative	 cultural	 and	 religious	 attitude.	 (Stringer	 2011,	
4)	
As	 described	 in	 chapter	 4,	 Pakistan	 generally	 underinvested	 in	 its	 national	 health	
system	 and	 created	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health	 paid	 salaries	 to	
medical	staff,	the	majority	of	whom	spent	more	time	in	their	private	practices	than	
in	the	state	hospitals.	
In	short,	MSF	rarely	treated	the	‘war	wounded’	and	admitted	that	the	public	
health	situation	was	no	worse	 in	KPK	than	 in	other	parts	of	Pakistan.	 If	 the	public	
health	data	were	not	driving	MSF	humanitarian	 triage,	what	was?	What	were	 the	
sorting	logics	underpinning	it	and	what	effects	did	they	have?	
	 The	 first	 section	of	 this	 chapter	outlines	a	 short	historical	 trajectory	of	 the	
project	 leading	 to	 a	 description	 of	 the	 Timergara	macro-humanitarian	 triage	 that	
prioritised	potential	 ‘war	wounded’	from	the	hostilities	 in	the	neighbouring	Bajaur	
Agency122	 (FATA)	 through	 the	 offer	 of	 secondary	 health	 care.	 The	 second	 section	
shows	that	most	of	the	staff	were	united	behind	the	idea	that	‘MSF	was	different’	
from	other	aid	actors,	relying	upon	considerable	efforts	by	the	institution	to	shape	
this	 perception	 as	 well	 as	 on	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 approach	 and	 positioning	 of	 the	
Timergara	 project.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 idea	 that	 ‘MSF	 is	 different’	 stabilised	 the	
Timergara	macro-triage.	The	third	section	delves	into	the	daily	practices	of	the	MSF	
OCB	 staff	 to	 show	 that	 the	 support	 and	 political	 staff	 acted	 mainly	 on	 external	
constraints,	managing	 to	 reduce	 them,	while	 the	medical	 staff	 shaped	 the	micro-
triage	thanks	to	an	activity-driven	project	management.	The	fourth	section	offers	an	
analysis	 of	 what	 the	 Timergara	 humanitarian	 triage	 produced,	 exploring	 the	
questions	of	who	were	eventually	included	and	excluded,	showing	that	overall	MSF	
OCB	refused	to	adopt	a	cost-effective	approach	and	essentially	prioritised	Pashtun	
people	in	urban	areas.	
																																																						
122	 In	 the	 FATA,	 instead	of	 ‘districts’	 like	 in	 the	other	provinces	of	Pakistan,	 there	are	 seven	 tribal	
‘Agencies’	and	six	‘Frontier	Regions’.	
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Macro-triage:	the	wounded	of	the	‘Global	War	on	Terror’	
Since	 2001	 Afghanistan	 and	 Pakistan	 have	 been	 at	 the	 core	 of	 international	
geopolitics	 in	the	context	of	what	has	been	labelled	the	‘Global	War	on	Terror’.	 In	
2009	Barack	Obama	described	 the	 two	 countries	 as	 “the	 epicenter	 of	 the	 violent	
extremism	 practiced	 by	 Al	 Qaeda”	 (Shane	 2009).	 During	 the	 same	 period,	MSF’s	
institutional	position	was	to	distance	itself	from	the	western	states,	a	change	from	
its	 position	 during	 the	 Cold	 War	 (Weissman	 2011;	 Weissman	 2013).	 This	
materialised	 within	 OCB	 with	 the	 creation	 in	 2009	 of	 ‘Cell	 4’	 to	 take	 charge	 of	
operations	 in	 the	 epicentre	 of	 the	 Global	 War	 on	 Terror:	 Iraq,	 Afghanistan	 and	
Pakistan:	“We	re-organised	the	house	according	to	these	conflicts”,	commented	the	
Executive	Director	during	our	 interview.	One	member	of	Cell	4	recalled	that	when	
they	 created	 it,	 many	 people	 were	 against	 the	 idea	 of	 going	 back	 to	 the	 ‘AfPak’	
area,	as	they	called	the	Afghanistan/Pakistan	region,	and	asked	him:	“Why?	You’re	
in	 the	West,	how	can	you	get	 involved	 in	a	 conflict	on	 the	 side	of	 those	who	are	
against	values	that	are	yours?”	adding,	“There	was	an	aversion	towards	this	kind	of	
risk…the	tribal	areas.	There	was	an	erroneous	perception	about	Pakistan”.	For	MSF	
to	be	 “at	 the	 forefront	of	 the	Global	War	on	Terror”	on	 the	 side	of	 the	 “victims”	
relied	in	part	on	the	necessity	of	dissociating	itself	from	“the	UN/NGO	circus”	(MSF	
OCA	2011,	1)	and	 to	publicly	distance	 itself	 from	those	and	other	western	actors.	
This	was	 consistent	with	 a	widely	 shared	opinion	within	 the	MSF	movement	 that	
western	 states	 had	 been	 abusively	 enrolling	 humanitarian	 actors	 and	 rhetoric	 in	
interventionist	policies	(de	Torrente	2004).	Visions	of	the	world	as	described	by	US	
President	 George	W.	 Bush	 through	 statements	 such	 as:	 “We	 will	 pursue	 nations	
that	provide	aid	or	safe	haven	to	terrorism.	Every	nation,	in	every	region,	now	has	a	
decision	to	make.	Either	you	are	with	us,	or	you	are	with	the	terrorists.”	(Bush	2001,	
n.p.)	were	challenged	by	most	of	MSF	OCB’s	public	communications	(Stokes	2010;	
Whittal	2011a;	Stokes	2011).	 It	was	also	challenged	by	MSF’s	macro-humanitarian	
triage	 in	 Pakistan	 as	 this	 section	 demonstrates,	 first	 through	 a	 description	 of	 the	
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trajectory	 of	 the	 Timergara	 project123	 and	 second,	 through	 a	 description	 of	 an	
organisational	structure	giving	primacy	to	strategic	considerations.		
The	trajectory	of	MSF	OCB	humanitarian	triage	in	Timergara	
In	 November	 2011	 there	 were	 three	 different	 MSF	 Operational	 Centres124	 in	
Pakistan:	 Operational	 Centre	 Amsterdam	 (OCA),	 which	 mainly	 worked	 in	
Baluchistan;	Operational	Centre	Paris	(OCP),	which	mainly	worked	in	South	KPK	and	
the	 FATA;	 and	Operational	 Centre	 Brussels	 (OCB),	 which	mainly	worked	 in	 North	
KPK.	 Apart	 from	 emergency	 responses	 to	 natural	 disasters	 that	 consisted	 of	
distributions	of	 items,	construction	of	shelters	or	mobile	clinics125,	 the	majority	of	
MSF	activities	in	Pakistan	since	2004	had	revolved	around	providing	free	secondary	
health	 care	 by	 running	 entire	 departments	 of	 district	 hospitals	 ensuring	 surgery,	
obstetric,	gynaecology	and,	sometimes,	paediatric	care.		
Secondary	 health	 care	 refers	 to	 hospitals	 that	 provide	 specialised	 services	
required	 to	 treat	 serious	 medical	 problems.	 In	 theory,	 the	 first	 contact	 patients	
have	 with	 the	 health	 system	 is	 with	 primary	 health	 care	 addressed	 by	 general	
practitioners	and	other	paramedical	staff.	Primary	health	care	 includes	mainly	 the	
treatment	of	common	diseases	or	injuries,	immunisation	and	health	education.	For	
more	serious	health	issues,	people	are	referred	to	specialists	in	charge	of	secondary	
health	 care	 in	 hospitals	 that	 offer	 special	 premises	 and	 the	 technology	 often	
required	for	surgeries,	blood	transfusion	or	special	tests.	
When	OCB	decided	to	come	to	Pakistan	in	2004,	it	was	for	strategic	reasons:	
With	the	humanitarian	space	shrinking	 in	Afghanistan	and	
OCB	 activities	 there	 becoming	 increasingly	 limited	 and	
difficult,	 the	 decision	 was	 taken	 to	 potentially	 leave	
																																																						
123	 In	 the	 MSF	 vocabulary	 the	 word	 “project”	 referred	 to	 a	 “location”	 rather	 than	 to	 a	 set	 of	
objectives	 that	needed	to	be	reached	within	a	certain	 timeframe	for	a	given	population.	So	 in	 the	
MSF	language	each	location	was	a	“project”,	even	though	some	activities	targeted	different	groups	
of	 people	with	 different	 timeframes	 –	 IDPs	 from	 Bajaur	 or	 the	 Lower	 Dir	 population	 -	 or	 tackled	
different	health	issues	–	like	MCH	emergencies	and	medical	emergencies.	
124	Operational	Centres	are	named	after	the	location	of	their	head	offices,	which	is	the	capital	city	of	
their	country	of	origin:	Operational	Centre	Amsterdam	stands	for	the	Dutch	MSF,	OC	Brussels	for	the	
Belgian	MSF	 and	 OC	 Paris	 for	 the	 French	MSF.	 They	 are	 Operational	 Centres	 since	 they	manage	
“operations”	 as	 opposed	 to	 other	 MSF	 institutions	 in	 Germany,	 Austria,	 Greece,	 etc.,	 which	
essentially	recruit	and	fundraise	for	the	Operational	Centre	they	are	affiliated	with.	
125	Since	2004	OCB	has	responded	to	natural	disasters	in	Bagh	(Kashmir)	after	the	2005	earthquake,	
in	 KPK,	 South	 Sindh	 and	Karachi	 after	 the	 2010	 floods,	 and	 in	 Badin	 (South	 Sindh)	 after	 the	 2011	
floods.	
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Afghanistan	 and	 establish	 contact	 with	 the	 Pashtun	
community	 on	 the	 Pakistan	 side	 of	 border.	 Following	 this	
decision,	 OCB	 started	 assessments	 in	 Pakistan	 in	 early	
2004,	 focussing	on	the	disputed	 line	of	control	 in	Kashmir	
and	 on	 the	 Afghan	 border	 area	 along	 the	 FATA	 line	
Peshawar	to	Quetta.	(Stringer	2011,	20)	
Only	one	month	after	OCB’s	 first	assessment	team	was	sent	 to	Pakistan,	 five	MSF	
staff	were	killed	in	Afghanistan	(Badghis,	June	2004)	which	led	to	the	interruption	of	
all	 MSF	 activities	 there.	 After	 this	 traumatic	 episode,	 the	 assessment	 was	
interrupted	 again	 in	 October	 2005	 when	 the	 Kashmir	 earthquake	 struck.	 OCB	
channelled	 all	 its	 staff	 to	 the	 set	 up	 of	 a	 “rapid	 and	 substantial”	 intervention	 in	
Bagh,	Kashmir	(Stringer	2011,	20),	and	it	was	not	until	three	months	later	that	the	
team	was	sent	to	Malakand	(KPK)	to	finish	the	assessment.	The	town	of	Agra	was	
chosen	as	the	location	of	OCB’s	first	project	in	the	Malakand	district	at	the	border	
with	 FATA	 (September	 2006),	 FATA	 at	 the	 time	 being	 considered	 “the	 world’s	
‘terrorism	central’”	(Rashid	2008,	265).	According	to	 interviewees	who	worked	for	
MSF	then,	Agra	was	chosen	for	the	following	reasons:	first,	the	Ministry	of	Health	in	
Peshawar	had	indicated	Agra	as	an	area	that	needed	health	support;	second,	it	was	
on	 the	 border	 with	 FATA	 and	 therefore	 strategically	 positioned	 for	MSF	 to	 start	
networking	with	 people	 from	FATA	 and	Afghanistan;	 third,	 it	was	 a	 remote	place	
significantly	lacking	access	to	health	care;	and,	finally,	it	was	small	enough	for	MSF	
to	 try	 to	 get	 known	 and	 build	 trust	 with	 the	 local	 people.	 Primary	 health	 and	
Mother	and	Child	Health	(MCH)	activities	were	started	but	internal	reports	mention	
that	MSF	 staff	 had	 difficulties	 in	 being	 accepted,	 and	 threats	 and	 pressures	 from	
different	 stakeholders	 increased,	 making	 the	 MSF	 teams’	 work	 more	 difficult.	
Medical	staff	said	that	they	felt	that	the	level	of	medical	activities	they	were	able	to	
provide	was	too	low	compared	to	the	investment	and	risk	required.	
In	June	2007,	the	project	was	moved	to	Dargai,	a	bigger	town	in	Malakand	
(and	a	little	further	away	from	the	FATA	border).	Here	the	objectives	of	the	project	
were	 relatively	 clear,	 given	 that	 the	 city	 hospital	 had	 just	 been	 destroyed.	 MSF	
would	cover	the	gap	in	provision	of	medical	services	until	a	new	hospital	could	be	
built.	Many	MSF	staff	describe	Dargai	as	a	“success	story”	because	first,	the	access	
and	quality	of	health	care	for	people	of	the	area	was	significantly	improved;	second,	
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MSF	managed	to	negotiate	its	acceptance	in	a	very	conservative	society	and	third,	
the	Dargai	project	served	as	a	base	of	operations	for	other	projects	further	north.	
One	example	 that	was	mentioned	 to	me	several	 times	was	 the	 story	of	 four	MSF	
staff	 who	 had	 been	 kidnapped	 in	 Dargai	 in	 December	 2009.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	
organisation	stopped	working	and	considered	 leaving	the	hospital;	 the	kidnappers	
then	 faced	 an	 enormous	 amount	 of	 political	 pressure	 from	 the	 local	 community.	
About	10,000	people	demonstrated	in	the	streets	of	Dargai	requesting	the	release	
of	 the	 MSF	 staff.	 The	 demonstration	 went	 on	 for	 several	 days	 until	 the	 group	
yielded	 to	 pressure	 and	 released	 them.	 “Dargai	was	 an	 expensive	 entry	 ticket	 to	
KPK,	 but	 it	 was	 an	 entry	 ticket”,	 commented	 an	 international	MSF	 staff	member	
who	had	worked	there.		
In	 August	 2008,	 MSF	 started	 medical	 relief	 in	 Lower	 Dir	 for	 internally	
displaced	persons	(IDPs)	from	the	neighbouring	Bajaur	and	Maiden	agencies	(FATA).	
There	were	very	few	other	actors	working	 in	this	area,	apart	 from	the	 ICRC	which	
distributed	food	(ICRC	2009)	and	the	Pakistani	NGO	Al	Khidmat,126	so	MSF	provided	
basic	 health	 care	 in	 several	 camps	 in	 Samarbagh,	 Sadbar	 Kelay,	 and	Munda.	 The	
camps	 in	 Samarbagh	 and	 Sadbar	 Kelay	 were	 closed	 but	MSF	 continued	 to	 assist	
people	 in	Munda,	 and,	 starting	 in	March	2009,	 to	 provide	 emergency	 care	 in	 the	
District	Headquarters	Hospital	of	Timergara,	a	forty-five	minute	drive	from	Munda.		
																																																						
126	http://al-khidmatfoundation.org		
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Map	8	Lower	Dir	
	
Source:	ICRC127	
MSF	distributed	tents	and	basic	relief	items	such	as	blankets,	soap	and	cooking	sets	
and	 provided	 free	 medical	 care	 in	 the	 camps	 until	 the	 end	 of	 2009.	 During	 the	
cholera	 season	 of	 September-October	 2009	 the	 organisation	 also	 operated	 three	
cholera	treatment	centres	in	Timergara	(MSF	2009).	
On	 25th	 January	 2010,	 the	 Pakistani	 army	 forcibly	 evacuated	 the	 Munda	
camp	 as	 they	 suspected	 it	 of	 hosting	 Taliban	 preparing	 attacks	 against	 military	
positions	 in	 Bajaur	 (MSF	 OCB	 2010a).	 Around	 3,000	 to	 4,000	 IDPs	 moved	 from	
Munda	to	Walay	Kandow	camp	in	the	mountains	where	there	were	already	about	
6,000	people.	MSF	first	followed	the	IDPs,	organising	mobile	clinics,	but	as	an	MSF	
staff	member	involved	at	the	time	as	an	“outreach	doctor”	recalled:	“After	a	while	
MSF	decided	to	leave	because	World	Vision	and	the	UNHCR	were	working	there	–	
and	working	in	the	same	area	was	not	ok	for	MSF”.	According	to	him,	the	reasons	
behind	 this	withdrawal	were:	 “When	 there	 is	 UN	 and	World	 Vision	who	 have	 no	
good	reputation,	if	we’re	working	with	them,	people	will	think	MSF	are	like	them”.	
He	regretted	that	MSF	had	to	leave	as	the	people	were	living	in	very	bad	conditions,	
																																																						
127	https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/pakistan-update-270409.htm#	
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and	would	have	needed	MSF	a	little	longer.	He	said	that	the	field	coordinator	was	of	
the	 opinion	 that	 “if	 the	 IDPs	 go	 to	 another	 place	 with	 no	 other	 NGO	 then	MSF	
would	start	again”.	
In	 Timergara,	 MSF	 first	 started	 supporting	 the	 hospital	 in	 the	 emergency	
room	 (ER),	 initially	 only	 stabilising	 patients	 to	 send	 them	 to	 Peshawar	 for	 further	
treatment.	 Then	 the	 organisation	 developed	 a	 new	 operating	 theatre	 (January	
2010),	 a	post-operative	unit	 (February	2010)	 and	a	 sterilisation	 (and	 laundry)	 and	
waste	management	system	for	the	entire	hospital.	Support	for	the	maternity	ward	
for	Mother	and	Child	Health	(MCH)	upon	the	request	of	the	local	elders,	and	for	the	
blood	bank	came	a	little	later,	in	October	of	the	same	year.	
Since	2010,	MSF	had	been	treating	an	increasing	number	of	patients	in	the	
project	area128	 and	by	November	2011,	 the	MCH	was	 the	main	activity	of	MSF	 in	
Timergara.129	 Emergency	 Room	 doctors	 had	 started	 to	 implement	 a	 new	 triage	
protocol:	the	South	African	Triage	Scale.	This	“physiology	and	symptom	based	scale	
which	 prioritises	 [patients]	 into	 one	 of	 four	 colours”130	 had	 proved	 effective	 in	
various	 contexts	 -	 hospital	 Emergency	 Centres	 as	well	 as	 in	 pre-hospital	 settings,	
both	 rural	 and	 urban	 (Rosedale	 et	 al.	 2011)	 –	 and	 worked	 well	 in	 the	 variety	 of	
contexts	 in	 which	 MSF	 works.	 MSF	 had	 however	 only	 started	 to	 open	 the	
Emergency	Room	24/7	three	weeks	before	my	fieldwork	began,	with	the	idea	to	do	
a	study	after	three	months	to	see	whether	the	South	African	triage	was	better	than	
the	 one	 of	WHO	 based	 on	 three	 categories	 only.	 After	 having	 been	 triaged,	 red	
cases	 (and	some	of	 the	orange	ones	under	 the	South	African	 triage	 system)	were	
sent	 to	 the	 resuscitation	 room	managed	 entirely	 by	MSF	while	 green	 and	 yellow	
cases	were	sent	to	the	Ministry	of	Health	doctors.	Those	who	needed	tertiary	care	
(such	 as	 neonatal	 care)	 were	 referred	 to	 Peshawar	 hospitals	 with	 a	 3,000	 PKR	
allowance.	
																																																						
128	The	number	of	people	seen	in	the	ER	in	the	third	quarter	of	the	year	went	from	4603	in	2010	to	
6597	in	2011	(MSF	OCB	2011d,	1).	
129	During	 the	3rd	quarter	of	2011,	MSF	had	1,265	deliveries	and	1,225	Red	cases	 in	 the	ER,	which	
probably	includes	some	of	the	complicated	deliveries.	In	the	postoperative	room	MSF	had	209	cases	
in	the	gynecology	category	and	66	in	the	general	surgery	category,	which	gives	indications	about	the	
amount	of	the	activity	dedicated	to	the	MCH	in	Timergara	over	this	period	(MSF	OCB	2011d).		
130	http://emssa.org.za/sats/.	
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In	November	2011	MSF	staff	spoke	of	their	organisation	as	being	relatively	
well	 accepted	 in	 Timergara,	 even	 though	 they	 remained	 vigilant	 on	 a	 daily	 basis	
about	 potential	 risks.	 Since	 December	 2009	 there	 had	 been	 about	 seven	 suicide	
bombings	and	five	 Improvised	Explosive	Device	attacks	 in	Timergara.	Bajaur	was	a	
forty-five	minute	drive	from	Timergara	and	when	the	Head	of	Mission	briefed	me	in	
October	2011,	he	described	the	situation	as	follows:	
At	the	moment	there	have	been	some	groups	at	the	border	
with	Buner	attacking	police	posts,	so	there	are	rumours	that	
there	are	Taliban	movements	inside	Bajaur.	There	have	also	
been	 rumours	 that	 there	 have	 been	 arrests	 of	militants	 in	
Swat.	We	cannot	be	sure.	
Not	 related	 to	 conflict	 but	 no	 less	 important	were	 the	 threats	 coming	 from	 local	
private	doctors.	Timergara	had	many	private	clinics	doing	deliveries	and	Caesarean	
sections	which	did	not	appreciate	MSF	offering	MCH	services	free	of	charge.	So	the	
exposure	to	risk	of	attack	for	the	MSF	staff	was	real,	yet	it	was	worth	it	according	to	
the	 field	 coordinator	 (often	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘field	 co’):	 “Working	 in	 the	 most	
important	hospital	is	high	visibility”,	he	said,	adding	that,	“strategically	Lower	Dir	is	
an	 important	 location:	 (…)	 before	 going	 to	 Peshawar	 people	 have	 to	 go	 through	
Timergara”.	
This	 trajectory	 shows	 how	 strategic	 and	 medical	 arguments	 have	 both	
played	out	in	each	MSF	decision	to	go	to,	stay	at	or	leave	a	location:	Agra	was	close	
to	the	FATA	(strategic)	but	of	a	very	low	medical	added	value.	Dargai	was	a	strategic	
replacement	with	higher	medical	raison	d’être.	Munda	was	medical	relief	that	fitted	
strategic	 ambitions,	 and	 the	 development	 of	 activities	 within	 the	 hospital	 of	
Timergara	came	as	a	strategic	replacement	with	high	medical	value	for	local	people,	
albeit	not	treating	many	war-related	cases	in	the	course	of	2011.	The	main	sorting	
logic	 of	 the	 Timergara	 project,	 however,	 relied	 upon	 a	 strategic	 prospect	 of	 a	
worsening	of	the	situation	in	the	FATA,	and	it	emerged	as	the	result	of	a	mix	of	an	
inclusive	management	style	in	a	top-down	organisational	structure	as	the	next	part	
demonstrates.
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Pre-positioning	and	the	primacy	of	the	strategic	logic	
The	general	decision-making	style	was	an	 important	element	 influencing	decisions	
on	whom	to	prioritise	for	assistance.	Most	of	the	staff	based	in	the	field	considered	
they	could	express	their	views,	and	contributed	to	decision-making.	Some	even	said	
most	decisions	emerged	from	the	field.	Yet	head	office	employees,	in	spite	of	their	
mentioned	 willingness	 to	 tone	 this	 tendency	 down,	 said	MSF	 was	 a	 rather	 “top-
down”	 structure.	 My	 observations	 of	 the	 Timergara	 project	 and	 of	 the	 line	 of	
managers	involved	up	to	the	direction	in	Brussels,	confirmed	both	assertions.	
The	 expression	 ‘top-down’	 was	 used	 by	 one	 of	 the	 directors	 of	 the	
organisation	 in	Brussels.	By	this	he	meant	that	OCB’s	way	of	working	 involved	the	
head	 office	 managers	 as	 primary	 decision-makers	 of	 the	 main	 strategic	 lines.	
Additionally	 he	 explained	 that	 even	 at	 the	 head	 office	 level	 in	 Brussels,	 staff	 had	
complained	that	the	directors	took	too	many	decisions	that	did	not	emerge	from	a	
wider	 consultation.	 The	 Annual	 Review	 of	 Operations	 process	 was	 a	 good	
illustration:	the	exercise	was	conducted	each	year	 for	each	country	after	heads	of	
department	 (finance,	 human	 resources,	 logistics	 and	 operations)	 submitted	 their	
department	 guidance	 documents.	 The	 department	 of	 operations	 produced	 a	
strategic	 paper	 called	 “Prospects”,	 framing	 the	 main	 objectives	 targeted	 by	 the	
organisation	for	the	next	three	years.132	Each	Country	Policy	Paper	needed	to	state	
clearly	 how	 it	 fit	within	 the	 “Prospects”,	 and	 then	 each	 project	 document	 how	 it	
fitted	 within	 the	 Country	 Policy	 Paper.	 Country	 Policy	 Papers	 and	 project	
documents	 were	 annual	 strategic	 documents	 at	 respectively	 country	 and	 project	
level.	 Cell	 4	 and	 the	 director	 of	 operations	 gave	 their	 final	 approval	 on	 these	
Country	 Policy	 Paper	 and	 project	 documents	 during	 an	 Annual	 Review	 of	
Operations	meeting,	open	to	comments	by	all	head	office	departments.	In	order	to	
be	able	 to	have	this	 level	of	 follow-up,	 the	position	of	Director	of	Operations	was	
split	 between	 three	 people	 responsible	 for	 different	 geographic	 areas	 and	 for	
relationships	 with	 different	 departments	 internally.133	 When	 a	 significant134	
amendment	 to	 a	 project,	 or	 a	 new	 project	 was	 needed	 in	 between	 two	 Annual	
																																																						
132	Before	2011	they	took	place	annually.	
133	 One	 of	 the	 three	 directors	 of	 operations	 is	 also	 responsible	 for	 representing	 OCB	 in	 the	
international	meeting	of	the	directors	of	operations	of	all	OCs	called	the	“RIOD”.	
134	Either	a	budget	revision	of	over	50,000	EUR	is	needed	or	the	nature	of	the	project	is	modified.	
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Review	 of	 Operations	 sessions,	 a	 “COmité	 de	 PROjet”	 (French	 for	 ‘project	
committee’)	 or	 “COPRO”	 was	 organised.	 A	 COPRO	 was	 a	 short	 proposition	 of	
activities	discussed	in	a	meeting	at	the	head	office	(similar	to	the	Annual	Review	of	
Operations	meeting)	 that	 validated	operational	 changes	 between	 the	 two	Annual	
Reviews	of	Operations.		
Two	 categories	 of	 projects	 helped	 the	 head	 office	 manage	 from	 the	 top,	
known	 as	 projects	 ‘by	 default’	 or	 ‘by	 choice’.	 Projects	 ‘by	 default’	 are	 those	
considered	 as	 fitting	 with	 the	 ‘classic’	 and	 widely	 shared	 interpretation	 of	MSF’s	
social	 mission,	 valuing	 ‘emergency	 response’	 to	 ‘crisis	 situations’	 emerging	 in	
conflict	 or	 natural	 disasters.	 Projects	 ‘by	 choice’	 correspond	 to	 less	 consensual	
projects,	considered	at	the	margins	of	the	social	mission	but	still	valued	due	to	their	
strategic	 or	 innovative	 potential.	 The	director	 of	 operations	 explained	 to	me	 that	
before	they	invented	this	typology,	they	used	to	associate	projects	with	numerous	
categories:	“IDPs”,	“war	wounded”,	“post	conflict”,	etc.	but,	he	added:	“We	did	not	
really	 know	 in	 the	 end	 what	 was	 what”.	 The	 turning	 point	 came	 with	 the	
development	of	large	projects	addressing	HIV/AIDs	and	malnutrition:	these	projects	
were	long	term	and	very	expensive,	so	the	management	team	at	the	head	office	felt	
the	need	to	create	categories	 that	would	enable	 them	to	analyse	the	structure	of	
their	responses	worldwide,	and	to	actively	manage	them	strategically,	 rather	than	
to	be	overwhelmed	by	certain	projects.	‘By	choice’	projects	would	therefore	have	to	
be	closely	followed	up	and	re-evaluated	so	that	they	would	not	absorb	the	overall	
budget	 to	 the	point	 that	MSF	would	 lose	 its	 relief	 surge	 capacity.	Conflict-related	
projects	were	generally	in	the	‘by	default’	category.	As	explained	by	the	head	of	Cell	
4:	 “this	 nomenclature	 helped	 us	 close	 some	 projects	 in	 order	 to	 rationalise	 our	
activity”.	Timergara	had	started	as	a	project	 ‘by	default’	assisting	people	who	had	
fled	the	conflict	outbreak	in	Bajaur,	yet	by	October	2011	it	had	an	ambiguous	status	
as	 it	 embodied	MSF’s	 strategic	 pre-positioning	 for	 working	 in	 future	 conflicts.	 Its	
reasons	for	intervention	were	given	as	follows:	
1. To	provide	free	speedy	medical	response	to	the	high	level	
of	 violence	 in	 the	 area	 as	 witnessed	 in	 the	 DHQ	 [District	
Head	Quarter]	currently.	
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2. Develop	links	with	the	Health	authorities	 in	Lower	Dir	and	
provide	 support	 in	 case	 of	 emergencies	 and	 mass	
casualties	(conflict	wounded.)	
3. To	develop	a	referral	system	from	the	periphery	to	Lower	
Dir	DHQ	and	onwards	to	Peshawar.	
4. Monitor	 the	 health	 situation,	 gain	 access	 to	 and	 possibly	
make	 assessment	 in	Bajaur	 if	 Security	 allowed.	 (MSF	OCB	
2010b,	6)	
For	MSF,	then,	the	raison	d’être	for	its	 intervention	was	related	to	“violence”,	and	
to	the	“conflict”	 in	Bajaur	and	 its	 links	to	wider	violence	 in	FATA.	The	explanation	
one	 of	 the	members	 of	 Cell	 4	 gave	me	was	 that	 the	withdrawal	 of	 international	
troops	 in	 Afghanistan	 was	 likely	 to	 trigger	 more	 incidents	 in	 Pakistan	 and,	 in	
particular,	in	the	FATA	and	KPK.	For	the	Head	of	Mission	(HoM),	“The	whole	point	is	
to	go	 to	FATA:	 it’s	a	neglected	area,	 suffering	 from	the	consequences	of	 the	war.	
Mohmand…less	so	because	it	is	close	to	Peshawar	but	Bajaur...	[The]	next	step	is	to	
build	a	network	in	Bajaur”.	
The	Project	Document	went	on	to	discuss	“operational	 response”,	centring	
on	health	and	providing	a	description	of	medical	 activities.	The	 logical	 framework	
displayed	 a	 standard	 general	 objective	 (the	 same	 for	 all	 projects):	 “Mortality	 and	
morbidity	 is	 reduced	 amongst	 the	 population	 of	 X”,	 a	 specific	 objective	 that	was	
usually	phrased	as	“The	population	in	X	makes	use	of	the	available,	accessible	and	
quality	 primary	 (curative	 and	 preventive)	 and	 basic	 secondary	 health	 services.”	 A	
list	of	clinical	planned	activities	was	then	given.		
From	that	document,	one	could	read	that	the	diagnosis	of	the	problems	and	
the	“reasons	for	intervention”	(that	came	first)	were	political	and	coming	from	top	
management	 (Cell	 4	 and	 the	Head	of	Mission),	while	 the	 response	 content	was	a	
medical	 one	 designed	 in	 the	 field.	 Yet	 this	 did	 not	 trigger	major	 tensions	 as	 the	
managers	 at	 several	 levels	 (head	 office,	 Islamabad	 and	 in	 Timergara)	 adopted	 an	
inclusive	 management	 style.	 Morning	 meetings	 were	 often	 mentioned	 as	 a	 key	
moment,	especially	for	employees	who	were	not	managers	or	for	inter-department	
general	 communications	 as	 daily	 security	 information	 was	 shared	 and	 briefly	
discussed.	Morning	meetings	 happened	 in	 the	 field	 at	 project	 level	 as	 well	 as	 in	
Islamabad	 and	 usually	 lasted	 about	 twenty	 minutes.	 Field	 staff	 also	 often	
mentioned	the	Annual	Review	of	Operations	process	when	explaining	how	they	felt	
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decisions	emerged.	The	2011	Annual	Review	of	Operations	process	was	underway	
when	 I	 interviewed	 people.	 The	 Operational	 Coordinator	 and	 the	 Medical	
Polyvalent	 (both	 members	 of	 Cell	 4	 in	 Brussels)	 had	 just	 come	 to	 the	 field	 and	
organised	meetings	with	key	staff	(both	international	and	national)	at	each	project	
location	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 HoM	 and	 Medical	 Coordinator	 to	 discuss	 each	
project.	 This	way,	what	was	 included	 in	 each	project	 document	was	 the	 result	 of	
direct	 head	 office-field	 discussions,	 where	 both	 strategic	 and	 clinical	 dimensions	
were	included.	This	way,	one	of	the	Cell	4	members	argued,	when	meeting	for	final	
approval	with	the	Director	of	Operations	in	Brussels,	the	Cell	4	team,	the	HoM	and	
the	 Medical	 Coordinator	 were	 already	 in	 agreement.	 Top	 managers	 busy	 with	
strategic	thinking	led	the	decision-making	process,	yet	in	a	way	that	did	not	appear	
as	 authoritarian	 or	 dismissive	 of	 field	medical	work.	 In	 addition,	 as	 the	 following	
section	 argues,	 MSF	 employees	 were	 united	 in	 the	 conviction	 that	 MSF	 was	
‘different’	 from	 other	 aid	 actors	 and	 widely	 supported	 the	 macro-triage	 logic	 of	
being	pre-positioned	to	treat	future	war-wounded	in	Lower	Dir.	
“MSF	is	different”:	the	macro	triage	maintained	
To	be	different	from	other	aid	actors	as	well	as	other	medical	actors	was	something	
the	 MSF	 staff	 were	 willing	 to	 perpetuate.	 Maintaining	 the	 MSF	 difference	 was	
important	as	 it	 justified	working	 in	Timergara	close	to	the	conflict	area	and	hence	
perpetuated	 the	geographical	 sorting	 logic	as	well	as	 the	macro-logic	of	providing	
secondary	health	care	free	of	charge.	Working	in	places	where	other	organisations	
were	 not	 present	 was	 a	 sorting	 logic	 and	 reinforced	 the	 idea	 of	 MSF’s	
distinctiveness.	Acting	differently	was	used	as	a	way	for	MSF	to	distance	itself	from	
other,	 negatively	 perceived,	 aid	 initiatives	 in	 Pakistan.	 I	 am	 not	 arguing	 that	
secondary	health	care	was	chosen	in	order	to	be	different	from	other	actors,	yet	it	
contributed	 to	 MSF’s	 distinctiveness.	 Additionally	 staff	 considered	 MSF	 to	 be	
different	 because	 it	 did	 not	 compromise	 with	 state-led	 political	 agendas,	 and	
because,	in	spite	of	the	many	westerners	working	for	the	organisation,	it	respected	
the	Pashtun	culture.	MSF	employees	believed	these	were	the	reasons	why	people	
accepted	and	respected	the	organisation	yet	the	following	paragraphs	show	there	
were	other,	perhaps	more	important	reasons:	MSF	was	indeed	different	insofar	as	it	
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offered	 secondary	medical	 care,	which	no	other	 actor	 offered	 at	 the	 time	 in	 that	
area.	 This	 section	 first	 describes	 how	people	 interviewed	 justified	 their	 view	 that	
MSF	was	different,	as	well	as	how	the	institutional	discourse	of	being	different	was	
constructed.	Second,	 it	 shows	how	MSF	managed	to	effectively	differentiate	 itself	
from	other	(humanitarian	and	medical)	actors.	
The	construction	of	a	distinctive	discourse	
For	the	MSF	staff	 it	was	 important	that	MSF	 ‘did	not	compromise	 itself	politically’	
and	 that	 ‘it	 respected	 the	Pashtun	culture’.	When	asked	whether	 there	had	been	
any	decision	made	by	the	hierarchy	with	which	he	disagreed,	a	Pakistani	watchman	
seemed	 surprised	 and	 answered:	 “No,	 because	 MSF	 is	 impartial	 and	 makes	
decisions	 [similarly]	 for	everyone”.	MSF	staff,	nationals	and	 internationals,	agreed	
with	this	general	sentiment,	saying	that	MSF	was	different	because	in	practice	it	did	
not	compromise	as	did	other	foreign	humanitarian	actors.	One	staff	member	noted:	
MSF	is	different.	It	is	not	only	medical,	it	also	has	principles.	
It	 is	different	in	the	way	of	 launching	operations:	 it	does	its	
own	 assessment,	 decides	 its	 own	 activities.	 Many	 other	
organisations,	 if	 the	 DCO	 [District	 Coordination	 Officer]	 or	
OCHA	 [Office	 for	 the	Coordination	of	Humanitarian	Affairs]	
requests	things,	they	go,	which	makes	their	credibility	thin.	
Sometimes	the	staff	referred	to	what	they	saw	as	their	organisation’s	secularity	and	
independence	 from	 governments:	 “Some	 [organisations]	 are	 influenced	 by	
government,	some	influenced	by	religion,	but	MSF	is	free.	MSF	is	mainly	to	work	on	
medical	care,	other	than	[the]	UN”.	As	described	in	chapter	4,	humanitarian	actors	
in	 Pakistan	were	 overtly	 criticised	 in	 2009	 for	 providing	 “politicised”	 assistance	 –	
meaning	 aligned	 with	 the	 GoP	 counter-insurgency	 agenda	 (Bennett	 2009;	
Humanitarian	Policy	Group	2009;	Cosgrave,	Polastro,	and	Zafar	2010).	MSF	clearly	
distanced	itself	from	regional	developments	of	stabilisation	models	(Government	of	
North	West	Frontier	Province	of	Pakistan	2009;	Gordon	2010;	Collinson,	Elhawary,	
and	Muggah	2010)	attempting	 to	minimise	 its	association	with	such	 ‘neo-imperial	
agenda’	 (Hofman	2011).	This	was	so	 important	 to	MSF	that	 the	three	Operational	
Centres	(Paris,	Brussels	and	Amsterdam)	agreed	to	speak	with	one	voice	and	act	as	
one.		
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The	 above-mentioned	 difference	was	 hence	 also	 a	 product	 of	 the	 coming	
together	of	the	three	OCs,	a	deliberate	construction	of	an	image	that	all	three	could	
identify	 with	 and	 for	 which	 they	 would	 be	 willing	 to	 set	 aside	 some	 of	 their	
differences.	 Between	 June	 2010	 and	 April	 2011,	 the	 three	 Operational	 Centres	
(OCs)	negotiated	the	text	of	a	Pakistan	Inter-OC	Operational	Agreement	which	was	
signed	in	April	2011.	Interviewees	involved	in	the	management	of	both	Pakistan	and	
Afghanistan	missions	over	the	past	three	years	told	stories	about	how	chaotic	it	had	
sometimes	 been	 between	 the	 three	 OCs	 before	 2010.	 During	 the	 massive	
displacement	 from	 Swat	 in	 2009,	 the	 three	 OCs	 had	 launched	 simultaneous	
assessments	 in	 Mardan	 (KPK),	 approaching	 authorities	 separately	 without	
coordinating	 their	 initiatives.	The	same	year,	 there	were	 inter-OCs	 tensions	about	
which	OC	would	establish	an	operational	presence	 in	Peshawar:	the	willingness	of	
OCB	 to	 establish	 a	 “referral	 hospital	 for	 the	 whole	 region”	 is,	 for	 example,	
mentioned	in	the	minutes	of	a	board	meeting	(MSF	OCB	2009).	A	2011	OCP	board	
meeting	 minute	 stated	 that	 “the	 organisation	 lost	 a	 lot	 of	 energy	 in	 2009	 with	
internal	 dissension	 [among	 the	 three	OCs],	 luckily	with	 no	 serious	 consequences,	
but	 finally	 found	a	 satisfying	modus	operandi”	 (MSF	OCP	2011).	Among	 the	main	
objectives	 of	 the	 agreement	 was	 the	 ambition	 “to	 reinforce	 the	 coherence	 of	
approaches	 between	 the	 three	 sections	 in	 Pakistan”.	 This	 had	 to	 translate	
practically,	 according	 to	 the	 agreement,	 not	 only	 into	 a	 geographic	 allocation	 of	
responsibilities	between	 the	 three	OCs,135	but	also	 into	a	common	representation	
that	would	ensure	a	common	reporting	towards	other	actors.	The	three	OCs	would	
also	 mutualise	 emergency	 preparedness	 and	 response	 capacities,	 optimise	 field	
support	costs	and	adopt	common	rules	about	communication	as	well	as	the	respect	
of	“principled	operational	approach”.	The	three	OCs	agreed	that	this	would	not	be	
possible	 without	 information	 sharing.	 The	 commitment	 of	 the	 three	 OCs	 to	
common	operating	procedures	like	only	using	private	funds	in	Pakistan,	never	using	
armed	escorts	or	 relying	only	on	Pakistani	 staff	 remotely	managed	by	expatriates	
(except	 for	 projects	 already	 using	 these	 for	 specific	 reasons	 at	 the	 time	 the	
agreement	was	signed)	was	strongly	expressed	in	this	extract	of	the	agreement:	“It	
																																																						
135	The	MSF	terminology	was	a	“Geographical	Yalta”	in	reference	to	the	1945	Yalta	Conference	and	
the	division	of	Germany	into	several	spheres	of	influences	among	the	Allied	Forces.	
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is	 essential	 to	 highlight	 that	 these	 principles	 should	 be	 adhered	 [to]	 by	 all	 -	
regardless	[of]	the	operational	needs	in	a	given	setting	or	the	decision	to	respond	to	
an	acute	humanitarian	crisis”.	
The	 three	 organisations	 were	 ready	 to	 give	 up	 part	 of	 their	 operational	
sovereignty136	to	construct	this	common	operational	strategy	that	 institutionalised	
the	 discourse	 of	 MSF	 being	 different	 from	 other	 actors.	 In	 order	 to	 consolidate	
MSF’s	 reputation	 in	Pakistan,	 the	 three	OCs	developed	a	 communication	 strategy	
isolated	 from	 other	 humanitarian	 actors’	 initiatives.137	 As	 I	 was	 questioning	 the	
director	 of	 communications	 in	 Brussels	 on	 the	 specificity	 of	 the	 communication	
about	Pakistan,	she	explained	to	me	that	in	order	to	work	where	they	wanted	to	in	
Afghanistan	 and	 in	 Pakistan,	 they	had	decided	 to	 “lash	out	 against	 the	West,	 the	
international	 community	 and	NATO”.	 She	 said	 that	 the	 strategy	 had	 started	with	
bilateral	meetings	with	the	Taliban	during	which	MSF	top	management	staff	argued	
that	they	were	different	from	other	international	organisations,	because	they	were	
independent	and	impartial.	She	went	on	to	explain	that	the	second	step	was	to	be	
vocal	in	the	media	as	the	Taliban	complained	that	MSF	did	not	publicise	its	presence	
in	Taliban	controlled	areas	 in	Afghanistan	enough:	 “So	we	 started	 to	write	OpEds	
criticising	 NATO	 and	 the	 international	 community	 playing	 the	 game	 of	 the	
stabilisation	agenda”	(Stokes	2010;	Stokes	2011).	It	was	less	the	urge	to	alert	public	
opinion	(Dodier	2011,	203)	than	the	need	for	MSF	to	make	a	public	statement	of	its	
loyalty	to	those	it	served	and	to	demonstrate	to	the	populations	in	its	project	areas	
that	it	was	different	from	the	others.		
A	 key	 tool	 in	 this	 process	 came	 with	 the	 hiring	 of	 an	 inter-OC	
Communication	Officer	to	work	on	local	and	national	communications	about	MSF.	
This	 employee	 produced	 communication	 material	 in	 which	 ‘NGO’	 was	 always	
replaced	 by	 “medical	 emergency	 organisation”.	 In	 the	 MSF	 inter-OCs	
																																																						
136	They	were	indeed	part	of	the	same	network	but	legally	and	operationally	distinct.	
137	This	was	not	the	first	time	in	MSF	history,	yet	it	had	not	always	been	that	way:	in	the	1980s	MSF	
had	been	funded	by	the	emergency	aid	fund	of	the	European	Commission,	and	by	the	UNHCR	and	
“participated	in	the	coordination	mechanisms	of	the	sectors	in	which	it	was	working	under	the	aegis	
of	local	authorities	or	the	UN”	(Brauman	and	Neuman	2014,	3).	The	first	time	MSF	“had	broken	ranks	
with	the	entire	aid	system”	was	during	the	famine	in	Ethiopia	in	1984	(Brauman	and	Neuman	2014,	
5).	
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communication	strategy	paper,	investing	in	being	different	was	specified	as	internal	
policy:	
MSF	 needs	 to	 take	 key	 opportunities	 to	 differentiate	 itself	
from	 these	 statements	 in	 the	 western	 public	 sphere,	 and	
enlist	 international	offices	to	do	the	same	in	public,	so	that	
those	 communications	 (the	 Christopher	 Stokes	 op-ed	
(Stokes	 2010),	 for	 instance,)	 can	 be	 referred	 to	 inside	 of	
Pakistan.	(MSF	2011a,	5)	
In	November	 2011,	 a	member	 of	 the	OCB	 coordination	 team	 commented	 on	 the	
fact	that	MSF	was	then	the	only	NGO	using	“visibility	material”	(stickers	with	logos)	
in	the	field:		
At	 least	 we’re	 now	 in	 a	 position	 to	 go	 to	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Interior	 because	 we’re	 in	 a	 position	 where	 we	 can	
differentiate	ourselves	and	make	a	point	for	ourselves.	MSF	
stands	out	visibly	(…)	you	cannot	go	and	talk	to	the	mullah	if	
nobody	sees	what	you’re	doing	(…)	If	we’re	targeted,	let’s	be	
targeted	as	MSF	not	UNICEF.	
Additionally,	MSF	made	a	point	never	to	appear	in	any	UN	material,	including	OCHA	
mapping	of	“Who?	does	What?	Where?”	and	attended	almost	no	coordination	fora	
at	national	level.138	The	organisation	did	attend	some	coordination	meetings	at	local	
level	 but	 with	 the	 sole	 purpose	 of	 communicating	 information	 about	 its	 own	
activities.	This	differentiation	strategy	translated	at	the	 local	 level	 into	an	attempt	
to	observe	a	certain	number	of	rules	in	line	with	Pashtun	customs.	MSF	made	sure	
it	would	not	be	associated	with	previous	 regrettable	experiences	 reported	 locally,	
as	illustrated	by	this	story	recounted	to	me	in	several	of	my	interviews.	One	version	
of	the	story	a	Pakistani	staff	member	told	went	as	follows:	
Before	there	was	one	organisation	with	nice	girls,	who	would	
discuss	 with	 females	 and	 try	 and	 convince	 them	 that	 they	
need	to	rebel,	etc…	pointing	out	all	what	the	women	were	not	
allowed	 to	 do.	 They	 wanted	 to	 change	 the	 minds	 of	 the	
females	 inside	 the	 community,	 which	 is	 against	 the	 culture.	
Family	 planning	 as	 well	 was	 discussed	 –this	 was	 discussed	
with	unmarried	 females,	 and	 that	 is	 not	 good.	 They	brought	
very	bad	ideas.	139	
																																																						
138	 Not	 attending	 cluster	 meetings	 was	 specific	 to	 certain	 countries	 including	 Afghanistan	 and	
Pakistan,	but	not	the	general	rule	in	all	countries	where	MSF	had	activities.	
139	The	story	could	as	well	 refer	 to	UN	agencies	as	 to	 INGOs.	The	United	Nations	Population	Fund	
worked	 together	 with	 the	 Pakistani	 government	 on	 family	 planning	 issues,	 and	 with	 WHO	 on	
programmes	against	polio	in	these	areas	and	could	have	triggered	such	stories.	
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Some	of	the	staff	told	me	another	version	of	the	same	story	according	to	which	an	
international	 organisation	 came	 into	 people’s	 houses	 and	 talked	 to	 their	 women	
telling	 them	 they	 had	 such	 and	 such	 rights,	 and	 he	 commented:	 “Yes,	 of	 course,	
legally,	maybe…	but	not	in	our	society”.	So,	in	KPK	there	was	this	historical	memory	
of	an	international	organisation	coming	in	with	an	assistance	programme	(what	sort	
was	 not	 specified)	 that	 clashed	 with	 the	 local	 culture.	 MSF	 hence	 developed	
operational	set-ups	that	were,	as	far	as	possible,	respectful	of	the	Pashtun	culture.	
Each	new	expatriate	arriving	 in	 Islamabad	was	briefed	 in	detail	about	appropriate	
behaviour	and	rules	to	follow	in	order	not	to	clash	with	local	cultural	practices:	all	
expatriates	 should	wear	 shalwar	 kameez	 and	 not	 go	 anywhere	 other	 than	 to	 the	
hospital,	the	office	and	the	house;	expatriate	females	should	cover	their	heads	and	
faces	when	outside	the	office,	house	and	maternity	ward.		
MSF	did	manage	to	build	trust:	many	highly	qualified	national	staff,	who	had	
studied	abroad,	or	 in	big	cities	of	Pakistan,	or	worked	abroad,	came	back	 to	 their	
villages	upon	the	advice	of	relatives	speaking	highly	about	this	international	medical	
organisation	who	had	started	to	work	in	the	hospital.	When	asked	about	their	vision	
of	MSF	most	national	staff	spoke	similarly.	One	of	them	said:	
Some	organisations,	they	work	but	their	goal	 is	other	–	 like	
Blackwater…	There	is	fear	that	Americans	want	to	bring	their	
own	 people	 and	 ideas.	 MSF	 is	 transparent	 and	 works	 in	
humanitarian	 fields,	 but	 if	 they	 do	 once	 something	 that	 is	
different,	 then	 it	 will	 not	 be	 possible	 to	 work	 anymore…	
Now	there	is	trust	with	MSF.	
Some	MSF	staff	mentioned	that	MSF	was	more	trusted	than	certain	Pakistani	NGOs,	
whose	activities	and	behaviour	were	judged	as	inappropriate.	A	Pakistani	MSF	staff	
member	in	Timergara	told	me:	
[This	Pakistani	NGO],	they’re	doing	micro	credit	–	it	is	haram	
[forbidden]	 in	 Islam.	 They’re	 doing	 a	 lot	 of	 mixing	 of	 men	
and	women	too.	They	had	two	times	bomb	blast	 (…)	and	a	
manager	kidnapped.	MSF	on	the	other	side,	really	work	for	
the	people.	After	 four	years,	even	those	people	who	didn’t	
want	to	bring	their	women	to	the	‘INGO	hospital’,	now	they	
are	 happy	 with	 MSF.	 The	 trust	 was	 built.	 MSF	 is	 the	 only	
organisation	that	is	really	independent.	[This	Pakistani	NGO],	
indirectly	 they	 are	 politically	 affiliated.	 They	 used	 to	 give	
assistance	 to	 some	people	 in	 a	 hidden	way	 -	 they	 selected	
	 164	
the	 people.	 Here	 expat(s),	 they	 come,	 they	 leave	 at	 five	
o’clock	and	are	not	allowed	to	go	out	of	 the	house	so	why	
not	to	trust	them?	
Local	Ministry	of	Health	officials,	such	as	medical	superintendents	of	hospitals	who	
dealt	with	MSF	on	a	daily	basis,	wanted	to	channel	an	overly	positive	image	of	their	
relationship	with	MSF,	silencing	all	small	and	big	disagreements	they	may	have	had	
(and	 that	 were	 reported	 by	 some	 MSF	 staff	 in	 interviews).	 These	 government	
officials	 seemed	 to	 have	 completely	 accepted	MSF’s	 strategy	 of	 not	 appearing	 as	
being	 like	other	NGOs,	 as	demonstrated	when	one	of	 them	 told	me:	 “MSF	 is	 not	
considered	as	an	NGO	because	of	its	way	of	working”.		
MSF	distinctiveness	at	implementation	stage	
As	 noted	 above,	 MSF	 was	 indeed	 different	 as	 it	 was	 the	 only	 international	
organisation	working	 in	the	area	with	 international	staff	 in	Timergara	and	offering	
free	secondary	health	care.	
Patients	 I	 interviewed	 in	 the	MSF	 hospital	 did	 see	MSF	 as	 an	 NGO.	 They	
knew	it	was	a	foreign	organisation	but	seemed	not	to	care	about	its	origin.	Patients	
I	talked	to	had	sometimes	travelled	six	to	eight	hours	to	come	to	the	hospital.	They	
did	not	know	the	name	‘MSF’,140	and	referred	to	the	hospital	as	“Angrezi	hospital”	
(foreigner141	hospital),	or	the	“NGO	hospital”.	They	understood	completely	that	the	
hospital	 was	 run	 by	 foreigners,	 but	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 those	 I	 met	 within	 the	
hospital	told	me	they	did	not	care	about	the	nationality	of	their	care-giver.	One	of	
them	said:	“They	can	be	American,	Chinese,	it	doesn’t	matter”.	The	few	important	
things	that	people	repeatedly	underlined	as	remarkable	were	that	MSF	had	solved	
their	 problem	 (when	 other	 doctors	 had	 not),	 that	 the	 hospital	 was	 “clean”,	 that	
people	were	“treated	well”,	 that	 it	was	“free	of	charge”	and	“open	every	day	and	
night”.	That	differentiated	MSF	from	other	hospitals	or	private	clinics,	which	one	of	
the	patients	referred	to	as	“the	hand	of	the	butchers”,	rather	than	from	other	NGOs	
or	foreigners	operating	clinics.		
																																																						
140	One	out	of	fifteen	patients	interviewed	knew	the	name	“MSF”	because	he	had	a	relative	working	
for	MSF.		
141	“Angrezi”	actually	means	English,	but	 is	used	by	people	as	a	general	 term	for	 foreigners	 in	 this	
region.	
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The	way	the	difference	was	expressed	at	the	Brussels	level	was	that	MSF	had	
a	 “comparative	 advantage”	 in	 its	 ability	 to	 practice	 medicine	 in	 highly	 insecure	
environments.	One	manager	explained:		
One	 thing	 that	 favours	 conflict	 as	 strategic	 positioning	 for	
MSF	 is	 the	 absence	 of	 other	 actors.	 The	 comparative	
advantage	 of	MSF	 is	 to	 be	 the	 only	 ones	 (together	maybe	
with	 the	 ICRC)	 to	 be	 able	 to	 have	 hospitals	 in	 war	 zones.	
Very	 few	 actors	 have	 this	 technical	 depth	 in	 war	 zones.	
There	 are	 no	 real	 exit	 strategies	 from	 hospital	 projects	 in	
war	zones,	so	donors	don’t	want	to	fund	it	so	much.	
The	staff	considered	that	MSF	was	actually	doing	things	in	contrast	to	other	actors:	
“a	lot	of	NGOs	are	mostly	present	on	paper.	They	go	to	the	EDOH	[Executive	District	
Officer	 for	 Health]	 meeting	 but	 we	 don’t	 see	 their	 actions”.	 MSF	 was	 actually	
providing	 free	medical	care	 in	areas	where	poor	people	at	 least	were	deprived	of	
access	to	health	care	as	other	medical	services	were	private	and	costly.		
The	 price	 element	 had	 been	 an	 MSF	 OCB	 policy	 generally	 since	 the	 mid	
2000s.	Up	until	the	2000s	MSF	OCB	had	been	involved	in	what	had	been	called	the	
‘health	districts’	approach.	‘Health	districts’	were	in	line	with	‘the	Bamako	Initiative’	of	
1987,	 a	 meeting	 of	 African	 health	 ministers	 gathered	 for	 the	 37th	 regional	 WHO	
committee.	 The	 Bamako	 Initiative	 supported	 a	 decentralised	 approach	 to	 health,	
relying,	 among	 other	 measures,	 on	 cost	 recovery	 methods	 that	 were	 believed	 to	
provide	 sustainable	 solutions	 to	 the	 poor	 health	 access	 in	 developing	 countries	
(Biberson	 2000,	 82–83).	 MSF	 OCB	 got	 involved	 in	 projects	 of	 “health	 districts”	 in	
particular	in	Chad	(Goemaere	2000),	Mali	and	Guinea,	which	were	highly	criticised	for	
their	 lack	of	quality	and	their	systematic	 tendency	to	exclude	people	who	could	not	
afford	to	pay	for	medical	services	(Philips	2013).	Most	of	the	directors’	team	in	2011-
2012	had	worked	on	such	projects,	and	were	in,	what	one	interviewee	called,	a	“never	
again”	 state	of	mind.	Once	at	 the	head	of	 the	organisation’s	 strategic	 thinking	 they	
contributed	between	2002	and	2005	to	a	change	in	OCB	policy	towards	an	access	to	
health	 free	 of	 charge,	 and	 a	 progressive	 prioritising	 of	 conflict	 settings142	 that	 they	
associated	with	this	policy	change.		
																																																						
142	 The	 opposition	 between	 emergency	 intervention	 after	 natural	 disasters	 or	 conflicts	 and	 “the	
other	emergency:	the	chronic	lack	of	medical	access	in	the	third	world”	(my	translation)	appears	as	
early	as	1972	during	the	first	Annual	Board	Meeting	of	MSF	(Vallaeys	2004,	134).	
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The	difference	 the	Timergara	project	made	 for	 the	people	of	 the	area	was	
significant	 since	 surgery	 and	 the	 capacity	 to	 hospitalise	 patients	 for	 long	 periods	
when	 needed	 had	 a	 more	 visible	 utility	 than	 projects	 that	 promoted	 healthy	
hygiene	practices.	 The	patients’	 testimonies	 showed	 that	what	mattered	 to	 them	
was	 that	MSF	was	providing	good	and	effective	 care.	 Their	 view	of	MSF	activities	
shows	that	 the	humanitarian	 triage	was	shaped	by	medical	practices	at	 the	micro	
level.	The	next	section	explores	how	the	daily	practices	of	the	medical	and	the	non-
medical	staff	came	together	to	influence	humanitarian	triage.	
Micro-triage	of	three	strategic	groups	
Following	the	idea	of	“strategic	groups”	defined	by	Olivier	de	Sardan	as	groups	that	
“defend	 common	 interests,	 especially	 by	 means	 of	 social	 and	 political	 action”	
(Olivier	de	Sardan	2005,	191),	I	argue	that	one	can	distinguish	three	main	groups	of	
staff	 having	 different	 types	 of	 influence	 on	 humanitarian	 triage.	 This	 notion	 of	 a	
strategic	 group	 is	 useful	 as	 it	 “helps	 us	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	 convergence	 of	 certain	
individual	strategies,	from	which	we	might	deduce	that	the	individuals	 in	question	
have	 an	 identical	 position	 in	 face	 of	 a	 given	 ‘problem’”	 (Olivier	 de	 Sardan	 2005,	
191).	It	is	important	to	note	that	these	groups	come	from	my	analysis	of	the	social	
reality	observed	and	not	from	actors	themselves	who	do	not	use	these	labels.	This	
section	shows	that,	at	the	micro	level,	two	strategic	groups	–	the	political	and	the	
support	 staff143	 –	 mainly	 influenced	 humanitarian	 triage	 by	 minimising	 external	
constraints	 (mainly	 insecurity,	 the	 difficulty	 in	 recruiting	 certain	 human	 resources	
and	administrative	constraints	 imposed	by	the	Pakistani	authorities),	while	a	 third	
strategic	group	–	the	medical	staff,	influenced	the	project	on	a	daily	basis	and	at	the	
micro	 level	 mainly	 thanks	 to	 a	 clinical	 activity-driven	 project	 management.
																																																						
143	I	use	these	expressions	in	italics	throughout	the	text	in	order	to	underline	that	they	are	analytical	
categories	as	opposed	to	labels	used	by	actors.	
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Support	staff:	reducing	external	administrative	constraints	on	triage	
The	 support	 staff	 influenced	 triage	 insofar	 as	 they	 channelled	 and	 attempted	 to	
reduce	 external	 constraints.	 I	 include	 administrators,	 logisticians	 and	
communication	officers	 in	 this	category	of	staff	 (referred	to	 in	Figure	8144	as	 ‘log’,	
‘admin’,	 ‘HR’	 or	 ‘supply’	 officers,	 assistants,	 and	 coordinators).	 Although	 in	 some	
organisations,	administrators	and	logisticians	would	primarily	describe	their	role	as	
one	 of	 ensuring	 that	 processes	 are	 respected	 (internal	 or	 related	 to	 institutional	
donors’	requests),	the	vast	majority	of	MSF	support	staff	explained	that	they	acted	
primarily	 to	 support	 medical	 activities.	 They	 did	 not	 mean	 they	 did	 not	 monitor	
whether	 rules	 and	 processes	 were	 observed:	 administrators	 had	 to	 check	 that	
everything	was	 in	accordance	with	Pakistani	 law;	 logisticians	and	suppliers	had	 to	
control	 the	 transparency	 of	 purchases	 through	 following	 internal	 procedures,	 or	
check	that	 items	ordered	by	field	teams	had	been	forecast	 in	the	budget.	Overall,	
MSF	was	not	 limited	by	 financial	means;	 in	 reality,	 finance	officers	had	 very	 little	
influence	beyond	the	facilitation	of	 the	cash	to	 flow	 in	the	most	appropriate	way.	
For	instance,	variations	of	up	to	50,000	EUR	in	the	budget	expenses	did	not	need	a	
head	 office	 validation.	 Financial	 arguments	 had	 regularly	 been	 underrated	 as	 if	
there	was	a	fear	that	humanitarian	morals	would	be	corrupted	by	economic	logics.	
In	meetings,	comments	like	“this	not	a	question	of	money”	were	commonly	thrown	
at	people	making	a	financial	argument.	
The	way	support	staff	facilitated	activities	on	a	daily	basis	was	often	invisible,	
although	 crucial	 to	 everyone	else.	 In	 the	 administration	 team,	 some	people	were	
dedicated	 to	 managing	 expatriates’	 visa	 applications,	 extensions	 and	 renewals,	
contract	 follow-ups,	 flight	 tickets	 and	 organisation	 of	 briefings	 and	 debriefings.	
These	people	could	spend	hours	 in	ministries	to	facilitate,	convince,	and	speed	up	
visa	 extension	 processes,	 building	 trust	 with	 their	 contacts	 in	 the	 administration	
over	 time.	 Even	 though	 issues	 with	 obtaining	 Travel	 and	 Project	 No	 Objection	
Certificates	 (NOCs)	and	visas	were	underlined	by	many	 in	 interviews	as	 important	
external	constraints,	support	departments	mostly	absorbed	them:	many	expatriates	
																																																						
144	This	organisational	chart	attempts	only	to	give	a	general	idea	of	the	organisation	of	MSF	OCB	staff	
in	 Pakistan.	 It	 does	 not	 represent	 all	 staff,	 in	 particular	 those	 at	 a	 lower	 level	 in	 the	 hierarchy	
(sterilisation	 technicians,	 waste	 collectors,	 lab	 technicians,	 watchmen,	 cleaners,	 drivers,	 radio	
operators	etc.).	
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had	 their	 visas	 and	 NOCs	 were	 granted.	 One	 of	 the	 Islamabad	 finance	 staff	
summarised	 their	 general	 attitude	 as:	 “Our	 general	 objective	 is	 to	 support	 other	
departments	to	achieve	a	common	goal”.	And	they	did,	as	another	demonstrated,	
telling	me	the	story	of	the	emergency	response	in	Swat:	
In	 Swat,	 when	 there	 was	 fighting,	 no	 bank	 was	 working	 –	
you	had	to	be	creative	about	how	to	send	money:	so	we	had	
different	options	–	sometimes	the	bank	made	it	easier	for	us	
through	payment	on	identity	cards,	sometimes	in	the	worst	
situations,	you	trusted	your	employees	and	transferred	on	a	
personal	account,	or	sent	the	cash	by	car.	
The	 biggest	 external	 constraint,	 cited	 many	 times	 by	 interviewees,	 was	 “human	
resources”	 (HR)	 or	 the	 capacity	 of	 MSF	 to	 recruit	 certain	 categories	 of	 staff	 –
surgeons,	anaesthetists	or	female	Pakistani	doctors	and	nurses.	Medical	specialists	
rarely	 dedicate	 their	 careers	 to	 humanitarian	 work	 and	 were	 therefore	 only	
available	for	shorter	periods.	On	recruiting	expatriates	in	general,	one	interviewee	
argued:	“We	have	to	fight	the	media	pressure	on	how	the	country	is	portrayed…”,	
adding	 that	 it	 was	 also	 a	 problem	 to	 convince	 some	 people	 in	 the	 support	
department	 in	 Brussels	 to	 come	 on	 field	 visits.	 Some	 mentioned	 the	 scarcity	 of	
human	resources	as	a	reason	why	MSF	did	not	open	a	neonatal	care	department	in	
Timergara	 or	 did	 not	 extend	 their	 medical	 services’	 outreach	 to	 the	 north	 of	
Timergara.	 Yet	 the	 Head	 of	Mission	 countered	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 human	 resources	
never	held	them	back	from	any	project.	So	although	human	resources	recruitment	
was	 a	 problem	 and	 impacted	 the	modalities	 of	 assistance	 (within	 the	 hospital	 or	
doing	outreach;	including	neonatal	care	or	referring	these	patients	to	Peshawar),	it	
played	 marginally	 and	 was	 never	 cited	 in	 interviews	 as	 the	 major	 reason	 why	 a	
particular	project	had	not	been	possible.	This	may	have	been	because	the	staff	 in	
charge	 of	 human	 resources	 management	 anticipated	 this	 difficulty	 in	 order	 to	
reduce	 it	 as	 much	 as	 possible.	 This	 was	 illustrated	 by	 what	 they	 called	 “the	 HR	
project”,	which	consisted	of	 listing	people	working	on	ongoing	projects	who	could	
be	deployed	immediately	in	case	of	a	sudden	disaster,	most	of	whom	were	working	
in	 Dargai.	 One	 of	 the	 human	 resources	 staff	 called	 it	 “an	 investment	 in	 human	
resources”.	This	strategy	had	proved	effective	during	the	floods	responses	in	2010	
and	 in	2011	when	MSF	was	able	to	deploy	significant	numbers	of	staff	 in	a	timely	
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manner	and	to	scale	up	its	response	for	the	floods-affected	people	in	KPK	and	South	
Sindh.	
The	 logistics	 department	 responsible	 for	 purchases,	 vehicle	 fleet	
management,	maintaining	premises	facilities	and	stock	management,	had	to	follow	
decisions	made	by	others	as	underlined	by	one	of	the	field	staff:	“When	they	make	
a	decision,	 they	don’t	 ask	 the	 feasibility	 in	 terms	of	 logistics”.	Overall,	 logisticians	
saw	the	necessity	to	innovate	and	anticipate	projects	‘needs	as	much	as	possible.	As	
explained	by	a	 logistician	at	 the	head	office:	 "If	 there	 is	no	 research	done,	within	
five	years	–	which	is	approximately	the	incubation	period	for	logistics	innovations	–	
the	reactivity	capacity	is	jeopardised".	He	gave	the	examples	of	innovations	such	as	
hospitals	under	tents	or	in	containers	that	MSF	had	developed	to	be	able	to	provide	
secondary	care	in	emergency	situations	–	like	the	inflatable	hospital	set	up	in	2005	
after	the	Kashmir	earthquake.	
Those	 in	 charge	 of	 resources	 influenced	 humanitarian	 triage	 by	 absorbing	
external	 constraints	 and	 hence	 minimising	 resource	 scarcity.	 Financial	 officers	
ensured	smooth	cash	flows,	administrators	minimised	the	significant	administrative	
pressures,	 human	 resources	 staff	 prepared	 for	 quick	 mass	 recruitment	 for	
emergency	 responses	 and	 logisticians	 responded	 to	 daily	 operations	 needs	 and	
challenges	while	(at	the	head	office	level)	thinking	about	logistical	innovations	that	
could	 increase	 the	 medical	 response	 reactivity.	 Yet	 one	 major	 operational	
constraint	was	 out	 of	 their	 hands:	 security	 and	 access	 to	 remote	 and	 sometimes	
hostile	areas	of	the	country.	This	was	the	political	staff’s	domain.	
Political	 staff:	 negotiating	 acceptable	 work	 conditions	 and	 promoting	 the	
strategic	logic	
This	strategic	group	supported	the	macro-triage	logic,	i.e.	that	MSF	should	work	as	
closely	as	possible	to	the	conflict	zone	in	the	Bajaur	Agency	and	to	this	end	it	should	
minimise	the	main	external	constraint	the	organisation	faced	to	reach	this	objective	
–	 the	 narrow	 local	 political	 room	 for	manoeuvre	 for	 a	western	 organisation.	 The	
political	staff	were	the	group	of	MSF	employees	who	dealt	with	political	authorities	
and	the	 final	decision-makers	at	 the	geographical	 level.	The	HoM	was	responsible	
for	 teams	 at	 a	 national	 level,	 and	 Field	 Coordinators	 at	 the	 level	 of	 their	
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geographical	 areas.	 In	October	 2011	 there	were	 five	 Field	 Coordinators,	 based	 in	
Timergara,	Dargai,	Mingora	 (KPK),	Karachi	and	Badin	 (Sindh)	 respectively.	Security	
Focal	Points	were	Pakistani	staff	in	charge	of	security	management	at	project	level.	
There	was	one	Security	Focal	Point	per	project	area,	so	only	one	in	Timergara.	This	
strategic	 group	 challenged	 the	 main	 external	 constraints	 of	 humanitarian	 triage:	
security	and	access	to	areas	close	to	the	conflict.	
Within	the	political	staff,	a	 line	could	be	drawn	between	those	who	stayed	
and	those	who	left.	This	line	was	rather	clear-cut	between	the	Security	Focal	Points	
who	stayed	and	the	HoMs	and	Field	Coordinators	who	eventually	left.	Even	though	
responsibilities	 of	 HoMs	 and	 Field	 Coordinators	 covered	 all	 departments’	 tasks	
(administration,	 logistics,	 medical,	 etc.)	 and	 included	 the	 coordination	 of	 all	 of	
them,	 they	had	over	 the	past	 few	years	 largely	delegated	other	domains	 to	other	
staff	in	order	to	concentrate	on	what	appeared	to	be	the	priority	and	was	not	done	
by	 any	 other	 person	 in	 the	 organisational	 chart:	 security	 analysis	 and	 the	
negotiation	 of	 access.	 In	 practice,	 they	 worked	 on	 political	 and	 cultural	 context	
analysis,	on	developing	a	communication	and	negotiation	 strategy	 to	explain	who	
MSF	was	and	what	it	did	in	order	to	demonstrate	to	people	the	value	of	having	MSF	
in	 their	 neighbourhood.	 Ultimately	 access	 was	 negotiated	 through	 compromises	
made	with	local	authorities.	The	Security	Focal	Point	assisted	them	in	these	tasks	as	
the	negotiation	of	access	was	seen	as	closely	 linked	to	security	management.	This	
message	 had	 to	 be	 channelled	 to	 the	 right	 people	 according	 to	 the	 political	 and	
cultural	 analysis.	 The	 communication	 and	 negotiation	 strategy	 had	 three	 main	
target	 groups:	 the	 MSF	 staff	 itself,	 Pakistani	 actors	 with	 power,	 and	 Pakistani	
common	people.	
The	 MSF	 staff	 were	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 organisation’s	 primary	
ambassadors	 and	 employees	 were	 trained	 as	 such:	 “SANOU”,145	 an	 internal	
nineteen	hour	 training	course	was	a	good	example	of	 the	energy	MSF	 invested	 in	
this	direction	in	Pakistan.	SANOU	was	a	kit	provided	to	staff	that	consisted	of	a	DVD	
with	movies	 and	 interactive	material	 about	MSF	activities	 across	 the	world	 and	a	
general	 introduction	 to	 its	 humanitarian	 environment.	 It	 was	 introduced	 in	 the	
																																																						
145	 It	means	 “hello,	welcome”	 in	Haoussa	which	 is	a	 language	 spoken	 in	 several	 countries	 in	West	
Africa.	
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Pakistan	 mission	 in	 March	 2011.	 Two	 people	 from	 MSF	 head	 offices	 came	 to	
Islamabad	 and	 trained	 twelve	 potential	 trainers.	 They	 selected	 seven	 of	 them	 to	
organise	the	same	training	in	Timergara	in	August	2011.	They	trained	sixteen	people	
in	English	(as	the	training	did	not	exist	in	Urdu	or	Pashtu)	and	selected	a	further	six	
staff	that	would	 in	turn	become	trainers.	When	I	was	 in	the	field,	another	SANOU	
course	was	planned	in	December	2011	for	the	three	MSFs	(OCA,	OCB	and	OCP)	 in	
Chaman	(Baluchistan).	The	main	objective	of	SANOU	stated	in	the	DVD	was:		
to	strengthen	MSF	staff’s	ability	to	act	as	‘Ambassadors	of	
MSF’,	internally	(with	their	colleagues,	the	beneficiaries,	...)	
and	externally	(partners,	communities,	etc.).	The	training	is	
an	 introduction	 to	 MSF	 allowing	 the	 participants	 to	
understand	better	the	principles	of	the	organization	and	to	
represent	it	around	them.	(MSF	OCB,	n.d.)	
It	 had	 been	 designed	 at	 the	 head	 office	 and	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	 assess	 the	 direct	
impact	of	SANOU	 in	 the	 field,	yet	 it	certainly	contributed	to	a	striking	consistency	
among	the	staff	interviewed	for	this	study	in	describing	MSF.	
Efforts	were	not	only	invested	in	explaining	MSF	to	the	staff;	they	were	also,	
in	 particular	 for	 the	 expatriate	 staff,	 about	 understanding	 the	 local	 context.	 In	
Timergara	 the	 Security	 Focal	 Point	 explained	 to	 me	 that	 he	 organised	 regular	
updates	on	the	local	context:	
Expats	are	inhabitants	of	the	area.	If	they	don’t	know	about	
the	context,	they	will	be	less	satisfied	and	competent.	If	they	
know	more,	 they	will	 be	more	 competent	 (…)	 so	 I	 need	 to	
update	 them	 regularly.	 Otherwise	 they	 can	 be	 here	 for	 six	
months	 and	 not	 know	 anything	 about	 the	 area.	 Plus	 life	 is	
limited	for	them.	(…)	So	the	main	objective	is	security,	but	it	
would	be	very	dry	if	I	spoke	only	of	incidents,	so	the	last	part	
is	to	smooth	things	out.	
The	 second	group	 targeted	by	 communication	and	negotiation	were	 those	
who	 held	 power	 locally	 outside	 the	 organisation,	 mainly	 District	 Coordination	
Officers	 (in	KPK)	or	Political	Agents146	 (in	 the	FATA),	Executive	District	Officers	 for	
Health	 (EDO-H),	 the	 Police,	 former	 nazims	 (mayors),	 Intelligence	 Agencies	 (Inter-
Services	 Intelligence,	Military	 Intelligence,	 Intelligence	Bureau,	Crime	 Investigation	
																																																						
146	 A	 Political	 Agent	 heads	 each	 tribal	 agency,	 representing	 the	 President	 of	 Pakistan	 and	 the	
Governor	of	Khyber	Pakhtunkhwa.	
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Department),	jirgas147	and	other	religious	leaders	and	the	private	doctors.	The	Field	
Coordinator	and	the	Security	Focal	Point	of	Timergara	visited	each	of	them	regularly	
to	explain	what	MSF	was	doing	and	to	discuss	potential	issues	raised	by	these	local	
authorities.	The	jirgas	were	considered	very	influential	and	vital	to	promoting	MSF’s	
general	 image.	 As	 the	 Field	 Coordinator	 assistant	 explained:	 “Since	 people	 trust	
them,	if	a	message	comes	from	them,	it’s	a	trusty	message”.	On	one	occasion,	the	
jirga	asked	why	 the	head	office	was	 in	Belgium	 like	 the	NATO	headquarters;	 they	
asked	 for	 proof	 that	 MSF	 was	 financially	 independent	 and	 why	 MSF	 needed	
expatriates	 in	 the	 field.	The	Field	Coordinator	and	 the	Security	Focal	Point	had	 to	
explain	 and	negotiate.	Once,	 one	member	 of	 the	 jirga	who	was	 a	 lecturer	 asked:	
“I’m	 reading	 a	 lot	 about	 hidden	 agendas	 of	 NGOs,	 tell	 me	 what’s	 yours?”	 They	
generally	challenged	MSF,	and	as	 long	as	MSF	could	keep	 their	 trust,	a	 significant	
part	of	the	acceptance	work	was	done.		
In	Timergara,	the	wife	of	the	EDO-H	was	a	private	gynaecologist	and	she	was	
not	very	happy	about	the	competition	presented	by	MSF’s	free	services.	The	Field	
Coordinator	knew	he	had	to	regularly	negotiate	with	the	EDO-H,	and	explained	that	
MSF	would	 do	 only	 “complicated”	 deliveries	 that	 necessitated	 intensive	 care	 and	
equipment.	 This	 was	 more	 generally	 the	 argument	 with	 all	 private	 doctors	 that	
initially	 felt	 threatened	by	the	MSF	free	medical	care	offer:	complicated	deliveries	
were	either	ones	that	a	private	practice	could	not	deal	with	or	ones	that	were	not	
financially	interesting	for	private	doctors	as	they	kept	them	busy	for	longer	than	a	
normal	 delivery	 and	 reduced	 the	 number	 of	 deliveries	 they	 could	 do	 (and	 thus	
limited	their	income).		
If	 needed,	MSF	 could	 call	 on	 the	 jirga	 for	 support	 as	 it	 had	 an	 interest	 in	
maintaining	free	secondary	care	locally:	the	jirga	had	no	(direct)	economic	interest	
and	was	more	respected	by	the	people	than	the	EDO-H.	The	HoM	explained	to	me	
that	 the	networking	 activity	was	 intense	 and	had	 to	be	done	 continuously:	 “Now	
most	of	the	people	who	are	Political	Agents	or	District	Coordination	Officers	 in	KP	
and	FATA	have	been	working	in	an	area	where	MSF	was	at	some	point.	There	is	a	
huge	turnover	[in	the	Pakistan	administrations]	–	so	if	you	stop	networking	for	half	
																																																						
147	A	“council	of	local	elders	and	notables”	(Lieven	2011,	92).	
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a	 year	 in	 some	 places	 you	 lose	 contact	 totally.”	 For	 instance,	 he	 explained,	 “The	
current	 Political	 Agent	 of	 Bajaur	 is	 the	 previous	 District	 Coordination	 Officer	 in	
Lower	Dir”.	Their	approach	seemed	effective,	since	in	November	2011	MSF	had	not	
had	any	serious	security	incidents	in	Timergara	since	the	beginning	of	the	project.	
The	 third	 target	 of	 the	 negotiation	 and	 communication	 strategy	 was	 ‘the	
community’	itself.	It	was	assumed	by	MSF	that	the	‘community’	would	be	reached	
mainly	 through	 local	 political	 and	 religious	 leaders,	 such	 as	 the	 jirgas	 previously	
mentioned,	 and	 through	 the	 ‘low	 profile’	 attitude	 of	MSF	 expatriate	 staff.	 Given	
that	 Field	 Coordinators	 and	 the	 HoM	 relied	 heavily	 upon	 the	 judgment	 of	 the	
Pakistani	 Security	 Focal	 Points,	 the	 latter	 had	 been	 strongly	 empowered.	 The	
Timergara	 Security	 Focal	 Point	 was	 responsible	 for	 helping	 the	 Field	 Coordinator	
build	 the	network.	He	would	explain	how	things	worked	 locally,	helping	 to	detect	
political	intricacies.	Other	staff	explained	to	me	that	they	were	not	to	interact	with	
other	political	or	humanitarian	stakeholders,	as	these	interactions	were	centralised	
by	the	Security	Focal	Point.	He	gave	his	opinion	on	what	was	culturally	appropriate	
for	 the	 Pashtun	 culture.	 His	 comments	 covered	 what	 is	 culturally	 acceptable	 in	
terms	of	behaviour	-	for	instance	he	said	that	“people	would	not	take	you	seriously	
if	you	were	wearing	a	lot	of	jewellery”	–	to	what	kind	of	medical	activity	would	be	
acceptable	to	the	Pashtun	culture.	Thus	he	influenced	MSF	humanitarian	triage:	for	
instance,	even	if	many	women	and	their	husbands	asked	for	contraceptives	during	
consultations,	 as	 a	 nurse	 explained	 to	 me,	 the	 Security	 Focal	 Point	 was	 of	 the	
opinion	that	MSF	should	not	get	involved	in	family	planning	education	or	prescribe	
contraceptives	as	“for	many	imams,	family	planning	is	against	Islam”.	At	the	time	of	
research,	in	November	2011,	OCB	did	not	offer	family	planning	services.148	
Political	and	cultural	analyses	were	formalised	internally	and	this	knowledge	
was	 hence	 institutionalised	 (Whittal	 2010;	 Whittal	 2011b;	 Whittal	 2011c).	 The	
Timergara	Project	Document	contained	a	 long	analysis	of	the	political	context	and	
actors,	 but	 in	 contrast,	 medical	 contextual	 analysis	 was	 not	 formalised,149	 and	
mentioned	only	briefly.	There	was	no	evidence	of	 it	being	done	thoroughly.	When	
																																																						
148	They	started	to	talk	about	revising	this	policy	when	I	was	about	to	leave	the	country	in	December	
2011.	
149	 Apart	 from	 exploratory	 mission	 reports	 (MSF	 OCB	 2011b)	 that	 remain	 very	 operational	 and	
centred	on	patients	and	medical	activity	rather	than	on	public	health	analysis.	
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asked	 about	 the	 follow-up	 and	 analysis	 of	 projects’	 different	 steps	 and	 results	
through	the	analysis	of	medical	data,	HoMs	and	Field	Coordinators	often	admitted	
it	was	‘the	next	priority’	but	had	not	yet	been	tackled.	Project	follow-up	had	been	
largely	 delegated	 to	 medical	 teams	 even	 though	 they	 pointed	 out	 they	 lacked	
qualitative	 analysis	 of	 the	 medical	 statistics,	 which	 could	 have	 given	 them	more	
information	on	each	project’s	medical	added	value.	This	did	not	mean	they	had	no	
interest	in	health	issues,	since	they	always	made	the	point	that	areas	they	worked	
in	had	very	poor	access	to	health	care.	
Medical	staff:	expanding	clinical	activity	at	the	hospital	level	
The	medical	staff	 included	specialists	(surgeons,	anaesthetists,	gynaecologists,	etc.	
see	Figure	8),	medical	doctors,	pharmacists,	nurses,	midwives	and	paramedical	staff	
assisting	with	patients’	treatments.	This	group	had	a	strong	influence	on	the	micro-
triage;	 as	 the	 following	 paragraphs	 show,	 medical	 staff	 deployed	 an	 important	
clinical	creativity	that	was	very	little	constrained	within	the	afore-described	macro-
triage.	
This	group	can	be	divided	in	three	sub-categories:	those	who	only	passed	by,	
those	who	managed	 them	 and	 those	who	 stayed.	MSF’s	medical	 specialists	 rarely	
stayed	for	 long	periods	of	time	since	the	vast	majority	went	back	to	a	fixed	 job	 in	
their	country	of	origin	(and	often	did	these	‘missions’	during	their	time	off).	These	
were	the	ones	labelled	those	who	only	passed	by.	MSF	human	resource	policy	was	
that	people	needed	to	accumulate	twelve	months	as	volunteers	before	they	could	
draw	a	salary.	Even	when	they	got	a	salary,	the	amount	was	derisory	compared	to	
any	 of	 these	 specialists’	 income	 at	 home.	 This	 category	 of	 people	 did	 not	 go	 on	
mission	for	money,	and	their	approach	was	that	they	offered	some	of	their	time	and	
energy	to	contribute	to	the	MSF	mission.	
Their	scope	of	motivation	and	energy	was	very	high	and	was	centred	on	the	
individual	patient.	As	they	were	medical	specialists	first	and	foremost,	their	interest	
focused	on	clinical	practices	and	how	to	 improve	them.	For	them,	the	quality	of	a	
“project”	was	tantamount	to	the	quality	of	care	that	they	were	able	to	provide.	 If	
the	number	of	patients	operated	on	increased,	they	wanted	to	increase	the	size	of	
the	 post-operative	 room.	 If	 more	 women	 came	 for	 deliveries,	 they	 wanted	 to	
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increase	 the	 size	 of	 the	 maternity	 ward	 as	 well	 as	 the	 number	 of	 midwives.	
Emergency	 medicine	 was	 a	 good	 example,	 as	 it	 was	 a	 recent	 medical	 specialty	
(dealing	with	unscheduled	patients	with	acute	illnesses	or	injuries)	and	MSF	had	not	
updated	 their	medical	 protocols	 to	 include	 new	ones	 covering	 emergencies.	 As	 a	
result,	 one	 of	 the	 emergency	 specialists	 MSF	 sent	 to	 the	 field	 spontaneously	
attempted	 to	 improve	 MSF	 practices,	 writing	 new	 drug	 protocols	 as	 well	 as	
requesting	 that	a	 ‘intensive	 care	unit’	be	 created.	 For	 specialists	 it	was	 the	act	of	
saving	 lives	 that	was	 important.	 It	was	their	professional	purpose,	and	the	reason	
why	they	came	to	the	remotest	parts	of	Pakistan,	worth	taking	time	off	and	some	
fair	 amount	 of	 risk.	 These	 people	 who	 only	 passed	 by	 typically	 stayed	 for	 a	 few	
weeks;	they	were	‘fresh’	and	full	of	ideas,	and	their	replacements	generally	had	as	
many	 new	 ideas.	 From	 this	 sub-group	 emerged	 an	 important	 clinical	 creativity,	
which,	 however,	 could	 also	 be	 disruptive	 and	 which	 consequently	 had	 to	 be	
channelled	and	transformed	into	a	coherent	strategy.	
	 The	second	sub-group	of	medical	staff	managed	those	who	only	passed	by.	
These	were	Medical	 Focal	 Points150	 (one	 per	 geographical	 area),	 and	 the	Medical	
Coordinator	(based	in	Islamabad).	These	people,	who	in	the	case	of	Pakistan	were	
all	expatriates,	were	responsible	for	the	medical	strategic151	follow-up	according	to	
their	 job	 description:	 “Scanning	 of	 health	 needs	 and	 exploratory	missions	 or	mid	
year	assessments;	participate	 in	 the	program	 implementation	and	monitoring”.	 In	
practice	 they	 seemed	 to	 spend	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 time	 and	 energy	 dealing	with	 the	
clinical	creativity	of	those	who	only	passed	by,	as	one	of	them	said:	
One	 thing	 [constraint]	 is	 the	 constant	 turnover	 of	 expats,	
that	 come	 in	 and	 see	 something	 they	want	 to	 change	 and	
argue	for	a	short	period…	Some	people	are	very	enthusiastic	
and	want	things	like	this	and	this	and	then	not	realising	that	
the	previous	one	just	changed	it	from	that	and	then,	even	if	
you	 tell	 them,	 they	argue	 that	 ‘this	 is	better’	 so	 it’s	 always	
this…	
In	practice,	Medical	Focal	Points	and	the	Medical	Coordinator	briefed	and	debriefed	
expatriates	as	 they	came	and	went,	explained	and	 re-explained	 the	 framework	of	
																																																						
150	Also	called	the	“Deputy	Field	Coordinator,	Medical”	 in	documents	such	as	organisational	charts	
and	job	descriptions.	
151	Strategy	“can	be	thought	of	as	the	way	a	nation,	sector	or	organization	relates	to	its	environment	
to	accomplish	its	intended	goals”	(Brinkerhoff	cited	in	Smillie	2000).	
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intervention	of	MSF	 in	 this	particular	 context,	and	 tried	 to	 situate	 the	context	 for	
them	to	make	sure	they	adhered	at	 least	to	the	MSF	protocols	and	general	know-
how.	 They	discussed	 ideas	 specialists	 brought	 forward	 and	 reflected	upon	 clinical	
changes.	When	asked	about	the	monitoring	and	analysis	of	medical	indicators,	they	
admitted	 that	 this	needed	to	be	 improved	and	said	 it	was	 the	next	 thing	on	 their	
long	to-do	list:	analytical	perspectives	on	projects	had	not	been	a	priority	compared	
to	channelling	the	clinical	creativity	of	those	who	only	passed	by.	
National	medical	employees	were	those	who	stayed.	Among	them	some	had	
been	 empowered	 as	 Medical	 Focal	 Points’	 deputies	 or	 Medical	 Coordinators.	 In	
interviews	they	stood	out	as	the	only	ones	who	sometimes	had	strong	opinions	or	
disagreements	 with	 choices	 made,	 and	 sometimes,	 critical	 ideas	 about	 MSF’s	
medical	positioning.	One,	based	in	Timergara,	was	sent	to	the	south	of	the	country	
in	the	aftermath	of	the	2011	floods	and	told	me	how	he	disagreed	with	the	decision	
to	 stop	 the	 medical	 relief	 about	 three	 months	 after	 the	 disaster	 had	 displaced	
thousands	of	 families	 (Hosh	Media	2011).	He	opposed	the	argument	he	had	been	
given	that	the	people	did	not	have	‘life	threatening	diseases’,	arguing	that	“there	is	
no	 such	 definition	 of	 ‘we	 only	 take	 care	 of	 life	 threatening	 diseases’”.	 Such	 staff	
were	 educated,	 experienced	 and	 knew	 the	 context	well.	 Several	 people	 said	 that	
there	was	room	for	them	to	raise	objections	in	front	of	their	hierarchy.	According	to	
one	person:	 “In	MSF	 you	have	 freedom	of	 speech”.	 Yet	 there	was	 also	 a	 tone	of	
frustration	 as	 they	 mentioned	 what	 should	 be	 done	 or	 should	 have	 been	 done	
which	suggested	that	 their	comments	did	not	always	have	a	decisive	 influence	on	
the	choices	made.	
Overall,	the	influence	of	the	medical	staff	was	contained	in	the	limit	of	the	
macro-triage	 and	 yet	 members	 of	 this	 group	 generally	 expressed	 very	 few	
grievances152	 about	 this	 situation.	 There	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	 balance	 between	 the	
influence	of	the	three	strategic	groups,	relying	mainly	on	a	tension	between	clinical	
and	strategic	sorting	logics	as	the	following	part	shows.	
																																																						
152	 I	 presented	 this	 perspective	 to	 the	 OCB	 coordination	 team	 and	 the	 OCA	 and	 OCP	 HoMs	 in	 a	
meeting	 in	 Islamabad	 on	 2nd	 December,	 2011.	 The	 OCB	 medical	 staff	 agreed	 that	 they	 were	
sometimes	asked	 ‘to	 find	needs’	once	 the	head	office	and	 the	HoM	had	decided	upon	a	 location.	
That	started	a	debate	among	members	of	medical	staff	and	of	the	political	staff	that	confirmed	the	
idea	 of	 various	 types	 of	 influence	 on	 humanitarian	 triage	 and	 of	 a	 tension	 between	 clinical	 and	
strategic	logics.		
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Clinical	activity-driven	project	management	
The	imperative	to	treat	people	was	at	the	centre	of	MSF’s	field	activities	and	MSF	
project	 management	 was	 activity-driven.	 This	 gave	 primacy	 to	 the	 expression	 of	
clinical	practices	at	the	local	level.	
The	 logical	 framework	 or	 ‘logframe’,	 the	 classical	 tool	 of	 the	 Project	 Cycle	
Management	 (see,	 for	 example,	 European	 Commission	 2004)	 was	 designed	 and	
written	once	a	year,	but	 served	more	as	a	communication	 tool	 to	which	different	
departments	 and	 hierarchical	 levels	 referred	 or	 used	 to	 brief	 new	 staff.	 As	
mentioned,	the	word	‘project’	unlike	its	use	by	other	aid	organisations,	referred	to	a	
location	for	MSF.	Monitoring	tools	such	as	operational	plans	and	monitoring	sheets	
existed	but	people	did	not	use	them.	At	the	head	office,	whilst	some	regretted	that	
these	tools	were	not	used,	others	had	a	stark	discourse	about	 logical	frameworks,	
illustrating	 what	 Peter	 Redfield	 describes	 as	 the	 “MSF	 antibureaucratic	 ethos”	
(Redfield	 2008b,	 208).	 I	 heard	 comments	 such	 as:	 “I	 don’t	 like	 it	 at	 all”,	 “I	 don’t	
believe	 it’s	useful”,	“It’s	an	accountancy	tool”,	underlining	 its	bureaucratic	aspect,	
or	 “It’s	 not	 adapted	 to	MSF”.	 One	 of	 the	 Brussels	 directors	 said	 “No	 operational	
decision	has	ever	been	made	on	the	basis	of	a	logframe”,	adding	that:	
It	 was	 adopted	 at	 the	 time	 MSF	 was	 working	 with	
institutional	 donors,	 and	 kept	 ever	 since.	 We	 don’t	 have	
anything	 else	 [and]	 our	 priority	 is	 to	 push	 people	 outside	
their	 office,	 and	 since	 we	 have	 many	 expatriates,	 projects	
are	 already	 closely	 followed	 up.	 The	 mission	 statement	 is	
already	 quite	 strong,	 so	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 room	 to	
manoeuvre	to	be	responsive.	
Reports	presented	activities	rather	than	objectives	or	expected	results,	and	
medical	data	were	collected	but	remained	largely	unanalysed,	as	one	of	the	director	
in	 Brussels	 commented	 ironically:	 “Medical	 figures?	 I	 would	 love	 to	 have	 them…	
we’re	 really	 bad	 on	 that	 point”.	 The	 volume	 of	 activities	 was	 mainly	 followed	
through	 indicators	 like	 the	number	of	patients	 in	 the	“Inpatient	Department”,	 the	
number	 of	 patients	 “discharged”,	 “expired”	 (i.e.	 deceased),	 the	 number	 of	
complicated	deliveries	etc.		
MSF	followed	an	activity-driven	management	model,	which	used	the	logical	
framework	 as	 a	 loose	 reference	 document	 across	 departments	 and	 as	 a	 briefing	
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tool.	What	is	 important	to	underline	is	the	space	that	the	activity-driven	reporting	
created	for	medical	staff.	Thanks	to	this	logic	they	had	the	freedom	to	adjust	their	
activities	to	the	number	of	patients,	i.e.	volume	of	work,	which	they	considered	‘the	
needs’.	 In	 this	way,	activities	were	perceived	to	be	designed	 ‘according	to	needs’:	
they	were	adjusted	to	an	open	demand,	with	no	restriction	of	a	“specific	objective”.	
This	perfectly	fitted	the	mindset	of	medical	staff.	
There	was	a	consistent	tendency	of	medical	staff	to	rely	on	a	“we	save	lives”	
argument.	Patients	arrived	in	a	critical	condition	and	medical	staff	treated	them	so	
that	 people	 got	 back	 on	 their	 feet	 and	 walked	 out	 of	 the	 hospital.	 One	 doctor,	
critical	 of	 his	 fellows’	 justifications,	 ironically	 illustrated	 this	 phenomenon	 in	 an	
interview:		
Their	logic	is	‘save	one	person	and	you	save	humanity’.	And	
then	they	go	‘Hey,	we	did	save	10,000	people’.	This	is	why	
calculating	 the	 volume	 reinforces	 their	 argument.	 Plus,	
once	 you’ve	 invested	 so	 much,	 you	 need	 to	 prove	 your	
point,	right?	(…)	But	anything	could	be	life	threatening	if	it	
lasts	long	enough.	
For	the	medical	staff,	treating	patients	was	meaningful	work.	Even	though	most	of	
the	patients	were	not	‘war	wounded’	as	mentioned	in	the	introduction,	but	normal	
medical	emergencies,	 they	were	patients,	who	 if	not	 treated	 rapidly	and	carefully	
might	die.	
As	 the	exception	that	confirmed	the	rule,	one	project	was	going	through	a	
period	of	being	debated	by	 field	 teams	at	 the	 time	of	my	research:	 the	Peshawar	
women’s	hospital.	 This	hospital	 had	been	 set	up	because	MSF	OCP	wanted	 to	be	
present	and	operational	 in	 the	capital	 city	of	 ‘Pashtunistan’.	 I	 spent	a	 few	days	 in	
Peshawar	and	observed	how	at	field	level	people	were	questioning	the	relevance	of	
the	 project,	 trying	 to	 reflect	 upon	 what	 had	 gone	 wrong	 in	 the	 design	 or	 early	
implementation.	 The	 situation	 was	 that	 there	 were	 almost	 no	 patients	 in	 the	
hospital	 at	 the	 time	 I	 visited	 it.	 It	was	 indeed	brand	new,	 and	 the	 pharmacy	was	
fully	stocked	but	it	was	also	situated	in	a	rich	and	rather	central	neighbourhood	of	
Peshawar	whereas	 those	who	needed	access	 to	 free	care	 lived	 in	 the	outskirts	of	
the	 city.	 The	 initial	 rationale	 for	 running	 such	 a	 project	 had	 come	 from	 an	
assessment	that	had	concluded	that	women’s	maternal	health	was	one	of	the	most	
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acute	health	 issues	 in	 Pakistan,	 and	 that	 the	district	 of	 Peshawar	 sheltered	many	
IDPs	and	Afghan	refugees	who	could	not	afford	private	medical	care.	Eight	months	
into	the	opening	of	the	maternity	ward,	the	team	was	basically	looking	for	patients,	
working	on	 referral	networks.	The	point	made	here	 is	not	 to	 say	 that	 this	project	
was	 not	 relevant,	 as	 over	 time	 they	 managed	 to	 create	 an	 effective	 referral	
network.	 Yet	 this	 showed	 that	 when	 medical	 staff	 did	 not	 treat	 patients,	 the	
legitimacy	of	 strategic	arguments	were	keenly	questioned	by	 field	medical	 teams,	
and	in	particular	by	the	specialists	who	wanted	to	make	their	time	donated	to	MSF	
was	used	effectively.	
Solidarity	in	the	name	of	impartiality	
Working	 for	 an	 organisation	 seen	 as	different	 was	 a	 source	 of	motivation	 and	 of	
commitment	 for	 the	 MSF	 staff,	 regardless	 of	 the	 strategic	 group	 they	 were	
associated	with.	 Each	 strategic	 group	 could	 reach	 its	 objectives,	with	 a	 feeling	 of	
contributing	 to	 a	 common	 overall	 project	 of	 “providing	 impartial	 medical	
humanitarian	 assistance”	 (Lockyear	 2013)	 in	 a	 way	 different	 from	 other	
humanitarian	 actors.	 What	 MSF	 humanitarian	 triage	 overall	 produced	 was,	
however,	never	explicitly	expressed:	who	did	MSF’s	humanitarian	triage	eventually	
prioritise?	Who	did	it	exclude?	In	this	section	I	argue	that	MSF’s	humanitarian	triage	
in	 Timergara	 (and	 in	 Pakistan	more	 generally)	 produced	 a	 form	of	 solidarity	with	
Pashtuns	that	came	with	an	operational	cost.	Although	mentioned	on	one	occasion	
by	a	member	of	management	in	Brussels,	the	notion	of	solidarity	was	not	explicit	in	
most	MSF	documents	or	the	interviews	I	did	and	is	not	described	here	as	a	hidden	
or	 subconscious	 intention,	 but	 rather	 as	 a	de	 facto	 result	 of	 the	 above-described	
humanitarian	triage	processes.	
Pashtuns	first	
Those	who	benefited	from	the	medical	offer	in	Timergara	were	mostly	people	from	
Upper	and	Lower	Dir,	and	a	few	people	from	Bajaur,	almost	exclusively	of	Pashtun	
origin	as	a	consequence	of	the	tribal	geography.	The	same	pattern	could	be	seen	in	
MSF’s	other	work	in	Pakistan	outside	of	natural	disaster	responses:	in	the	FATA	and	
in	KPK,	where	most	OCP	and	OCB	projects	were	implemented,	the	vast	majority	of	
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people	 were	 of	 Pashtun	 origin;	 in	 Balochistan	 two	 of	 the	 three	 OCA	 ongoing	
projects	in	2011	mentioned	Pashtun	Afghan	refugees	as	being	their	main	patients.	
In	Karachi	(Sindh),	OCB	was	starting	a	hospital	project	in	the	Machar	colony,	where	
there	was	a	large	Pashtun	population.	Becoming	aligned	with	the	Pashtuns	was	not	
an	 intention	 of	 the	 organisation,	 but	 rather	 the	 result	 of	MSF’s	 strategic	 logic	 of	
networking	 with	 Taliban	 leadership	 (which	 was	 mostly	 based	 in	 big	 cities	 in	
Pakistan)	in	order	to	be	able	to	set	up	projects	in	areas	of	Pakistan	and	Afghanistan	
(Crombé	2011)	that	were	affected	by	conflict	and	had	been	for	many	years	averse	
to	any	kind	of	Western	 influence	and	thus	 largely	deprived	of	access	to	health	 let	
alone	any	other	kind	of	non	militarised	aid.153	
Opposing	efficiency	
As	a	result	all	those	who	had	no	access	to	health	care	but	had	nothing	to	do	with	
the	Pashtun	geopolitics	were	effectively,	if	not	deliberately,	excluded	or	included	as	
secondary	recipients	within	MSF’s	humanitarian	triage	as	illustrated	by	the	minimal	
investment	of	MSF	OCB	after	the	2011	floods.	At	the	end	of	my	stay	with	MSF	OCB	
in	 Pakistan	 I	 made	 a	 presentation	 of	 my	 preliminary	 research	 results	 to	 the	
Islamabad	Coordination	team.	The	overall	 important	influence	of	the	political	staff	
over	others	 triggered	debate	between	members	of	 the	political	and	medical	staff.	
Even	though	the	medical	coordinator	was	of	the	opinion	that	MSF	dealt	with	“acute	
situations”,	 and	 that	 “if	 mortality	 is	 high,	 then	MSF	 should	 stay”154,	 the	 Head	 of	
Mission	admitted	that	they	would	have	to	work	hard	to	convince	the	head	office	in	
Brussels	 that	 Naukot	 (an	 area	 badly	 affected	 by	 the	 2011	 floods	 in	 South	 Sindh)	
should	become	MSF	OCB’s	priority	 in	Pakistan.	As	one	director	explained	to	me	in	
Brussels,	the	reason	why	they	opposed	this	was	precisely	that	MSF	was	“not	only	a	
service	provider”,	adding	that	in	Pakistan	“needs	are	not	discriminatory	enough”.	In	
																																																						
153	In	Afghanistan	military	driven	forms	of	aid	had	developed	since	2002	that	went	with	the	strategy	
of	 winning	 “hearts	 and	 minds”	 as	 a	 counter-insurgency	 tool:	 US-led	 coalition	 forces	 deployed	
Provincial	Reconstruction	Teams	(PRTs)	in	order	to	contribute	to	the	building	of	local	governance,	in	
providing	 service	 delivery	 to	 areas	 first	 secured	 by	 the	 army.	 For	 critiques	 of	 PRTs	 and	 their	
relationships	to	humanitarian	actors	see	Gordon	(2010)	and	Donini	(2012a).	
154	He	illustrated	his	argument	with	an	episode	of	his	own	experience	of	working	in	Chad	after	“an	
emergency”	and	explained	that	once	the	“emergency”	was	finished	they	had	considered	leaving	the	
country.	Before	that	they	did	a	retrospective	mortality	survey	that	showed	rates	as	high	as	in	conflict	
settings,	and	finally	decided	to	stay.	
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line	with	this	comment,	one	of	the	MSF	Field	Coordinators	said:	“You’ll	find	needs	
everywhere	and	 if	 you	 compare	with	 the	 first	world	 then	 you	 can	 take	over	KPK.	
Every	time	you’ll	look	into	something,	you’ll	find	something”.		
MSF	dismissed	the	objective	of	providing	a	cost-effective	approach	to	health	
(Briend	2000)	as	explained	by	one	of	the	directors	 in	Brussels:	“It’s	 too	much	of	a	
mathematical	 approach	 to	 say	 ‘in	 the	 south	 we	 would	 spend	 less	 on	 security	
management,	 and	 as	 a	 result	 we	 would	 treat	 more	 people’.	 If	 you	 model	
everything,	 you’ll	 sterilise	 commitment”.155	 In	 the	 case	of	 Pakistan,	 it	was	neither	
mortality	rates,	nor	a	efficiency	rationale	that	influenced	MSF’s	humanitarian	triage.	
MSF’s	 approach	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 sub-optimal	 in	 an	 international	 humanitarian	
arena	 dominated	 by	 cost	 effectiveness	 and	 maximalist	 approaches:156	 there	 was	
indeed	a	form	of	attraction	to	the	tribal	areas	among	some	of	the	members	of	the	
direction	 of	 the	 organisation	 in	 Brussels	who	 had	worked	 in	 Afghanistan.	 One	 of	
them	 said:	 “NWFP	 is	 a	 myth”,	 using	 the	 previous	 name	 of	 Khyber	 Pakhtunkhwa	
(changed	in	2010).	This	comment	echoes	the	idea	of	“coup	de	coeur”	translated	by	
Jennifer	Rubenstein	as	“an	intense	but	fleeting	passion	or	interest	and	partiality”	(J.	
C.	Rubenstein	2008,	229)	that	constituted	a	well-known	argument	for	prioritising	a	
project	 or	 a	 country	 over	 others	 because	 they	 were	 “close	 to	 the	 heart”	 (J.	 C.	
Rubenstein	 2008,	 229).	 Working	 in	 these	 areas	 was	 indeed	 challenging	 and	
adventurous,	as	another	MSF	staff	explained:	“Other	organisations	 thought	 it	was	
too	dangerous”.	
The	cost	of	MSF	OCB	humanitarian	triage:	a	populist	inclination	
In	its	attempt	to	preserve	good	relationships	with	local	actors,	MSF	OCB	developed	
relationships	 with	 actors	 embodying	 the	 opposition	 to	 the	 ‘westernisation’	 of	
Pakistani	society.	Al	Khidmat	Foundation,	a	Pakistani	NGO,	had	been	an	operational	
NGO	partner	of	MSF	 in	KPK:	MSF	had	made	donations	of	medicines	when	certain	
																																																						
155	This	is	my	translation.	The	French	word	used	for	commitment	was	“engagement”.	This	word	used	
in	the	context	of	humanitarian	action	has	no	exact	equivalent	in	English.	It	means	a	passionate	and	
intimate	commitment	to	humanitarian	ethos.	Johanna	Siméant,	in	her	sociology	of	the	humanitarian	
profession	showed	how	polymorphous	“l’engagement”	was,	and	chose	to	study	it	through	the	scope	
of	 activism	 (Siméant	 2001;	 Dauvin	 and	 Siméant	 2002),	 which	 indicates	 the	 potential	 political	
dimension	of	“engagement”	too.	
156	André	Briend	studied	one	example	of	this	 logic	promoted	by	international	donors	favouring	the	
most	cost	effective	programmes	in	the	framework	of	“heath	for	all	by	the	year	2000”	(Briend	2000)		
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areas	were	 affected	 by	 conflict	 and	MSF	 staff	 could	 not	 access	 them	directly,	 for	
instance.	Al	Khidmat	was	known	as	the	humanitarian	wing	of	 the	Jamaat-e-Islami,	
one	 of	 the	 original	 and	most	 influential	 Islamist	 organisations	 (together	with	 the	
Muslim	Brotherhood)	founded	in	1941	in	British	India.	The	members	of	Al	Khidmat	I	
interviewed	in	Peshawar	denied	any	 involvement	with	a	political	party	and	used	a	
rhetoric	similar	to	one	of	the	other	NGOs:	“Al-Khidmat	Foundation	is	dedicated	to	
the	service	of	humanity	in	all	parts	of	the	world	without	any	discrimination	of	creed,	
religion	and	political	association”.157	Like	many	Muslim	NGOs,	they	implemented	a	
wide	 range	 of	 activities	 (education,	 health,	 water,	 small	 businesses,	 disaster	
management),	 had	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 orphans,	 made	 appeals	 for	 zakat	 and	
distributed	food	for	Eid.	They	collected	also	funds	for	Gaza	(Palestine).	They	worked	
with	community-based	approaches	 in	all	provinces	of	Pakistan,	which	meant	 they	
had	an	extensive	network	of	 volunteers	on	 the	ground	 ready	 to	help	 in	 case	of	a	
disaster	or	of	a	population	displacement.	The	person	from	Al	Khidmat	I	interviewed	
explained	 that	many	 decisions	were	made	 on	 the	 ground	 by	 these	 volunteers	 as	
they	claimed	to	be	a	grassroots	organisation.	This	also	meant	they	had	less	control	
over	the	allocation	of	assistance	locally.	The	perception	outside	MSF	was	that	their	
activities	were	suspicious,	as	a	member	of	the	PDMA	of	KPK	commented:	“There	is	
an	impression	that	Al	Khidmat	is	connected	to	a	political	party,	but	they	don’t	admit	
it	openly”.	Yet	MSF	did	not	find	it	problematic	to	be	somehow	associated	with	them	
(in	 contrast	 to	 being	 associated	 with	 any	 other	 humanitarian	 arena	 actor	 in	
Pakistan).	
Additionally	it	had	become	consensual	within	the	organisation	not	to	judge	
what	 the	 political	 staff	 defined	 as	 the	 ‘Pashtun	 culture’,	 i.e	 anything	 that	 could	
upset	the	local	(male)	leadership	as	this	comment	of	an	expatriate	health	promoter	
showed:	 “Sometimes	 when	 they	 have	 a	 baby	 girl,	 and	 already	 have	 many,	 they	
don’t	feed	her…	you	should	not	judge.	Sometimes	you	want	to,	but	it’s	useless”.	As	
already	mentioned,	Security	Focal	Points	had	rated	‘family	planning’	as	a	sensitive	
issue	in	KPK	and	the	organisation’s	policy	at	the	time	of	my	fieldwork	was	to	avoid	
writing	family	planning	prescriptions	and	discussions	revolving	around	the	issue	of	
																																																						
157	http://al-khidmatfoundation.org/about-us/introduction/#sthash.IdUfrpRE.dpbs		
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birth	control.	One	of	the	midwives	attempted	to	raise	the	issue,	as	she	knew	there	
were	other	voices	among	the	Pashtun	people,	whom	she	saw	in	the	course	of	her	
medical	practice,	but	faced	strong	internal	resistance.	Her	arguments	were	that	part	
of	 the	 treatment	 for	women	 having	 successive	miscarriages	 (whether	 induced	 or	
natural)	was	 family	 planning	 solutions.	 Some	women	 (even	 sometimes	 supported	
by	their	husbands)	without	a	better	option	induced	abortions,	risking	their	 lives	 in	
the	process.	She	told	me	the	answers	she	got	from	her	line	managers	were:	“Don’t	
put	 western	 ideas	 in	 a	 context	 like	 this”	 or	 “You	 will	 give	 power	 to	 women	 and	
women	don’t	have	power	here”,	or	 “The	pharmaceutical	 industry	already	doesn’t	
like	us	and	 it’ll	be	even	worse	 if	we	distribute	pills	 for	 free”	 (which	she	argued	as	
not	making	sense	since	other	drugs	were	already	given	without	charge).	She	faced	
the	consensual	priority	 to	maintain	a	 fragile	acceptance	 in	Timergara.	The	cost	of	
MSF’s	 macro-triage	 was	 the	 impossibility	 of	 public	 critique	 of	 some	 of	 the	 local	
medical	 practices158	 and	 the	 reinforcement	 of	 established	 local	 power	 structures.	
When	I	questioned	the	HoM	about	the	internal	debates	about	operational	choices	
and	priorities,	he	answered:	 “When	you	ask	 the	question,	 I’m	 tempted	 to	answer	
there	is	not	a	lot	of	debate	because	we	don’t	really	need	it”.	In	his	view	the	reasons	
why	 they	 started	projects	 in	KPK	 three	years	ago	 remained	“Bajaur	 is	 still	 at	war,	
so…”,	adding:	“but	the	[quality	[of	our	medical	offer]	has	improved	greatly,	which	is	
why	 we’re	 not	 that	 dynamic	 in	 changing”.	 When	 studying	 MSF	 contributions	 to	
transnational	medical	innovations	Nicolas	Dodier	underscores	the	specific	“political	
dimension”	of	MSF	to	challenge	the	established	framework	of	medical	practices	in	
order	 to	 bring	 about	 transformations	 (Dodier	 2011,	 222).	 This	 “fundamentally	
political	 tendency”	 (Dodier	 2011,	 223)	 that	 has	 been	 at	 the	 source	 of	 so	 many	
innovations	 in	 the	 field	of	humanitarian	medicine	was,	 in	 this	 case,	 the	 source	of	
medical	 conservatism.	MSF	 validation	 of	 certain	 local	 medical	 practices	 could	 be	
qualified	as	“populist”,	as	it	relied	on	“a	policy	that	promotes	characteristic	popular	
resources	 and	 supports	 the	 dynamics	 of	 local	 societies”	 (Olivier	 de	 Sardan	 2005,	
																																																						
158	Another	one	was	the	misuse	of	‘oxytocin’,	a	hormone	used	to	stimulate	contractions	of	the	uterus	
and	quicken	 labour,	by	private	doctors	 (MSF	OCP	2015).	The	 issue	of	 launching	a	public	 campaign	
denouncing	 the	 deadly	 consequences	 of	 the	misuse	 of	 oxytocin	 for	mothers	 and	 newborns	were	
being	discussed	 in	December	2011,	yet	 to	date	 it	has	never	been	 the	object	of	a	 full-fledged	MSF	
campaign	 in	 Pakistan,	 but	 rather	 only	 incidentally	 mentioned	 in	 articles	 published	 on	 the	 MSF	
websites	(MSF	OCA	2014;	MSF	OCP	2015).		
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120).	Part	of	what	MSF	considered	as	acceptable	work	conditions	also	went	against	
some	of	the	organisation’s	advocacy	campaigns	such	as	those	promoting	access	to	
family	planning.159	
Conclusion	
This	 chapter	 showed	 that	 the	 humanitarian	 triage	 of	 the	 Timergara	 project	 was	
mainly	driven	by	a	strategic	logic	of	being	operational	and	ready	for	the	victims	of	
the	Global	War	on	Terror	by	way	of	being	pre-positioned	for	future	war	wounded	in	
case	 hostilities	 started	 again	 in	 the	 neighbouring	 Bajaur	 Agency	 (FATA).	 This	
strategic	 logic	promoted	 from	 the	 top	was	 internalised	by	 staff	 in	Pakistan	as	 the	
idea	that	MSF	was	different:	different	from	other	international	actors	as	they	tried	
to	 stay	 away	 from	 the	 Pakistani	 authorities	 or	western	 foreign	 regional	 agendas;	
different	from	other	aid	actors	as	they	developed	projects	in	areas	considered	off-
limits	 by	 most	 other	 aid	 actors,	 and	 because	 they	 offered	 sophisticated	 medical	
services	(secondary	health).	They	were	different	from	governmental	health	systems	
as	they	actually	did	provide	assistance	to	people;	and	different	from	private	medical	
actors	as	they	provided	it	free	of	charge.	The	chapter	also	demonstrated	that	three	
strategic	groups	had	three	types	of	influence	on	the	micro-triage.	The	support	and	
the	 political	 staff	 contained	 external	 constraints,	 in	 particular	 the	 constraint	 on	
“access”	 (ICG	2012b,	16)	 seen	by	others	as	a	 limit	 to	 their	action	 (see	chapter	7).	
The	medical	staff	were	the	source	of	growing	clinical	activities	within	the	Timergara	
hospital,	some	of	which	were	not	targeting	war	wounded	at	all	(such	as	mother	and	
child	 health).	 As	 a	 result	 MSF	 mostly	 treated	 Pashtun	 people,	 and	 opposed	 the	
mainstream	aid	 logic	of	efficiency,	at	 the	cost	of	a	 form	of	populism	entailing	not	
questioning	some	of	the	local	cultural	norms	related	to	access	to	health,	as	well	as	
the	political	bias	of	some	of	their	partners.	
For	MSF,	 the	 victim	most	 deserving	 of	 aid	 is	 both	 a	 life	 put	 at	 risk	 and	 a	
victim	of	political	violence,	in	an	echo	of	the	origin	of	the	organisation	(Dodier	2011,	
203).	As	the	Talibans	(both	Afghan	and	Pakistani	ones)	mostly	came	from	Pashtun	
tribes,	 in	 the	 geopolitics	 of	 the	 Global	 War	 on	 Terror	 the	 Pashtuns	 were	 by	
																																																						
159	http://www.msf.org.au/resources/special-features/womens-health/obstetrics/msfs-
approach.html.	
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extension	the	victims	of	“the	sacrificial	international	order”	(Bradol	2004,	1),	as	the	
president	of	MSF	OCP	phrased	it	 in	the	introduction	of	a	collective	book	reflecting	
upon	 the	 role	 of	 MSF	 in	 a	 context	 of	 Western	 states’	 (military)	 “humanitarian	
interventions”	launched	in	the	name	of	humanity.		
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Chapter	6	
Solidarités	International:	impartiality	from	the	‘world	of	the	
proposal’	
Introduction	
This	 chapter	 analyses	 the	 triage	 logics	 of	 a	 12	 month	 and	 €3.5	 million	 water,	
hygiene	 and	 sanitation	 project	 in	 north	 Sindh	 implemented	 by	 Solidarités	
International	 (hereafter	 referred	 to	 as	 Solidarités)	 in	 2011-2012.	 It	 shows	 how	 a	
narrow	 reading	 of	 a	 ‘logical	 framework’	 shaped	 the	 humanitarian	 triage	 logics	 in	
spite	of	the	numerous	actors	involved	in	the	project	implementation	acknowledging	
contradictions	with	the	stated	objectives	or	with	what	affected	people	requested.
	 The	chapter	is	divided	into	six	sections.	I	first	give	the	history	of	the	project	
and	identify	the	various	sorting	logics	that	shaped	who	were	eventually	assisted,	in	
what	priority	 and	with	what	 type	of	 assistance.	 The	 second	 section	describes	 the	
mechanisms	that	led	Solidarités	to	design	a	water,	sanitation	and	hygiene	project	in	
north	Sindh	and	how	such	geographic	and	technical	specificity	defined	the	implicit	
framework	 of	 triage	 that	 hence	 went	 unquestioned	 by	 those	 implementing	 the	
project.	The	third	section	then	demonstrates	how	the	explicit	triage	criteria	defined	
in	the	paper	version	of	the	project	–	assisting	‘the	most	vulnerable’	–	was	ignored	in	
the	 concrete	 implementation	 in	 the	 field,	 triggering	 questions	 by	 some	 of	 the	
personnel.	 The	 fourth	 section	 delves	 into	 the	 ambition	 of	 sustainability,	 showing	
that	 even	 though	 the	 proposal	 stated	 that	 the	 sustainability	 of	 the	 project	 relied	
upon	the	involvement	of	local	authorities	and	communities	in	its	planning	as	well	as	
in	 its	 implementation,	 their	 engagement	 was,	 in	 fact,	 minimal.	 In	 practice,	 the	
participatory	survey	methods	did	not	take	into	account	potential	recipient	villagers’	
queries	and	appeared	to	be	more	an	educational	tool	about	good	hygiene	practices	
and	 a	measure	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 their	 behaviour	 compared	 to	 the	 quantitative	
project’s	indicators.	The	section	also	describes	how	the	inability	of	the	‘Community	
Based	Organisations’,	lacking	funds	and	skills,	to	manage	infrastructures	sustainably	
appeared	obvious	 to	 several	 Solidarités	employees.	 The	 fifth	 section	moves	on	 to	
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question	 why	 the	 project	 implementation	 went	 ahead	 despite	 the	 many	 doubts	
expressed	by	those	 implementing	 it	about	the	relevance	of	both	the	macro	triage	
(access	 to	 water	 and	 latrines)	 and	 micro	 triage	 (excluding	 some	 of	 ‘the	 most	
vulnerable’,	for	instance).	In	this	respect	a	logic	appears	to	have	determined	more	
than	 others	 the	 macro	 and	 micro	 triage	 mechanisms:	 the	 blind	 adherence	 of	
Solidarités’s	operational	commitments	with	regard	to	ECHO,	its	donor	–	in	particular	
concerning	 the	 number	 of	 beneficiaries	 and	 the	 technical	 quality	 of	 the	
infrastructures.	 In	 the	 sixth	 section,	 I	 ultimately	 argue	 that	 the	 continuation	 of	
triage	 practices	 that	 many	 of	 the	 project’s	 actors	 saw	 as	 contradictory	 can	 be	
explained	by	their	confinement	to	a	narrow	reading	of	the	donor’s	proposal	and	its	
logical	 framework.	This	self-alienating	effect	can	be	explained	by	the	deficiency	 in	
interpretation	of	the	policy	by	those	embodying	the	Solidarités	institution	who	had	
sufficient	(symbolic)	authority	to	interpret	a	project	proposal.		
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The	story	of	Echo	3	
This	first	section	sets	the	historical	basis	for	understanding	the	analysis	that	unfolds	
in	the	rest	of	the	chapter.	
Submitting	the	proposal	
In	2009,	as	the	Solidarités	Asia	Desk	Manager	based	in	Paris,	I	sent	and	supervised	
an	assessment	team	after	the	displacement	of	people	from	the	Swat	Valley.	While	
this	 assessment	did	not	 lead	 to	a	project	 (as	explained	 in	 chapter	4),	 I	 decided	 to	
maintain	one	person	in	 Islamabad	as	a	 liaison	officer	to	supervise	the	organisation	
registration	process	in	Pakistan,	in	the	hope	of	developing	further	activities	later	on.	
This	 liaison	officer	also	attended	a	few	cluster	meetings	and	regularly	updated	the	
Solidarités	headquarters	about	the	displacements	from	the	FATA.		
By	 July	 2010,	 Solidarités	 had	 still	 not	 managed	 to	 get	 registered	 and	 the	
organisation	was	about	 to	close	 its	office	 in	 Islamabad	when	 the	 floods	started	 to	
unfold.	I	was	due	to	leave	Solidarités	two	weeks	later	and	had	just	enough	time	to	
brief	 an	 assessment	 team	 that	 was	 leaving	 for	 Pakistan	 shortly	 to	 evaluate	 the	
consequences	 of	 the	 disaster	 and,	 if	 needed,	 to	 negotiate	 the	 launch	 of	 an	
emergency	relief	project	with	the	authorities	and	donors.	Between	September	2010	
and	 June	 2011	 Solidarités	 implemented	 two	 projects	 funded	 by	 the	 European	
Commission	Humanitarian	Aid	and	Civil	Protection	Office	(ECHO),	the	first	targeting	
over	200,000	people	and	the	second	approximately	100,000,	all	of	whom	had	been	
affected	by	the	floods	in	the	Sindh	region.	Situated	in	the	south-east	of	the	country,	
Sindh	 is	the	second	most	populous	province	of	Pakistan	(after	Punjab)	with	a	 little	
over	55.2	million	inhabitants	(A.	S.	Khan	2012),	the	majority	of	whom	live	in	what	is	
commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘Interior	 Sindh’,	 working	 as	 sharecroppers	 for	 feudal	
landlords.160	According	to	the	GoP,	over	a	million	people	had	been	displaced	by	the	
flood	 in	 the	province	 (in	 late	August	 2010)	which	had	damaged	 farmland	and	 the	
few	existing	infrastructures	(roads,	public	facilities,	wells,	etc.).	
																																																						
160	As	opposed	to	Karachi,	its	provincial	capital	city	situated	on	the	Arabian	Sea,	which	accounts	for	
“around	two-thirds	of	Sindh’s	GDP”	(Lieven	2011,	317).	
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As	the	second	ECHO	project	was	coming	to	an	end,	Solidarités	launched	a	new	series	
of	assessment	missions	between	February	and	April	2011.	In	May	2011,	it	submitted	
a	new	project	 to	ECHO	(that	Solidarités	staff	called	 ‘ECHO	3’)	proposing	 improving	
access	 to	 water,	 sanitation	 and	 hygiene	 conditions	 for	 around	 130,000	 flood-
affected	persons	in	the	Upper	Sindh	region.	At	the	end	of	January	2011,	the	GoP	had	
declared	the	‘emergency	phase’	over.	However,	while	actors	had	as	a	consequence	
to	work	under	 the	 ‘early	 recovery	 framework’	 led	by	 the	UNDP,	 some,	 like	ECHO,	
continued	to	argue	that	the	remaining	‘relief’	needs,	in	particular	concerning	food,	
shelter	 and	water,	 hygiene	 and	 sanitation	 (ECHO	2011,	 5)	 had	 to	 be	 covered.	 For	
instance	water	 tables	 had	 been	 contaminated	 by	 the	 floods	 and	 became	 salty,	 at	
least	 at	 levels	 the	 hand	 pump	 commonly	 pumped	 it	 (15	meters)	 (Robin	 2010,	 6).	
People	would	not	drink	salty	water	and	seeking	alternative	options	they	consumed	
unsafe	water	from	open	wells	and	from	irrigation	channels	(Brodeur	2012,	13).	The	
pH	of	the	water	after	the	floods	rose	up	to	9,	which	meant	chlorine	could	not	treat	it	
effectively.	 As	 surface	 water	 was	 polluted,	 people	 were	 affected	 by	 water-born	
diseases	 like	water	acute	diarrhoea	that	 the	WHO	reported	still	 in	August	2011	as	
one	of	 the	three	main	health	 issues	 in	North	Sindh	(together	with	Leishmania	and	
malaria)	(WHO	2011,	8).		
As	one	of	the	Solidarités	staff	who	designed	the	ECHO	3	proposal	explained,	
the	‘Letter	of	Intent’	submitted	to	ECHO	was	“strategically	written”	to	address	both	
ECHO’s	 and	 the	 GoP’s	 expectations.	 Its	 title	 combined	 an	 ‘emergency	 relief’	
ambition	with	a	longer	term	objective	of	‘preparedness’	and	‘sustainable	reduction	
of	 future	 risks’:	 Emergency	 safe	 drinking	 water	 and	 sanitation	 assistance	 with	
community	 based	 disaster	 risk	 reduction	 and	 disaster	 preparedness	 support	
(Solidarités	2011b,	1).	On	paper,	 it	was	an	 ‘emergency	project’	assisting	 ‘the	most	
vulnerable’	people	in	a	‘sustainable’	way.		
The	 main	 project	 document	 upon	 which	 the	 contractual	 relationships	
between	Solidarités	and	the	donor	was	based,	the	ECHO	3	proposal,	described	the	
project	 from	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	 situation	 to	 the	 description	 of	 activities	 and	
means	 needed	 to	 reach	 a	 specific	 objective	 over	 a	 period	 of	 twelve	 months.	
According	to	Solidarités’s	assessment,	the	situation	was	that	people	who	had	been	
displaced	 by	 the	 floods	 in	 2010	 were	 returning	 to	 their	 home	 villages	 and	 being	
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exposed	 to	water-borne	diseases	 for	 three	 reasons:	 first,	 “90%	of	 the	pre-existing	
water	 networks	 in	 the	 assessed	 areas	 were	 damaged	 in	 the	 floods”	 (Solidarités	
2011b,	 3);	 second,	 “very	 poor	 hygiene	 knowledge,	 attitudes	 and	 practice	 were	
evidenced	in	all	the	assessed	villages”;	and	third,	“local	communities	and	authorities	
lacked	the	necessary	capacity	in	water	and	wastewater	management	to	(…)	mitigate	
the	 serious	 health	 risks	 to	 the	 communities”	 (Solidarités	 2011b,	 3).	 While	 the	
damage	done	 to	water	 infrastructures	by	 the	 floods	called	 implicitly	 for	an	urgent	
response,	 the	 poor	 hygiene	 practices	 and	 lack	 of	 capacity	 of	 ‘communities’	 and	
‘authorities’	noted	referred	to	structural	issues	people	had	faced	for	years.		
The	 project’s	 main	 objective	 therefore	 was	 “to	 improve	 access	 to	 safe	
drinking	 water	 and	 sanitation	 facilities	 and	 improve	 hygiene	 conditions	 for	
vulnerable	 persons	 in	 Sindh”	 (Solidarités	 2011b,	 9)	 in	 the	 Dadu,	 Jamshoro	 and	
Qambar	Shahdadkot	districts.161	This	objective	was	subdivided	into	three	‘expected	
results’:	 to	 provide	 “access	 to	 safe	 drinking	water	 to	 25,500	 households	 (approx.	
153,500	 individuals)	 and	 improved	 community	 sanitation	 systems”	 (Solidarités	
2011b,	 9),	 to	 impart	 “[i]mproved	 hygiene	 knowledge,	 attitudes	 and	 practices	 for	
153,500	 persons”	 (Solidarités	 2011b,	 9)	 and	 to	 provide	 “[i]mproved	 community	
based	Disaster	Risk	Reduction	for	130,000	persons”	(Solidarités	2011b,	9).		
According	 to	 the	 logical	 framework	 included	 in	 the	 proposal,	 the	 first	
expected	result	was	to	be	achieved	through	the	repair	or	construction	of	43	water	
supply	schemes	and	42	sanitation	systems	in	around	40	villages.	The	water	schemes	
had	 to	overcome	a	major	 technical	 obstacle:	 the	 large-scale	 contamination	of	 the	
water	 table	 with	 salt	 water,	 which	 made	 it	 unfit	 for	 consumption.	 The	 project	
initially	 envisaged	 the	 building	 of	 water	 networks	 with	 a	 deep,	 mechanised	 tube	
well	feeding	one	or	more	header	tanks	through	a	pressurised	piped	network.	On	the	
sanitation	side,	600	pour-flush	 latrines	with	septic	 tanks	and	soakaway	pits	had	to	
																																																						
161	 As	 described	 in	 chapter	 4,	 heavy	 rains	 in	 August	 and	 September	 2011	 had	 compounded	 the	
situation	 in	 certain	 areas	of	 Sindh;	 the	 Solidarités	 field	 teams	had	 therefore	 amended	 ‘ECHO	3’	 in	
December	2011	(i.e.	six	months	after	it	had	started)	in	order	to	include	some	of	those	affected	in	the	
Shahid	Benazirabad	district	 about	170	 kilometres	 south	of	Mehar	 (see	maps	9	 and	10).	 This	 could	
almost	have	been	a	 separate	project,	 and	Solidarités	 staff	 called	 it	 “ECHO	3	bis”	which	meant	 the	
amended	version	of	ECHO	3.	I	spent	some	time	on	the	base	that	was	being	set	up	to	start	the	ECHO	3	
bis	activities,	but	the	following	ethnographic	account	draws	mainly	on	ECHO	3,	because	ECHO	3	bis	
had	hardly	started	in	March	2012.		
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be	built.	The	second	and	third	expected	results	implied	the	creation	of	community-
based	 organisations	 (CBOs)	 tasked	 with	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 water	 and	
sanitation	 schemes,	 and,	 through	 training	 sessions,	 the	 improvement	 of	 villagers’	
hygiene	behaviours	and	disaster-coping	mechanisms.		
The	 only	 project	 run	 by	 Solidarités	 in	 Pakistan	 from	 June	 2011	 onwards,	
ECHO	3	was	placed	under	the	supervision	of	the	Solidarités	Head	of	Mission	based	
in	Islamabad,	assisted	by	three	technical	coordinators	(administration,	logistics	and	
WASH	 (as	 practitioners	 commonly	 called	 those	 in	 charge	 of	water,	 sanitation	 and	
hygiene).	 Responsible	 for	 liaising	with	 Solidarités	 headquarters	 and	 the	 donors	 in	
Pakistan,	 the	 coordination	 team	 supervised	 and	 supported	 a	 field	 team	 based	 in	
Mehar	 (Dandu	district).	 Headed	 by	 a	 field	 coordinator,	 the	 field	 teams	 comprised	
five	managers	 responsible	 for	 logistics,	 administration,	 the	water	 scheme	 project,	
sanitation	 project	 and	 hygiene	 project	 respectively.162	 Most	 of	 the	 Pakistani	
employees	 from	 ‘ECHO	 2’	 (which	was	 due	 to	 end	 at	 the	 end	 of	May	 2011)	were	
ready	to	start	work	on	‘ECHO	3’.		
Starting	the	project	
On	paper,	ECHO	3	was	due	to	start	in	June	2011,	and	most	of	the	field	managers,	all	
French	expatriates,	 had	arrived	at	 that	 time.	However,	 they	had	 to	wait	 until	 July	
2011	for	both	the	official	signing	of	the	contract	by	the	donor	and	the	renewal	by	
the	 Pakistani	 authorities	 (Economic	 Affairs	 Department)	 of	 Solidarités’s	 interim	
permission	to	work	in	the	country.		
As	 the	 assessment	 upon	 which	 the	 proposal	 was	 written	 had	 been	 done	
between	 February	 and	 April	 2011,	 the	 three	 field	 managers	 in	 charge	 of	 water,	
sanitation	and	hygiene	activities	launched	new	assessments	in	July	2011	to	update	
their	 information	about	the	situation	of	the	people	they	would	be	supporting.	The	
water	and	sanitation	managers	quickly	discovered	that	they	were	‘missing	people’:	
in	 the	villages	 listed	 in	the	proposal	 they	had	found	only	80,000	people	 instead	of	
130,000.	In	August	the	two	managers	extended	their	assessments	to	new	villages	to	
																																																						
162	The	hygiene	manager	was	also	responsible	for	activities	related	to	Disaster	Risks	Reduction	(DRR)	
but	as	it	was	a	smaller	part	of	the	project	and	in	order	to	simplify	her	title,	I	have	not	included	DRR	in	
her	title.		
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increase	the	project’s	geographic	coverage	and	reach	the	 initially	planned	number	
of	people.		
In	August,	the	Mehar	water	manager	also	decided	that	a	geophysical	survey	
had	 to	 be	 done	 to	 verify	 the	 technical	 feasibility	 of	 the	 water	 infrastructures	
planned	 –	 checking	 the	 presence	 and	 location	 of	 unsalted	 water	 tables.	 The	
Islamabad	 water	 and	 sanitation	 coordinator	 initially	 delayed	 this	 as	 it	 was	 not	
itemised	 in	 the	 budget.	When	 she	 finally	 agreed	 in	 September,	 the	monsoon	had	
started	which	delayed	the	survey	and	consequently	the	start	of	construction	work.	
They	 eventually	 completed	 the	 geophysical	 survey	 in	November	 2011	 and	 started	
some	 of	 the	 purchases	 for	 the	 water	 supply	 schemes	 in	 December	 2011.163	 The	
results	of	the	survey	were	a	shock	to	the	water	manager:	
It	 hit	 us	 like	 a	 ton	 of	 bricks	 because	 for	most	 of	 the	water	
schemes	we	had	started	to	work	on,	we	had	no	water…	
	
Nobody	had	expected	 it	would	be	that	bad:	the	first	results	
were	 horrible.	 We	 were	 in	 touch	 with	 PHED	 [the	 Public	
Health	 Engineering	 Department]	 but	 they	 hadn’t	 given	 us	
any	 information	about	this.	The	water	may	have	been	fresh	
before	 but	 it	 can	 change	 with	 overpumping	 [and	 become	
salted]	so…164	
The	months	 of	 October,	 November	 and	 December	were	 described	 as	 a	 period	 of	
uncertainty	 for	 field	 staff:	 none	 of	 the	 construction	 work	 had	 really	 started	 and	
according	to	the	Mehar	staff,	the	head	of	mission	did	not	give	any	guidance	on	how	
to	adapt	the	project,	given	the	bad	news	revealed	by	the	survey.	With	direct	head	
office	 support	 the	 water	 manager	 worked	 on	 three	 new	 designs:	 the	 first	 was	
groundwater	 pumping	 employing	 an	 elevated	 pumping	 house	 and	 a	 pressurised	
piped	network	delivering	the	water	to	a	storage	tank	with	taps.	The	second	design	
would	be	used	where	the	quantity	of	water	available	had	been	rated	as	insufficient	
to	supply	a	network:	 in	 this	case	 they	would	 install	a	pump	on	the	seepage	water	
and	add	a	water	tank.	The	third	solution	was	a	catchment	on	irrigation	canals	with	a	
gravity	pipe	scheme	bringing	the	water	to	a	pond	where	the	water	would	undergo	
																																																						
163	Dates	are	approximate	and	deduced	from	interviews	done	in	March	2012	as	well	as	the	monthly	
budget	follow-up	document.	
164	As	all	managers	were	French	nationals,	I	conducted	interviews	in	French	and	translated	the	quotes	
used	in	this	chapter	into	English.	
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UV	treatment,	and	go	through	a	pond	sand	filter	to	be	stored	 in	a	water	tank	and	
distributed	via	an	electric	pumping	system	to	a	 fountain	 in	the	villages	(Solidarités	
2011b,	15).	 It	was	 therefore	not	until	 six	months	after	 the	 theoretical	 start	of	 the	
project	that	the	WASH	managers	could	 launch	the	first	tenders	to	subcontract	the	
construction	of	the	water	and	sanitation	schemes.		
At	 the	 beginning	 of	 March	 2012,	 the	 water	 and	 sanitation	 schemes	
construction	had	started	but	the	teams	had	still	a	long	way	to	go:	of	the	forty-three	
rehabilitation	 or	 construction	 schemes	 only	 two	 were	 finished	 and	 four	 were	
ongoing;	 and	 of	 the	 forty-two	 village	 treatment	 systems	 planned,	 only	 one	 was	
finished	and	eleven	under	construction.	Solidarités	obtained	a	two-month	extension	
from	the	donor,	which	brought	the	official	end	of	ECHO	3	to	July	31st	2012.	
Macro-triage:	 staff	 assumptions	 about	 Solidarités	 operational	
capabilities	
When	I	asked	one	member	of	the	initial	assessment	team	why	they	had	chosen	to	
propose	 a	 water	 and	 sanitation	 project	 in	 the	 Dadu,	 Shadadkot	 and	 Sehwan	
districts,	he	answered:	“Here,	we	had	knowledge”.	And,	indeed,	quite	literally	this	is	
what	the	first	part	of	this	section	shows:	the	project’s	first	sorting	logic	was	the	staff	
assumption	 of	 Solidarités’s	 area	 of	 expertise,	 geographically	 and	 technically.	
Solidarités	knew	North	Sindh	and	had	shown	expertise	in	WASH.	Yet	the	second	part	
shows	that	as	the	project	unfolded,	some	Solidarités	employees	started	to	question	
the	relevance	of	this	framework,	highlighting	more	pressing	demands	made	by	the	
population	for	shelter	and	food,	as	well	as	the	inadequacy	of	the	sanitation	system	
included	 in	 the	proposal.	These	doubts	did	not	challenge	the	 implicit	macro	triage	
logic	 at	 work	 as	 the	 third	 part	 demonstrates:	 the	 organisation	 had	 been	 ‘doing’	
water	and	sanitation	in	Upper	Sindh	since	August	2010	and	it	was	these	informal	yet	
intangible	 assumptions	 about	 Solidarités	 operational	 capabilities	which	 successive	
Solidarités	managers	were	reflecting	in	their	work	in	Pakistan.	
“Here,	we	had	knowledge”	
The	 trajectory	 of	 Solidarités	 in	 Sindh	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 2009	 when	 the	
organisation	refused	to	take	US	funds	and	thus	was	unable	to	respond	to	the	issues	
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faced	by	people	displaced	from	Swat	(as	explained	in	chapter	4).	A	year	later	when	
the	floods	struck	KPK	first,	Solidarités	was	in	the	process	of	closing	its	office	and	had	
no	operational	teams	in	Pakistan.	NGOs	already	present	on	the	ground	in	KPK	were	
contracted	 by	 donors	 to	 provide	 first,	 relief	 and	 then	 reconstruction	 assistance.	
Donors	made	clear	they	would	not	fund	any	‘new’	actors	in	KPK.		
As	a	result,	the	floods	that	eventually	hit	Sindh	in	August	2010	were	a	good	
reason	for	Solidarités	to	resume	work.	Sindh	was	an	unknown	field	to	actors	in	the	
humanitarian	 configuration	 and	 as	 such	 open	 to	 ‘newcomers’.	 Solidarités	
assessment	 teams	 went	 straight	 to	 Sukkur,	 the	 biggest	 city	 in	 North	 Sindh,	 and	
managed	to	get	funding	and	authorisations	for	a	first	intervention	targeting	one	of	
the	many	areas	severely	affected	by	the	floods	in	September	2010	in	the	north-west	
of	the	province.		
At	the	end	of	2011,	as	the	war	provoked	new	displacements	from	the	Khyber	
Agency	to	KPK,	Solidarités	staff	in	Islamabad	and	Paris	considered,	but	decided	not	
to	 launch	 an	 assessment	 to	 propose	 an	 intervention	 for	 conflict-related	 IDPs	 in	
northern	 Pakistan.	 Solidarités	 was	 not	 present	 in	 KPK	 (in	 contrast	 to	many	 other	
international	organisations	since	2009)	and	the	2011	floods	had	just	happened	and	
affected	 Sindh	 again.	 Solidarités	 decided	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 latter	 as	 it	 already	 had	
“knowledge”	of	the	area.		
At	 the	 geographical	 level,	 Solidarités’s	 choice	 to	 implement	 a	 project	 for	
flood-affected	 people	 in	 Sindh	was	 consistent	 with	 information	 about	 the	 overall	
post-floods	 situation	circulated	 in	 the	humanitarian	configuration	six	months	after	
the	disaster,	in	particular	by	the	UNDP	(Stalon	2011,	6),	the	UN	agency	in	charge	of	
coordinating	the	’early	recovery	phase’.	In	terms	of	the	type	of	response,	however,	
Solidarités’s	choice	was	not	in	line	with	the	general	needs	assessment	published	by	
UNDP.	 UNDP	 data	 pointed	 to	 issues	 of	 housing,	 food	 security	 and	 agriculture	 as	
more	 important	 than	 those	of	water	and	 sanitation,	 as	 figure	10	 shows.	Although	
considered	 questionable,165	 data	 circulating	 in	 the	 humanitarian	 arena	 were	 not	
pointing	to	water	and	sanitation	as	a	priority.	
																																																						
165	These	data	were	admittedly	problematic	as	the	report	they	come	from	did	not	give	any	indication	
about	 how	 they	were	 calculated	 apart	 from	 the	 following	 sentence:	 “The	 Early	 Recovery	Working	
Group	has	prioritized	the	needs	of	the	most	vulnerable	and	the	table	below	represents	the	funding	
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Figure	10	Early	Recovery	funding	gap	repartition	by	sector166	
	
	 Source:	(UNDP	2011,	4)	
Solidarités	 did	 not	 actually	 refer	 to	 these	 documents	when	 deciding	 on	 its	
work	 in	Pakistan.	The	February	and	April	assessments	had	 focused	entirely	on	 the	
access	 to	 water,	 hygiene	 and	 sanitation	 of	 people	 in	 Upper	 Sindh,	 without	
considering	 other	 fields	 of	 relief	 (such	 as	 the	 need	 for	 shelter	 or	 food	 assistance,	
highlighted	 as	 a	 priority	 by	 UNDP	 and	 the	 GoP).	 The	 team	 knew	 from	 previous	
experience	that	the	Dadu,	Shadadkot,	and	Sehwan	districts	were	particularly	poorly	
equipped	with	water	and	sanitation	infrastructures.	In	this	sector	and	in	this	region,	
there	was	no	other	organisation	to	provide	a	‘counter-expertise’	as	Solidarités	had	
been	the	most	prominent	provider	of	water	and	sanitation	assistance	since	2010.		
According	 to	 one	 of	 the	 ECHO	 representatives	 in	 Islamabad,	 the	 donor	
funded	this	project	on	the	basis	that	Solidarités	was	a	“reliable”	NGO,	able	to	work	
in	remote	areas,	and	which	knew	what	 it	was	capable	of.	 In	particular,	this	person	
																																																																																																																																																										
gap	for	responding	to	these	critical	needs”	(UNDP	2011).	There	was	no	mention	of	what	constituted	
a	 “need”,	 how	 they	 were	 “prioritized”,	 what	 constituted	 a	 “vulnerable	 person”,	 and	 how	 these	
problems	were	translated	into	“funding	gap”.	
166	After	the	Early	Recovery	Working	Groups	prioritised	needs	and	calculated	the	cost	of	response.	
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was	of	the	idea	that	Solidarités	had	expertise	in	water	and	sanitation	activities	as	its	
previous	 projects	 showed	 technical	 virtuosity.	 The	 ECHO	 person	 spoke	 of	 the	
organisation’s	 knowledge	 and	 expertise	 and	 commented	 about	 a	 previous	
Solidarités	 project:	 “it	 was	 so	 sexy	 for	 our	 technical	 advisers	 that	 four	 of	 them	
wanted	to	come	[and	visit	the	project]!	I	had	to	stop	them:	Solidarités	staff	have	to	
work,	they	can’t	babysit	the	WASH	adviser!”		
Additionally,	 even	 though	 the	 2012	 annual	 report	 showed	 that	 WASH	
accounted	 for	 only	 51.7%	 of	 Solidarités	 spending	 around	 the	 globe	 (Solidarités	
2012a,	6)	most	of	 the	Pakistani	 staff	 I	 interviewed	 in	Mehar	 (and	 in	Nawab	Shah)	
thought	Solidarités	only	worked	in	WASH.	
Project	assumptions	questioned	but	not	challenged	
In	interviews	conducted	during	my	research,	several	Solidarités	Pakistani	staff	were	
critical	of	the	fact	that	Solidarités	focused	on	water	and	sanitation	and	did	not	offer	
support	 to	people	 to	 rebuild	 their	homes,	 as	 this	 appeared	by	 far	 as	 the	people’s	
first	request	(in	Mehar,	as	well	as	in	Nawab	Shah).	One	of	them	said:	
Shelter	is	very	small	work	and	[in	comparison]	this	work	[we	
are	 implementing]	 is	 very	 difficult	 work,	 so	 definitely	
Solidarités	 could	 do	 the	 shelter	 projects.	 For	me,	 shelter	 is	
easy.	Within	one	hour,	I	can	make	this	room.	
A	Solidarités	community	mobiliser	speaking	also	as	inhabitant	of	one	of	the	villages	
where	Solidarités	worked,	said:	
The	villagers’	opinion,	including	me,	is	they	hope	Solidarités	
will	 give	 them	 shelter	 and	 food	 items,	 or	 hygiene	 kits.	 (…)	
Some	 villages	 give	 priority	 to	 shelter	 and	 some	 to	 water.	
They	say:	when	we	have	no	home,	what	are	we	going	to	do	
with	 water?	 And	 sanitation…	 if	 you	 give	 us	 no	 water,	
sanitation	is	useless.	
When	I	was	in	the	field	with	the	Solidarités	field	officers,	I	often	talked	to	people	in	
the	 villages	 with	 one	 of	 the	 Solidarités	 staff	 translating	 for	 me,	 and	 I	 indeed	
confirmed	 this	 view.	 Yet	 Solidarités	 managers	 did	 not	 take	 such	 comments	 into	
account.	
In	addition	 to	 the	shelter	 issue,	 some	Solidarités	managers	 raised	concerns	
about	the	construction	of	 latrines	 in	a	region	where	people	mostly	practiced	open	
defecation.	 Solidarités	 had	 built	 latrines	 during	 its	 two	 previous	 projects	 in	 Sindh	
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and	it	had	been	particularly	noted	in	a	final	evaluation	that:	“most	latrines	are	not	
used	 anymore.	 These	 are	 simply	 abandoned	 without	 backfilling	 the	 pit”	 (Burlot	
2011,	9).	Solidarités	WASH	managers	in	Mehar	and	Islamabad	were	aware	of	these	
previous	 experiences,	 as	 one	of	 them	who	had	worked	 in	 the	 country	 since	 2010	
explained:	
Personally,	 I	 assume	 that	 when	 you	 want	 things	 to	 be	
sustainable,	 they	need	to	change	people’s	habits	as	 little	as	
possible	 (…)	 the	 latrines...	 in	 an	 emergency	 people	 used	
them,	because	they	do	what	they	are	told	when	they’ve	lost	
their	 points	 of	 reference.	 When	 people	 go	 back	 to	 their	
normal	 lives,	 they	 go	 back	 to	 their	 own	practices,	 and	 that	
means	back	to	open	defecation	practices.	
Another	commented:		
My	feeling	is	that	these	latrines...	I’ve	never	seen	people	use	
them…	The	donor	 asked	 for	 them	apparently,	 I	 don’t	 know	
whether	 that’s	 true…	 because	 the	 assessment	 of	 J.	 B.	
showed	that	latrines	were	not	used…	these	latrines	-	now	we	
have	to	make	them,	it’s	in	the	project,	so	how	can	we	make	
them	sexy?	Thanks	to	the	technical	aspect.	(…)	It’s	true	that	
latrines	are	the	solution	to	control	contaminations,	but	often	
in	many	countries	there	are	none,	so…	
Both	managers	suggested	that	people	would	not	use	latrines,	for	cultural	and	social	
reasons,	but	 felt	 that	since	 latrines	were	 in	the	proposal	 they	would	have	to	build	
them,	hoping	that	technical	improvements	(poor	flush	latrines	instead	of	pit	latrines	
whose	smell	repulsed	people)	would	encourage	their	use.		
However	 recent	 research	 in	 India	 and	 Nepal	 drawing	 on	 complementary	
qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 data	 sources	 has	 reported	 that	 it	 is	 not	 a	 lack	 of	
financial	 resources	to	maintain	them	or	access	to	water	or	poor	quality	of	 latrines	
that	 was	 the	 reason	 that	 so	many	 people	 did	 not	 use	 them;	 rather,	 it	 was	 what	
could	be	termed	a	‘lifestyle	choice’.167	In	addition,	building	latrines	was	not	without	
risk	 from	a	hygiene	point	of	view,	as	noted	by	 the	evaluator	of	ECHO	2:	 “If	heavy	
rain	occurs,	most	of	them	[the	latrines]	are	at	risk	of	flooding	and	overflowing	in	the	
village,	carrying	with	them	all	the	waste”	(Burlot	2011,	9).	
																																																						
167	 Instead	 the	 study	 found	 that	across	 caste,	 religious,	 age	and	gender	boundaries,	 “many	people	
regard[ed]	open	defecation	as	part	of	a	wholesome,	healthy,	virtuous	 life”,	as	 it	 implied	getting	up	
early,	walking	outside,	and	breathing	some	fresh	air.	People	believed	it	helped	the	process	of	aging	
well.	 Many	 informants	 of	 the	 study,	 including	 74%	 of	 those	 having	 access	 to	 a	 latrine	 said	 they	
defecated	in	the	open	“because	it	is	pleasurable,	comfortable,	or	convenient”	(Gupta	et	al.	2014,	53).	
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How	staff	perception	shapes	needs	
The	decision	 to	 launch	a	water	and	 sanitation	project	 for	 flood-affected	people	 in	
Sindh	 was	 primarily	 the	 result	 of	 circumstances	 related	 to	 Solidarités’s	 specific	
history	 in	Pakistan.	Having	refused	to	 intervene	 in	northern	Pakistan	 in	2009	using	
US	 funds,	 Solidarités	 was	 about	 to	 close	 its	 office,	 for	 lack	 of	 funding	 and	
registration,	when	the	floods	hit	Pakistan	in	2010.	The	disaster	allowed	Solidarités	to	
find	 a	 place	 in	 the	 humanitarian	 configuration	 compatible	 with	 the	 interests	 of	
donors	 and	 the	 Pakistani	 government,	 as	 an	 NGO	 specialising	 in	 water	 and	
sanitation	addressing	‘new	needs’	induced	by	the	floods	in	Sindh.		
In	 2011,	 this	 adaptation	 to	 the	 circumstances	 had	 become,	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	
Solidarités	 managers,	 an	 informal	 but	 intangible	 operational	 framework,	
determining	 the	 choice	 of	 people	 to	 help	 (victims	 of	 floods	 in	 the	 south)	 and	 the	
type	 of	 assistance	 to	 be	 deployed	 (water,	 sanitation	 and	 hygiene	 projects).	 This	
vision	defined	the	boundaries	within	which	other	triage	logics	developed.	Any	issues	
that	 people	 faced	 that	 were	 not	 related	 to	 water,	 sanitation	 and	 hygiene	 (and	
disaster	 risks)	 or	 not	 situated	 in	 Upper	 Sindh	 were,	 de	 facto,	 excluded.	 Never	
formulated	 nor	 justified	 explicitly,	 this	 sorting	 logic	 was	 not	 challenged	 by	 the	
project	 managers,	 although	 they	 were	 aware	 of	 the	 gap	 between	 people’s	
expectations	and	what	the	project	was	able	to	deliver.		
	 This	macro	sorting	logic	illustrates	a	phenomenon	of	the	development	arena:	
aid	 actors	 sometimes	 	 identify	 as	 “needs”	what	 they	are	equipped	 to	deliver	–	or	
consider	they	are	equipped	to	deliver	as	a	result	of	their	historical	trajectory	(in	the	
country	 and	 globally)	 (Naudet	 1999).	 Similar	 patterns	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	way	 the	
more	 explicit	 sorting	 logic	 contained	 in	 the	 proposal	 and	 emphasising	 the	
commitment	 to	 assist	 “the	 most	 vulnerable”	 as	 a	 priority	 was	 translated	 into	
practice.	
Micro-triage:	‘the	most	vulnerable’	left	in	oblivion	
As	will	be	shown	in	the	first	part	of	this	section,	according	to	the	paper	version	of	
the	project,	Solidarités’s	intervention	was	supposed	to	target	“the	most	vulnerable	
people”,	 vulnerability	 being	 defined	 in	 two	 ways:	 people	 whose	 access	 to	 fresh	
water	and	latrines	was	the	most	limited;	and	people	who	were	marginalised	in	their	
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society	because	of	 their	age,	 gender,	 religious	or	 tribal	 affiliation,	etc.	 The	 second	
part	argues	that	 in	practice,	however,	the	Solidarités	teams	did	not	consider	social	
inequalities	 in	 the	 design	 of	 their	 operations.	 The	 third	 part	 explains	 that	 the	
Solidarités	teams	excluded	some	of	the	worst-off	villages	in	terms	of	access	to	water	
from	 the	 project	 for	 ‘technical	 reasons’	 -	 raising	 concerns	 among	 Solidarités	 staff	
about	their	 inability	to	honour	the	promises	made	to	villagers	they	considered	the	
most	vulnerable.	
The	plan:	Targeting	the	‘most	vulnerable’	
The	word	 ‘emergency’	appears	 in	 the	 title	of	 the	proposal	but	was	not	used	 in	 its	
description.	 Instead,	 the	 phrases	 ‘vulnerable	 population’,	 ‘vulnerable	 groups’	 and	
‘vulnerable	persons’	were	used	several	times.	The	word	‘vulnerable’	was	part	of	the	
common	 humanitarian	 jargon:	 many	 of	 the	 interviewees	 from	 other	 relief	
organisations	 used	 the	 term	 in	 a	 similar	 way:	 an	 assistance	 that	 is	 impartial,	 or	
based	on	needs	only	is	often	described	as	reaching	out	for	vulnerable	people	or	the	
most	vulnerable.	The	use	of	the	word	was	in	line	with	the	rhetoric	of	impartiality.		
A	 thorough	 tracking	 of	 the	word	 in	 the	 Solidarités	 project	 proposal	 shows	
that	 it	 had	 two	 different	meanings.	 First,	 a	 ‘vulnerable	 population’	 seemed	 to	 be	
defined	as	a	population	vulnerable	to	waterborne	diseases.	The	first	occurrence	of	
the	word	in	the	document	shows	an	interpretation	of	vulnerability	related	to	water	
and	sanitation	access	as	well	as	being	associated	with	health	problems:	
The	 assessments	 were	 undertaken	 in	 Dadu,	 Jamshoro	 and	
Qambar	Shadatkot,	as	the	previous	work	of	Solidarites	in	the	
region	had	identified	specific	areas	in	these	districts	as	being	
vulnerable	based	on	visual	observations	of	water,	sanitation,	
and	hygiene	conditions,	and	community	and	medical	reports	
about	 health	 problems	 in	 these	 areas.	 (Solidarités	 2011,	 3	
emphasis	added)	
The	 second	 use	 of	 the	 word,	 in	 the	 expressions	 ‘vulnerable	 groups’	 and	
‘vulnerable	persons’,	was	slightly	different	as	it	specified	“those	in	the	communities	
that	 may	 be	 vulnerable	 to	 exclusion	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 gender,	 age,	 physical	
capacity,	religious	or	tribal	affiliation,	or	social	positioning”	(Solidarités	2011b,	6),	or	
“women,	 children,	 disabled	 persons	 and	 the	 elderly”	 (Solidarités	 2011b,	 6).	
Therefore	targeting	those	who	were	vulnerable	 in	the	Solidarités	language	seemed	
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to	mean	targeting	those	who	are	exposed	to	risks	associated	with	a	lack	of	access	to	
water	and	sanitation	infrastructures	–	and,	within	this	category,	prioritising	women,	
children,	disabled	persons	and	the	elderly,	and	more	generally	those	suffering	from	
exclusion	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 gender,	 age,	 physical	 capacity,	 religious	 or	 tribal	
affiliation,	or	social	positioning.	
The	implementation:	social	inequalities	glossed	over	
In	 practice,	 however,	 the	 claim	made	 in	 the	 project	 document	 to	 prioritise	 those	
who	 suffer	 from	 ‘exclusion	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 gender,	 age,	 physical	 capacity,	
religious	or	tribal	affiliation,	or	social	positioning’	did	not	translate	into	any	precise	
social	 inclusion	mechanisms.	There	was	a	certain	knowledge	of	the	social	fabric,	 in	
particular	among	 the	 staff	 going	 to	 the	villages	on	a	daily	basis,	but	 there	was	no	
formal	 collection	 of	 these	 data,	 no	 analysis	 of	 social	 structures	 and/or	 habits	 and	
therefore	no	institutional	inclusion	of	these	components	in	the	process	of	choosing	
and	prioritising	who	and	how	to	assist.		
Also,	each	village	differed	in	their	caste	numbers:	a	caste	might	dominate	in	
one	 village	 and	 be	 a	 minority	 in	 others.	 According	 to	 Gazdar,	 a	 sociologist	 who	
works	 on	 social	 policy	 issues	 in	 Pakistan	 within	 the	 Collective	 for	 Social	 Science	
Research,	there	are	in	Pakistan,	like	in	India,	caste-based	inequalities.	Gazdar	argues	
that	in	Sindh,	“bonded	labour”	like	“bheel	tenants	of	Sindh	landlords”	(Gazdar	2007,	
87),	 kolhis	 and	 other	 Scheduled	 Caste	 Hindus168	 all	 face	 caste-based	 oppression.	
According	to	Gazdar,	“affirmative	action	regulations	do	exist,	but	are	largely	ignored	
by	local	government”	(Gazdar	2007,	87	Footnote	2).169	
Yet,	Solidarités	staff	did	not	attempt	to	make	a	systematic	recording	of	the	
caste	structure	of	each	village	of	intervention.	The	issue	of	caste	was	perceived	only	
as	an	obstacle	to	be	overcome	to	implement	the	project	rather	than	an	element	of	
																																																						
168	‘Scheduled	Caste	Hindu’	is	an	official	census	category	in	Pakistan.		
169	 For	 him,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 “systematic	marginalisation	 of	 individuals,	 families	 and	
groups	due	to	their	‘social’	attributes	such	as	caste,	traditional	occupation,	kinship,	ethnicity,	religion	
and	 lifestyles”	 (Gazdar	2007,	86),	 there	 is	 little	tolerance	 in	the	public	domain	for	discussion	about	
caste-based	oppression:	“The	Right	silences	such	talk	by	shouts	of	"we	are	all	Muslims"	and	"caste	is	
another	country"-it	being	obvious	which	country	that	might	be.	In	fact,	the	denunciation	of	"the	evil	
caste	 system"	 is	 a	 standard	 hymn	 in	 the	 rightist	 intellectual's	 repertoire	 on	 India,	 Hindus	 and	 the	
Two-Nation	Theory.	For	the	Left	 in	Pakistan,	when	there	was	one,	 it	was	all	about	class...”	 (Gazdar	
2007,	86)	
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the	 context	 that	 could	 have	 shaped	 the	 project.	 Caste	 was	 never	 discussed	 in	
Solidarités	meetings	while	I	was	there;	it	was	mentioned	several	times	in	interviews	
for	 this	 research,	 but	 as	 a	 reality	 that	 delayed	 the	 work	 –	 for	 instance,	 when	
meetings	 had	 to	 be	 specifically	 organised	 because	 people	 from	 different	 castes	
refused	to	attend	the	same	meeting.	The	teams	in	direct	contact	with	the	villagers	
dealt	 with	 caste	 issues	 on	 a	 daily	 basis	 and	 as	 they	 went	 along.	 A	 manager	
explained:	 “In	 the	 field	when	 they	 face	 an	 issue	 related	 to	 caste	 for	 the	 sessions,	
teams	try	to	understand	and	see	for	themselves”.	A	few	Solidarités	staff	mentioned	
the	marginalisation	of	the	Hindus,	but	none	seemed	to	be	in	a	position	to	give	me	a	
social	 analysis	 of	 people’s	 types	 of	 vulnerabilities	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 floods.	
Mostly	the	Solidarités	staff	 talked	of	their	beneficiaries	as	being	poor,	uneducated	
and	powerless	in	a	uniform	way.		
Budhani	 and	Gazdar,	who	were	 consulting	 for	Oxfam	at	 approximately	 the	
same	time,	had	noticed	however	that	“those	who	were	displaced	by	the	floods	and	
lost	 their	 assets	 and	means	 of	 livelihood	 consisted	 disproportionately	 of	 landless	
tenants	and	labourers”	(Budhani	and	Gazdar	2011,	3).	They	assumed	that	“access	to	
land,	 for	 homesteads	 as	 well	 as	 agricultural	 use,	 is	 a	 key	 correlate	 of	 economic	
opportunity	and	social	position	in	rural	Pakistan”	(Budhani	and	Gazdar	2011,	3),	and	
argued	 there	were	 three	 levels	 of	 vulnerability	 among	 flood-affected	populations:	
“those	with	no	agricultural	land	and	no	security	of	residential	possession;	those	with	
no	agricultural	land	but	secure	residential	entitlements	and	smallholders”	(Budhani	
and	Gazdar	2011,	27).	This	is	probably	not	the	only	way	to	look	at	various	layers	of	
vulnerability	among	 flood-affected	people	 in	Sindh,	but	 it	 showed	that	differences	
may	have	existed	between	people	and	their	capacity	to	cope	with	the	consequences	
of	the	disaster	upon	their	lives.	I	explored	the	knowledge	that	community	mobilisers	
in	 particular	 had	 accumulated	 in	 the	 course	 of	 their	 daily	 work	 through	 a	 rapid	
exercise:	I	adapted	the	activity	monitoring	tool	(see	figure	11)	into	another	Excel	file	
with	columns	for	caste	structure	per	village,	size,	number	and	names	of	 landlords,	
number	of	tenants,	and	presence	of	a	functioning	school	and	dispensary.	With	the	
approval	of	their	managers	I	invited	some	of	the	community	mobilisers	and	hygiene	
promoters	to	work	with	me	to	fill	out	this	improvised	document.	As	figure	12	shows,	
the	 result,	 albeit	 approximate,	 displays	 the	 complexity	 and	 diversity	 of	 the	 social	
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fabric	of	each	village	that	had	been	glossed	over	by	this	very	 large	category	of	the	
“most	vulnerable”.	It	is	debatable	whether	creating	further	or	sub	categories	would	
have	had	allowed	for	a	fairer	targeting	of	the	‘beneficiaries’	(Eyben	and	Moncrieffe	
2007),	yet	the	absence	of	category	did	not	substantiate	Solidarités’s	claim	to	assist	
“the	most	vulnerable”.	One	of	the	WASH	managers	stated	that	had	they	had	more	
time	 they	would	have	done	a	 social	profile	of	each	village.	This	 comment	 showed	
that	within	the	amount	of	time	they	had,	knowing	more	about	‘the	most	vulnerable’	
had	not	been	prioritised.		
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Exclusion	of	the	worst-off	for	technical	reasons	
As	 the	project	 unfolded,	 targeting	 ‘the	most	 vulnerable’	 either	 in	 terms	of	 global	
water	and	sanitation	access	did	not	appear	to	be	an	overriding	priority.	In	spite	of	
the	 claim	 to	 “specifically	 target	 smaller,	 more	 vulnerable	 communities	 with	 the	
most	 insecure	water	 supply”	 (Solidarités	 2011b,	 14),	 an	 issue	 emerged	when	 the	
WASH	managers	faced	situations	in	which	villages	were	found	to	be	too	far	from	a	
reliable	 source	 of	 underground	 drinking	 water.	 It	 became	 technically	 too	
complicated	 and	 too	 expensive	 to	 build	 a	 scheme	 for	 them	 and	 in	 the	 smaller	
villages	the	projected	per	capita	cost	was	very	high.	As	a	result,	some	villages	(often	
the	poorest	with	no	 fresh	water	 supply	at	all)	were	eventually	excluded	 from	the	
water	 scheme	 construction	 plan,	 on	 the	 technical	 facts.	 One	 of	 the	 managers	
expressed	his	doubts	in	the	following	terms:		
The	only	solution	we	can	offer	to	these	villages	 is	to	provide	
them	with	water	that	is	a	little	salty.	Can	we	distribute	water	
to	people	if	it	is	a	little	salted?	
He	went	 on	 to	 explain	 that	 for	 him	 the	 issue	was	 that	 today	 the	water	was	only	
slightly	 salty	 but	 that	 pumping	 the	 water	 table	 would	 only	 make	 it	 saltier,	 so	
“should	we	just	forget	about	these	villages?”	Underlying	these	words	was	the	issue	
of	 the	 sustainability	 of	 the	 technical	 solution:	 Solidarités’s	 vision	 of	 quality	 was	
technical	 and	 guided	 by	 the	 aspiration	 to	 deliver	 sustainable	 infrastructures.	
Achieving	 the	project’s	objective	 in	 terms	of	 total	number	of	people	 reached	and	
sustainability	 of	 infrastructure	 appeared	 to	 be	more	 important	 than	 assisting	 the	
poorest	and	the	more	vulnerable	people	in	terms	of	access	to	safe	drinking	water.		
Sidelining	individuals	in	the	names	of	‘sustainability’	and	‘community	
participation’	
Achieving	 “sustainable”	 outcomes	 was	 a	 key	 objective	 enshrined	 in	 the	 project	
proposal.	 The	 first	 part	 of	 this	 section	 explains	 that,	 on	 paper,	 sustainability	was	
supposed	 to	 be	 guaranteed	 by	 the	 involvement	 of	 both	 the	 authorities	 and	
recipient	communities	in	the	design	and	implementation	of	the	project	–	especially	
in	decisions	related	to	the	micro-allocation	of	project	assets:	where	and	how	to	set	
up	water	and	sanitation	schemes.	The	second	part	demonstrates	 that	 in	practice,	
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however,	Solidarités	teams	quickly	realised	the	lack	of	interest	in	the	project	on	the	
side	 of	 the	 local	 authorities.	 The	 third	 part	 shows	 that	 the	 participative	methods	
which	 were	 supposed	 to	 involve	 the	 communities	 in	 the	 design	 of	 the	 project	
through	the	survey	and	discussion	groups	(so	that	Solidarités	could	meet	their	‘real	
needs’)	 in	 reality	 failed	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 people’s	 views.	 The	 Solidarités	
methods	of	obtaining	 ‘community	 feedback’,	and	 ‘surveying	and	debriefing	of	 the	
communities’	 really	 functioned	only	 as	 a	 delivery	 channel	 to	 educate	 villagers	 on	
good	hygiene	practices	and	assess	their	expected	behavioural	changes.	The	fourth	
part	 explains	 that	 the	 Solidarités	 teams	 also	 realised	 that	 the	 Community	 Based	
Organisations	they	had	created	to	maintain	the	water	and	sanitation	infrastructures	
as	well	as	to	improve	hygiene	practices	and	disaster	coping	mechanisms,	were	not	
able	to	fulfil	their	task	due	to	lack	of	resources,	and	know-how.	Finally,	the	fifth	part	
argues	 that	 far	 from	 being	 a	 sign	 of	 the	 populations’	 involvement	 in	 project	
resource	allocation	at	village	level,	the	rhetoric	of	the	community	actually	acted	as	
a	useful	fiction	concealing,	inter	alia,	the	fact	that	the	agency	of	activity	recipients	
was	not	taken	into	account	in	micro-triage	practices.	
The	Paper	version	of	sustainability	
The	words	sustainable,	sustainably,	and	sustainability	were	used	many	times	in	the	
document,	being	applied	 to	 “the	 impact	of	 the	action”	 (Solidarités	2011b,	16),	or	
“the	action”	itself	(Solidarités	2011b,	18),	and	to	the	infrastructures	built	during	the	
project:	 “the	 hand	 pumps”	 (Solidarités	 2011b,	 20)	 ,	 “the	 latrines”	 (Solidarités	
2011b,	 21),	 the	 “water	 networks	 and	 sanitation	 systems”	 (Solidarités	 2011b,	 29).	
The	term	was	applied	also	to	the	impact	of	other	activities	like	“hygiene	promotion”	
(Solidarités	2011b,	29).	Those	who	wrote	the	project	document	emphasised	several	
times	 the	 need	 for	 community	 and	 local	 authority	 involvement	 in	 order	 for	 the	
outcome	of	the	project	to	be	sustainable:	
Solidarités	expects	 there	to	be	a	high	 level	of	sustainability	
to	 the	 action	 as	 the	 local	 authorities	 and	 communities	 are	
heavily	 involved	 in	 the	 action,	 and	 throughout	 Solidarités	
will	 work	 to	 support	 the	 building	 of	 capacities	 both	 in	 the	
community	 and	 with	 local	 authorities	 so	 to	 be	 able	 to	
confidently	 hand	over	 the	 action	 at	 the	 end	of	 the	 project	
implementation.	(Solidarités	2011b,	41)	
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The	word	 ‘sustainability’	 emphasised	 that	 the	 project	was	 not	 ephemeral	 and	 as	
phrased	 in	 the	 document:	 “the	 impact	 of	 the	 action	 is	 both	 immediate	 and	
sustainable,	benefiting	communities	 in	the	short	term	and	for	many	years	beyond	
the	project	implementation”	(Solidarités	2011b,	16).	The	frequent	use	of	the	word	
seemed	to	be	inferring	value	for	money:	‘you	invest	a	lot	today,	but	it	will	last	such	
a	long	time	that	 it	 is	worth	it’.	The	word	also	served	as	a	bridge	between	the	two	
institutional	 categories	 of	 “emergency”	 and	 “early	 recovery”;	 the	 project	 was	
submitted	to	a	 relief	donor,	by	a	 relief	NGO	but	within	a	context	qualified	by	 the	
GoP	of	“early	recovery”	–	implying	investment	in	“sustainable	infrastructures”.	
In	the	project	document,	the	commitment	to	the	sustainability	of	the	action	
relied	heavily	upon	the	delegation	of	 the	maintenance	of	 infrastructures	 to	“local	
authorities”	 and	 “communities”	 as	 well	 as	 upon	 educating	 people	 “to	 improve	
hygiene	 practices”.	 Sustainability	 was	 also	 supposed	 to	 be	 achieved	 through	 the	
involvement	of	the	“community”	in	the	design	of	the	project	(through	participatory	
surveys	and	discussion	groups)	meant	to	identify	the	‘right	needs’	of	the	people	and	
adapt	the	project	implementation	accordingly.			
The	 general	 idea	 seemed	 to	 be:	 ‘if	 we	 tell	 people	what	 to	 do	 to	 improve	
their	 living	 conditions,	 they	will	 so’.	 This	 assumption	was	 a	 pervasive	 idea	 of	 the	
project.	 The	 first	 expected	 result	 focused	 on	 water	 and	 sanitation	 infrastructure	
construction	 but	 also	 included	 two	 important	 sets	 of	 activities:	 to	 “support	 local	
authorities	 in	 improving	 capacities	 in	 the	 ongoing	 operation	 and	maintenance	 of	
water	supply	and	sanitation	systems”	(Solidarités	2011b,	18),	and	to	form	and	train	
“community	water	supply	and	sanitation	committees”	(Solidarités	2011b,	19)	(also	
called	Community	Based	Organisations	or	CBOs	by	the	Solidarités	staff).	The	second	
and	 third	 “expected	 results”	were	both	 entirely	 focused	on	 educating	people,	 on	
hygiene	 practices	 and	Disaster	 Risk	 Reduction	 (DRR)	methods	 respectively.	 These	
were	 managed	 by	 the	 same	 field	 officer	 and	 relied	 on	 ‘promotion	 sessions’	 of	
specific	 behaviours	 related	 to	 hygiene	 (such	 as	 handwashing,	 etc.)	 and	 how	 to	
mitigate	asset	losses	in	case	of	flooding.	
In	order	to	adjust	the	programme	to	the	local	context,	and	to	measure	the	
level	of	achievement	of	all	three	‘expected	results’	and	their	level	of	sustainability,	
Solidarités	 planned	 activities	 to	 collect	 data	 about	 social	 practices	 and	 people’s	
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access	 to	 infrastructures,	 also	 referred	 to	 as	 “community	 feedback”	 (Solidarités	
2011b,	13).	The	methods	most	often	used	were	Knowledge,	Attitude	and	Practices	
(KAP)	surveys	and	Focus	Group	Discussions	(FGDs).	The	concrete	methodology	and	
content	 of	 the	 KAP	 surveys	 were	 not	 described	 in	 the	 project	 document	 as	 KAP	
surveys	 are	 a	 classic	 tool	 of	 investigation	 about	 social	 practices	 in	 the	 aid	 sector	
(Campbell,	 Shrestha,	 and	 Stone	 2011	 [1979]),	 and	 the	 donor	 had	 not	 specifically	
requested	it.		
FGDs	 were	 described	 as	 following	 a	 commitment	 of	 Solidarités	 to	 “full	
community	 participation	 in	 all	 activities,	with	 a	 particular	 focus	on	 recognition	of	
and	 response	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 vulnerable	 groups”	 (Solidarités	 2011b,	 13).	 The	
description	of	the	FGD	activity	specified	that	“community	feedback	will	ensure	the	
longevity	and	sustainability	of	the	intervention”	(Solidarités	2011b,	13).	They	were	
to	be	held	“in	each	community	with	the	following	specific	outcomes:	agreement	on	
the	 setting	 and	 layout	 of	 water	 supply	 boreholes	 and	 distribution	 networks	 and	
agreement	on	the	setting	and	layout	of	community	sanitation	systems”	(Solidarités	
2011b,	 13).	 In	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 project,	 once	 the	 community	 feedback	 had	 been	
gathered,	Solidarités	 teams	would	be	able	 to	build	 the	 right	water	and	sanitation	
infrastructures	 and	 to	 deliver	 the	 right	 hygiene	 and	 disaster	 preparedness	
education	messages.	Solidarités	teams	would	also	be	 in	a	position	to	mobilise	 the	
community,	 in	 the	 guise	 of	 CBOs,	 to	maintain	 the	 infrastructures	 in	 the	 long-run	
with	the	support	of	the	local	authorities.	At	least,	that	was	the	plan.	The	following	
parts	unpack	how	the	implementation	of	the	project	and	staff	daily	practices	lived	
up	to	these	claims.	
Involving	the	local	authorities	in	practice	
In	 the	 humanitarian	 sector,	 sustainability	 is	 often	 associated	 with	 working	 in	
collaboration	 with	 state	 institutions,	 which	 stay	 when	 relief	 actors	 leave.	 As	
planned	 in	 the	 proposal,	 Solidarités	 staff	 had	 been	 in	 contact	 with	 the	 local	
authorities	 ahead	 of	 the	 start	 of	 the	 construction	 activities,	 but	 by	March	 2012,	
they	 had	 revised	 their	 expectations	 to	 the	 bare	 minimum.	 Among	 the	 local	
authorities	 involved,	 the	 project	 document	 mentioned	 mostly	 the	 Public	 Health	
Engineering	Department	(PHED)	and	the	Tehsil	Municipal	Administration	(TMA).	In	
	 213	
Pakistan,	TMAs	handle	spatial	planning	and	municipal	services	and	since	2001,	they	
have	been	responsible	for	maintaining	the	water	schemes	handed	over	to	them	by	
PHED	 (previously	 responsible	 for	 their	 maintenance).	 The	 PHED	 representative	 I	
met	explained	that	he	was	responsible	for	the	planning	and	construction	of	water	
schemes	 (under	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 Government	 of	 Sindh	 and	 its	 Planning	 and	
Development	Department).	Once	built,	the	schemes	were	to	be	handed	over	to	the	
TMA	and	the	communities.	Solidarités	had	therefore	to	coordinate	with	PHED	over	
the	 water	 scheme	 construction,	 and	 with	 the	 TMA	 for	 the	 handover	 and	 future	
maintenance	of	the	work.		
When	 I	 interviewed	 people	 from	 the	 TMA	 and	 PHED	 I	 sensed	 a	 certain	
tension	between	the	two	institutions:	“When	PHED	has	money,	they	start	to	work	
anywhere,	without	consulting	us”,	alleged	the	TMA	representative	I	met	in	one	of	
the	districts	of	Upper	Sindh.	The	two	institutions	had	previously	been	merged	by	a	
2001	 ordinance	 and	 separated	 again	 three	 years	 later	 because,	 according	 to	 the	
same	person,	PHED	did	not	want	 to	work	under	 the	 supervision	of	 the	TMA.	The	
PHED’s	version	of	their	relationship	was	equally	uncomplimentary:	
Then	 …	 when	 there	 is	 no	 proper	 maintenance…	 so	 the	
scheme	 falls	 into	 abandonment.	And	 this	 is	 a	 crime!	 There	
are	 a	 hundred	 and	 ten	water	 and	 sanitation	 schemes,	 and	
not	 five	per	 cent	 are	maintained.	 If	 you	physically	 visit	 the	
scheme,	you	will	be	disappointed.	Within	a	maximum	of	five	
years,	usually	they	are	destroyed.	(Pakistani	authority	2012)	
Caught	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 this	 rivalry,	 Solidarités	 staff	 realized	 that	 local	
authorities	could	neither	be	avoided,	nor	relied	upon	to	ensure	the	sustainability	of	
their	project.	The	December	2011	report	sent	to	the	donor	stated	that,	“the	TMA	
cannot	be	a	 sustainable	partner	 for	a	handover	as	 it	 lacks	 the	means	 to	maintain	
the	existing	networks”	(Solidarités	2011b,	17).	Instead,	the	communities	in	the	form	
of	Community	Based	Organisations	were	to	take	on	the	role	of	the	reliable	partners	
as	reported	in	the	December	2011	donor	report:	
The	 local	 Government,	 for	 its	 part,	 does	 not	 wish	 to	 be	
involved	 further	 than	 through	 giving	 its	 final	 validation.	 To	
ensure	 the	 sustainability	 of	 activities	 and	 infrastructures,	
Solidarités	 has	 thus	 focused	 on	 capacity	 building	 of	 CBOs.	
This	 decision	 had	 been	 taken	 after	 several	 meetings	 with	
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different	 representatives	 of	 local	 authorities.	 (Solidarités	
2011b,	17)	
Surveying	and	debriefing	the	‘community’		
The	 notion	 of	 ‘community’	 has	 long	 been	 discussed	 and	 criticised	 in	 the	
anthropological	 literature.	 Some	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 term	was	 “constructed	 by	
people	who	regard	themselves	as	 'non-members'	of	 these	 'communities'	and	that	
the	 views	 of	 the	 putative	 'members'	 are	 not	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 their	
construction”	(Jewkes	and	Murcott	1996).	Yet	 its	use	persists	among	practitioners	
and	was	a	cornerstone	of	this	project.	Even	though	only	4%	of	the	overall	project	
budget	 was	 dedicated	 to	 activities	 aimed	 at	 engaging	 and	 educating	 the	
community,	 according	 to	 the	 Solidarités	 staff,	 ‘communities’	 could	 be	 surveyed,	
debriefed,	convinced,	and	mobilised	as	if	they	were	a	person.		
The	‘community’	was	surveyed	through	a	Knowledge,	Attitude	and	Practices	
(KAP)	 survey.	 Presented	 as	 a	 way	 to	 investigate	 people,	 their	 knowledge	 and	
practices	 (as	 its	 name	 suggests),	 it	 served	 in	 practice	mostly	 as	 the	 tool	 used	 to	
inform	the	 indicators	measuring	the	project’s	 impact	on	people’s	social	behaviour	
and	 change.	 The	main	 objectives	 stated	 in	 the	 protocol	 of	 the	 KAP	 survey	 were	
twofold:	“to	shape	the	health,	hygiene	promotion	and	DRR	activities	 in	the	target	
communities	 to	 achieve	 the	 project	 objective”	 and	 to	 allow	 “later	measurement	
against	 project	 indicators”	 (Solidarités	 2012b,	 1).	 Two	 surveys	were	planned:	one	
before	the	start	of	the	project	and	one	after	its	completion.		
The	 KAP	 survey	 was	 based	 on	 a	 questionnaire	 of	 thirty-six	 questions	
grouped	 in	 five	main	 sections:	 (1)	 Information	 about	 the	 interviewee,	 (2)	 water:	
carriage	 and	 storage,	 (3)	 hygiene	 and	 health,	 (4)	 sanitation,	 and	 (5)	 disaster	 risk	
reduction”.	Of	the	thirty-six	questions	asked,	only	six	were	open-ended.	The	others	
were	multiple	choice	questions	directing	the	interviewees	towards	answers	shaped	
by	 the	 predetermined	 content	 of	 the	 education	 sessions.	 For	 example,	 question	
twenty	was:	“On	which	occasions	do	members	of	your	household	wash	their	hands	
with	soap?”	and	the	options	given	were:	“1/	After	defecation;	2/	After	cleaning	a	
child's	 bottom;	3/	Before	 cooking;	 4/	Before	meals”.	 This	 question	did	not	 reveal	
the	 social	 practices	 of	 the	 people	 interviewed,	 but	 rather	 tested	whether	 people	
already	 knew	what	was	 going	 to	 be	 expected	 from	 them	during	 the	 project.	 The	
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common	content	of	hygiene	promotion	sessions	on	handwashing	was	indeed	to	tell	
people	 to	 wash	 their	 hands	 several	 times	 a	 day	 around	 meals	 and	 defecation	
situations.	 Similarly	 the	 question	 “How	do	 you	 dispose	 of	 your	 rubbish?”	 offered	
four	alternatives:	“1/	common	waste	pit;	2/	waste	pit	in	the	compound;	3/	burning;	
4/on	the	street”.	The	Disaster	Risk	Reduction	part	of	the	survey	was	the	shortest:	
questions	revolved	around	what	people	had	lost	during	the	2010	floods,	what	they	
valued,	and	whether	assets	could	be	stored	at	an	elevated	position.	These	choices	
were	strictly	oriented	towards	potential	solutions	envisaged	by	Solidarités	staff.		
The	KAP	survey	results	served	the	second	objective	of	measuring	the	project	
indicators,	 which	 had	 a	 ‘target	 value’:	 in	 its	 contractual	 relationship	 with	 ECHO,	
Solidarités	 had	 committed	 to	 modifying	 the	 behaviour	 of	 75%	 of	 the	 targeted	
beneficiaries	 (Solidarités	 2011b,	 27).	 As	 explained	 by	 the	 Hygiene	 Promotion	
Manager	the	KAP	was	meant	to	measure	this	outcome:	
The	 initial	 KAP	 was	 used	 to	 compare	 the	 before/after	
hygiene	situation	and	for	the	DRR	too…in	order	to	assess	the	
impact	of	our	action	and	to	show	an	indicator	to	the	donor.	
In	 parallel	 we	 could	 see	 the	 people’s	 practices	 and	 see	
whether	 there	 was	 a	 lot	 of	 work	 in	 terms	 of	 behaviour	
change.	
Yet	 her	 statement	 did	 not	 show	 an	 intention	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 project	
recipients	and	when	the	survey	results	revealed	that	the	majority	of	people	washed	
their	hands	‘when	they	should’,	i.e.	on	those	occasions	listed	in	international	public	
health	norms,	the	analysis	nuanced	their	validity,	arguing	that	the	results	could	be	
improved,	as	the	following	two	extracts	of	the	KAP	analysis	show:	
92%	of	interviewees	wash	their	hands	after	defecation,	74%	
before	cooking	(most	of	the	time	females	are	involved),	88%	
before	 a	 meal	 and	 62%	 after	 cleaning	 a	 child’s	 bottom	
(again,	 females	 are	 involved),	 but	 we	 have	 to	 continue	
messages	 to	 be	 sure	 that	 all	 people	 respect	 that	 and	 also	
have	better	figures.	(Solidarités	2011a,	18)	
The	 FGDs	 were	 presented	 to	 me	 as	 complementary	 to	 the	 KAP	 survey,	 the	
community	 being	 debriefed	 about	 their	 experience	 of	 the	 floods	 through	 focus	
group	discussions:	
To	 capture	 feedback	 from	 the	 target	 communities,	 a	 focus	
group	 discussion	 will	 be	 held	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 the	
intervention	 in	 each	 community	 to	 determine	 their	 health	
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and	hygiene	needs	and	identify	specific	areas	of	training	and	
behaviour	 change.	 Gathering	 this	 feedback	 at	 the	 project	
outset	 will	 ensure	 development	 of	 a	 health	 and	 hygiene	
promotion	program	specifically	catering	to	the	needs	of	the	
target	communities.	(Solidarités	2011b,	28)		
There	were	 FGDs	 focused	 on	water	 and	 sanitation	 and	 FGDs	 focused	 on	DRR.	 In	
both	 cases,	 three	 community	mobilisers	 (one	 facilitator,	 one	 note-taker	 and	 one	
observer)	asked	a	community	leader170	to	help	them	form	a	group	of	ten	to	fifteen	
persons	who	were	‘motivated’.	There	were	separate	groups	for	males	and	females,	
and	 sometimes	 several	 groups	 per	 village	 when	 people	 from	 different	 castes	
refused	to	sit	together.		
At	the	beginning	of	the	FGD,	the	community	mobilisers	and	Solidarités	staff	
introduced	 themselves,	and	asked	people	 to	 introduce	 themselves.	Depending	on	
the	 focus	 of	 the	 FGD,	 the	 mobilisers	 directed	 the	 discussion	 around	 water,	
sanitation,	 hygiene	or	disaster	 risks	 and	 requested	 feedback	 from	 the	 group.	 The	
facilitator	 asked	 questions	 and	 attempted	 to	 ensure	 that	 everyone	 talked.	 FGDs	
usually	 lasted	 between	 one	 and	 two	 hours.	 The	 final	 report	 presented	 the	
discussions	 as	 consensual	 and	 homogenous.	 As	 groups	 were	 divided	 by	 sex,	
differences	 were	 sometimes	 reported	 between	 the	 groups	 but	 each	 individual	
group	was	 presented	 as	 being	 unanimous.	Nothing	 unexpected	 arose	 from	 these	
FGDs;	 they	were	broadly	 in	 line	with	 the	 results	of	 the	KAP	 surveys,	 according	 to	
one	 of	 the	 managers.	 The	 community	 mobilisation	 staff’s	 assessment,	 however,	
was	that	the	FGDs	allowed	people	to	speak	about	what	they	had	experienced,	and	
acted	like	support	groups	in	which	the	public	sharing	of	one’s	traumatic	experience	
acts	as	a	catharsis.		
																																																						
170	 Termed	 “chief	 of	 village”	 or	 “focal	 person”	 in	 interviews.	 The	 final	 report	 on	 focus	 group	
discussions	about	DRR	stated:	“Most	of	the	time	they	are	reference	people	 in	the	community	and	
are	 involved	 in	 all	 process,	 project	 or	 discussions	 regarding	 new	 actions	 in	 their	 village.	 (…)	 The	
involvement	 of	 focal	 persons	 in	 FGD	 increase	 the	 chance	 for	 the	 information	 shared	 to	 be	
disseminated	within	community	with	a	better	impact	on	all	population”	(Solidarités	2012d,	4–5).	
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Educating	and	mobilising	the	‘community’	
The	 community	 could	 also	 be	 educated	 through	 hygiene	 promotion	 sessions.	
‘Sensitisation	officers’171	held	 four	 sessions	a	day	 for	 separate	groups	of	25	 to	30	
children/men/women,	 usually	 visiting	 one	 village	 per	 day.	 Each	 session	 was	
organised	 as	 a	 course	 on	 personal	 hygiene	 ‘from	 head	 to	 toe’	 as	 one	 of	 the	
sensitisers	 said,	 covering	 environmental	 hygiene,	 food	 management,	 water	
management	and	 sanitation.	The	content	 included	 informing	people	about	 taking	
showers,	washing	their	hands	at	the	right	moments	of	the	day,	using	soap,	washing	
clothes,	brushing	their	teeth,	cutting	their	nails	and	wearing	shoes.	Environmental	
hygiene	emphasised	cleaning	 the	 living	environment	 inside	 the	house	as	much	as	
on	 the	 streets:	 people	 were	 told	 where	 to	 put	 their	 rubbish	 and	 to	 keep	 their	
environment	 clean	 and	 healthy.	 The	 issue	 of	 latrines	 was	 very	 sensitive	 as	most	
males	practiced	open	defecation	in	these	areas;	because	the	Solidarités	project	was	
building	 latrines,	 the	 sensitisation	 teams	had	 to	 try	 to	 convince	people	 that	open	
defecation	was	unsafe	and	that	they	should	use	the	latrines.	People	used	to	cook	all	
the	 day’s	meals	 at	 once,	 but	 the	 sensitisation	 teams	 told	 them	 they	 should	 cook	
three	times	instead	and	eat	healthy	food,	as	food	is	what	“protects	your	body”.		
One	promoter	told	me	that	during	the	previous	two	projects,	they	had	told	
people	 that:	 “Safe	 water	 is	 water	 you	 treat”	 (either	 by	 boiling	 it	 or	 using	
chlorination	 tablets),	 as	 they	 were	 distributing	 Aquatabs.	 But	 since	 ECHO	 3	 was	
building	water	supply	systems,	 they	explained	what	 they	were,	 their	benefits	and	
that	 safe	 water	 would	 come	 out	 of	 the	 taps.	 So	 hygiene	 messages	 changed	
depending	 on	 the	 project	 activities.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 each	 session,	 attendance	 was	
taken	 with	 thumbprints	 so	 that	 the	 Solidarités	 staff	 could	 prove	 the	 number	 of	
attendees.	The	content	of	the	message	were	standards	and	the	overall	logic	behind	
it	was	the	theory	that	by	explaining,	it	was	possible	to	convince	‘the	community’	to	
change	 some	of	 its	most	 intimate	 social	 practices	 like	 how	 to	 eat,	 drink,	 arrange	
their	houses	and	defecate.	
	 The	community	could	also	be	organised	in	Community	Based	Organisations	
and	 ‘mobilised’.	 CBOs	 were	 designed	 as	 the	 local	 backbone	 of	 the	 sustainability	
																																																						
171	They	were	hygiene	promoters	but	used	the	word	“sensitiser”.	The	word	“sensitisation”	probably	
was	an	approximate	translation	from	the	French	“sensibiliser”.		
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strategy:	 they	were	created	 through	 the	 identification	of	 “trusted	 representatives	
of	the	recipient	communities”	(Solidarités	2011b,	19),	and	trained	to	be	able	to	do	
minor	 repairs	 of	 the	water	 and	 sanitation	 schemes,	 to	 “act	 as	 focal	 points	 in	 the	
community”	(Solidarités	2011b,	19)	and	to	convey	key	messages	around	the	good	
use	and	maintenance	of	the	water	and	sanitation	facilities	as	well	as	around	good	
practice	for	managing	one’s	own	waste	and	rubbish.	To	ensure	that	the	CBOs	would	
be	 lasting	 structures	 (in	 theory),	 Solidarités	 committed	 itself	 to	 supporting	 them	
through	 the	 registration	process	with	 the	Social	Welfare	District	Department.	The	
implication	of	 this	was	 that	 they	were	considered	micro-NGOs:	Solidarités	helped	
them	open	bank	 accounts	 and	 elect	 board	members	 of	 people	 from	 the	 villages.	
The	assumption	was	that	because	these	organisations	were	community-based	the	
people	in	them	would	collaborate	easily.	
	 The	 heavy	 reliance	 on	 CBOs	 for	 the	 future	 maintenance	 of	 the	 water	
schemes	was,	however,	a	topic	of	concern	for	Solidarités	staff.	Several	issues	were	
noted.	 Some	 staff	 criticised	 the	 little	 time	 they	 had	 to	 train	 CBOs	 about	 the	
management	and	formalities	of	their	activities.	Solidarités	was	registering	them	as	
fully-fledged	NGOs,	but	not	giving	them	enough	support	in	becoming	self-sufficient:	
“CBOs’	work	in	this	timeframe,	it	is	very	difficult.	That	would	be	the	criticism:	if	they	
do	an	evaluation	on	CBOs,	they	will	[see	they	are]	not	mature	enough	to	grow	and	
work	efficiently”.	The	cost	of	maintenance	had	not	been	anticipated	in	the	design	
of	the	project	and	CBOs	were	informed	they	would	have	to	pay	the	electricity	bills	
for	 the	 schemes’	 electric	 pumps.	 One	 of	 the	 managers	 concluded	 in	 a	 meeting:	
“Nobody	pays	electricity	anyway,	so	it’s	no	big	deal,	the	CBO	can	manage”.	
Useful	fictions	
According	to	the	project	rhetoric	the	community	could	give	its	feedback,	participate	
in	 “activity	 planning	 and	 implementation”	 (Solidarités	 2011b,	 44)	 and	 ensure	 the	
sustainability	 of	 the	project	 through	CBOs.	 In	 practice,	 the	KAP	 survey172	 and	 the	
																																																						
172	 Campbell	 et	 al.	 demonstrated	 through	 a	 comparison	 of	 a	 questionnaire	 based	 survey	 and	
ethnographic	knowledge	of	the	same	areas	and	social	practices	in	Nepal	“that	surveys	(…)	produced	
information—	 especially	 concerning	 people’s	 opinions,	 knowledge,	 and	 behavior	 —that	 was	
incorrect	and	misleading,	often	widely	off	the	mark”	(Campbell,	Shrestha,	and	Stone	2011,	v).	Even	
though	the	initial	publication	dates	back	to	1979,	the	authors	reprinted	their	work	in	2011	asserting	
that	although	many	things	had	changed	in	Nepal	and	within	the	field	of	anthropology	in	thirty	years,	
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FGDs	 functioned	as	 tools	 to	entrench	some	of	 the	Solidarités	staff’s	preconceived	
views	of	peoples’	expectations	and	project	activities.	David	Mosse,	referring	to	the	
implementation	of	Participatory	Rural	Appraisal	techniques	in	a	rural	development	
project	in	India,	writes:		
Despite	 our	 self-representation	 as	 passive	 facilitators	 of	
such	 process,	 we	 project	 workers	 retained	 the	 power	 to	
direct	 and	 shape.	We	owned	 the	 research	 tools,	 chose	 the	
topics,	 recorded	 the	 information,	 abstracted	 and	
summarised	 according	 to	 our	 criteria	 of	 relevance	 (Mosse	
2005,	91)		
Commenting	on	a	project	with	far	greater	resources	(in	terms	of	time,	budget	and	
personnel)	than	the	Solidarités	project,	Mosse	also	argues	that:	
Enhancing	 community	 or	 demand-driven	 approaches	
requires	a	more	intensive	agency	presence	(time,	personnel,	
resources).	This	both	compromises	the	claimed	strength	and	
cost-efficiency	of	participatory	approaches,	and	also	means	
that	agencies	are	pushed	or	drawn	into	patronage	modes	of	
work.	(Mosse	2005,	228)	
Combined	with	the	KAP	and	FGDs,	the	hygiene	promotion	sessions	and	the	creation	
of	CBOs	provided:	
a	framework	which	allowed	a	dangerously	chaotic	situation	
shot	 through	 with	 power	 to	 be	 understood	 and	
communicated	as	a	manageable	sequence	of	procedures	to	
be	 completed	 (…)	 taken	 to	 demonstrate	 community	
consensus,	consent	and	inclusion.	(Mosse	2005,	149)	
In	this	regard,	the	word	‘community’,173	employed	by	Solidarités	members	to	mean	
people,	 or	 infrastructure	users	 (characterised	by	 their	 position	with	 regard	 to	 the	
project),	or	the	inhabitants	of	the	village	(a	geographic	entity),	proved	to	be	one	of	
the	three	main	fictions	used	by	Solidarités	staff	to	justify	continuing	the	project	as	it	
was.	 The	 three	 fictions	 were:	 first,	 the	 project	 prioritised	 the	 most	 vulnerable;	
second,	 local	 authorities	 were	 partners	 to	 whom	 part	 of	 the	 project	 would	 be	
																																																																																																																																																									
“development	 agencies	 and	 projects	 for	 the	 most	 part	 continued	 to	 use,	 indiscriminately	 and	
uncritically,	questionnaire	surveys	to	gather	information	for	their	policies	and	projects”,	adding	“we	
will	persist	and	will	once	again	draw	attention	to	what	we	see	as	major	flaws	in	current	research	for	
development	in	Nepal”	(Campbell,	Shrestha,	and	Stone	2011,	vi).	
173	The	word	“community”	has	been	debated	in	the	social	sciences	literature	for	more	than	a	century	
(Crochet	 2000),	 and	 some	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 term	 was	 “constructed	 by	 people	 who	 regard	
themselves	as	'non-members'	of	these	'communities'	and	that	the	views	of	the	putative	'members'	
are	not	taken	into	account	in	their	construction”	(Jewkes	and	Murcott	1996).	
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handed	over,	which	would	guarantee	its	sustainability;	and	third,	each	step	of	the	
project	would	be	implemented	hand	in	hand	with	‘the	communities’	who	best	knew	
what	was	good	for	them.	‘Community’	helped	to	translate	a	difficult	to	grasp	social	
reality	 into	manageable	groups,	each	having	a	specific	function	with	regard	to	the	
project	 and	 created	 an	 impression	 of	 order	where	 the	 social	 reality	was	 seen	 as	
‘messy’.	 The	 rhetoric	 of	 the	 ‘community’	 implies	 cooperation,	 collaboration,	 and	
solidarity	beyond	the	family	circle	among	people	with	no	kinship	ties	(Crochet	2000,	
60).	 It	 is	 idealised174	 as	 a	 “place-where-people-share-and-collaborate”175	 (Crochet	
2000,	66)	and	used	as	a	social	unit	 that	conveniently	 fits	a	project-centred	vision.	
The	 complexity	of	 the	 social	 situations	of	people	was	hence	 concealed,	while	 the	
Solidarités	staff	attempted	to	navigate	institutional	constraints,	and	secure	external	
support	 by	 delivering	 a	 technically	 ambitious	 project	 to	 the	 promised	 number	 of	
beneficiaries.	
Targets	and	technique:	“because	it’s	in	the	proposal”	
From	my	 field	 observations,	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 Solidarités	 employees	 cared	 about	
helping	people	and	were	uncomfortable	with	some	aspects	of	the	project:	the	fact	
that	Solidarités	was	not	answering	the	villagers’	requests	for	shelter	and	food,	the	
exclusion	of	some	villages	from	water	assistance	for	technical/cost	reasons	(despite	
being	 among	 the	 poorest),	 the	 anticipation	 that	 the	 latrines	 they	 were	 building	
would	 be	 useless,	 if	 not	 dangerous	 from	 a	 disease	 control	 point	 of	 view,	 the	
fictional	 character	of	 local	 authorities	 and	 community	participation,	 etc.	But	on	a	
daily	 basis,	 and	 despite	 their	 ability	 to	 be	 self-critical,	 what	 eventually	 mattered	
most	to	Solidarités	staff	was	to	do	what	was	in	the	project	proposal	“because	it	was	
in	the	proposal”.	The	first	two	parts	of	this	section	elaborate	on	what	they	saw	in	
the	 proposal	 signed	 with	 ECHO	 in	 2011	 as	 the	 most	 important:	 the	 beneficiary	
targets,	and	the	technical	solidity	of	the	infrastructures	they	had	to	deliver.	Yet	the	
last	part	shows	that	this	was	not	what	the	donor	expected	from	them.	
																																																						
174	Marc	Augé	spoke	of	an	“illusion	villageoise”	(Augé	1973);	Mary	Douglas	deconstructed	the	idea	of	
automatic	 solidarity	within	 a	 small	 group	of	 people	 (Douglas	 1987,	 24–29);	 and	Olivier	 de	 Sardan	
called	the	idealism	of	the	local/autochthon	a	form	of	“populism”	(Olivier	de	Sardan	2005,	118).	
175	My	translation.	
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Meeting	the	‘target’	
“Philipp176	 cannot	 give	 up	 on	 his	 beneficiaries”,	 said	 one	 of	 the	 Solidarités	
administrators	 about	 one	 of	 the	 WASH	 managers.	 He	 was	 not	 the	 only	 one,	 as	
many	 discussions	 in	 the	 Mehar	 meetings	 revolved	 about	 the	 number	 of	
beneficiaries.	The	Mehar	managers	did	not	want	to	compromise	on	the	number	of	
beneficiaries	reported	to	the	donor	as	numbers	had	been	stipulated	in	the	contract	
signed	 with	 ECHO	 and	 as	 a	 result	 had	 spent	 almost	 two	 months	 assessing	 new	
villages	 after	 having	 realised	 that	 the	 numbers	 in	 the	 proposal	 had	 been	
overestimated.	Reaching	the	130,000	beneficiaries	cited	in	the	proposal	had	had	a	
big	influence	on	all	three	WASH	managers,	as	shown	by	this	comment	made	by	the	
hygiene	manager:	
Ideally,	 if	 I	 could	 have,	 I	 would	 have	 an	 ID	 card	 of	 each	
village:	where	we	start	from,	where	we	want	to	go	and	what	
we	want	to	insist	on…	but	I	could	not	do	it.	Quickly	I	realised	
that	 the	 timeframe	 was	 very	 short	 for	 us	 to	 go	 to	 all	 the	
villages.	
Additionally,	when	the	team	learnt	that	PHED	might	cover	one	of	the	villages	they	
had	 included	 in	 their	 assessment,	 their	 first	 thoughts	were	about	beneficiary	 loss	
rather	than	resource	redistribution	to	others,	as	shown	in	this	extract	from	a	base	
meeting:	
We	 met	 with	 PHED	 in	 Dadu.	 They	 announced	 they	 would	
cover	 Faridabad,	 and	 we’d	 lose	 12,000	 beneficiaries.	 So	 we	
need	 to	 set	 up	 another	 meeting.	 The	 financial	 stake	 is	
€60,000.	Action:	set	up	a	meeting	with	the	EDO-H	[Executive	
District	Officer,	Health]	and	negotiate	with	them	but	we	must	
try	not	to	lose	the	12,000	beneficiaries.	
Most	reporting	done	by	the	field	teams	was	quantitative:	they	followed	the	number	
of	 villages,	 of	 their	 inhabitants	 or	 of	 people	 attending	 sessions.	 The	 sensitisation	
project	manager	assistant	described	the	reporting	done	by	their	officers	on	a	daily	
basis	as	follows:		
They	 tell	 how	 many	 sessions	 were	 produced	 with	 males,	
children,	 etc.	 timing	 of	 session,	 total	 timing	 of	 day,	 total	
participation,	name	of	village,	district,	Union	Council.	There	is	
a	 small	 block	 on	 methodology:	 what	 kind	 of	 methodology,	
																																																						
176	Names	have	been	changed	throughout	to	maintain	anonymity.	
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and	 activities	 if	 they	 change,	 and	 any	 issues	 we	 faced	 and	
how	it	was	solved.	And	at	the	end	of	the	report,	remarks	also.	
The	 qualitative	 part	 he	 referred	 to	 was	 “small”	 and	 it	 was	 oriented	 towards	
problems	 in	 implementing	 activities	 rather	 than,	 for	 instance,	 on	 collecting	
information	showing	what	difference	they	made	to	the	people.	
Technical	quality	
The	 technical	 quality	 of	 the	 infrastructures	 was	 also	 high	 on	 the	 agenda.	 The	
decision	to	wait	until	the	geophysical	survey	could	be	done	in	November	shows	that	
compromising	 the	 technical	 sophistication	 of	 infrastructures	 was	 not	 an	 option,	
even	 when	 weighed	 against	 the	 urgency	 of	 some	 people’s	 situation	 who	 were	
described	 as	 having	 no	 local	 access	 to	 drinking	 water	 and	 walking	 several	 hours	
every	day	to	get	water	in	other	villages.	According	to	the	Solidarités	managers,	the	
only	 satisfactory	 response	 to	 people’s	 ‘needs’	 were	 these	 water	 schemes	 that	
would	provide	drinking	water	in	sufficient	quantities	and	be	a	lasting	solution.	The	
improvement	 of	 people’s	 situation	 by	 the	 project	 was	 considered	 to	 depend	 on	
how	solid	and	long-lasting	the	infrastructures	were	going	to	be.		
This	project	was	indeed	technically	exceptional	for	Solidarités,	as	underlined	
by	the	WASH	adviser	based	at	 the	head	office	 in	Paris:	“This	project	 is	very	sharp	
technically	speaking.	 It’s	a	 type	of	project	we	normally	don’t	do.	 It’s	probably	 the	
most	technical	of	all	Solidarités	WASH	projects	apart	from	Kalémie177”.	Two	of	the	
WASH	managers	 had	 previously	worked	 as	 consultants	 in	 the	 private	 sector,	 and	
were	used	 to	working	with	 a	bill	 of	 specifications.	 It	was	 striking	 to	observe	how	
proud	 the	Solidarités	 staff	were	 to	be	 involved	 in	 such	a	 technically	 sophisticated	
project.	 Even	 one	 of	 the	 staff	 who	 was	 very	 critical	 of	 his	 manager	 said:	 “In	
sanitation	 or	 water,	 quality-wise	 the	 work	 is	 superb”.	 They	 liked	 the	 fact	 that	
Solidarités	 was	 ambitious	 for	 the	 people,	 unlike	 many	 other	 NGOs	 who	 just	
provided	 temporary	 infrastructures	 that	 they	described	as	being	 “of	 low	quality”.	
They	emphasised	how	closely	 they	 followed	 the	work	of	 the	contractors,	not	 just	
																																																						
177	Since	2008	Solidarités	has	been	involved	in	a	rehabilitation	project	of	an	urban	water	network	for	
Kalémie,	a	city	of	230,000	inhabitants	in	the	east	of	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo.	In	contrast	to	
ECHO	3,	this	project	was	implemented	in	partnership	with	local	actors	and	over	several	years.	
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subcontracting,	 but	 making	 sure	 that	 each	 piece	 of	 work	 would	 be	 exactly	 as	
initially	designed,	as	this	officer	described:	
I	 am	 in	 the	 field	 all	 day	 to	 check	 either	 they	 are	 using	 the	
material	we	said,	or	not	etc.	We	have	to	be	there	at	the	site	
all	day	long	until	the	filling	is	fully	completed.	We	check	that	
all	 the	 parameters	 are	 good:	 gravels	 and	 sand	 quantity	 are	
the	 right	ones	 and	good	proportion.	 For	 concrete,	we	 check	
the	quantity	of	water	or	not	(for	the	quality	of	cement)	(…)	To	
check	 the	 work	 if	 a	 contractor	 starts	 in	 two	 villages	 at	 the	
same	time,	they	should	not	do	concrete	at	the	same	time,	or	
if	so,	we	need	a	third	person	to	check	the	other	village	
Donor	expectations	misinterpreted	
The	donor	was	mentioned	several	times	as	expecting	things	to	be	done	in	a	certain	
way	–	especially	with	regard	to	the	number	of	beneficiaries	to	be	reached	and	the	
quality	standards	needed	to	make	the	project	sustainable.	When	I	later	interviewed	
the	 donor	 representative,	 I	 realised	 that	 there	 was	 gap	 between	 what	 his	
expectations	 were	 and	 what	 the	 Solidarités	 field	 teams	 believed	 they	 were.	 The	
donor	representative	saw	Solidarités	as	being	small	enough	to	be	flexible	and	have	
an	 internal	 fluid	 communication,	 as	 well	 as	 being	 technically	 expert	 enough	 to	
adjust	 its	activity	according	 to	 the	specificity	of	people’s	 situations.	He	said	ECHO	
usually	 accepted	 to	 negotiate	 an	 amendment	 to	 the	 proposal,	 as	 very	 often	
requested	by	NGOs	and	even	 that	he	was	 surprised	 to	have	had	 so	 few	 requests	
from	and	contacts	with	Solidarités	since	the	beginning	of	the	project.	The	donor	did	
not	actively	influence	teams	in	their	implementation	since	there	had	been	very	few	
contacts	with	him.	Ironically,	the	donor	representative	shared	an	anecdote	with	me	
that	 proved	 his	 mindset	 was	 the	 exact	 opposite	 of	 what	 the	 Mehar	 managers	
thought.	 It	was	about	 the	previous	Solidarités	project	and	 in	particular	about	 the	
negative	 evaluation	 of	 the	 latrines	 construction	 that	 Solidarités	 had	 shared	 with	
him:	
For	 us,	 it	 was	 behavioural	 change.	 You	 don’t	 change	 these	
things	 overnight,	 or	 in	 six	months…	with	 good	 luck	 about	 a	
year	even!	Solidarités	was	one	of	the	rare	ones	coming	back	
to	us	and	saying	this	transparently.	
Such	scepticism	could	have	applied	to	the	ECHO	3	ambitions	of	social	change	over	a	
period	of	twelve	months	such	as	setting	up	a	working	CBO	that	would	manage	to	
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raise	 funds	 from	 the	 people	 using	 the	 water	 facilities	 and	 organise	 frequent	
maintenance	without	any	local	government	involvement.	
Taking	policy	at	face	value:	triage	tangled	in	the	‘logframe’	matrix	
The	 importance	of	numbers	and	of	the	technical	dimension	of	 the	project	was,	 in	
fact,	an	interpretation	made	by	the	Solidarités	staff.	Ultimately	their	interpretations	
of	 what	 they	 thought	 ECHO	 expected	 of	 them	 were	 generally	 wrong.	 This	
interpretation,	however,	was	never	presented	as	a	policy	choice,	but	appeared	to	
me	to	be	the	product	of	everyday	practices	and	work	relationships.	The	first	part	of	
this	section	shows	that	from	Solidarités	headquarters,	to	Islamabad	head	of	mission	
and	 to	 the	 Mehar	 field	 coordinator,	 no	 Solidarités	 manager	 symbolically	 and	
statutorily	empowered	to	speak	on	behalf	of	the	institution	ever	provided	a	shared	
interpretation	of	the	project,	explicating	its	meaning,	objective	or	modus	operandi	
beyond	the	vocabulary	used	in	the	ECHO	3	proposal.	This	lack	of	political	guidance	
was	eventually	 filled	by	 the	 technical	 field	managers	 in	 charge	of	 the	bulk	of	 the	
activities	 (the	 construction	 of	 the	 water	 and	 sanitation	 schemes)	 who	 tried	 to	
translate	the	language	of	‘sustainability’,	‘emergency’,	‘community’,	‘vulnerability’,	
and	‘quality’	into	work	plans	and	follow-up	tools	which	complied	with	the	technical	
and	quantitative	expectations	of	both	the	proposal	and	their	technical	supervisors.	
The	 second	 part	 describes	 how	 the	 Pakistani	 staff,	 while	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 field	
version	of	the	project,	did	not	participate	in	this	translation	process,	as	they	were	
denied	access	to	the	ECHO	3	proposal	and	had	 little	 information	about	the	way	 it	
was	 interpreted.	 The	 third	 part	 of	 the	 section	 argues	 that	 the	 interpretation	 the	
WASH	managers	made	of	 the	proposal	on	a	daily	basis	was	guided	by	 the	Mehar	
team,	 yet	 the	 reality	 that	 prevailed	 was	 a	 managerial	 and	 technical	 one	 which	
isolated	them	from	the	complexity	of	the	‘outside	world’.	The	Mehar	team	ended	
up	 living	 in	 the	project	world	 rather	 than	 in	Mehar,	 in	Sindh	or	 in	Pakistan.	 If	 the	
ECHO	 3	 proposal	 constituted	 a	 good	 ‘policy	 document’,	 whose	 language	 of	
‘sustainability’,	‘community’,	and	‘vulnerability’	allowed	the	enrolment	of	different	
groups	 and	 interests,	 it	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 terrible	 guide	 for	 action,	 especially	 as	 its	
logical	framework	was	interpreted	literally	in	a	maximalist	form	by	the	field	teams.	
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The	silence	of	the	institution	on	policy	implementation	
From	 the	 various	 head	 office	 departments	 in	 Paris	 to	 Mehar	 and	 through	 the	
Islamabad	 staff,	 everyone	agreed	 that	 the	Pakistan	mission	 functioned	differently	
from	others.	Head	office	reported	that	it	was	the	only	country	that	did	not	submit	
an	annual	strategic	plan	for	2012.	Some	said	that,	based	on	the	time	spent	working	
on	it,	Pakistan	was	not	a	priority	for	the	desk	team.	Except	for	the	WASH	support	
department	 in	 Paris	 that	 had	 been	 involved	 in	 quite	 a	 lot	 of	 technical	 support	
according	to	the	WASH	managers,	most	expatriates	said	they	had	had	a	very	quick	
briefing	 at	 head	 office	 and	most	 had	 not	 seen	 the	 desk	manager	 for	more	 than	
fifteen	minutes	 before	 leaving.	 In	Mehar	managers	 referred	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 support	
from	 the	 head	office	 during	 the	 period	without	 a	 head	of	mission	 (in	 the	 two	 to	
three	months	 before	my	 fieldwork):	 “the	 head	 office…	 they	 call	 only	 when	 they	
need	something,	otherwise	they’re	non-existent”.	The	lack	of	guidance	they	told	of	
echoed	the	briefing	 I	had	received	from	the	Asia	desk	manager	before	 leaving	for	
the	field:	
Today,	with	the	head	office	Desk	team,	we	don’t	understand	
why	we	absolutely	want	to	stay	in	Pakistan.	Ok,	what	we	do	is	
relevant.	 There	 are	 huge	 needs	 in	 Pakistan,	 but	 elsewhere,	
too.	
The	 lack	 of	 guidance	 also	 stemmed	 from	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 broad	 view	 of	
what	 Solidarités	 was	 doing	 among	 those	 who	 were	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 project	 in	
Pakistan.	When	I	arrived	in	Islamabad	in	February	2012,	a	new	head	of	mission	and	
administrative	coordinator	had	arrived	a	week	before;	there	was	no	longer	a	WASH	
coordinator	 as	 the	 Asia	 desk	 manager	 had	 handed	 this	 responsibility	 over	 to	 a	
consultant	 who	 had	 joined	 the	 project	 in	 December	 (and	 who	 had	 previously	
worked	 with	 Solidarités).178	 He	 was	 doing	 the	 backstopping	 from	 his	 home	 in	
France.	The	coordination	 team	was	 fragmented	and	half	of	 the	position	were	not	
filled	 for	 several	 months.	 In	 Islamabad	 only	 one	 staff	 member	 had	 worked	 for	
Solidarités	continually	since	2009.	He	had	been	a	liaison	officer	when	Solidarités	did	
not	 have	 activities	 on	 the	 ground	 during	 2009-2010,	 and	was	 key	 to	maintaining	
relationships	with	the	Pakistani	authorities	in	Islamabad.	He	dealt	with	Solidarités’s	
																																																						
178	This	person	was	a	member	of	the	first	Solidarités	assessment	team	after	the	2005	earthquake	in	
Pakistan.	
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registration	 and	 expatriate	 visas,	 and	 had	 also	 been	 acting	 as	 an	 administrative	
coordinator	 for	 several	 weeks	 doing	 the	 accounting	 and	 administrative	 human	
resources	management.	His	main	job	for	ECHO	3	was	the	tedious	negotiation	with	
the	authorities	in	Islamabad	to	obtain	and	renew	the	visas	and	Solidarités’s	interim	
permission	 and	 he	 had	 no	 role	 in	 guiding	 field	 teams	 in	 their	 project	
implementation.	
In	Mehar	most	of	the	expatriate	managers	had	arrived	in	June	2011.	As	per	
the	organisational	chart,	 they	were	hierarchically	under	a	 field	coordinator	whose	
position	was	only	filled	two	months	later.	So	until	the	end	of	August	2011,	the	five	
managers	had	sought	support	mainly	from	their	distant	technical	advisers:	a	WASH	
coordinator	when	they	had	one	in	Islamabad	or	someone	based	in	the	head	office.	
In	the	first	eight	months	of	the	project,	people	had	followed	the	guidance	of	their	
respective	 line	 departments	 and	 of	 the	 proposal.	 The	 water	 and	 sanitation	
managers	 had	 organised	 around	 technical	 and	 organisational	 constraints	 and	 the	
hygiene	manager	followed	their	choices	as	it	was	only	logical	to	promote	the	use	of	
the	 infrastructures	 after	 they	 had	 been	 built.179	 The	 administrator	 supervised	
accounting	and	cash	flow	and	the	logistician	vehicles	and	equipment	management,	
as	 well	 as	 the	 tenders	 to	 select	 contractors.	 The	 water	 and	 sanitation	managers	
were	clearly	leading	the	project	implementation,	influencing	which	village	would	be	
included	 (or	 excluded)	 and	 how	 it	 would	 be	 assisted.	 The	 six	 of	 them,	 French	
expatriates	 all	 between	 twenty-five	 and	 thirty-five	 years	 old,	 lived	 together	 and	
gave	the	impression	that	they	were	a	group	of	friends.	They	were	flatmates,	shared	
most	of	their	meals	together	and	played	games	in	the	evenings	or	at	weekends	to	
pass	 the	 time.	 Professionally	 they	were	 independent	 of	 each	 other	 and	 each	 did	
their	share	of	the	work.	
On	a	daily	basis	Pakistani	field	officers	and	supervisors	came	to	the	office	at	
8	am,	met	with	 their	 respective	managers	 for	a	morning	briefing	and	 left	 to	 their	
respective	project	 sites,	 to	 come	back	 in	 the	afternoon,	do	a	debriefing,	work	on	
their	reports	and	solicit	the	logistics	department	if	needed.	Their	managers	went	to	
																																																						
179	It	was	not	strictly	the	case	however.	The	construction	work	had	been	so	greatly	delayed	that	the	
hygiene	manager	had	started	sensitisation	sessions	 in	certain	villages	before	 the	construction	had	
started.	
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visit	 field	sites	regularly.	The	water	and	sanitation	managers	met	with	contractors	
to	negotiate	prices	and	 the	quality	of	 the	deliverables	 together	with	 the	 logistics,	
and	 they	 also	 had	meetings	 with	 local	 authorities	 to	 negotiate	 authorisations	 to	
build	the	infrastructures.	The	rest	of	their	time	was	spent	in	the	office	on	reporting	
and	planning.	
Silencing	Pakistani	staff	
The	work	was	also	divided	among	managers	and	their	subordinate	employees.	The	
top	 of	 the	 organisational	 chart,	 i.e.	 coordinators	 and	 managers,	 were	 all	
expatriates.	 Even	 though	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 hire	 qualified	 and	 experienced	 national	
staff	in	a	country	like	Pakistan,	it	was	quite	usual	for	Solidarités	to	rely	on	expatriate	
staff.	 This	 could	 be	 partly	 explained	 by	 the	 recent	 presence	 of	 Solidarités	 in	
Pakistan.180	 In	 Mehar,	 the	 highest	 Pakistani	 employees	 in	 the	 hierarchy	 were	
assistants	 to	 the	 five	managers.	 They	 all	 had	 higher	 education	 degrees	 (two	 had	
Masters	degrees)	 and	 several	 years	of	professional	 experience	with	Pakistani	 and	
international	organisations	such	as	UNICEF	or	the	World	Bank.	They	were	assisting	
managers	in	supervising	field	activities	on	a	daily	basis	and	were	delegated	part	of	
the	management	responsibilities,	in	particular	with	staff	who	did	not	speak	English.		
In	February	2012	they	had	been	delegated	full	supervision	of	field	activities	
as	 the	 expatriates	 based	 in	 Mehar	 had	 been	 evacuated	 to	 Islamabad	 after	 the	
kidnapping	 of	 two	 foreign	 aid	 workers	 in	 Multan	 (Punjab).	 Even	 though	 they	
received	 daily	 instructions	 by	 phone,	 this	 experience	 showed	 the	 expatriate	
managers	they	could	trust	their	assistants	and	give	them	more	responsibilities.	
	 Asking	about	how	Pakistani	staff	worked	on	a	daily	basis,	I	realised	that	the	
vast	 majority	 of	 them	 had	 not	 been	 given	 the	 proposal	 and	 budget	 documents.	
They	were	 the	pillars	of	 field	data	 collection	during	needs	assessments,	but	were	
not	involved	in	data	analysis	or	project	document	writing:		
I	 was	 not	 involved	 in	 the	 proposal	 writing,	 I	 don’t	 have	 the	
proposal	 now,	 and	 I	 don’t	work	with	 the	 logical	 framework.	
Nobody	explained	the	project:	nobody	knows	the	title	of	the	
project	until	now.	What	we	know	is	that	130,000	beneficiaries	
																																																						
180	Most	 countries	where	Solidarités	had	promoted	national	 staff	 to	management	or	 coordination	
positions	 were	 countries	 where	 qualified	 employees	 could	 be	 found	 and	 where	 Solidarités	 had	
worked	for	several	years,	for	example	in	Kenya	and	Bangladesh.	
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is	 the	 target,	 and	 that	 we	 do	 water,	 sanitation,	 hygiene	
promotion	and	DRR.	
There	 was	 a	 frustration	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	 Pakistani	 staff,	 whereas	 for	 their	
managers	it	was	a	de	facto	situation:	“the	proposal	is	always	something	that	we	do	
in	additional	to	our	daily	work,	in	the	evening,	so	the	Pakistani	staff	are	not	at	work	
anymore…	 and…	 we’ve	 always	 done	 them	 in	 a	 rush…”.	 As	 for	 the	 budget,	 the	
Pakistani	 staff	 was	 told	 this	 information	 was	 “confidential”.	 For	 some	 who	 had	
worked	 for	other	 international	organisations,	 this	withholding	of	 information	was	
offensive.	The	Pakistani	staff	who	were	working	directly	with	expatriates	felt	 they	
were	not	involved	in	decision-making	and	that	the	expatriates	did	not	trust	them.		
	 It	 was	 not	 that	 expatriates	 did	 not	 respect	 or	 value	 their	 teams;	 in	 most	
conversations	 and	 interviews	 I	 had,	 they	 spoke	 about	 them	 in	 a	 respectful	 way.	
They	underlined	how	some	were	hard	workers,	and	others	had	good	networks	that	
benefited	the	project.	One	of	the	managers	said	how	grateful	she	was	to	have	been	
trained	on	some	aspects	of	her	work	by	a	Pakistani	staff	member.	They	also	cared	
about	 the	 motivation	 of	 the	 staff.	 Expatriates’	 daily	 management	 was,	 in	 fact,	
paternalistic.	 They	 supervised	work	 hours	 rather	 than	 objectives,	made	 Pakistani	
staff	 sign	 attendance	 sheets,	 tried	 to	 control	 them	 from	 a	 distance	 and	 worried	
about	staff	behaviour	 in	Shadadkot,	a	base	 three	hours	away	 from	Mehar,	where	
there	were	no	expatriates.	
	 Staff	 and	 managers	 were	 definitely	 not	 working	 on	 an	 equal	 footing	
(regardless	 of	 the	 hierarchical	 relationship).	 Managers	 interpreted	 project	
documents	 and	 translated	 them	 into	 workplans	 and	 follow-up	 tools.	 Their	
subordinates	 filled	 in	 the	 templates	and	reported	against	what	had	been	planned	
by	 their	managers	 on	 a	 daily	 basis.	 They	mostly	 had	 tasks,	 which,	without	 other	
contextual	elements	of	the	project,	could	not	be	challenged.	Assistants	were	acting	
as	‘remote	control	devices’	of	the	managers	who	said	they	spent	most	of	their	time	
in	 the	 office.	 Having	 access	 to	 the	 proposal	 or	 not	 was	 a	 dividing	 line	 in	 the	
organisation	 of	 work	 between	 those	 with	 power,	 and	 those	 with	 less	 power.	 In	
effect,	work	was	fragmented	and	the	only	thing	that	held	it	together	was	the	WASH	
field	engineers’	interpretation	of	the	proposal.	
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Sorting	according	to	policy	documents	
François	 Giovalucchi	 and	 J-P.	 Olivier	 de	 Sardan,	 deconstructing	 the	 logical	
framework	as	a	hegemonic	development	tool,	clearly	explain	that	the	main	issue	of	
this	 management	 tool	 is	 that	 it	 applies	 “a	 sanitised	 and	 depoliticised	 vision”181	
(Giovalucchi	 and	 Olivier	 de	 Sardan	 2009,	 np).	 They	 argue	 that	 there	 are	 “two	
distinct	 forms	 of	 ‘appropriation’	 of	 the	 logical	 framework	 by	 the	 personnel	 of	
development	institutions:	a	minimal	or	collateral	use	(testing	the	coherence)	and	a	
maximal	or	central	use	(to	build	the	project	upon	this	coherence)”182	 (Giovalucchi	
and	 Olivier	 de	 Sardan	 2009,	 np)183.	 This	 also	 applies	 to	 the	 ECHO	 proposal	
structured	 around	 the	 logical	 framework	 and	 the	 Mehar	 managers	 provide	 an	
example	of	humanitarian	employees	who	made	 ‘maximal	use’	of	 the	proposal,	at	
least	 at	 their	 level.	 Although	Giovalucchi	 and	Olivier	 de	 Sardan	 demonstrate	 that	
the	 logical	 framework	 can	be	useful	 in	 its	 ‘minimal	use’,	 they	also	argue	 that	 the	
logical	framework	can	be	the	ultimate	expression	of	a	dark	side	of	development:		
It	reflects	through	what	it	does	not	mention,	the	dark	side	of	
development,	its	black	boxes,	its	malaise,	its	ambiguities:	the	
little	 taste	 of	 development	 institutions	 for	 iterative,	
interactive	and	adaptive	projects,	with	alterable	objectives	–	
taking	into	account	feedbacks,	unexpected	effects,	drifts;	the	
incipient	 inclusion	 of	 actors’	 strategies,	 of	 conflicts,	 of	 local	
stakes,	 of	 the	 diversity	 of	 dynamics	 and	 social	 logics;	
quantophrenia,	 the	 lack	 of	 qualitative	 follow-up,	 the	 fear	 of	
the	 long	 term	 and	 of	 the	 undetermined.	 (Giovalucchi	 and	
Olivier	de	Sardan	2009,	np)	(emphasis	in	original)	
In	 this	 sense,	 the	 ECHO	 3	 project	 was	 an	 illustration	 of	 the	 dark	 side	 of	
humanitarian	 action,	 yet	 the	 WASH	 managers	 who	 ultimately	 interpreted	 the	
project	 in	 its	 ‘darker’	 way	 repeatedly	 stated	 in	 interviews	 that	 they	 had	 lacked	
guidance	from	their	superiors.	As	Luc	Boltanski	explains	that	“[t]o	institutions	falls	
the	 task	 of	 saying	 and	 confirming	 what	 matters”	 (Boltanski	 2011,	 75)	 through	
spokespeople	 that	embody	them.	For	diverse	reasons	this	was	not	done	by	those	
																																																						
181	My	translation.	
182	My	translation.	
183	For	more	discussion	about	the	logical	framework	approach	and	its	uses,	see	also	Gasper	(2000b),	
Gasper	(2000a)	and	Dearden	and	Kowalski	(2003).	
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who	had	the	symbolic	and	statutory	power	to	do	it	in	Solidarités:	the	desk	manager,	
head	of	mission	and	field	coordinator.		
However,	these	were	not	the	only	people	who	embodied	Solidarités;	others	
within	 the	 organisation	 developed	 communication	 and	 advocacy	 campaigns	 that	
narrated	 what	mattered	 to	 Solidarités.	 Even	 though,	 as	 the	 2012	 annual	 report	
showed,	 half	 of	 Solidarités’s	 activities	 were	 developed	 around	 other	 types	 of	
responses	 (providing	 food	 and	 shelter,	 for	 instance)	 (Solidarités	 2012a,	 6),	
communication	 and	 advocacy	 campaigns	 all	 revolved	 around	 “unsafe	 water”	
presented	as	“the	primary	cause	of	death	worldwide”	(Solidarités	2012c,	3).	From	a	
fundraising	 point	 of	 view,	 it	 was	 a	 niche	 in	 the	 French	 market:	 Action	 Against	
Hunger	 specialised	 in	 fighting	 hunger,	 MSF	 and	 Doctors	 of	 the	 World	 in	 global	
health	issues,	Handicap	International	on	people	with	disabilities.184	It	occupied	the	
same	niche	as	Water	Aid	in	the	UK.		
This	 language,	 as	 well	 as	 that	 of	 several	 people	 at	 head	 office,	 directly	
echoed	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 ECHO	 3.	 The	 expression	 “water	 borne	 diseases:	 the	
emergency	 of	 sustainable	 solutions”	 was	 used	 in	 Solidarités	 fundraising	 and	
advocacy	documents.	The	director	of	operations	unpacked	the	idea	in	the	editorial	
of	 a	 document	 published	 on	 the	 occasion	 of	 the	 World	 Water	 Forum	 in	 2012	
entitled	Water	and	Sanitation	In	Crisis.	The	Urgent	Need	for	Sustainable	Solutions	in	
a	Humanitarian	Context:	
However	 legitimate,	 imperative	 and	 essential	 it	 may	 be,	
humanitarian	action	has	always	imposed	two	limitations	on	
itself,	 which	 are	 to	 “do	 no	 harm”	 and	 to	 “not	 become	 a	
substitute”.	 For	 SOLIDARITES	 INTERNATIONAL,	 which	 has	
been	 active	 in	 the	 field	 for	 over	 thirty	 years,	 putting	 this	
vision	into	practice	has	required	us	to	place	our	emergency	
actions	 within	 a	 constant	 search	 for	 sustainable	 impact	
among	the	populations	we	work	with,	to	make	them	actors	
in	 their	 own	 assistance	 rather	 than	 victims.	 (Solidarités	
2012c,	2)	
In	 this	 regard,	 ECHO	 3	 fitted	 in	 a	 wider	 policy	 discourse	 of	 Solidarités,	 using	
“emergency”,	“sustainability”,	“community”,	and	“quality”	as	“metaphors”	(Mosse	
2005,	 230)	 symbolising	 altogether	 the	 interests	 of	 all	 actors	 of	 the	 humanitarian	
																																																						
184	ACTED,	the	other	‘top	six’	French	relief	NGO,	did	not	raise	funds	from	the	general	public.	
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arena	 and	 ensuring	 the	 project	 the	 support	 it	 needed	 to	 exist.	 As	 such,	 it	 was	 a	
“good	policy”	in	Mosse’s	terms:	
Policy	 discourse	 generates	 mobilising	 metaphors	
(‘participation’,	 ‘partnership’,	 ‘governance’)	 whose	
vagueness,	 ambiguity	 and	 lack	 of	 conceptual	 precision	 is	
required	 to	 conceal	 ideological	 differences	 so	 as	 to	 allow	
compromise	 and	 the	 enrolment	 of	 different	 interests,	 to	
distribute	agency	and	to	multiply	the	criteria	of	success	within	
project	 systems	 (cf.	 Dahl	 2001:20,	 Li	 1999).	 But	 ideas	 that	
make	for	‘good	policy’	–	policy	that	legitimises	and	mobilises	
political	 and	 practical	 support-	 are	 not	 those	 that	 provide	
good	guides	 to	action.	Good	policy	 is	unimplementable;	 it	 is	
metaphor	not	management.	(Mosse	2005,	230)		
	
The	idea	that	circulated	within	the	organisation	was	a	mobilising	policy,	but	
not	a	guide	for	action.	The	Mehar	WASH	managers	had	been	confronted	with	the	
difficulty	of	 reconciling	 the	general	 idea	of	 this	policy	with	 the	 local	 facts	of	 their	
project	 settings:	 underground	water	 was	 often	 salty,	 in	 particular	 in	 the	 poorest	
villages,	 which	 had	 been	 established	 where	 there	 was	 no	 fresh	 water	 precisely	
because	 they	 could	 not	 afford	 to	 live	 elsewhere.	 Governmental	 local	 authorities	
were	 unwilling	 to	 maintain	 infrastructures,	 shifting	 the	 responsibility	 to	 newly	
established	and	inexperienced	CBOs	and	the	complexity	of	the	social	fabric	(among	
castes	in	particular)	made	it	almost	impossible	for	Solidarités	to	offer	‘community’	
solutions,	 i.e.	 solutions	 for	 an	 entire	 homogeneous	 group	 of	 people.	 They	 knew	
how	to	build	technically	sound	infrastructures,	yet	they	did	not	know	how	to	ensure	
their	effective	sustainability,	or	even	whether	this	was	a	priority	for	those	who	had	
the	most	difficult	access	to	water.		
Conclusion	
The	 “multi-layered	 complex	 of	 relationships”	 (Mosse	 2004,	 639)	 that	 drives	
humanitarian	practice	was,	 in	 the	 case	of	 Solidarités	 in	Pakistan,	 fragmented	and	
linked	only	by	a	policy	discourse	which	is	never	a	good	guide	for	action,	as	it	needs	
to	 fit	 into	 very	 normative	 frameworks	 dictated	 by	 the	 entire	 bureaucracy	 of	 aid	
including	 international	 norms	 and	 standards,	 the	 donor’s	 template,	 and	 various	
buzzwords	 such	 as	 ‘vulnerability’,	 ‘sustainability’,	 ‘communities’,	 and	 ‘DRR’.	 Since	
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the	 same	 project	 cannot	 meet	 all	 these	 expectations	 simultaneously,	
interpretations	 are	 made	 that	 led	 to	 certain	 choices	 about	 who	 to	 prioritise	 for	
assistance	 and	what	 form	 the	 assistance	will	 take.	 This	 chapter	 examined	 a	 case	
where	 these	 interpretations	were	not	made	proactively,	 but	 rather	 by	 default	 by	
those	 required	 to	 survey,	 construct,	 distribute	 and	 mobilise.	 Each	 of	 the	 Mehar	
managers	 interpreted	 the	proposal	 in	his/her	own	way,	 and	 sought	 refuge	 in	 the	
technical	 side	 of	 their	 responsibility,	 the	 one	 thing	 they	 had	 no	 doubt	 about.	 In	
order	 to	 reconcile	 what	 they	 did	 with	 what	 was	 in	 the	 proposal,	 they	 sustained	
useful	 fictions	 that	 had	 begun	 in	 the	 planned	 version	 of	 the	 project.	 Thus	 they	
never	 questioned	 their	 initial	 choice	 of	 doing	 a	 WASH	 response	 in	 north	 Sindh,	
which	put	them	in	the	position	of	falling	short	of	other	types	of	assistance	for	the	
people	(who	were	asking	for	shelter	and	food).	
What	drove	the	response	was	a	narrow	reading	of	the	proposal:	the	need	to	
meet	the	beneficiary	target	of	130,000	people	and	build	solid	infrastructures.	These	
two	major	humanitarian	triage	logics	drove	the	choice	of	who	would	be	assisted.	In	
the	face	of	these	logics,	understanding	who	the	people	were,	what	they	requested,	
and	what	their	priorities	were,	was	secondary.	Everything	in	the	environment	that	
resisted	the	ideal	of	the	logical	framework’s	“expected	results”	and	that	called	for	a	
revision	 of	 the	 ongoing	 activities	 (Pakistani	 authorities	 saying	 that	 infrastructures	
were	never	maintained,	 the	CBOs	 that	 they	obviously	 could	not	afford	 to	pay	 for	
the	maintenance,	etc.)	was	sidelined	as	the	managers	were	inextricably	tangled	in	
the	matrix	of	the	proposal.	
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Chapter	7	
Save	the	Children	International:	‘coverage’,	children	and	
security	management	first	
Introduction	
This	 chapter	 analyses	 the	 humanitarian	 triage	 operated	 by	 a	 Save	 the	 Children	
International	 project	 assisting	 people	 fleeing	 the	 Khyber	 Agency	 in	 the	 Federally	
Administered	 Tribal	 Areas	 of	 Pakistan	 because	 of	 military	 operations	 led	 by	 the	
army	against	 the	Pakistani	 Taliban.	 This	 case	 shows	how	SCI	 humanitarian	 triage,	
constrained	 by	 powerful	 internal	 security	management	 and	 driven	 by	 the	 double	
logic	 of	 coverage	 and	 efficiency	 with	 the	 ‘entry	 point’	 of	 the	 cause	 of	 children,	
ended	up	being	blind	to	its	own	political	underpinnings.	
In	the	first	section	I	briefly	describe	the	history,	structure	and	ambitions	of	
the	 Emergency	 Response	 and	 Recovery	 Programme	 of	 Save	 the	 Children	
International	(SCI)	in	Pakistan,	then	move	on	to	give	details	about	the	following	the	
SCI	 Khyber	 IDP	 response	 project:	 initial	 assessments,	 strategic	 plan,	 and	
implementation	 status	 three	months	 after	 it	 started	 (at	 the	 time	 of	 fieldwork).	 I	
show	that	 initial	assessments	emphasised	the	 internally	displaced	persons’	urgent	
need	for	food	and	shelter	and	that	the	SCI	response	strategy	states	the	organisation	
will	 assist	 non-registered	 IDPs	 as	 a	 priority	 in	 areas	 with	 the	 highest	 density	 of	
people	fleeing	the	conflict.	
In	 the	 second	 section	 I	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 project	 macro-triage	 was	
determined	and	constrained	above	all	by	 the	 security	 situation,	as	 interpreted	by	
the	 internal	 SCI	 security	 department.	 As	 a	 side-effect	 of	 its	 ability	 to	 prevent	 SCI	
field	teams	from	visiting	areas	they	rated	as	‘too	dangerous’,	security	management	
had	 the	power	 to	exclude	 IDPs	settled	 in	 these	areas.	Demanding	 the	SCI	 staff	 to	
trust	 their	 (confidential)	 analyses	 SCI	 security	 managers	 relied	 on	 a	 strategy	
informed	 mainly	 by	 UN	 agencies	 and	 Pakistani	 intelligence	 services.	 Security	
management	excluded	areas	with	a	high	density	of	IDPs	and	held	the	SCI	staff	at	a	
distance	from	those	they	were	attempting	to	help.	
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	 It	 is	 in	 this	 framework	 that	 SCI	 relief	 activities	 took	 place,	 in	 particular	
activities	responding	to	children’s	needs	of	education	and	protection.	Even	though	
these	were	not	 emphasised	 as	 particularly	 urgent	 in	 the	 initial	 assessments,	 they	
were	 the	 first	 activities	 begun	 by	 SCI.	 I	 show	 in	 the	 third	 section	 that	 those	
implementing	the	activities	remained	blind	to	the	Khyber	people’s	specific	situation	
and	expectations	and	to	the	political	dimension	of	education	in	a	country	in	which	
the	content	of	curricula	and	the	issue	of	girls’	education	are	at	the	core	of	violent	
political	controversies,	in	particular	with	the	Pakistan	Taliban.	Prioritising	children’s	
education	 is	 the	 result	 of	 ideological	 assumptions	 of	 the	 organisation’s	
unquestioning	reliance	on	the	construction	of	children	as	unacceptable	victims	and	
as	being	at	risk	outside	schools.	
	 The	other	activities	of	 the	SCI	project	were	presented,	 together	with	 child	
education	and	protection,	as	complementary	 to	each	other	or	 integrated.	Yet	 the	
fourth	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 shows	 that	 they	 each	 followed	 their	 own	 activity-
driven	triage	logic,	dominated	by	the	ambition	of	health	care	and	food	distribution	
activities	to	reach	as	many	people	as	possible.	With	regard	to	access	to	healthcare,	
this	 ambition	 justified	 the	 choice	 of	 primary	 health	 care	 and	 health	 promotion	
activities	as	 the	primary	objective,	even	 though	 it	meant	excluding	 those	needing	
intensive	and	specialised	care.	Food	aid,	in	turn,	was	designed	as	a	WFP-contracted	
activity,	 which	 meant	 that	 SCI	 had	 to	 use	 UN	 beneficiary	 lists	 which	 had	 been	
submitted	to	the	GoP	for	validation.	The	triage	logics	for	cash-based	assistance	had	
very	 strict	parameters	 in	order	 to	ensure	 that	 recipients	were	amongst	 the	 ‘most	
vulnerable’	and	that	they	would	make	the	best	use	of	the	money	–	and	this	delayed	
the	first	cash	distribution	until	August	2012.	
	 The	 last	section	argues	 that	 the	different	sorting	 logics	ended	up	 including	
and	 excluding	 people	 in	 a	 way	 that	 contradicted	 the	 initial	 assessments,	 SCI	
strategic	 objectives	 and	 internal	 quality	 standards.	 Halfway	 through	 the	 project	
implementation	 the	 internal	 Monitoring,	 Evaluation,	 Accountability	 and	 Learning	
unit	 had	 not	 yet	 identified	 this	 discrepancy	 even	 though	 it	 was	 in	 charge	 of	
monitoring	 the	 relevance	 of	 SCI	 projects,	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 beneficiary	
selection	and	response	priorities.	In	fact,	this	unit	instead	focused	on	the	technical	
quality	 of	 activities	 implemented,	while	 field	 teams	mainly	 concentrated	 on	 their	
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own	‘coverage’	or	number	of	people	reached	by	their	respective	activities,	as	well	
as	 their	 cost	 effectiveness.	 Practically,	 SCI	 staff	 did	 not	 engage	 with	 a	 political	
reading	of	the	conflict	and	of	 its	consequences	for	the	people	they	were	trying	to	
help,	and	instead	their	work	ended	up	effectively	under	the	control	of	the	GoP.	
Elements	of	background	
The	SCI	Emergency	Response	and	Recovery	Programme	in	Pakistan	
Like	many	other	 international	NGOs	 (see	 chapter	4),	 Save	 the	Children	 started	 to	
work	 in	 Pakistan	 in	 1979,	 providing	 assistance	 to	 Afghan	 refugees	 fleeing	 their	
country	 during	 the	 Soviet	 invasion.	 It	was	 only	 later	 (in	 particular	 after	 the	 2005	
earthquake)	that	the	organisation	developed	programmes	for	Pakistanis.	By	2012,	
Save	the	Children	had	become	the	biggest	international	NGO	in	Pakistan	according	
to	its	country	director.	With	a	total	budget	of	$105	million	(Save	the	Children	and	
Mariam	 Jamal	 2012,	 11),	 it	 provided	 assistance	 to	 7.1	million	people	 (including	 4	
million	children)	across	the	country.185	
Until	 the	 summer	of	 2010,	 there	were	 three	 Save	 the	Children	 Federation	
members	in	Pakistan:	SC	UK,	SC	US	and	SC	Sweden.	After	the	military	operation	and	
the	massive	 population	 displacement	 from	 Swat	 in	 the	 spring	 of	 2009	 the	 three	
members	 decided	 to	 set	 up	 a	 common	 emergency	 response.	 They	 built	 an	
Emergency	 Response	 Team,	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 SC	 US,	 which	 was	 later	
renamed	the	Emergency	Response	and	Recovery	Program	(ERRP)	and	placed	under	
the	aegis	of	Save	the	Children	International.186	
In	 July	 2012	 the	 ERRP	 director	 presented	 the	 programme	 as	 a	 well-
structured	 and	 ambitious	 department.	 The	 overall	 objective	 of	 the	 ERRP	 was	
described	in	an	ERRP	Powerpoint	presentation	as:	“To	ensure	children’s	rights	and	
needs	are	prioritized	in	emergency	preparedness	and	response	programs”.	
																																																						
185	 In	 sixty	 districts	 of	 the	 country,	 seven	 Federally	 Administered	 Tribal	 Areas	 (FATA),	 six	 Frontier	
Regions	and	Azad	Jammu	and	Kashmir.	
186	 2012	 was	 the	 final	 year	 of	 a	 three-year	 transition	 from	 an	 “alliance”	 model,	 federating	 all	
members	of	the	brand	Save	the	Children,	to	the	consolidation	of	international	operations	into	one	
global	 movement	 called	 Save	 the	 Children	 International.	 The	 Khyber	 IDP	 project	 was	 the	 first	
implemented	under	this	new	SCI	model.		
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Map	11	Geographic	outreach	of	SCI	in	Pakistan	in	2011	by	sector	
	
Source:	(Save	the	Children	and	Mariam	Jamal	2012,	10)	
Headed	by	 the	Deputy	Country	Director	 for	Emergencies,	 the	ERRP	 structure	was	
organized	 around	 six	 thematic	 areas	 or	 sectors:	 (1)	 shelter	 and	 non-food	 items	
(NFIs),	(2)	child	protection,	(3)	education,	(4)	health	&	nutrition,	(5)	WASH	and	(6)	
food	security	and	 livelihoods.	There	was	also	a	Disaster	Risk	Reduction	unit	and	a	
Monitoring,	 Evaluation,	 Accountability	 and	 Learning	 (MEAL)	 unit.	 The	 hierarchical	
relationships	are	shown	in	the	following	organisational	chart187.	
	
																																																						
187	This	is	a	copy	of	the	version	I	was	given	but	with	names	deleted.	
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The	ERRP	was	a	recent	programme	and	had	built	its	standing	within	SCI	through	its	
capacity	 for	 rapid	 growth,	 first	 during	 the	 Swat	 IDP	 crisis	 and	 then	 the	 flood	
emergency	in	2010,	when	it	employed	up	to	2,500	staff.	Due	to	its	growth,	the	ERPP	
coordination	 staff	 had	 moved	 to	 new	 office	 buildings	 in	 Islamabad,	 and	 was	
separated	 from	 the	 SCI	 Country	 Office	 team	 which	 supervised	 long-term	
‘development’	projects.	The	two	offices	had	different	working	hours	and	supervised	
programmes	with	different	timeframes:	for	the	Country	Office	programmes	usually	
lasting	 several	 years	while	 ERRP	 ones	were	much	 shorter	 –	 a	matter	 of	months.	
Development	 project	 teams	 were	 more	 senior	 in	 the	 organisation,	 and	 some	
members	 of	 ERRP	 staff	 exhibited	 signs	 of	 an	 inferiority	 complex:	 “[The	 country	
office]	 think	 they	 know	 better	 and	 we	 should	 report	 to	 them”,	 mentioned	 one	
manager	 based	 in	 the	 ERRP	 Islamabad	 office,	 adding,	 “they	 have	 the	 impression	
emergency	 is	 a	 new	baby:	 it’s	 like	 there	 are	 five	people	 in	 the	house	 and	 then	a	
sixth	one	is	coming”.	The	‘new	baby’	was,	however,	eager	to	make	its	mark	on	the	
family,	to	the	point	of	eventually	influencing	the	other	members,	as	the	head	of	the	
ERRP	explained:	
It	is	quite	clear	that	knowing	Pakistan	and	its	vulnerabilities,	
it	 is	 imperative	 to	 have	 a	 dedicated	 emergency	 response	
team.	We	need	to	be	the	largest	 INGO	at	 least,	next	to	the	
UN	 [United	 Nations].	 And	 for	 this	 we	 need	 systems,	
procedures	 and	 SOPs	 [Standard	 Operating	 Procedures]	
defined,	 so	 we	 have	 a	 full	 package	 to	 respond	 swiftly	 (…)	
These	 procedures	 and	 SOPs	 have	 been	 built	 in-house	 [in	
Pakistan],	 they	 have	 not	 been	 inherited	 from	 SCI.	
Additionally	a	number	of	SCI	offices	in	other	countries	have	
adopted	 them,	 refining	 them	 in	 terms	 of	 making	 them	
generic	 for	 their	own	country.	Our	objective	 is	 to	be	a	unit	
providing	resources	globally	to	SCI,	not	only	for	Pakistan.		
He	continued,	sharing	his	idea	of	setting	up	a	research	and	policy	team	in	order,	“to	
produce	policy	recommendations	and	frameworks	and	to	get	involved	academically	
–	ultimately	to	serve	as	a	global	academic	resource”	.	The	ERRP	management	was	
ambitious,	 and	 had	 acquired	 a	 lot	 of	 power	 internally	 next	 to	 the	 development	
management	team.	It	was	also	very	aware	that	its	‘institutional	survival’	was	fragile	
as	 its	 funding	 was	 short	 term:	 “the	 sustainability	 of	 the	 ERRP,”	 as	 phrased	 by	 a	
senior	 finance	 staff	 member,	 was	 an	 issue.	 Although	 some	 spoke	 about	 a	
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“transition”	 (from	 the	 current	 two	 office	 structure	 to	 one	 that	 merged	 the	
hierarchies	of	both	the	emergency	and	development	projects)	which	might	happen	
as	early	as	September	2012,	by	July	there	was	still	no	official	information	about	the	
ability	of	the	ERRP	to	maintain	its	current	structure	(and	number	of	staff).	Rumours	
about	it	being	re-absorbed	by	the	‘development	programs’	spread	a	diffuse	anxiety	
among	the	Islamabad	ERRP	staff.	
Adding	 to	 the	 anxiety	 was	 the	 fallout	 of	 the	 Afridi	 accusation:	 since	
September	2011,	SCI	had	been	publically	compromised	because	of	allegations	that	
it	was	linked	to	the	CIA	fake	vaccination	campaign	associated	with	the	execution	of	
Osama	bin	Laden	(see	chapter	4).	As	a	result,	the	organisation	had	been	under	close	
scrutiny	 by	 the	 Pakistani	 authorities	 whose	 concurrent	 refusal	 to	 renew	 most	
foreign	 employees’	 visas	 caused	 some	of	 their	 staff	 to	 have	 to	 leave	 the	 country	
(Boone	2012;	Crilly	2012).188	Because	of	this	and	SCI’s	local	hiring	practices,	at	the	
time	of	my	 fieldwork,	 the	vast	majority	of	 the	SCI	 staff	 in	Pakistan	was	Pakistani:	
there	were	only	four	expatriates.	
SCI’s	2012	Khyber	IDP	crisis	response:	a	rapid	overview	
It	 is	 in	 the	 institutional	 context	 outlined	 above	 that	 I	 attempted	 to	 explore	 the	
triage	 logics	 informing	one	of	the	ERRP	responses	to	a	significant	displacement	of	
people	from	the	Khyber	Agency	(FATA)	in	the	district	of	Peshawar.	In	October	2011,	
the	Pakistani	army	launched	a	powerful	offensive	against	Pakistani	Talibans	 in	the	
Khyber	Agency,	a	district	bordering	Afghanistan	and	through	which	ran	one	of	the	
major	 NATO	 supply	 routes	 to	 Afghanistan.	 The	 military	 assault	 led	 to	 the	
displacement	 of	 several	 hundred	 thousand	 inhabitants	 towards	 the	 district	 of	
Peshawar.	 Initially,	 the	 Pakistani	 army	 prevented	 international	 agencies	 from	
intervening	and	undertook	to	assist	the	people	by	itself,	mainly	through	an	official	
IDP	camp	in	Jalozai.	At	the	beginning	of	January	2012,	IDPs	from	Khyber	started	to	
																																																						
188	 On	 11	 June,	 2015	 SCI	 was	 ordered	 out	 of	 Pakistan	 after	 officials	 accused	 it	 of	 “anti-Pakistan”	
activities,	that	is	activities	“considered	detrimental	to	national	interest,	sovereignty	and	integrity	of	
Pakistan”	 (Boone	 2015).	 However,	 two	 days	 later	 the	 Interior	 Ministry	 issued	 a	 memorandum	
reversing	 the	 action	 against	 SCI,	 allegedly	 under	 financial	 pressure	 from	 the	 UK’s	 Deputy	 Higher	
Commissioner	and	Head	of	Department	 for	 International	Development	 in	Pakistan	 (Solangi	2015).	
SCI	re-opened	a	few	days	later.	
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flock	to	the	Jalozai	camp	where	30,000	IDPs	were	already	living.189	Then,	in	March	
2012,	 the	 Pakistani	 Army	 called	 on	 humanitarian	 actors	 to	 support	 its	 effort,	 as	
explained	by	a	member	of	the	senior	SCI	management	team	based	in	Islamabad:	
In	 January	 [2012]	 there	was	a	 lot	of	 coverage	on	 the	 issue	
[the	conflict	triggering	displacements	in	Khyber]	but	no-one	
was	 allowed	 to	 respond	 to	 that,	 because	 the	 army	 said	 it	
was	taking	care	of	it.	(…)	We	were	told	straightforwardly	by	
the	agencies	that	…	‘No,	you’re	not	allowed	to	go	in	there’.	
So	 we	 were	 constantly	 getting	 the	 updates	 and	 in	 March	
what	happened	was	that	the	army	could	no	longer	take	care	
of	 the	 volume	 of	 people	 that	were	 in	 there,	 so	 they	were	
actually	handing	it	over	to	all	the	organisations.	And	for	SCI	
it	 has	 been	 the	 case	 that	 we	 have	 been	 one	 of	 the	 most	
preferred	 organisations	 by	 the	 government	 and	 by	 the	
donor	agencies	in	the	region	for	emergencies	so	there	were	
a	lot	of	donors	which	came	to	us	and	asked	us	‘So	what	are	
you	doing	in	terms	of	those	[people]?’…		
As	 illustrated	 by	 the	 graphs	 below,	 the	 number	 of	 IDPs	 had	 started	 to	 rise	
dramatically	in	March	2012	when	international	humanitarian	actors	like	SCI	and	the	
UN	agencies	were	eventually	allowed	to	launch	assessments	and	produce	reports.	
In	 the	 following,	 I	 first	 describe	 the	 initial	 assessments	 launched	 in	 March-April	
2012.	 Second,	 I	 elaborate	 upon	 the	 strategic	 six	 month	 emergency	 programme	
document	detailing	who	SCI	intended	to	assist	and	how.	Third,	I	describe	as	of	July	
2012,	the	activities	that	had	started	to	be	implemented.	
																																																						
189	A	 former	Afghan	refugee	camp,	 Jalozai	had	been	reopened	 in	November	2008	by	the	Pakistani	
authorities	to	host	people	displaced	by	ongoing	counter-insurgency	operations.	
	
24
2	
	 Fi
gu
re
	1
4	
U
N
H
CR
	ID
P	
Fa
ct
sh
ee
t	a
s	
of
	A
pr
il	
20
12
	(n
um
be
r	
of
	fa
m
ili
es
)	
	
So
ur
ce
:	h
tt
p:
//
co
m
pl
ex
.p
ak
re
sp
on
se
.in
fo
/F
ac
ts
Fi
gu
re
s.
as
px
	 	
	
24
3	
	 Fi
gu
re
	1
5	
U
N
H
CR
	ID
P	
Fa
ct
sh
ee
t	a
s	
of
	M
ar
ch
	2
01
3	
(n
um
be
r	
of
	fa
m
ili
es
)	
	
So
ur
ce
:	h
tt
p:
//
co
m
pl
ex
.p
ak
re
sp
on
se
.in
fo
/F
ac
ts
Fi
gu
re
s.
as
px
	
	 	
	 244	
	
Map	13	Internal	Displacements,	Khyber	Pashtunkwa	and	FATA,	Pakistan,	
September	2012 
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SCI	initial	assessments	
According	 to	 interviews	and	 internal	documents,	 the	 first	 SCI	ERRP	assessment	 in	
Khyber	 took	 place	 in	 March	 2012	 over	 four	 days.	 It	 was	 conducted	 by	 three	
members	of	the	MEAL	team	seconded	by	a	child	protection	and	a	health	specialist	
(see	 organisational	 chart	 figure	 13).	 The	 assessment	 only	 covered	 areas	 that	 had	
been	cleared	by	the	SCI	security	department	(MEAL	2012a,	9):	areas	adjoining	the	
Khyber	Agency	 (FATA)	 like	Bada	Ber,	Matani	and	Shaikhan	were	excluded	as	 they	
were	considered	as	too	dangerous	or	no-go	areas.		
Trying	 to	 gather	 more	 demographic	 and	 economic	 data	 about	 the	 newly	
displaced	 population	 (material	 possessions,	 health	 status,	 size	 of	 family,	 number	
and	age	of	children,	etc.),	the	assessment	team	interviewed	people	both	in	Jalozai	
and	outside	 the	camp,	going	door	 to	door	 in	areas	 they	had	been	 told	 contained	
people	 from	 Khyber.	 There	was	 an	 obvious	 difference	 between	 IDPs	 living	 inside	
the	 camp	and	 those	 living	outside.	 Those	 living	 inside	 Jalozai	were	provided	with	
food,	 water,	 access	 to	 sanitation	 facilities	 and	 shelters.	 The	 team	 differentiated	
between	the	newly	arrived	IDPs	and	those	who	were	already	settled	in	Jalozai	camp	
before	the	Khyber	displacement.	They	gathered	initial	information	from	NGOs	and	
UN	agencies	 already	working	 in	 this	 camp	as	well	 as	 from	 the	Provincial	Disaster	
Management	 Authority	 (PDMA).	 Some	 SI	 employees	 involved	 in	 the	 observation	
assessment	told	me	that	outside	the	camps	it	was	not	uncommon	to	see	three	or	
four	families	staying	in	the	same	house.	People	who	had	no	family	in	the	Peshawar	
district	could	not	necessarily	afford	to	rent	a	flat.	Some	reported	to	the	team	that	
they	had	to	stay	in	khujiraz	(public	buildings	where	men	usually	organise	meetings	
and	receive	guests)	or	in	graveyards,	and	generally	IDPs	reported	they	had	difficulty	
finding	 health	 centres	 and	 hospitals	 buildings.	 People	 interviewed	 outside	 Jalozai	
said	they	did	not	want	to	live	in	a	camp	where	there	was	no	privacy	(in	particular	
for	the	women)	and	crowded	living	conditions.	Some	also	feared	for	their	security	
inside	the	camp.	Another	issue	noted	by	the	team	was	that	of	UNHCR	registration:	
the	 process	 could	 take	 up	 to	 four	 days	 and	 required	 people	 to	 have	 a	 national	
identity	card,	which	not	all	IDPs	had.		
This	 assessment	 had	 only	 been	 an	 ‘observation’	 step,	 as	 the	 report’s	 title	
conveyed:	 Initial	Observation	Report:	Focusing	on	of	off-camp	 Internally	Displaced	
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People	 from	 Tehsil	 Bara	 in	 Khyber	 Agency,	 FATA,	 Pakistan.	 The	 assessment	 was	
completed	on	April	8-10	with	the	publication	of	a	joint	Report	on	Khyber	Off-Camp	
IDPs	 in	 Peshawar,	 Nowshera	 and	 Kohat	 –	 KPK,	 (Inter-Agency	 Rapid	 Assessment	
2012),	also	commonly	referred	to	as	IARA,	in	which	SCI	participated	together	with	
UN	agencies	and	other	NGOs.	The	 IARA	assessed	people	outside	 Jalozai	only.	The	
IARA	 report	 was	 clear	 on	 the	 fact	 that	most	 IDPs	 (84.6%)	 were	 in	 the	 Peshawar	
district	 (Inter-Agency	 Rapid	 Assessment	 2012,	 7),	 and	 that	 the	 areas	 with	 the	
highest	concentration	of	 IDPs	were	those	bordering	the	FATA	(Inter-Agency	Rapid	
Assessment	2012,	29).	The	report	also	stated	a	significant	number	of	the	IDPs	living	
outside	 the	 camp	 were	 not	 registered	 with	 the	 UNHCR	 (Inter-Agency	 Rapid	
Assessment	 2012,	 14).	 People	were	 allowed	 to	 register	 outside	 Jalozai,	 but	 some	
could	not	afford	to	reach	registration	points,	and	others	did	not	have	the	required	
identity	 cards.	 The	 UN	 organised	 food	 distribution	 outside	 Jalozai,	 but	 only	 for	
those	registered.	The	IARA	did	notice	that:		
Displacements	 are	 mainly	 occurring	 from	 Bara	 Tehsil	 in	
Khyber	 Agency	 where	 a	 number	 of	 new	 areas	 and	 tribal	
groups	 have	 recently	 been	 notified	 as	 eligible	 [emphasis	
added]	 for	 IDP	 assistance	 following	 scaling	 up	 of	 security	
operations	 in	 their	areas.	 (Inter-Agency	Rapid	Assessment	
2012,	3)	
As	an	INGO	based	in	Peshawar	confirmed	to	me,	this	implied	that	the	GoP	classified	
some	 tribal	 groups	 from	 Khyber	 as	 not	 eligible	 for	 assistance.	 Finally,	 the	 IARA	
report	insisted	that	“when	asked	about	their	immediate	needs,	it	was	evident	from	
the	responses	that	Shelter	and	Food	were	the	most	important	and	immediate	basic	
needs	of	the	Khyber	off-camp	IDPs”	(Inter-Agency	Rapid	Assessment	2012,	26).	
SCI	strategy	
Referring	 to	 these	 two	assessments,	 in	April	 the	SCI	ERRP	drafted	an	SCI	 strategy	
document	 defining	 ‘target	 locations’,	 ‘target	 groups’,	 ‘objectives’,	 ‘activities’	 and	
‘expected	results’	for	each	of	the	sectors	for	the	next	six	months.190	The	document	
was	 set	 as	 the	 reference	 point	 for	 all	 future	 grant	 requests	 sent	 to	 institutional	
donors,	as	well	as	SCI	members.	The	 ‘overall	programme	goal’	of	 the	project	was	
																																																						
190	 Child	 Protection,	 Education,	 Food	 Aid,	 Food	 Security	 and	 Livelihoods,	 Health	 and	 Nutrition,	
Shelter	&	Non-Food	Items,	as	well	as	Disaster	Risk	Reduction.	
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phrased	 as	 follows:	 “To	 respond	 to	 the	 immediate	 needs	 of	 internally	 displaced	
children	 of	 Khyber	 Agency,	 their	 families	 and	 host	 communities	 in	 KPK	 province,	
Pakistan”	(Save	the	Children	2012b,	11).	Children	structured	the	whole	rhetoric	of	
the	 strategy	 document.	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 table	 summarising	 the	 ‘beneficiary	
targets’,	two	columns	were	allocated	to	the	counting	units:	“total”,	and	“children”	
(Save	the	Children	2012b,	13).	
	 The	 SCI	 strategy	 document	 stated	 that	 “almost	 half	 a	 million	 have	 been	
displaced,	 and	 Save	 the	 Children	 is	 estimating	 that	 over	 600,000	 in	 total	 will	 be	
displaced	if	military	operations	continue	–	among	which	over	300,000	are	expected	
to	 be	 children”191	 (Save	 the	 Children	 2012b,	 3).	 The	 event	 triggering	 the	
displacement	was	summarised	as	follows:		
Security	operations	by	 the	Government	of	Pakistan	against	
non-state	armed	groups	have	displaced	more	than	a	quarter	
of	 a	 million	 men,	 women	 and	 children	 from	 Bara	 Tehsil,	
Khyber	 Agency	 in	 the	 Federally	 Administered	 Tribal	 Areas	
(FATA)	of	Pakistan.	(Save	the	Children	2012b,	4)	
No	other	 comment	or	analysis	was	made.	Sometimes	 ‘security	operations’	
were	 called	 ‘military	 operations’	 but	 the	 strategy	 document	 did	 not	 say	why	 the	
Pakistani	military	was	in	these	areas	at	this	time,	nor	did	they	directly	refer	to	the	
Pakistani	 government	 as	 a	 party	 to	 the	 conflict	 or	 to	 the	 tribal	 targeting	 of	
assistance	alluded	to	in	the	IARA	report.	Everything	was	phrased	as	if	the	Pakistani	
military	was	an	actor	 independent	of	 the	Pakistani	government	 that,	 in	 turn,	was	
acknowledged	as	a	key	partner	for	the	sustainability	of	SCI’s	response.	
The	 overall	 SCI	 goal	 was	 “to	 reach	 250,000	 children	 and	 their	 families	
(estimated	 500,000	 beneficiaries	 in	 total)”	 (Save	 the	 Children	 2012b,	 3).	 The	
document	 explicitly	 added:	 “We	will	 be	 targeting	 both	 the	 recent	 IDPs	 and	 host	
communities	and	the	target	therefore	exceeds	the	benchmark	of	reaching	20%	of	
the	 affected	 population	 and	 25%	 of	 the	 affected	 children”	 (Save	 the	 Children	
2012b,	3).	 These	were	SCI	 global	benchmarks	 that	 the	organisation	defined	as	 its	
																																																						
191	 This	 forecast	 proved	 approximately	 correct	 according	 to	 information	 gathered	 by	 the	 UNHCR,	
since	 as	 of	 1st	 November	 2012	 the	 UNHCR	 reported	 70,133	 IDP	 families	 outside	 the	 camps	
(http://complex.pakresponse.info/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=nx_6DTW94cU%3d&tabid=64&mid=656)	
which	makes	approximately	550,000	people	 if	one	uses	 the	average	number	of	people	per	 family	
deduced	from	the	IARA	report	of	77,453	people	and	9,744	families	(Inter-Agency	Rapid	Assessment	
2012,	7)	
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goal	 in	 any	 emergency	 response.	 Within	 this	 benchmark,	 the	 strategy192	 was	 to	
“primarily	 target	 vulnerable	 IDPs	 from	 Khyber	 Agency	 living	 in	 off-camp	 host	
communities	outside	of	Jalozai	Camp,	in	areas	where	the	highest	concentration	of	
IDPs	 are	 settling”	 (Save	 the	 Children	 2012b,	 11).	 It	 concentrated	 on	 the	 issue	 of	
unregistered	 people,	 showing	 “they	 have	 little	 if	 any	 access	 to	 urgently	 needed	
services	and	facilities”	(Save	the	Children	2012b,	12).	
	
Map	14	Union	Councils	targeted	by	the	SCI	strategy,	Peshawar	district,	Pakistan	
	
Source:	(Save	the	Children	2012b,	11)	
As	 mentioned	 above,	 SCI’s	 objective	 was	 to	 respond	 to	 ‘immediate	 needs’.	 The	
expression	was,	 however,	 not	 precisely	 defined	 in	 the	 strategy	document.	As	 the	
various	 components	 of	 the	 response	were	 described,	 it	 appeared	 that	 what	was	
more	 important	 to	 SCI	 was	 its	 intention	 to	 carry	 out	 “a	 multi-sector	 integrated	
response	 in	 KPK	province	 including	 Shelter	 and	Non-Food	 Items,	 Food	 Security	&	
																																																						
192	 A	 rapid	 calculation	 translates	 these	 estimations	 into	 a	 total	 number	 of	 off-camp	 IDPs	 ranging	
from	 475,000	 to	 570,000,	 including	 50%	 of	 children	 if	 employing	 the	 ratio	 used	 in	 the	 strategy	
document.		
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Livelihoods,	Education,	Child	Protection,	Food	Aid,	Health	and	Nutrition,	WASH	and	
DRR	activities”	(Save	the	Children	2012b,	3).		
SCI’s	strategy	document	set	out	how	“targeting”	would	be	done	according	to	
each	sector:	
Health,	 Education,	 Child	 Protection	 and	 DRR	 interventions	
will	 target	 locations	 where	 there	 are	 the	 highest	
concentrations	of	IDPs,	however	[they]	will	provide	support	
to	children	from	both	displaced	and	host	communities.	The	
rationale	 for	 this	 is	 that	 we	 will	 work	 through	 existing	
government	 and	 community	 infrastructure	 and	
mechanisms,	 to	 reach	 IDP	 children	 and	 their	 families,	
thereby	benefitting	both	groups.	
	
Food	Aid,	Food	Security	&	Livelihoods,	Shelter	and	non-food	
item	interventions	will	target	IDPs	(both	registered	and	non-
registered)	directly.	The	rationale	is	that	these	interventions	
are	more	targeted	assistance.	(Save	the	Children	2012b,	13)	
The	information	that	food	and	shelter	had	been	identified	as	the	most	critical	needs	
was	 repeated	 in	 the	 “assessment	 summary	 and	 problem	 analysis”	 section	 of	 the	
strategy	 document	 (Save	 the	 Children	 2012b,	 7).	 However,	 neither	 sector	 was	
described	as	a	priority	in	the	“Response	Plan”	(Save	the	Children	2012b,	11–31)	that	
gave	equal	importance	to	each	sector:	shelter	and	non-food-items,	child	protection,	
health	 and	 nutrition,	 education,	 food	 aid,	 food	 security	 and	 livelihoods,	 Disaster	
Risk	Reduction,	and	water,	sanitation	and	hygiene.	
SCI	response	in	July	2012	
By	 mid-July	 2012,	 the	 response	 was	 halfway	 through	 the	 six-month	 period	 for	
which	the	strategy	had	been	designed.	Activities	had	started	quickly	after	the	initial	
assessment	in	April,	thanks	to	SCI’s	own	funds	(which	they	called	“seed	funding”),	
and	various	institutional	donors.	
Figure	16	Breakdown	of	donor	funding	for	the	SCI	Khyber	IDP	response	as	of	July	
2012	
Donor	 Country	 April	 May	 June	 July	 August	 Sept	 Oct	 Nov	 Dec	
Danida	 Denmark	 Education	+	Health	/	$76	000	 		 		 		
SIDA	 Sweden	 Education	+	Child	Protection	/	$54	000	 		 		 		 		
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WFP	
United	
Nations	
Food	Distribution	/	$340	000	+	Food	in	kind	
(worth	$9	million)	
		 		 		 		
ECHO	
European	
Union	
		
Health	+	NFI,	Child	Protection	+	Cash	Based	
response	/	€3	million	
		 		
OFDA	 USA	 		 Cash	Based	Response	/	$1.4	million	 		 		
MOFA	 Norway	 		 		 		 		 	?/	approx	$1.4		
Source:	the	author,	based	on	interviews	
In	July	2012,	the	SCI	was	running	activities	in	primary	health	care,	education,	
child	 protection,	 non-food	 items	 and	 food	 aid	 (Save	 the	 Children	 2012e)	 for	 off-
camp	 IDPs	 in	 the	 Peshawar	 district.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 SCI’s	 security	
management	forbade	the	assessment	team	to	go	to	areas	close	to	the	FATA	border,	
which	de	facto	excluded	those	areas	with	the	highest	concentration	of	IDPs	in	the	
Peshawar	district	(Inter-Agency	Rapid	Assessment	2012,	29)	such	as	Sheikhan,	Bada	
Ber	and	Mattani	(see	Map	14).		
SCI	had	provided	 food	 to	about	140,000	people,	who	had	 to	be	 registered	
(Save	 the	 Children	 2012b,	 25),	 a	 condition	 imposed	 by	 the	 donor	 (WFP).	 Finally,	
“shelter”	 and	 “livelihoods”	 issues	 were	 to	 be	 addressed	 together	 from	 August	
onwards193	through	providing	cash	assistance	to	the	“extremely	vulnerable	conflict-
affected	households	who	 [were]	unable	 to	meet	 immediate	 shelter,	 food-security	
and	 other	 essential	 needs	 of	 their	 families”	 (Save	 the	 Children	 2012d).	 While	
considered	 a	 priority	 in	 both	 assessments	 (Inter-Agency	 Rapid	 Assessment	 2012,	
26),	food	and	shelter	activities	were	actually	the	last	to	be	started.	
The	power	of	security	management	
While	 SCI	 strategy	 insisted	 that	 it	 should	 prioritise	 “areas	 where	 the	 highest	
concentration	 of	 IDPs	 are	 settling”	 (Save	 the	 Children	 2012b,	 11),	 SCI	 security	
management	 prevented	 SCI	 staff	 from	 going	 to	 places	 like	 Bada	 Ber,	Matani	 and	
Shaikhan	 (see	map	 14),	 the	 very	 places	 that	were	 hosting	 the	 highest	 density	 of	
displaced	people	according	to	its	initial	assessment	(Inter-Agency	Rapid	Assessment	
2012,	 29).	 The	 first	 part	 of	 this	 section	 describes	 the	 control	 the	 security	
																																																						
193	When	I	interviewed	the	Senior	Food	Security	and	Livelihoods	Coordinator	of	Peshawar	on	25	July,	
the	field	teams	were	verifying	the	assessment	of	who	would	be	allocated	cash	grants;	the	next	step	
of	the	cash	grant	allocation	was	to	be	done	at	the	beginning	of	August.	
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department	 had	 over	 which	 areas	 the	 field	 teams	 could	 go	 to	 and,	 hence,	
implement	 activities	 in.	 This	 power	 appeared	 to	 be	 accepted	 by	 SCI	 staff.	 The	
second	part	shows	that,	as	 I	experienced	myself,	 staff	were	expected	to	obey	the	
rules	and	orders	of	 security	officers	 rather	 than	using	 their	personal	 judgment	 to	
assess	 the	 risks	 and	 benefits	 of	 their	 mission.	 The	 third	 part	 shows	 that	 SCI’s	
security	 strategy	 in	 Khyber	 relied	 on	 information	 passed	 on	 by	 the	 UN	 and	 the	
Pakistani	 Security	 Agencies	 and	 on	 the	 organisation	 being	 locally	 perceived	 as	 a	
governmental	agency.	In	practice,	the	way	security	was	managed	kept	SCI	staff	at	a	
distance	 from	the	people	 they	were	meant	 to	assist,	and	 induced	triage	practices	
that	 excluded	 populations	 living	 in	 areas	 considered	 ‘uncleared’	 by	 the	 Pakistani	
army	due	to	suspected	insurgent	presence.	
Insecurity	as	an	unquestionable	constraint	
According	 to	 the	 SCI	 ‘Field	 Security	 Handbook	 for	 NGO	 Staff’194	 (the	 Security	
Handbook),	security	management	is	about	“minimising	risks	to	staff,	assets,	and	the	
organization”	 (Shaun	 Bickley	 2010,	 6).	 At	 the	 time	 I	 carried	 out	 this	 study,	 SCI	
security	management	in	Pakistan	was	mainly	the	field	of	internal	experts	working	in	
a	department	dedicated	to	security	and	safety.	
The	 Security	 Handbook	 emphasises	 on	 several	 occasions	 the	 role	 of	 each	
and	every	member	of	staff	in	the	daily	appraisal	of	security	(Shaun	Bickley	2010,	11,	
63).	 It	 also	 underlines	 the	 importance	 of	 disseminating	 safety	 and	 security	
information	 and	 regularly	 discussing	 risks	 “as	 a	 team”	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 better	
responses	 to	 safety	 and	 security	 incidents	when	 they	 occur	 (Shaun	 Bickley	 2010,	
198).	 Yet	what	 I	 observed	 in	 Pakistan	 in	 practice	was	 very	 different.	 The	ways	 in	
which	 staff	 members	 outside	 the	 security	 department	 talked	 about	 risks	 and	
security	 was	 mostly	 vague.	 When	 describing	 their	 daily	 activities	 they	 did	 not	
mention	risk	analysis,	nor	did	 they	seem	to	have	a	nuanced	understanding	of	 the	
context	 or	 of	 why	 the	 established	 security	 rules	 were	 relevant.	 Rather	 they	
mentioned	 insecurity	 as	 an	 external	 constraint	 managed	 by	 the	 security	
department:	 “We	are	 in	 close	 coordination	with	our	 security	department	 and	we	
might	 expand,	 but	 it’s	 not	 sure…”	 said	 a	 MEAL	 officer	 who	 was	 waiting	 for	 the	
																																																						
194	http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/8677621-safety-first		
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security	 department’s	 approval	 to	 expand	 the	 response	 to	 other	 areas	 in	 the	
Peshawar	 district.	 Another	 officer	 explained	 that,	 “assessment	 was	 a	 challenge,	
because	of	security	constraints.	We	[only]	went	to	areas	that	were	security	cleared	
[by	 the	 SCI	 security	 department]”.	 The	 internal	 safety	 constraints	 were	 several	
times	referred	to	on	a	par	with	external	administrative	constraints	coming	from	the	
Pakistani	 authorities:	 “Will	 the	 government	 give	 us	 an	 NOC	 to	 go	 to	 the	 areas	
bordering	FATA?	Would	our	security	assessment	allow	it?”	were	mentioned	as	the	
two	 main	 questions	 a	 programme	 manager	 was	 facing	 at	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 SCI	
response.		
Headed	 by	 the	 Director	 of	 Security	 and	 Safety	 in	 Islamabad,	 the	 security	
department	had	a	 lot	of	power.	First,	 it	had	the	authority	to	declare	areas	as	 ‘no-
go’,	considered	too	dangerous	for	staff	regardless	of	the	needs	or	numbers	of	IDPs	
present.	As	explained	by	one	of	the	Peshawar	staff:	
We	are	working	very	carefully	and	with	a	very	limited	access.	
We’re	trying	hard	to	access	areas,	but	always	need	a	security	
clearance.	We	could	target	more	areas	(…)	We	wanted	to	go	
to	these	areas	closer	to	Bara	but	Security	don’t	want	[us	to].	
Some	areas	we	could	access	and	would	not	be	dangerous	but	
Security	does	not	allow	 [it].	 Some	other	areas	would	be	 too	
dangerous	and	we	agree.	It	depends	on	the	areas.		
	
Security	 management	 also	 kept	 an	 eye	 on	 micro-aspects	 of	 programme	
implementation:	field	officers	said	that	each	week	they	shared	their	work	plan	with	
their	 management	 team	 and	 with	 Security.	 Most	 people	 spoke	 of	 security	 as	 a	
person	rather	than	designating	the	people	of	this	department	they	interacted	with.	
Risk	assessments	related	to	their	movements	 in	the	field	had	to	be	carried	out	by	
Security.	 In	order	 to	ensure	 that	 the	 two	hundred	Peshawar	staff	members	could	
work	in	a	‘safe	environment’,	they	had	to	tell	the	logistics	department	twenty-four	
hours	in	advance	where	they	intended	to	go;	but	they	could	only	go	with	Security	
approval.	 If	 the	security	department	refused	clearance,	“the	teams	would	adapt”,	
as	one	field	officer	said,	which	meant	they	either	stayed	at	the	Peshawar	office	or	
went	to	another	location	that	was	‘cleared’.	
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Staff	were	 sometimes	prevented	 from	going	 into	 the	 field	 to	 visit	 sites,	 as	
this	 email	 received	 from	 a	 Peshawar-based	member	 of	 staff	 after	 the	 end	 of	my	
field	study	shows:	
Security	 [situation]	 has	 been	 pretty	 bad	 and	 I	 often	 don’t	
have	 clearance	 to	 go	 out	 into	 the	 field,	 which	 is	 why	 it	 is	
incredibly	difficult	to	leave	the	office.	Following	the	security	
incident	in	Peshawar	today,	the	office	has	been	closed	down	
till	further	notice.	Hopefully	it	doesn’t	get	any	worse!		
I	was	told	that	between	April	and	July	security	management	had	suspended	
activities	four	or	five	times,	for	between	seven	to	fourteen	days	each.	So	employees	
were	physically	kept	away	from	their	field	sites	for	long	periods	of	time.	
Those	 who	 criticised	 security	 management	 did	 so	 very	 cautiously	 and	
quietly,	 which	 I	 also	 interpreted	 as	 a	 methodological	 bias	 as	 I	 was	 doing	 Skype	
interviews	from	the	Islamabad	office	where	most	of	the	security	management	team	
was	based:	 interviewees	may	have	not	dared	to	criticise	them.	But	generally	staff	
worked	on	the	premise	that	inside	SCI	and	the	safe	spaces	SCI	created	for	the	IDPs	
was	secure	and	‘outside’	was	insecure.	This	discourse	of	danger	being	potentially	all	
around	was	all	the	more	powerful	for	being	enshrined	in	the	wider	discourse	in	the	
humanitarian	arena	 that	 the	danger	was	now	greater	 than	ever	 for	humanitarian	
workers	 (Fast	 2014;	 Associated	 Press	 2012),	 a	 perception	 also	 adopted	 by	 the	
Security	Handbook,	as	its	introduction	shows:		
Few	issues	in	recent	years	have	grabbed	the	attention	of	the	
humanitarian	 aid	 community	 more	 than	 the	 increasing	
problem	 of	 insecurity.	 Around	 the	 world,	 humanitarian	
workers	 are	 being	 targeted	 as	 never	 before.	 According	 to	
the	UN,	international	aid	work	has	now	become	one	of	the	
world’s	most	hazardous	professions	(Deen	2006).	However,	
unlike	 in	 other	 hazardous	 occupations,	 the	 risk	 to	 aid	
workers	comes	mainly	in	the	form	of	intentional	violence,	as	
aid	 workers	 regularly	 face	 being	 harassed,	 attacked,	
kidnapped,	or	worse.	(Shaun	Bickley	2010,	1)	
According	to	one	of	the	security	employees,	security	management	was	not	initially	
seen	as	a	priority	by	field	teams,	
We	 [the	 security	 department]	 used	 to	 have	 issues	 of	
funding.	Now	we	are	making	sure	that	every	proposal	that	is	
being	 submitted	 does	 have	 sufficient	 funds	 for	 safety	 and	
security.	That’s	cleaning	up	now	(…)	Since	the	last	two	years,	
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management	decided	they	had	to	have	a	dedicated	security	
focal	person.	In	the	staff,	acceptance	of	security	issues	were	
not	clear	 initially,	but	 that	 is	much,	much	better	now.	Now	
they’ve	understood	it	is	a	serious	issue.		
For	another	of	the	security	staff,	“the	challenge	[was]	to	put	these	rules	and	
regulations	 in	 peoples’	 heads	 –	 get	 them	 to	 accept	 them.	Making	 them	 a	 logical	
thing	rather	than	from	top	to	bottom	is	a	challenge”.	He	added:	“A	key	aspect	of	my	
job	is	to	get	people	to	trust	me”.	People	had	to	trust	security	managers’	analysis	of	
the	environment’s	risks	and	opportunities	and	to	trust	that	the	rules	were	relevant	
and	proportionate.	People	had	to	internalise	these	rules	on	the	basis	of	trust	rather	
than	on	the	basis	of	their	judgment	of	the	information	they	accessed.	This	scenario	
gave	security	management	and	those	supporting	it	a	great	deal	of	power	within	the	
organisation.	
The	tools	of	SCI	security	management:	containment	and	staff’	trust	
I	experienced	this	association	between	trust	and	power	as	I	was	preparing	my	field	
study	with	SCI.	The	week	before	my	departure	I	received	an	email	from	a	member	
of	security	management	 in	 Islamabad	(hereafter	referred	to	as	 Islamabad	security	
person),	 copying	 the	 Country	Director	 and	 the	 Singapore-based	Regional	 Security	
Director	(hereafter	referred	to	as	Singapore	security	person):	
Due	 to	 very	 recent	 developments	 on	 Security	 Canvass	 in	
Pakistan,	 we	 are	 reviewing	 our	 profile	 and	 security	
protocols.	Until	further	notice	no	new	visits	or	internships	to	
PkCO	 [Pakistan	 Country	 Office]	 can	 be	 considered,	 unless	
they	 are	 related	 to	 an	 as	 yet	 unforeseen	mega	 emergency	
response.	 We	 are	 currently	 reviewing	 the	 list	 of	 all	
forthcoming	missions	that	have	already	been	approved	and	
will	very	likely	cancel	many	of	these.		
	
I	understand	that	your	visit	 is	among	those	visits	 that	have	
been	planned	for	a	long	time	and	I	can	foresee	management	
support	for	this	visit.	Still	I	will	be	able	to	confirm	this	in	next	
24	hours.195	
Straight	after	this	email	I	received	reassurance	from	the	Country	Director,	copying	
his	 three	deputies,	 that	he	had	approved	my	visit	 and	 that	 it	would	 therefore	go	
ahead.	This	was	a	 formal	demonstration	of	 the	fact	 that	the	Country	Director	still	
																																																						
195	SCI	Director	Security	and	Safety	in	Islamabad,	email	received	27	June,	2012.	
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had	more	power	than	security	management.	As	the	Singapore	security	person	had	
told	me	a	 few	days	before	my	departure	 to	Pakistan	 I	 had	 to	 request	by	 email	 a	
security	“pre-departure	briefing”,	I	did	so	but	received	no	answer.	So	the	Singapore	
security	person	sent	this	warning	to	me:	
Hello	Marion,	 I	don't	have	confirmation	you	have	received	a	
mandatory	pre	departure	briefing.	Please	note	we	will	expect	
you	 to	 abide	 by	 all	 Save	 the	 Children	 security	management	
policy	during	your	visit	to	Pakistan.	The	pre	departure	briefing	
is	part	of	this	and	onus	is	on	the	traveller	to	arrange	it.	Kindly	
inform	me	once	you	have	 spoken	with	director	 security	 and	
safety	in	Islamabad.	Best	regards.196	
I	suggested	catching	up	once	I	arrived	in	Pakistan	the	following	day.	Having	been	to	
Pakistan	four	times	already	and	to	several	areas	of	the	country	I	did	not	see	what	
was	 so	 crucial	 for	 me	 to	 know	 before	 I	 took	 the	 plane.	 My	 answer	 clearly	
underestimated	the	 importance	of	respecting	security	protocols.	 I	received	swiftly	
from	Singapore	the	following	lines:	
The	CO	[country	office]	has	already	shown	great	flexibility	 in	
assisting	 here.	 However	 without	 the	 pre	 departure	 briefing	
from	you,	and	agreement	that	all	SCI	security	policies	will	be	
followed,	the	trip	is	not	agreed	to.197	
The	Islamabad	security	person	finally	called	me	and	gave	me	a	very	general	briefing	
about	Pakistan	and	the	dangers	of	terrorism.	This	confirmed	to	me	that	there	was	
less	 danger	 from	 the	 situation	 in	 Pakistan	 than	 in	 not	 following	 SCI’s	 procedures	
and	acknowledging	the	power	of	security	management.	Like	all	other	employees	I	
eventually	accepted	that	I	had	to	trust	and	obey	security	management.		
My	second	experience	of	the	power	of	security	management	revealed	to	me	
that	once	 the	Country	Director	had	gone	 (he	had	 left	a	couple	of	days	before	my	
arrival	in	the	country),	security	management’s	power	was	absolute.	This	was	quite	
significant	 as	 it	 ended	 up	 preventing	 me	 from	 seeing	 the	 actual	 activities’	
implementation	of	the	project	 I	was	studying.	 I	had	arrived	on	a	Friday	and	learnt	
there	 was	 a	 five-day	 ‘Emergency	 Preparedness	 and	 Response	 Workshop	 for	 SCI	
Pakistan’	 organised	 in	 Murree,	 a	 small	 touristic	 town	 an	 hour	 north-east	 of	
Islamabad	 in	 the	 Punjab	 province.	 The	 Director	 of	 Programme	Development	 and	
																																																						
196	SCI	Regional	Security	Director	-	South	and	Central	Asia,	Email	received	on	July,	3rd	2012,	7.29pm.	
197	SCI	Regional	Security	Director	-	South	and	Central	Asia,	Email	received	on	July,	3rd	2012,	7.56pm.	
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Quality	suggested	that	I	ask	for	permission	to	participate	in	order	to	start	observing	
meetings.	The	Deputy	Country	Director	agreed	that	I	could	attend	and	so	I	left	for	
Murree	on	the	Sunday	on	a	bus	with	other	ERRP	staff,	arriving	later	that	day	at	the	
Shangrila	Resort	Hotel	in	Murree	Hills.	
During	the	first	three	days,	my	presence	did	not	seem	to	interrupt	or	disturb	
anyone,	 except	 the	 Safety	 and	 Security	 Director	 who	 came	 to	 see	 me	 when	 he	
arrived	 on	 the	 Monday	 morning	 saying	 that	 I	 should	 have	 sought	 his	 approval	
before	 coming,	 and	 that	 he	was	 not	 sure	 I	 would	 be	 able	 to	 stay	 –	 but	 without	
explaining	what	 the	decisive	 factor	would	be.	On	 the	 third	day	of	 the	seminar	he	
asked	me	 to	 pack	 as	 I	 had	 to	 go	 back	 to	 Islamabad	 immediately	 as	 he	 had	 been	
“informed	 that	 my	 presence	 in	 Murree	 was	 a	 problem”	 for	 the	 Pakistani	
authorities.	He	did	not	give	me	any	more	information.	
What	I	did	not	know	when	I	returned	to	Islamabad	that	day	was	that	I	was	
not	 to	 leave	 the	 capital	 again	 until	 the	 end	 of	my	 stay	with	 SCI.	 The	 Safety	 and	
Security	Director	had	already	warned	me	in	Murree	that	he	was	not	sure	whether	I	
was	going	to	be	able	to	go	to	Peshawar	to	study	the	project	I	had	been	advised	to	
focus	on	by	the	director	of	the	ERRP.	Peshawar	seemed	to	me	an	accessible	area:	I	
had	 already	 visited	 it	 several	 times	 (before	 my	 stay	 with	 SCI),	 I	 knew	 some	
expatriates	who	were	based	there	and	 it	was	so	close	to	 Islamabad	that	day	trips	
were	possible.	Yet	again,	within	the	SCI	framework	I	could	not	assess	the	situation	
as	 I	did	not	have	access	 to	all	 the	 information	on	potential	 risks	 for	me	as	an	SCI	
‘staff	member’	in	Peshawar.	The	Safety	and	Security	Director	confirmed	a	few	days	
later	that	I	was	not	to	go	to	Peshawar,	and	when	I	asked	whether	I	could	work	on	a	
different	 project	 in	 the	 south	 of	 the	 country	 (not	 affected	 by	 the	 conflict)	 the	
answer	remained	that	I	could	not	leave	Islamabad.	I	could	see	that	other	expatriate	
staff	 movements	 were	 equally	 restricted	 even	 though	 they	 had	 important	
responsibilities,	 and	 concluded	 that	 I	 was	 not	 being	 kept	 at	 a	 distance	 as	 a	
researcher	 but	 rather	 as	 a	 non-Pakistani	 SCI	 staff	member	 in	 a	 field	 that	was,	 by	
default,	considered	‘too	dangerous’.	
My	ethnographic	path	had,	 in	 fact,	 given	me	 first-hand	experience	of	how	
security	 management	 could	 bring	 staff	 to	 accept	 its	 authority.	 Security	
management	did	not	have	to	provide	details	or	justifications	for	their	rules,	as	some	
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of	 their	 information	 was	 deemed	 confidential.	 It	 was	 the	 only	 department	 that	
escaped	 all	 forms	 of	 accountability:	 they	 were	 not	 expected	 to	 report	 to	 the	
donors,	nor	were	they	part	of	the	internal	monitoring	unit	(MEAL).	The	power	and	
expertise	 of	 security	 managers	 regarding	 routine	 security	 management	 was	 not	
questioned	by	anyone.198	 In	fact,	a	session	of	group	reflection	on	how	to	 improve	
security	management	 during	 the	 part	 of	 the	 annual	 strategic	meeting	 that	 I	 was	
present	 for	 in	Murree	 showed	 that	people	 thought	 security	management	needed	
more	 budget,	 or	 more	 tools	 like	 “life-saving	 equipment,	 risk	 mapping	 or	 risk	
indicators	tools,	or	orientation	sessions	for	new	staff	hired”.	
The	security	strategy	on	the	side	of	Pakistani	authorities	
I	 interviewed	 three	 members	 of	 the	 security	 department.	 All	 of	 them	 had	 long	
experience	 of	 managing	 security	 at	 SCI	 or	 other	 aid	 agencies.	 In	 line	 with	 the	
description	Mark	Duffield	gives	of	the	 institutionalisation	of	risk	management	and	
the	profile	of	security	experts	(Duffield	2010a,	463),	one	had	a	background	working	
for	the	Pakistan	Military	Academy,	another	was	a	retired	Defence	Police	Officer	and	
the	 third	had	worked	 for	USAID	 in	Afghanistan	 for	 several	 years	 in	 the	post	9/11	
period	as	Country	Director	for	Security	and	then	in	Pakistan	as	a	Director	of	Security	
for	Grants	for	FATA	areas.		
These	experts	presented	 their	 task	as	a	difficult	one	because	 the	 situation	
was	 “unpredictable”	 and	 their	 mission	 was	 to	 ensure	 “that	 none	 of	 the	 staff	 is	
harmed,	affected,	or	stressed”,	and	“to	create	a	safer	environment	for	the	children	
and	 our	 staff”.	 They	 said	 they	 followed	 an	 “acceptance	 strategy”	 defined	 by	 the	
famous-among-aid-workers	 Van	 Brabant	 ‘Operational	 Security	 Management	 in	
Violent	Environment’	as,		
the	 attempt	 to	 remove	 the	 threat	 or	 have	 local	 actors	
control	 the	 threat	 on	 your	 behalf	 by	 getting	 their	more	 or	
less	 formal	 consent	 and	 acceptance	 for	 your	 presence	 and	
your	work.	(van	Brabant	et	al.	2010,	xi)	
According	 to	 one	 interviewee,	 acceptance	 was	 not	 sought	 through	 close	
relationships	 with	 the	 beneficiary	 populations	 as	 “IDPs	 don’t	 share	 information	
																																																						
198	 I	 cannot	comment	on	confidential	discussions	between	directors	on	security	 issues	as	 I	did	not	
attend	 any	 of	 them,	 nor	 was	 I	 told	 about	 them.	 The	 point	 I	 am	 making	 is	 only	 about	 the	 daily	
management	of	security.	
	 258	
because	they	are	afraid”	and	because	the	SCI	Peshawar	office	had	received	threats.	
Instead	the	external	relationships	that	were	developed	and	trusted	were	those	with	
the	Pakistani	“security	agencies”	 (I	was	not	given	details	of	which	ones),	with	 the	
Interior	 Ministry	 of	 KPK,	 or	 with	 other	 international	 aid	 agencies,	 all	 of	 which	
shared	security	information.	For	example,	SCI	shared	its	security	incidents	with	the	
UN	 Department	 for	 Security	 and	 Safety,	 received	 the	 UN	 reports,	 and	 attended	
monthly	 meetings	 of	 the	 Security	 Cluster.	 As	 one	 interviewee	 put	 it:	 “We	 are	
working	under	one	umbrella,	the	UN	umbrella”.	
Rather	 than	risk	analysis	connected	 to	particular	contexts,	 security	experts	
spoke	 about	 “threats”:	 threats	 of	 the	 insurgents,	 of	 unexploded	 mines,	 bomb	
blasts,	 of	 drones	 (even	 though	 drones	 were	 only	 active	 over	 the	 FATA	 and	 not	
within	 the	 Peshawar	 district),	 criminal	 activities,	 kidnapping,	 and	 the	 presence	 of	
Taliban.	 These	 threats	 were	 various,	 acute,	 diffuse	 and	 described	 as	 potentially	
everywhere.	One	member	of	security	management	staff	described	the	situation	to	
me	as	so	unstable	that	it	was	not	possible	to	attribute	a	“security	level”	as	usually	
advised	 by	 internal	 security	 guidelines.	 So	 in	 Peshawar	 movements	 had	 to	 be	
controlled	 in	order	 to	protect	 the	 staff,	 and	 in	 Islamabad	both	 the	office	and	 the	
staff	 had	 to	 be	 protected	 against	 potential	 attacks.	 The	 Islamabad	 office	 was	
prepared	for	potential	threats,	in	particular	bomb	blasts	similar	to	the	one	that	had	
killed	five	employees	in	the	WFP	office	in	October	2009	(Walsh	2009):	there	was	a	
strict	‘safety	and	security	access	control	policy’	with	badges	for	visitors.	The	office	
had	several	bulletproof	rooms,	high	walls,	barbed	wire	and	(unarmed)	watchmen	to	
protect	 the	 compound.	 Staff	were	 also	 offered	 the	 opportunity	 to	 attend	 a	 four-
day-security	 course	 organised	 by	 the	 International	 Organisation	 for	 Migrations,	
including	 two	 days	 of	 field	 simulation	 of	 attacks	 to	 teach	 people	 defensive	
techniques.	
Ultimately,	given	the	allegation	that	 it	was	 involved	 in	spying,	and	the	bad	
reputation	 of	 NGOs	 in	 general,	 SCI	 decided	 to	 hide	 its	 name	 from	 the	 people	 it	
helped:	“In	Peshawar,	we	avoid	 introducing	ourselves	 in	 the	community	–	we	say	
we	are	 from	PDMA.	PDMA	has	agreed	 that	we	can	 introduce	ourselves	as	PDMA	
members,”	one	of	the	Peshawar	staff	explained.	The	SCI	security	strategy	in	Khyber	
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was	to	be	accepted	as	a	government	agency	and	this	was	informed	by	its	security	
services	and	other	actors	of	the	“UN	umbrella”.		
Security,	as	mediated	by	SCI	security	management	policy,	first	framed	a	SCI	
macro	 triage	 logic	 excluding	 people	 in	 areas	 deemed	 ’too	 dangerous’	 and	 not	
‘cleared	 of	 militants’	 by	 the	 Pakistani	 army	 and	 second,	 influenced	 the	 overall	
nature	 of	 SCI	 humanitarian	 triage	 by	 keeping	 field	 staff	 at	 a	 distance	 from	 the	
people	 they	were	 supposed	 to	help.	 This	was	within	 the	macro	 triage	 framework	
that	‘child	education	and	protection’	activities	should	be	prioritised	during	the	ERRP	
response.		
Children	as	unacceptable	victims	
This	 section	 shows	 first	 that	 activities	 related	 to	 child	 education	 and	 protection	
were	prioritised	in	the	SCI	emergency	response.	Second,	I	argue	that	education	was	
prioritised	 because	 of	 general	 assumptions	 about	 the	 primacy	 of	 children	 and	
education	in	emergency	responses	that	overshadowed	the	specific	situation	of	the	
Khyber	IDPs	and	the	political	dimension	of	education	issues	in	Pakistan.	Third,	the	
section	 demonstrates	 that,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 this	 project,	 considering	 children	 as	
universal	unacceptable	victims	and	access	to	education	as	one	of	their	fundamental	
rights	acted	as	a	sorting	logic	driving	humanitarian	triage.		
Child	education	and	protection	
Child	education	was	the	first	activity	to	be	started	by	SCI	in	Khyber	‘cleared	areas’.	
The	IARA	assessment	had	identified	the	lack	of	enrolment	of	children	in	schools	as	a	
consequence	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 livelihood	 (Inter-Agency	 Rapid	 Assessment	 2012,	 23–
24),	but	not	as	the	main	issue	for	people	displaced	from	Khyber	as	confirmed	in	the	
SCI	documents:	
the	first	priority	need	for	43	%	of	IDPs	was	shelter	(…)	Food	
is	 the	 first	 priority	 for	38.9%	of	 the	 IDPs	 surveyed.	 (…)	 and	
59%	 of	 the	 surveyed	 group	 stated	 that	 they	 do	 not	 have	
money	 to	 send	 their	 children	 to	 school.	 (Save	 the	 Children	
2012b,	25)		
	
For	 75.6	 percent	 of	 assessed	 off-camp	 IDP	 communities	
their	 sources	 of	 income	 are	 badly	 damaged	 (…)	 the	 only	
available	 income	 generation	 opportunity	 to	 most	 of	 off	
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camp	IDPs	from	Bara	(Khyber	Agency)	 is	daily	wage	 labour.	
However	even	the	daily	wage	labour	opportunities	are	also	
scarce	 for	 the	 IDPs	 from	Bara	 because	most	 employers	 do	
not	 trust	 the	 IDPs.	 (…)	 at	 several	 instances	 the	 key	
informants	reported	IDP	daily	wagers	worked	on	below	the	
market	wage	rate.	(MEAL	2012a,	14–15)	
The	 focus	 on	 children’s	 education	 was	 justified	 in	 the	 SCI	 strategy	 by	 the	
consequences	and	condition	of	 their	displacement:	“Children	displaced	 from	their	
homes	 report	 having	 witnessed	 traumatic	 events	 and	 are	 exhibiting	 signs	 of	
distress”	(Save	the	Children	2012b,	9).	The	report	further	argued	that	children	were	
either	 “losing	 the	 opportunity	 to	 continue	 their	 education”	 or,	 for	 those	 having	
been	out	of	school	for	some	time	already	before	fleeing	their	area	of	origin,	“falling	
further	behind	in	education”	(Save	the	Children	2012b,	9).	It	was	therefore	obvious	
to	SCI	that	“[c]hildren	are	in	need	of	safe	environments	to	feel	protected,	recover	
from	stress	and	aid	their	return	to	normalcy”	(Save	the	Children	2012b,	9),	and	that	
“urgent	 surge	 support	 is	 needed	 to	 ensure	 that	 existing	 education	 infrastructure	
can	accommodate	the	new	IDP	children”	(Save	the	Children	2012b,	9).	
As	described	by	one	of	the	interviewees,	most	typical	activities	of	what	SCI	
calls	‘Education	in	Emergencies’	were	implemented	(except	infrastructure	building)	
(INEE	2004).	Activities	included	distribution	of	school	supplies	like	bags,	books,	and	
notebooks,	 as	well	 as	 sessions	 about	hygiene	where	health	 and	hygiene	mini-kits	
were	 distributed.	 They	 also	 included	 training	 for	 the	 teachers	 on	 the	 education	
system,	 community	 mobilisation199	 around	 issues	 of	 child	 protection,	 and	
mentoring	 the	 Provincial	 Education	 Department,	 providing	 them	with	 support	 in	
managing	education	in	emergencies.		
SCI	 was	 keen	 to	 make	 the	 point	 that	 it	 was	 not	 establishing	 a	 parallel	
system,	but	rather	sought	to	work	with	the	GoP	Education	Department.	However,	
before	 it	 obtained	 a	 response	 to	 the	 request	 of	 partnership	 in	 Peshawar	 the	 SCI	
team	had	already	started	to	establish	Temporary	Learning	Centres	(TLCs)	and	Child	
Friendly	 Spaces	 (CFSs)200	 in	 tents	 on	 rented	 land	 and	 hired	 staff	 as	 teaching	
assistants.	TLCs	were	equivalent	 to	 schools,	except	 that	 classes	were	multi-grade.	
CFSs	were	similar	 to	kindergartens	and	welcomed	not	only	displaced	children	but	
																																																						
199	For	a	critical	discussion	of	the	concept	of	“community”	see	Chapter	6.	
200	The	same	spaces	were	used	as	TLCs	(in	the	morning)	and	CFSs	(in	the	afternoon).	
	 261	
also	 children	 from	 the	 local	 community.201	 SCI	 eventually	managed	 to	 establish	 a	
Memorandum	 of	 Understanding	 with	 the	 Education	 Department	 and	 set	 up	
fourteen	TLCs	based	in	permanent	schools.	
The	 idea	behind	 the	 setting	up	of	CFSs	and	TLCs	was	 that	 inside	 them	the	
children	would	be	protected:	according	to	the	child	protection	coordinator	based	in	
Peshawar,	 “[i]f	 [they	are]	outside	CFSs,	 they	 can	be	abused,	 violence	 can	happen	
over	there”.	One	of	the	Peshawar	staff,	explaining	the	difference	between	normal	
schools	or	kindergartens	and	TLCs	and	CFSs,	said:	“They	are	told	what	 is	good	for	
them,	and	what	their	rights	are.	We	tell	them,	‘Don’t	 listen	to	strangers’	(…)	They	
manage	to	understand	how	strangers	cannot	touch	them	for	example”.	
Community	 mobilisation	 was	 central	 to	 the	 set	 of	 child	 education	 and	
protection	 activities.	 One	 community	 mobilisation	 officer	 described	 the	
‘community’	as	“people	who	share	a	common	interest”	–	in	this	case	he	meant	the	
education	and	protection	of	their	children	–	and	his	job	was	meeting	with	them	to	
convince	them	about	the	benefits	of	education,	the	importance	of	child	protection	
and	 to	 convey	 basic	 health	messages.	Mobilisation	was	 both	 direct	 and	 indirect.	
Indirect	mobilisation	was,	for	example,	the	setting	up	Child	Protection	Committees	
or	 Parent	 Teacher	 Councils.	 Comprised	 of	 volunteers	 recruited	 from	 among	 the	
community,	Child	Protection	Committees	were	in	charge	of	ensuring	that	there	was	
no	 abuse	 or	 violence	 against	 children	 outside	 schools	 and	 kindergartens.	 Parent	
Teacher	 Councils	were	 in	 charge	of	mediating	 relationships	 between	parents	 and	
teachers	 and	 building	 upon	 shared	 interests.	 The	 Parent	 Teacher	 Council	 was	 a	
form	 of	 local	 governance	 set	 up	 by	 SCI	 whose	 members	 included	 one	 from	 the	
school	and	 seven	 from	 the	 so-called	 communities	 (including	parents),	one	 retired	
officer	(government),	and	the	head	of	the	area	(village	or	street).	One	example	of	
direct	mobilisation	was	the	organisation	of	community	events,	inviting	parents	and	
children	to	sessions	where	they	were	told	about	the	importance	of	education	in	the	
hope	that	those	who	had	dropped	out	of	school	would	consider	re-joining.		
																																																						
201	 There	 were	 five	 types	 of	 activities	 that	 took	 place	 involving	 children	 depending	 on	 age:	
imaginative	 (role	 plays,	 dramas	 using	 doctor	 and	 patient	 characters,	 for	 example,	 where	 they	
needed	to	define	the	drama	and	present	it	 in	front	of	the	others),	creative	(drawing	and	painting),	
manipulative,	communicative	(debates,	story-telling,	etc.)	and	physical	activities.	
	 262	
One	 of	 the	 community	 mobilisers	 told	 me	 about	 the	 importance	 of	
explaining	 to	 people	 why	 it	 was	 important	 that	 their	 children	 attend	 school,	
recognising	that	the	reason	they	dropped	out	in	the	first	place	was	poverty	rather	
than	disinterest.	This	 linked	back	to	the	assessment	report	that	pointed	this	trend	
out	 from	 the	 start:	 children	 did	 not	 go	 to	 school	 because	 they	 were	 needed	 to	
participate	 in	 economic	 activities	 sustaining	 the	 household.	 People	 may	 have	
already	been	 aware	 about	 the	 importance	of	 education,	 yet	 they	 said	 they	 could	
not	 afford	 to	 send	 their	 children	 to	 school.	 The	 community	mobiliser	went	 on	 to	
explain	 that	 his	 job	 was	 to	 be	 close	 to	 the	 people,	 or	 to	 the	 community,	 yet	
dismissing	the	parents’	 judgments	saying:	“people	don’t	know	about	the	problem,	
they	don’t	know	what	is	important”.	His	words	implied	that	they	needed	to	be	told	
what	was	important	as	the	example	he	gave	me	illustrated:	
When	we	meet	a	father	whose	son	is	not	going	to	school,	
and	goes	with	his	father	to	work	instead,	he	explains:	‘my	
son	is	all	money	for	me.	What	would	he	do	in	the	school?	
In	school	he	gets	only	education,	not	money’.	 I	explain	to	
him,	 ‘Here,	 we	 start	 the	 education	 process:	 education	 is	
not	for	money,	and	it	is	important,	etc…’	Then	he	realises	it	
is	important	and	says	he	has	nothing	to	give	to	his	child	to	
go	to	school.	So	we	provide	him	with	things,	and	then	the	
son	gets	education.		
The	decontextualised	and	apolitical	view	of	education	
When	 the	 Peshawar	 staff	 spoke	 about	 their	 activities	 they	 never	 referred	 to	 the	
initial	assessments	or	strategy	document	discussed	above.	When	talking	about	the	
children	 they	 were	 trying	 to	 help,	 the	 only	 comment	 they	 made	 specific	 about	
those	 displaced	 from	Khyber	was	 that	 they	 had	 been	 deprived	 of	 their	 access	 to	
school	 for	 the	 past	 three	 years.	 Interviewees	 did	 not	mention	whether	 they	 had	
children	dropping	out,	 and	what	 children	were	doing	 instead,	or	 their	 role	 in	 the	
family	 or	 the	 wider	 group	 they	 belonged	 to.	 They	 could	 not	 tell	 me	 that	 they	
observed	 direct	 consequences	 for	 these	 children	 of	 being	 out	 of	 school	 in	 this	
specific	context.	Neither	in	interviews	nor	in	internal	documents	was	there	any	sign	
of	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 specificities	 of	 the	 situation	 of	 the	 children	 displaced	 from	
Khyber	that	would	justify	the	provision	of	schools	and	child-friendly	spaces	instead	
of	 any	 other	 type	 of	 assistance.	 Rather,	 they	 used	 general	 arguments	 revolving	
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around	the	fact	that	children	had	to	be	protected	and	that	their	education	should	
not	be	disrupted	even	though	they	were	displaced	(Chelpi-den	Hamer,	Fresia,	and	
Lanoue	2010).	
Additionally	SCI	did	not	consider	education	a	political	 issue.	Yet,	 the	MEAL	
Emergency	 Coordinator,	who	was	 supervising	 the	monitoring	 of	 the	 project	 from	
Islamabad,	 told	 me	 that	 in	 the	 Bara	 Thesil,	 where	most	 of	 the	 IDPs	 came	 from,	
thirty-two	schools	had	been	blown	up	by	the	insurgents	and	in	the	FATA	no	female	
had	 been	 enrolled	 in	 school	 since	 2009	 due	 to	 attacks	 on	 schools	 and	 social	
pressure	from	the	Pakistani	Talibans.202	He	did	not	elaborate	on	the	power	struggle	
between	the	Taliban	and	the	Government	over	the	content	and	reach	of	education.	
The	TLCs	were	presented	to	me	as	a	linear	prolongation	of	the	national	curriculum,	
glossing	over	both	the	diversity	of	the	education	on	offer	and	the	deep	social	and	
political	division	surrounding	the	topic	in	Pakistan	(Jaffrelot	2013,	469).	The	right	of	
children	 to	 education	was	presented	 as	universally	 accepted,	 not	 as	 a	 contended	
and	 hotly	 debated	 issue	 in	 society.	 Despite	 the	 rich	 literature	 on	 the	 politics	 of	
education	 in	 a	 secular	 state	 which	 had	 adopted	 Islam	 as	 its	 state	 religion203	
(Hoodbhoy	1998;	Nelson	2009),	the	 issue	was	perceived	as	uncontroversial	to	the	
point	 that	 no	 interviewee	 thought	 to	 discuss	 it,	 other	 than	 to	 say	 that	 SCI	 staff	
included	 messages	 about	 children’s	 rights.	 Unfortunately,	 my	 confinement	 to	
Islamabad	 meant	 that	 I	 was	 unable	 to	 observe	 these	 activities	 on	 site	 and	 this	
prevented	me	from	enquiring	more	into	the	parents’	perspectives	about	what	was	
being	said	and	 taught	 to	 their	children	 (including	children’s	 rights).	Yet	as	already	
observed	 in	 anthropological	 work	 on	 education	 in	 emergencies,	 “[c]onsidering	
education	 as	 a	 fundamental	 right	 ‘for	 all’	 eludes	 the	 question	 of	 knowing	 which	
education,	 for	 whom	 and	 for	 which	 vision	 of	 a	 society”204	 (Chelpi-den	 Hamer,	
Fresia,	and	Lanoue	2010,	9).	
																																																						
202	 In	December	2014,	 an	 assault	 by	 the	Pakistani	 Taliban	on	an	Army	Public	 School	 in	 Peshawar	
killed	 145	 people	 including	 132	 schoolchildren	 (Walsh	 2014).	 It	 was	 the	 deadliest	 of	 over	 1000	
attacks	on	schools	in	the	past	few	years.	
203	It	became	the	“Islamic	Republic	of	Pakistan”	in	1956,	yet	the	state	did	not	adopt	all	Islamic	laws.	
204	My	translation.	
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The	construction	of	children	as	intolerable	victims	
The	facts	that	children	had	to	be	put	first	in	an	emergency	response	and	that	what	
they	needed	most	was	“education”	(following	the	national	curriculum	and	insisting	
on	 child	 rights)	 was	 presented	 as	 self-evident	 by	 SCI	 staff.	 This	 was	 indeed	
consistent	with	the	global	emergency	ambition	of	Save	the	Children	International:	
“to	be	 the	 leading	humanitarian	response	agency	 for	children”	 (Save	 the	Children	
International	 2012a,	 3).	 The	 idea	 SCI	 staff	 had	 of	 their	 organisation	 was	 of	 one	
caring	 for	 children:	 “compared	 to	 UNICEF,	 we	 have	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	
children’s	issues.	I	link	it	to	the	historical	perspective	where	Eglantyne	saw	children	
suffering	 and	 took	 action”	 said	 a	 staff	 member	 involved	 in	 health	 and	 nutrition	
activities,	echoing	this	citation	of	E.	Jebb	used	in	the	2007	SC	US	annual	report:	
It	 is	 essential	 that	 we	 should	 put	 the	 world	 in	 order.	 We	
must	develop	a	powerful	international	organization	for	child	
saving	which	would	extend	its	ramifications	to	the	remotest	
corners	of	the	globe.	(Save	the	Children	USA	2007,	2)	
The	need	for	education	and	child	protection	was	seen	as	requiring	no	more	
evidence	somehow,	than	the	general	discourse	of	the	organisation,	repeated	by	its	
staff,	that	it	was	unacceptable	for	children	to	be	out	of	school.	Yet	recounting	the	
evolution	 of	 child	 labour	 over	 the	 nineteenth	 and	 twentieth	 centuries,	 Patrice	
Bourdelais	 clearly	 explains	 the	 emergence	 in	 Western	 European	 societies	 of	 an	
imperative	 for	 children	 to	 go	 to	 school	 instead	 of	 being	 sent	 to	 work.	
Industrialisation	 resulted	 in	 children	 entering	 factories	 where	 small	 hands	 and	
cheap	labour	were	needed,	until	doctors	and	progressive	minds	started	to	point	out	
how	child	labour	damaged	children’s	bodies,	health	and	general	development.	Laws	
were	 passed,	 but	 it	 took	 many	 people	 and	 more	 laws	 to	 fight	 the	 idea	 of	 child	
labour,	and	mainly	economic	and	technological	evolutions	to	reach	a	point,	on	the	
brink	of	the	First	World	War,	when	children	under	twelve	were	no	longer	being	sent	
to	work,	but	to	school	instead	(Bourdelais	2005).	The	same	period	saw	changes	in	
the	values	and	 sensitivities	of	 European	 society	which	made	wrongdoings	against	
children	 both	 unacceptable	 (value-based)	 and	 unbearable	 (sensitivity-based),	 the	
two	meanings	 of	what	 Fassin	 and	Bourdelais	 term	 in	 French	 “intolérable”	 (Fassin	
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and	 Bourdelais	 2005,	 13).	 Children	 became	 “innocent	 victims”	 and	were	 granted	
specific	rights.		
It	is	on	this	moral	edifice	that	SCI	was	founded	in	the	aftermath	of	the	First	
World	War.	 Fassin	 and	 Bourdelais	 demonstrate	 how	what	 now	 seems	 commonly	
unacceptable	 and	 unbearable,	 in	 this	 case	 child	 labour	 and	 violence	 against	
children,	 is	 in	 fact	 socially	 constructed	 and	 historically	 situated	 within	 a	 specific	
society	 rather	 than	 absolute	 and	 universal.	 For	 them,	what	 is	 “intolerable”	 for	 a	
society	 evolves	 over	 time,	 demonstrating	 that	 it	 is	 historically	 situated,	 and	 that	
certain	 things	 are	 tolerated	 in	 some	 social	 groups	but	 are	 seen	 as	 unbearable	by	
others	 demonstrates	 that	 it	 is	 socially	 situated.	 For	 Fassin,	 “all	 human	 societies	
construct	what	 is	unacceptable,	because	all	human	societies	refer	to	a	realm	with	
values	that	are	embodied	in	sensitivities,	a	realm	in	which	these	values	draw	a	line	
that	 cannot	 be	 crossed	without	 giving	 up	 on	what	 constitutes	 these	 societies”205	
(Fassin	2005,	46).	
The	 project	 prioritised	 the	 inclusion	 of	 as	 many	 children	 as	 possible,	
disregarding	any	hierarchy	among	children	 that	were	out	of	 school.	 It	was	not	an	
issue	 for	 the	ERRP	 teams	 that	 there	was	no	empirical	evidence	 that	education	or	
child	 protection	 represented	 immediate	 needs	 from	 the	 people’s	 perspective	 or	
that	 the	 vision	 of	 society	 conveyed	 by	 the	 education	 SCI	 offered	 might	 exclude	
some	children	because	their	parents	did	not	agree	with	it,	or	even	that	it	exposed	
children	 at	 school	 to	 specific	 threats	 from	 the	 insurgents	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 GoP	
curriculum.	 This	 discourse	 of	 children	 being	 the	 unacceptable	 victims,	 that	 was	
repeated	by	SCI	staff	 in	Pakistan,	was	an	important	driver	of	the	SCI	humanitarian	
triage	 in	 this	project:	 this	 logic	prioritised	children	 through	the	 implementation	of	
child-related	activities	first,	regardless	of	the	specificity	of	the	situation,	and	in	spite	
of	 the	 fact	 that	 there	were	 fewer	 donors	 funding	 education	 in	 emergencies	 than	
other	sectors.206		
																																																						
205	My	translation.	
206	ECHO,	for	example,	did	not	consider	education	a	priority	in	emergency	responses	and	therefore	
did	not	fund	education	activities.	
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A	(dis)integrated	approach:	The	micro	triage	logics	of	each	sector		
Alongside	 child-related	 activities,	 SCI	 rolled	 out	 health,	 food	 aid	 and	 cash-based	
activities	 in	 response	 to	 the	displacement	of	people	 from	Khyber.	These	different	
activities	 were	 initially	 presented	 to	 me	 as	 part	 of	 an	 “integrated	 approach”	 to	
people’s	 needs,	 justified	 by	 the	 SCI	 global	 emergency	 policy:	 “Wherever	 feasible,	
we	 must	 strive	 to	 integrate	 our	 sectors	 in	 ways	 that	 offer	 children	 and	 families	
more	holistic	support”	(Save	the	Children	International	2011,	7).	Yet,	 interviewees	
described	 activities	with	 a	 diversity	 of	 unconnected	micro	 triage	 logics	 related	 to	
the	 modus	 operandi	 of	 each	 sector.	 While,	 as	 the	 previous	 section	 showed,	
educational	activities	tried	to	include	all	out-of-school	children,	the	first	part	of	this	
section	 shows	 that	 the	 health	 sector	 targeted	 everyone	with	minor	 health	 issues	
with	 the	 aim	 of	 reaching	 as	many	 people	 as	 possible.	 The	 second	 part	 describes	
how	 SCI	 operated	 as	 a	 subcontractor	 of	 WFP	 for	 food	 aid,	 accepting	 that	 only	
registered	 IDPs	would	 receive	 it	 in	 the	hope	of	 “keep[ing]	WFP	happy”.	The	 third	
part	 describes	 how	 cash-based	 activities	 targeted	 households	 matching	 five	 of	 a	
strict	socio-economic	list	of	criteria	to	be	sure	that	money	was	only	given	to	people	
who	really	needed	it	and	would	spend	it	well.	
Health	care:	reaching	as	many	people	as	possible	
SCI	 considered	health	as	“an	 immediate	priority	 (…)	 to	prevent	disease	outbreaks	
and	malnutrition	 among	 the	 displaced	 communities	 …	 Diarrhoea	 and	 respiratory	
infections	 were	 the	most	 common	 causes	 of	 morbidity	 in	 children,	 and	mothers	
were	 reporting	 changes	 and	 difficulties	 in	 breastfeeding	 practices”	 (Save	 the	
Children	2012b,	8).	 In	 the	ECHO	grant	 request	 the	principal	objective	was	health-
related,	 phrased	 as:	 “To	 provide	 immediate	 life-saving	 assistance	 and	 support	 to	
disaster	affected	populations	in	Pakistan	to	alleviate	their	suffering	and	ensure	their	
health,	 dignity,	 safety	 and	 well-being”	 (Save	 the	 Children	 2012c,	 14).	 The	 IARA	
report	explained	that	health	facilities	were	available	in	the	Peshawar	district	(Inter-
Agency	 Rapid	 Assessment	 2012,	 20),	 but	 that	 the	 problem	 was	 that	 in	 Pakistan	
more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 medical	 services	 were	 private	 (Inter-Agency	 Rapid	
Assessment	2012,	21,	Fig.	33),	and	hence	expensive	and	not	accessible	to	the	poor.	
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The	 overall	 idea	 of	 the	 SCI	 health	 response	 was	 that	 “if	 someone	 is	
educated,	he	can	protect	his	health”	as	the	Peshawar	health	coordinator	phrased	it.	
In	 terms	of	activities	 it	 translated	 into	an	 important	and	multi-topic	promotion	of	
hygiene,	 to	 pre	 and	 post-natal	 awareness,	 supported	 by	 the	 distribution	 of	 basic	
hygiene	items	and	by	the	provision	of	general	consultations	and	free	medicine.	The	
approach	 included	 as	 many	 people	 as	 possible	 in	 each	 IDP-populated	 area	
accessible	to	SCI	with	the	aim	that	per	capita	time	and	medical	costs	would	be	kept	
low.		
The	general	medical	consultations	were	mainly	provided	by	six	mobile	clinics	
that	 rotated	 among	 several	 Union	 Councils207.	 Locations	were	 visited	 at	 different	
frequencies	 depending	 on	 the	 number	 of	 IDPs,	 and	 logistical	 and	 security	
constraints.	The	mobile	clinic	teams	each	 included	two	medical	officers	(male	and	
female),	one	Lady	Health	Volunteer	and	her	assistant,	two	hygiene	promoters	(male	
and	female),	and	two	breastfeeding	counsellors.	In	theory	each	team	was	allocated	
three	Union	Councils	(at	least	over	the	first	three	weeks	of	July	2012,	according	to	
the	 health	 mobile	 clinic	 workplan)	 and	 rotated	 among	 those,	 doing	 about	 125	
consultations	per	team	per	day	(SCI	2012b).	
IDPs	 also	 received	 free	 basic	medicine	 if	 needed	 and	 items	 such	 as	 soap,	
wash	 cloths,	 toothpaste,	 sanitary	 pads,	 nail-clippers,	 etc.	 According	 to	 SCI	 health	
teams,	 acute	 respiratory	 infections,	 diarrhoea	 and	 skin	 infections	 were	 the	most	
common	 diseases	 as	 people	 lived	 in	 overcrowded	 accommodation.	 “You	 can	 see	
twelve	 people	 living	 in	 one	 room	 sometimes”	 reported	 the	 health	 coordinator	 in	
Peshawar.	 Therefore	 hygiene	 promotion	 sessions	 were	 organised	 alongside	 the	
mobile	 clinics	 to	 educate	 people	 about	 the	 common	 environmental	 hygiene	
problems	 and	 diseases	 that	 they	 faced	 such	 as	 diarrhoea	 or	 dysentery,	 acute	
respiratory	 infection,	 skin	 diseases	 and	 malaria.	 Hygiene	 promotion	 teams	
explained	the	symptoms	of	these	diseases,	how	they	spread,	how	people	should	try	
and	 protect	 themselves	 and	 how	 to	 prevent	 the	 diseases	 from	 spreading	
(handwashing	 practices,	 for	 example,	 were	 covered).	 Pregnant	 and	 lactating	
women	were	addressed	as	a	specific	category	and	briefed	about	personal	hygiene,	
																																																						
207	Also	known	as	 “village	councils”	which	 is	a	 large	village	and	surrounding	areas,	often	 including	
nearby	small	villages.	
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the	 signs	 that	 should	 attract	 their	 attention	 as	 potentially	 dangerous	 during	
pregnancy,	 how	 to	 prepare	 for	 delivery,	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 exclusive	
breastfeeding	in	the	first	six	months	after	the	birth	of	the	baby.208	
The	initial	observation	report	drew	attention	to	the	fact	that	“women	from	
82.2	 percent	 of	 assessed	 off-camp	 IDP	 communities	 have	 reported	 decrease	 in	
breastfeeding	frequency	after	displacement”	(MEAL	2012a,	18),	but	also	mentioned	
that	 “[i]nformal	 discussion	 with	 women	 in	 assessed	 off-camp	 IDP	 communities	
revealed	 that	 unavailability	 of	 sufficient	 food	 has	 been	 the	 main	 cause	 for	 a	
decrease	in	frequency	of	breastfeeding”	(MEAL	2012a,	18).	Yet	Breastfeeding	Field	
Officers	(BFOs)	addressed	the	issue	of	disruption	of	breastfeeding	in	the	same	spirit	
as	 any	 other	 health	 and	 hygiene	 promotion	 activity,	 concentrating	 solely	 on	 the	
benefits	of	breastfeeding,	with	no	acknowledgment	 that	mothers	might	have	 lost	
their	milk	through	lack	of	food.		
One	BFO	reported	the	content	of	her	sessions:	at	the	start	she	emphasised	
practical	arguments	-	breastfeeding	was	easily	available,	did	not	cost	anything,	and	
was	efficient	over	time.	She	then	added	health-related	arguments:	breast	milk	was	
“mentally	 and	 physically	 active”;	 it	 boosted	 the	 baby’s	 immunity;	 breastfeeding	
generally	prevented	diseases	and	for	the	mother	it	decreased	the	chances	of	breast	
cancer;	 it	 also	 reduced	 the	 infant	 mortality	 rate.	 Social	 arguments	 presented	 as	
scientific	facts	were	also	used	such	as:	“it	creates	a	bond	between	the	mother	and	
her	baby”,	or	“the	child	will	be	more	 intelligent”.	 In	parallel,	 the	disadvantages	of	
bottle-feeding	 were	 put	 forward.	 These	 were	 mostly	 health-related	 arguments:	
when	 you	 bottlefeed	 a	 baby,	 it	 “is	 always	 not	 feeling	 well,	 suffering	 from	 acute	
respiratory	 infection,	diarrhoea,	germs	always	remain	on	the	bottle	as	you	cannot	
clean	the	bottle	easily.	The	baby	looks	very	lethargic”.	Breastfeeding	had	therefore	
to	be	exclusive:	“Don’t	give	anything	else	to	the	infant	before	six	months,	not	even	
																																																						
208	 The	 World	 Health	 Organisation	 asserts	 that	 “breast	 milk	 (…)	 help[s	 to]	 protect	 infants	 from	
common	 childhood	 illnesses	 such	 as	 diarrhoea	 and	 pneumonia”	
(http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/breastfeeding/facts/en/index1.html)	and	that	“[a]dolescents	
and	adults	who	were	breastfed	as	babies	 are	 less	 likely	 to	be	overweight	or	obese.	 They	are	 less	
likely	 to	 have	 type-2	 diabetes	 and	 perform	 better	 in	 intelligence	 tests.”	
(http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/breastfeeding/facts/en/index3.html).	 However	 the	 topic	 is	
still	being	scientifically	researched	and	a	recent	study	done	on	siblings	in	the	US	fails	to	confirm	any	
difference	on	“long-term	child	health	and	wellbeing”	(Colen	and	Ramey	2014,	56).	
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water”.	Women	were	also	advised	to	wash	their	hands	with	soap,	and	balance	their	
diet	 in	 order	 to	 have	 milk.	 The	 key	 risk	 of	 the	 use	 of	 unsafe	 water	 when	 using	
formula	milk	for	newborns,	however,	was	not	clearly	spelt	out.		
When	 I	 questioned	 the	 BFO	 about	 the	 women’s	 questions	 and	 concerns	
during	 these	 sessions,	 she	 regretted	 that	women	 seemed	more	 interested	 in	 the	
medicine	 that	 SCI	 could	 provide	 than	 in	 learning	 about	 breastfeeding.	 The	 main	
challenges,	according	to	the	BFO,	were	the	 low	number	of	women	who	attended,	
and	 that	 they	were	 uneducated.	 For	 the	 BFO	 I	 spoke	 to,	 “these	messages	would	
need	people	to	be	more	educated”.	Her	view	was	that	the	women	did	not	react	as	
they	should	have.	There	was	no	attempt	to	link	breastfeeding	promotion	with	the	
SCI	 food	 or	 cash	 grant	 sectors,	 so	 as	 to	 address	 the	 lack	 of	 sufficient	 food	 that,	
during	 the	 assessment	 mission	 had	 been	 identified	 as	 the	 main	 cause	 for	 the	
decrease	in	breastfeeding.	
Overall,	 people	who	were	 in	 seriously	 bad	health	were	 excluded	 from	 the	
SCI	health	project.	The	SCI	mobile	clinic	provided	only	basic	care,	and	even	though	
SCI	developed	a	referral	system	and	had	the	use	of	two	ambulances	for	people	who	
needed	secondary	and	tertiary	care209	(patients	suffering	from	chronic	diseases	or	
in	 need	 of	 surgery	 or	 emergency	 care,	 for	 example),	 Peshawar	 hospitals	 were	
private	 and	 hence	 not	 always	 affordable	 for	 IDPs.	 Internal	 statistics	 I	 gathered	
about	the	number	of	referrals	 indicated	very	 low	figures	(the	reporting	document	
mentioned	only	 seven	over	a	one	month	period),	but	 I	was	unable	 to	gather	any	
information	about	why	this	might	be	so.210	It	was,	however,	consistent	with	the	fact	
that	 patients	who	 needed	more	 than	 a	 general	 consultation	were	 not	 central	 to	
SCI’s	health	‘beneficiary	targeting’.	
Relying	on	hygiene	promotion	and	primary	health	care,	SCI	health	activities	
aiming	to	“provide	immediate	life-saving	assistance	and	support”	actually	excluded	
those	patients	most	at	risk	of	dying	–	the	emergency	and	most	serious	cases.	Yet,	
																																																						
209	 For	 women’s	 delivery,	 SCI	 was	 in	 July	 2012	 in	 the	 process	 of	 discussing	 a	 Memorandum	 of	
Understanding	with	the	Peshawar	MSF	maternity	unit	in	order	to	refer	all	the	complicated	deliveries	
to	them.	
210	 It	could	have	been	that	not	many	people	needed	secondary	and	tertiary	care;	that	people	who	
needed	such	care	went	directly	to	secondary	or	tertiary	hospitals,	or	that	they	were	never	treated	as	
they	 knew	 hospitals	 were	 private	 and	 expensive	 and	 Save	 the	 Children	 provided	 only	 general	
consultations.	
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this	 triage	 logic	 allowed	 SCI	 to	 reach	 a	 high	 number	 of	 beneficiaries.	 The	 main	
complaint	 made	 by	 health	 staff	 in	 interviews	 was	 that	 they	 lacked	 funding	 to	
continue	providing	these	services	after	 June.	This	sector	had	 initially	been	funded	
for	 three	 months	 through	 private	 sources	 (for	 the	 April	 –June	 period),	 and	 was	
supposed	 to	be	 sustained	with	Australian	 funding	 (allowing	 them	 to	 set	 up	 static	
primary	health	care	facilities)	that	had	fallen	through.	Showing	that	they	considered	
SCI’s	approach	to	be	appropriate,	in	July	2012,	the	team	had	submitted	a	proposal	
to	ECHO	to	see	whether	their	activities	could	be	prolonged	after	the	summer	for	a	
few	additional	months.	
Food	aid	as	a	subcontractor:	“keeping	WFP	happy”	
Food	aid	was	implemented	in	partnership	with	WFP	and	was	the	largest	activity	in	
terms	of	the	number	of	beneficiaries	reached	(see	Figure	17).	SCI	had	long	been	a	
partner	 of	 WFP	 globally,	 and	 in	 Pakistan	 in	 particular	 after	 the	 displacement	 of	
people	from	the	Swat	Valley	since	2009.	
	
Figure	17	Total	beneficiaries	reached	to	date	in	SCI	Khyber	IDP	response		
	
Source:	(Save	the	Children	2012e,	3)	
The	 food	 aid	 specialist	 explained	 that	 there	 were	 two	 different	 ways	 of	
working	with	WFP	when	it	came	to	the	beneficiary	lists.	While	in	conflict	situations,	
it	was	 via	UNHCR,	which	had	 the	mandate	 to	 register	 conflict-affected	people.	 In	
the	case	of	natural	disasters	SCI	teams	established	the	beneficiary	lists	themselves	
using	 set	 criteria.	 They	 then	 shared	 the	 list	 with	 WFP	 “because	 they	 are	 the	
donors”.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Khyber	 displacement,	 a	 conflict	 situation,	 SCI	 had	
obtained	 the	 food	 distribution	 lists	 from	 WFP	 (on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 UNHCR	
registrations).	WFP	had	established	four	off-camp	hubs	and	allocated	two	of	them	
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(Peshawar	 and	Nowshera)	 to	 SCI:	 these	held	 23,000	households	 out	 of	 a	 total	 of	
50,000.	In	practice,	SCI	was	given	access	with	a	user	name	and	a	password	to	a	WFP	
beneficiary	 web	 database.	 SCI	 food	 aid	 teams	 distributed	 a	 standard	 basket	 of	
99.5kg	 of	 food	 (a	 one	 month	 supply)	 to	 each	 household,	 and	 made	 sure	 the	
distribution	 site	 respected	 the	 SCI	minimum	quality	 standards:	 there	had	 to	 be	 a	
separate	 area	 for	 women,	 with	 dedicated	 female	 staff,	 shade	 provided,	 seating	
areas,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 notice	 board	 indicating	 what	 people	 were	 entitled	 to	 and	
another	explaining	the	complaint	mechanism	and	its	contact	number.	People	could	
file	a	complaint	in	a	logbook,	but	SCI	could	not	change	the	beneficiary	list,	it	could	
only	pass	 the	 logbook	on	to	WFP.	As	both	the	 food	aid	specialist	and	coordinator	
mentioned,	SCI	was	in	fact	“implementing	the	WFP	programme	in	distribution	hubs	
established	 and	 allocated	 by	WFP”.	 They	 said	 one	 of	 their	main	missions	was	 to	
“secure	a	good	relationship	with	WFP”	or	“to	keep	WFP	happy”.		
I	 asked	 the	 food	 aid	 specialist	 whether	 SCI	 had	 considered	 doing	 food	
distribution	independently	of	WFP.	He	replied:	
No,	the	value	of	the	food	is	9	million	dollars…	so	with	these	
kinds	of	procurements	we	need	validation	from	HQ,	so	we	
cannot	 stick	 ourselves	 with	 internal	 organisation	
procedures	when	WFP	has	the	food.	The	country	director	
has	some	limits	to	approve.	It	would	take	us	5	to	6	months	
to	procure	that	food.	It	is	very	good	to	have	them.		
Understanding	of	the	details	of	who	was	getting	aid	was	not	the	priority	of	the	food	
aid	 teams.	 Rather	 they	 were	 busy	 securing	 the	 place	 and	 making	 sure	 the	
conditions	 under	 which	 the	 distribution	 was	 happening	 were	 correct.	 The	 main	
distribution	challenge	was	to	prevent	riots	from	forming:	an	interviewee	explained:	
“On	a	daily	basis	the	district	police	is	called	and	their	mobile	squads	come	to	both	
our	 distribution	 hubs.	 The	 police	 are	 not	 there	 to	 hit	 them,	 of	 course.	 They	 just	
have	 to	 stand	 with	 us”.	 As	 the	 budget	 allocated	 to	 SCI	 was	 dependent	 on	 the	
tonnage	 effectively	 distributed	 another	 important	 activity	 was	 the	 recording	 of	
weight	and	number	of	commodities,	and	beneficiaries	to	fill	in	the	various	reports:	
tonnage	report,	monthly	report	and	report	for	the	end	of	the	project.	One	of	them	
summarised	the	general	ethos	of	the	food	aid	teams:	“It’s	better	to	reach	200,000	
people	with	lesser	quality	than	100,000	with	better	quality	–	especially	in	the	initial	
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days	of	the	emergency.”	It	is	not	that	teams	never	discussed	the	registration	issue:	
“We	 said	 we	 would	 try	 to	 get	 WFP	 to	 have	 distribution	 points	 closer	 to	 the	
communities”.	They	also	told	me	they	knew	that	the	government	initially	prevented	
the	Sipah211	tribe	from	registering,	but	said	that	it	was	not	the	case	anymore.	Food	
aid	influence	on	triage	was	driven	by	WFP.	SCI,	which	acted	as	a	subcontractor	for	
these	activities,	however,	saw	it	as	a	good	partnership	which	allowed	them	to	assist	
large	numbers	of	people.	
Cash	distribution:	a	slow	but	evidence-based	triage	
The	cash-based	activities	aiming	at	covering	daily	basic	needs	like	housing	or	food	
needs	 of	 people	 not	 included	 in	 the	 WFP	 distribution	 scheme	 had	 the	 most	
sophisticated	 prioritisation	 logic	 of	 the	 project.	 According	 to	 the	 SCI	 strategy,	
before	implementation,	“strict	eligibility	criterion	will	be	applied	to	ensure	that	the	
most	vulnerable	and	excluded	groups	benefit	from	the	FSL	interventions“	(Save	the	
Children	 2012b,	 27).	 The	 SCI	 Livelihood	 and	 Food	 Security	 Specialist	 based	 in	
Islamabad	 confirmed	 this	 position	 by	 saying	 that	 “if	 the	 assessment	 is	 right,	 the	
utilisation	[of	the	cash	grant]	will	not	be	wrong”.		
The	design	of	the	vulnerability	criteria	triggered	a	lot	of	discussion	with	one	
of	 the	 donors,	 who	 wondered	 whether	 people	 who	 were	 not	 registered	 by	 the	
UNHCR	 would	 be	 included;	 it	 also	 wondered	 which	 IDPs	 were	 considered	 to	 be	
more	vulnerable	–	those	who	stayed	with	host	families	or	those	paying	rents.	These	
discussions	led	SCI	to	conduct	a	door-to-door	assessment,	using	the	criteria	below	
that	 the	 country	 director	 cited	 as	 an	 example	 of	 very	 “objective	 and	 specific	
criteria”.	To	be	eligible,	displaced	people	had	to	meet	at	least	five	of	the	following	
eight	criteria:	
• Conflict-affected	 poor	 registered	 and	 unregistered	
households	migrated	since	March	2012212	
• Conflict-affected	 poor	 registered	 and	 unregistered	
households	currently	residing	with	host	families	as	tenants	
																																																						
211 Together	with	the	Malikdin	Khel,	Kamar	Khel,	and	Shalobar	tribes,	the	Sipah	tribe	supported	the	
Lashar	e	Islam,	the	group	the	Pakistani	army	was	particularly	chasing	as	it	had	ambushed	a	Frontier	
Corps	convoy	in	October	2011,	killing	nine	soldiers	including	a	high	ranking	officer. 
212	The	IARA	report	indicates	that	in	Peshawar	district,	76%	of	IDPs	had	arrived	over	a	month	earlier,	
21%	3-4	weeks	earlier,	2.5%	1	to	2	weeks	prior	and	less	than	1%	during	the	previous	week.	
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• Conflict	 affected	 poor	 registered	 and	 unregistered	
households	 with	more	 than	 two	 children	 under	 12	 years	 of	
age	
• Conflict-affected	 poor	 registered	 and	 unregistered	
households	 with	 orphans,	 disabled,	 elderly	 or	 chronically	 ill	
members	
• Conflict-affected	poor	unregistered	families	who	are	currently	
not	receiving	any	food	relief	and	other	assistance	from	other	
sources	
• Conflict-affected	 poor	 registered	 and	 unregistered	
households	with	a	high	dependency	ratio,	i.e.	when	the	ratio	
of	 children	 or	 elderly	 dependents	 exceeds	 that	 of	 active	
adults	by	more	than	3:1	
• Conflict	affected	households	without	an	adult	who	 is	able	to	
contribute	 to	 sourcing	goods	and	 income	 (elderly	headed	or	
headed	by	someone	with	disabilities	and/or	female	headed)	
• Conflict-affected	poor	registered	and	unregistered	vulnerable	
women	 and	 women	 headed	 families.	 (Save	 the	 Children	
2012c,	29)	
According	to	the	Livelihood	and	Food	Security	Specialist,	once	the	beneficiary	lists	
had	been	 compiled,	 a	 strict	 verification	protocol	had	 to	be	 followed.	The	 list	was	
submitted	 to	 both	 the	 Food	 Security	 and	 Livelihood	 coordinator,	 and	 a	 MEAL	
coordinator,	who	each	randomly	picked	five	people	from	it	and	went	to	the	field	to	
verify	 whether	 they	 fit	 the	 criteria.	 The	 list	 was	 then	 shared	 with	 the	 Field	
Programme	Manager	 who	 in	 turn	 conducted	 random	 checks	 in	 the	 field.	 Only	 if	
90%	 of	 the	 verification	 was	 correct	 could	 the	 cash	 grant	 distribution	 start,	
otherwise	the	team	had	to	start	again.	The	finance	department	distributed	grants	
by	issuing	cheques	which	were	handed	to	beneficiaries	individually	at	the	bank.		
After	three	instalments,	SCI	teams	would	visit	beneficiaries	to	inquire	about	
how	the	money	had	been	spent:	the	SCI	‘ideal’	would	be	20-30	%	on	food,	30%	on	
education,	 20%	 on	 health	 and	 20-30%	 on	 shelter.	 SCI	 staff	 asked	 people	 not	 to	
spend	 all	 the	 money	 in	 one	 sector.	 According	 to	 the	 FSL	 programme	 assistant,	
verifications	were	 done	 ‘critically’	 but	 they	 remained	 realistic	 about	 the	 fact	 that	
they	had	to	trust	that	people	told	them	the	truth	and	couldn’t	“check	whether	they	
lie[d]	unless	it	[was]	obvious”.	Cash-based	activities	were	not	perceived	as	needing	
to	 reach	 as	 many	 people	 as	 possible.	 Debating	 (in	 part	 with	 the	 donor)	 and	
designing	 control	 processes	 took	 so	 long	 that	 three	 months	 after	 the	 biggest	
displacement	from	Khyber,	the	people	who	needed	housing	support	and	those	who	
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had	been	excluded	from	the	WFP	general	food	distribution	because	they	could	not	
provide	a	registration	card	had	not	yet	received	any	money.	
The	political	blindness	of	coverage	and	efficiency	
Beyond	 the	 initial	 choice	 to	 implement	 activities	 in	 the	 Peshawar	 district,	 in	
security-cleared	areas	where	off-camp	people	had	gathered,	the	micro	triage	logics	
of	each	sector	were	very	different	and	unconnected.	The	Peshawar	staff	 included	
sector	 specialists,	 coordinators	and	managers,	but	had	only	one	Field	Programme	
Manager	 to	make	 the	 links	 between	 the	 different	 sectors	 and	 activities.	When	 I	
asked	 him	 for	 a	 document	 summarising	 the	 project’s	 progress,	 I	 received	 the	
response	below,	which	clearly	illustrates	how	much	each	team	was	actually	working	
on	its	own	output	targets:	
• We	 have	 now	 reached	 over	 189,000	 beneficiaries	 (almost	
40%	of	our	response	strategy	target)		
• More	 than	half	of	 the	 funding	 target	 for	 the	$17m	response	
strategy	has	been	confirmed	or	is	in	the	pipeline.		
• Food	 Aid	 program	 has	 distributed	 food	 to	 almost	 150,000	
people	
• 146	 more	 people	 from	 both	 IDP	 and	 host	 communities	
received	training	on	Child	Protection	issues	
• Six	more	children's	clubs	formed	in	three	Temporary	Learning	
Centres	(TLCs)		
• 4,388	 beneficiaries	 benefited	 from	 static	 and	mobile	 health	
facilities	in	the	last	two	weeks.		
• Successful	 launch	 of	 additional	 Health,	 Child	 Protection	 and	
Livelihoods	program	for	IDPs	in	Peshawar.	The	program	aims	
to	reach	at	least	60,000	people.		
• Planned	 launch	 for	 2	 other	main	 projects,	which	 have	 been	
approved,	one	cash-support	program	for	29,400	people	and	a	
1-year	Education	and	Child	Protection	program.		
Highlighting	 quantitative	 output,	 this	 summary	 of	 the	 IDP	 project	
achievement	 was	 also	 illustrative	 of	 the	 overarching	 logic	 governing	 SCI	
humanitarian	triage:	the	quest	for	coverage	and	efficiency,	which	concealed	those	
who,	in	the	process,	were	excluded	and	why	they	were	excluded.	By	not	engaging	
in	 a	 political	 analysis	 of	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 conflict	 that	 triggered	 the	
displacement,	SCI	humanitarian	triage	officially	depoliticised	its	resource	allocation	
yet	 its	work	ended	up	being	controlled	to	a	certain	extent	by	the	GoP,	one	of	the	
parties	to	the	conflict.		
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The	first	part	of	this	section	describes	how,	rather	than	reflecting	upon	how	
the	 project	 affected	 IDPs’	 daily	 situation,	 it	 was	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 project	 that	
drove	 its	 implementation	 and	 monitoring.	 This	 approach	 fed	 the	 ambition	 of	
‘coverage’	 that	 could	be	 interpreted	 in	one	of	 two	ways:	 a	willingness	 to	help	 as	
many	 as	 possible	 or	 as	 a	 desire	 to	 be	 big	 and	 powerful.	 The	 second	 part	 of	 the	
section	sheds	light	on	those	who	were	excluded	by	the	triage	process,	showing	that	
those	who	implemented	the	project	did	not	question	the	political	underpinnings	of	
their	activities.	
A	coverage-driven	humanitarian	triage		
Managing	by	numbers	
Members	of	the	Monitoring,	Evaluation,	Accountability	and	Learning	unit	regularly	
visited	 the	 field	 to	 assess	 compliance	 with	 internal	 minimum	 standards	 and	
processes.	 Their	 Field	 Monitoring	 Reports	 commented	 on	 how	 activities	 were	
implemented	and	whether	they	met	the	minimum	standards	technically	or	not.		
The	 ERRP	 had	 defined	 “standard	 processes	 and	 minimum	 standards”	 for	
each	SCI	sector.	Each	document	appeared	to	be	a	comprehensive	checklist	which,	if	
followed,	would	allow	the	production	of	an	 ideal	assessment	and	 implementation	
process.	 The	 standards	 required	 SCI	 to	 reach	 “the	most	 vulnerable	 communities”	
(SCI	2012a,	1)	and	to	check	that	SCI	teams	“have	not	carried	out	need	assessment	
in	easily	accessible	areas	only”	(SCI	2012a,	1).	“Needs	of	affected	population”	(SCI	
2012a,	 1)	 were	 to	 be	 identified,	 “interventions”	 prioritised	 and	 affected	
communities	to	be	“consulted	for	implementing	planned	interventions”	(SCI	2012a,	
1).	Non-discrimination	was	spelt	out	clearly,	with	a	reminder	that	the,	“[s]election	
of	 beneficiaries/sites	 is	 not	 influenced	 by	 political	 or	 religious	 orientation	 of	
affected	 population,	 their	 tribal	 background,	 ethnic	 origin	 or	 social	 prestige”	 (SCI	
2012a,	 1).	 These	 standards	 served	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 the	MEAL	 teams	monitoring	 the	
quality	of	activities	and	writing	regular	Field	Monitoring	Reports.	
	 However,	 these	 monitoring	 reports	 did	 not	 address	 the	 discrepancies	
between,	on	the	one	hand,	the	initial	assessments	in	Khyber,	the	objectives	set	 in	
the	strategy	document,	and	the	minimum	ERRP	operational	standards	and	on	the	
other	 hand	 the	 way	 beneficiaries	 and	 interventions	 were	 actually	 prioritised.	
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Examples	 of	 MEAL	 recommendations	 were:	 “Accountability	 to	 Beneficiaries’	
panaflexes	 [notice	 boards]	 related	 to	 Child	 Protection	 and	 Education	 programs	
were	 not	 displayed	 in	 visited	 TLS	 (…)	 Supervisor	will	 be	 instructed	 to	 display	 the	
panaflex”	or	“Education	Officer	shared,	 ‘Toilets	were	cleaned	while	shifting	TLC	to	
school	building	but	due	to	the	high	number	of	the	children	enrolled,	the	toilet	gets	
dirty’	 (…)	 A	 sweeper	will	 be	 called	 for	 cleaning	 the	 toilet”	 (MEAL	 2012b,	 2).	 The	
Field	Monitoring	 Reports	 were	 the	main	 follow-up	 tools	 of	 the	 sector	 specialists	
based	in	Islamabad,	giving	them	an	activity-centred	vision	of	the	project.	However,	
this	 only	 allowed	 them	 to	 focus	 on	 delivery	 of	 these	 activities	 rather	 than	 the	
relevance	of	the	response	with	regard	to	whom	to	prioritise	for	assistance	and	how.	
Similarly,	 at	 the	 micro	 level,	 internal	 reporting	 documents	 showed	 the	
primacy	 of	 quantitative	 information	 and	 indicators	 over	 qualitative	 ones.	 At	 field	
level,	 most	 teams	 used	 weekly	 reports	 to	 communicate	 with	 their	 hierarchy.	
Completed	by	field	officers	and	their	assistants,	weekly	sector	reports	were	almost	
exclusively	 about	 numbers:	 numbers	 of	 TLCs,	 of	 CFSs	 set	 up,	 number	 of	 people	
(breakdown	 of	 girls	 and	 boys)	 in	 TLCs	 or	 CFSs,	 or	 number	 of	 people	 attending	
meetings	 organised	 by	 SCI.	 Activities	 were	 described	 only	 briefly	 with	 few	
comments	on	 issues	 faced,	 as	 illustrated	by	 this	 full	 paragraph	about	 the	Parent-
Teachers	Councils	meetings,	a	weekly	report:	
A	 total	 number	 of	 02	 PTC	 [Parent	 Teacher	 Councils]	
meetings	at	location	of	GPS	Mama	Khel	and	GPS	Pawaka	2.	
In	 these	meetings	 future	 frequency	of	meetings	 (biweekly)	
of	PTC	to	be	held	was	decided.	The	school	development	plan	
was	 devised	 and	 committed.	 The	 issues	 and	 challenges	
came	 to	 surface	 in	 the	 meeting	 and	 action	 plan	 by	 the	
concerned	committee	was	worked	out	 so	 that	 to	minimize	
its	effects.	(Education	Manager	2012,	1)	
	 Data	 from	 weekly	 reports	 were	 later	 compiled	 in	 ‘situation	 reports’	 or	
‘sitreps’,	 describing	 for	 all	 sectors	 how	many	 activities	 had	 taken	 place	 and	 how	
many	people	had	been	reached.	In	the	case	of	the	Khyber	IDP	response,	the	sitreps	
had	both	external	and	internal	sections.	The	part	for	external	use	was	shared	in	the	
cluster	meetings	as	well	 as	on	 the	“humanitarian	community	portal”	 linked	 to	on	
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the	home	page	of	 ‘Humanitarian	Response,	Pakistan’.213	 The	part	 for	 internal	use	
was	slightly	more	detailed.	It	contained	figures	and	breakdowns	between	boys	and	
girls,	 IDPs	 and	 host	 population,	 locations	 of	 people	 reached,	 etc.,	 as	 well	 as	 a	
security	 report	 and	 contact	 details	 of	 technical	 sector	 heads.	 There	 was	 no	
information	 about	 the	 observed	 benefit	 for	 the	 people	 or	 their	 requests	 and	
reactions	to	the	assistance	delivered	that	might	have	led	staff	to	question	the	initial	
approach	or	influenced	the	nature	of	activities	or	the	targeting	done.	Numbers,	and	
numbers	only,	were	paramount,	and	efficiency	was	implicitly	expected.		
Valuing	coverage	and	efficiency	‘in	a	big	way’	
Efficiency	was	indeed	an	explicit	expectation	from	employees	who	were	subjected	
to	 a	 quantitative	 assessment	 of	 their	 work.	 Their	 attendance	 was	 monitored	
through	attendance	sheets	which	had	to	be	signed	on	a	daily	basis.	At	 field	 level,	
officers’	effectiveness	was	stimulated	with	a	target	number	of	people	to	reach	or	to	
assess	per	week.	One	of	 the	programme	assistants	explained:	“The	coordinator	 is	
setting	the	target	…	we	have	to	assess	three	hundred	people	in	a	week.	If	there	is	a	
security	problem,	and	we	can’t	go	to	the	targeted	area,	and	then	not	achieve	our	
target,	 they	send	us	on	a	Sunday	to	achieve	the	target.	 If	we	work	on	Sunday	we	
have	 wellness	 leave	 [day	 in	 lieu]	 afterwards”.	 He	 agreed	 with	 these	 practices,	
detailing	 the	 many	 potential	 disturbing	 elements	 such	 as	 “Taliban	 threat,	 road	
block,	bombing	threat,	politics”,	repeating	that	“if	one	day	there	[was]	a	problem,	
performance	[would]	be	disturbed”.	
Efficiency	 was	 also	 sought	 and	 advocated	 in	 SCI’s	 relationship	 with	 its	
institutional	donors.	The	 internal	policy	was	that	no	donor	grants	under	$500,000	
would	be	accepted	unless	 for	 research,	advocacy,	child	protection,	 ‘pilot	projects’	
or	‘gap	filling’.	The	idea	was	to	minimise	the	number	of	grants	and	thus	the	amount	
of	 administration	 involved.	 Technical	 specialists	 in	 charge	 of	 each	 sector	 were	
assessed	partly	on	their	ability	to	raise	funds	-	the	percentage	of	proposals	leading	
to	funding	was	compared	to	the	total	number	submitted	to	donors	in	each	sector.	
Here	again,	 the	 indicator	pointed	at	efficiency:	what	was	 followed	was	the	return	
on	 investment	 of	 work	 done	 by	 sector	 specialists.	 Efficiency	 was	 always	 in	 SCI	
																																																						
213	http://www.pakresponse.info.	
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employees’	minds,	as	one	member	of	the	health	and	nutrition	team	said	of	SCI	and	
UNICEF:	“We	can	do	better	work	for	less	money”.		
Coverage	 was	 a	 key	 ambition	 explicitly	 stated	 at	 the	 global	 level	 by	 the	
newly	 created	 SCI’s	 “benchmark	 of	 reaching	 20%	 of	 the	 affected	 population	 and	
25%	 of	 the	 affected	 children”	 (Save	 the	 Children	 2012b,	 3).	 This	 benchmark	was	
repeated	in	the	Khyber	IDP	response	document,	and	reiterated	by	the	head	of	the	
ERRP	 in	meetings	 in	 Islamabad	when	 discussing	 strategic	 issues.	 The	 ambition	 of	
‘coverage’	 had	 two	 intertwined	 interpretations:	 the	 ambition	 to	 reach	 as	 many	
people	 as	 possible	 and	 the	 ambition	 of	 SCI	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 main	 responders,	
implicitly	comparing	itself	to	other	actors	on	the	international	humanitarian	stage.	
The	 implications	 of	 those	 two	 interpretations	 are	 quite	 different.	 The	 first	 is	 the	
expression	of	a	maximalist	ethic:	in	a	context	in	which	there	were	more	needs	than	
means	to	meet	them,	the	objective	was	to	raise	as	much	money	as	possible	and	use	
it	as	efficiently	as	possible	in	order	to	help	as	many	people	as	possible.	The	second	
interpretation	 is	 the	 institutional	drive	 to	be	 important	and	powerful:	 in	 this	case	
reaching	as	many	people	as	possible	is	a	means	towards	the	end	goal	of	increasing	
the	organisation’s	power.	However,	there	 is	no	evidence	allowing	a	conclusion	on	
whether	one	interpretation	overrides	the	other:	the	ambiguity	behind	the	ambition	
of	 coverage	 is	probably	what	allowed	 it	 to	work	as	each	 interpretation	 reinforces	
the	other.	
Under	the	thumb	of	Pakistani	authorities	
Exclusion	bias	
Whatever	 its	 interpretation,	 the	 quest	 for	 coverage	 and	 efficiency	 within	 the	
framework	defined	by	SCI	Security	and	 the	other	 sector	departments	had	 framed	
SCI	triage	logics	in	Khyber	in	a	way	that	was	perfectly	consistent	with	the	goal	and	
modalities	 of	 the	 Pakistani	 army	 counter-insurgency	 operation.	 First,	 the	
undisputed	power	of	the	SCI	security	department	prevented	SCI	staff	from	going	to	
areas	 close	 to	 the	 Khyber	 Agency,	 areas	 deemed	 too	 dangerous	 by	 the	 Pakistani	
army	 on	 the	 basis	 they	 could	 not	 guarantee	 they	were	 free	 of	 insurgents.	 These	
areas,	 however,	 were	mapped	 as	 having	 the	 highest	 density	 of	 displaced	 people	
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(Inter-Agency	 Rapid	 Assessment	 2012,	 29),	 and	 not	 including	 them	was	 in	 direct	
contradiction	to	SCI	policy	that	explicitly	stated	they,	
will	 primarily	 target	 vulnerable	 IDPs	 from	 Khyber	 Agency	
living	in	off-camp	host	communities	outside	of	Jalozai	Camp,	
in	 areas	 where	 the	 highest	 concentration	 of	 IDPs	 are	
settling.	(Save	the	Children	2012b,	11)		
Second,	once	security	management	had	decided	the	limits	of	SCI’s	response,	
it	was	mainly	structured	by	this	aspiration	to	maximum	possible	coverage.	Food	aid	
was	the	activity	that	reached	most	people,	as	already	mentioned.		
SCI’s	 food	 aid	 role	was	 as	 a	 subcontractor	 of	 the	WFP	which	 decided	 the	
beneficiary	selection	criteria.	SCI	staff	argued	that	by	using	the	established	WFP	set-
up	which	 provided	 them	with	 beneficiary	 lists	 and	 food	 supplies,	 they	 enhanced	
their	ability	to	reach	as	many	people	as	possible.	However	the	major	exclusion	bias	
was	that	people	who	could	not	register	with	the	UN	could	not	access	food.	People	
excluded	from	assistance	by	the	Pakistani	authorities	and	the	aligned	UN	agencies	
were	de	facto	excluded	from	SCI	food	aid.	
	 The	existence	of	exclusion	bias	 in	WFP	distribution	 lists	had	been	a	known	
issue	since	2009	as	was	the	controversy	over	the	role	of	PDMA	and	the	military	in	
deciding	who	 the	 humanitarian	 configuration	 should	 prioritise	 for	 assistance	 (see	
chapter	4).	In	the	case	of	Khyber,	another	NGO	based	in	Peshawar	had	documented	
how,	 up	 until	 January,	 the	 PDMA	 had	 restricted	 registration	 to	members	 of	 two	
tribes,	the	Sipah	and	Malikdin	Khel,	and	that	only	if	they	agreed	to	live	in	the	Jalozai	
camp,	 thus	 removing	 them	 from	 the	 field	 of	 conflict	 (Anonymous	 2012,	 3).	 The	
registration	 progressively	 extended	 to	 other	 tribes,	 again	with	 the	 provision	 that	
they	removed	themselves	from	the	conflict.	Yet	for	an	organisation	to	use	the	UN	
beneficiary	lists	was	to	accept	the	risk	of	being	accused	of	serving	as	an	aide	to	the	
Pakistani	army.		
Politically	blinkered		
SCI	 staff	 seemed	 blind	 to	 the	 above-described	 political	 underpinnings	 of	 their	
activities	and	one	even	commented:	“The	non-partisan	thing	that	we	have	at	Save	
the	Children	is	really	inspiring.	That	would	contrast	with	government	social	services	
and	local	NGOs”	.	Members	of	staff	were	not	cynical.	The	organisation’s	functioning	
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was	estranged	from	any	political	analysis,	which	staff	 interpreted	as	taking	a	non-
partisan	approach.		
The	way	 the	crisis	and	 the	people	 from	Khyber	were	presented	 in	 internal	
documents,	 interviews	and	during	meetings	struck	me	as	following	the	rhetoric	of	
the	 GoP	 described	 in	 Chapter	 4.	 The	 conflict,	 which	 had	 triggered	 military	
operations	 around	 the	 Shalobar	 area	 close	 to	 Bara,	 was	 seen	 in	 terms	 of	
displacements	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 potential	 “multi-sector”	 assistance,	 but	 never	
referred	 to	 as	 an	 actual	 conflict	 or	 a	 “low	 intensity	 civil	war”	 as	 regional	 experts	
defined	 it	 (Jaffrelot	 2014).	 This	 was	 in	 line	 with	 the	 UN	 rhetoric,	 as	 the	 OCHA	
Humanitarian	Operational	Plan	showed.	Whether	 in	documents	or	 interviews,	 the	
role	of	the	GoP	and	the	role	of	SCI	in	effectively	supporting	it	were	not	questioned.	
IDPs	 from	 Khyber	 were	 described	 as	 people	 who	 were	 among	 “the	 most	
conservative	 in	 the	 region,	 reluctant	 to	 live	 in	 camps	 where	 their	 women	 and	
children	will	 be	 exposed	 [to	other	 people’s	 eyes]”	 (Save	 the	Children	2012a).	 Yet	
there	was	no	social,	political	and	historical	analysis	of	the	different	groups	of	people	
from	 Khyber,	 or	 any	 references	 to	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 conflict	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
timing	 of	 the	 various	 attacks	 and	 differences	 between	 the	 tribes’	 situations,	
especially	with	regard	to	their	in/exclusion	in	PDMA/UNHCR	distribution	lists.214		
SCI	as	an	 institution	did	not	promote	 reflection	by	 its	 staff	on	 the	project.	
This	was	also	visible	in	the	comments	made	freely	in	interviews	by	staff,	regardless	
of	 their	 hierarchical	 levels,	 in	which	 they	 inadvertently	 revealed	 their	 prejudices:	
“People	from	KPK,	they	are	not	advanced	(…)	 In	Punjab	and	Sindh,	they	are	more	
advanced”;	“People	were	living	in	very	insecure	areas:	near	Bara.	SCI	does	not	allow	
us	to	go	to	those	areas	because	you	cannot	differentiate	whether	they	are	militants	
or	beneficiaries”	 .	A	member	of	the	security	department	confirmed	this	view,	and	
justified	it	by	saying	that:	
IDP	 and	 floods	 are	 totally	 different:	 people	 who	 are	
moving	 from	 Khyber	 to	 Peshawar	 might	 have	 some	
elements	 of	 militancy.	 In	 a	 CNN	 report,	 they	 said	
children	 were	 trained	 to	 become	 suicide	 bombers!	
Nobody	 was	 ready	 to	 take	 these	 children	 to	 educate	
																																																						
214	If	it	was	done,	such	an	analysis	must	have	remained	confidential	at	a	senior	management	level,	
and	did	not	attempt	to	prevent	discriminations	against	certain	groups	of	IDPs	and	it	was	apparently	
not	used	on	a	daily	basis	at	the	field	level	to	assess	and/or	adjust	the	response.	
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them.	 If	 our	 staff	 face	 a	 situation	 where	 children	 are	
trained,	they	need	to	report	to	us	and	we’ll	decide	what	
to	do.		
	 In	 all	 internal	 documents	 as	well	 as	 in	 interviews,	 as	 transparent	 as	 some	
were	 in	 unpacking	 their	motivations	 (as	 above),	 the	 SCI	 perspective	 glossed	 over	
power	 relations	 between	 the	 different	 actors	 in	 the	 conflict	 (Pakistani	 military,	
government,	insurgents	and	tribes	supporting	them,	etc.)	and	their	related	impact	
on	 the	 various	 groups	 of	 people.	 SCI	 context	 analysis	 was	 formalised	 in	 a	 way	
acceptable	 to	 the	 Pakistani	 authorities,	 not	 addressing	 the	 political	 details	 of	 the	
parties	 to	 the	 conflict,	 their	 agendas,	 or	 evaluating	 people’s	 situation	 in	 light	 of	
these	political	dynamics.		
Assisting	people	who	were	excluded	from	official	UN	and	PDMA	assistance	
would	have	been	double-binding	indeed:	on	one	hand	it	could	have	allowed	for	SCI	
assistance	 consistent	 with	 its	 claim	 to	 assist	 the	 ‘not	 easily	 accessible’,	 the	
‘unregistered’,	and	‘the	most	vulnerable’.	On	the	other	hand,	it	could	have	put	SCI	
in	 a	 difficult	 situation	 with	 the	 Pakistani	 authorities	 who	 attempted	 to	 use	 the	
process	 of	 assistance	 as	 a	 means	 of	 bringing	 pressure	 to	 bear	 on	 the	 different	
actors	involved.	Instead,	SCI	decided	not	to	tackle	the	political	details	of	the	conflict	
and	to	treat	the	PDMA	and	GoP	as	the	only	sovereign	assistance	authority,	which	it	
was	legitimate	to	support.	
Conclusion		
In	 2012,	 more	 than	 other	 actors,	 SCI	 was	 feeling	 the	 pressure	 the	 GoP	 put	 on	
foreign	 actors	 to	 bolster	 its	 national	 sovereignty:	 threatened	 with	 expulsion	
because	 of	 the	 CIA	 link	 allegation,	 SCI	 gave	 primacy	 to	 its	 security	management.	
Within	 the	 framework	 of	 what	 was	 authorised	 by	 ‘Security’	 the	 Khyber	 IDP	
response	 was	 essentially	 driven	 by	 the	 quest	 for	 coverage,	 efficiency	 and	
institutional	growth	with	the	entry	point	of	putting	children	first.	SCI	was	blinded	by	
its	 twin	 beliefs	 that	 the	 restrictions	 imposed	 by	 security	 management	 were	 a	
necessity	 imposed	by	the	environment	rather	than	a	form	of	political	control,	and	
that	education	should	be	prioritised	over	other	needs	as	a	universal	and	apolitical	
right	for	children.	Not	questioning	these	assumptions	in	the	context	of	the	conflict	
that	 involved	 the	GoP	military	 and	 Taliban	 armed	 groups	 led	 the	 organisation	 to	
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take	an	apolitical	view	of	the	situation	in	which	its	primary	objective	was	to	reach	
as	 many	 people	 as	 possible,	 regardless	 of	 who	 they	 were.	 Avoiding	 the	 cost	 of	
negotiating	with	the	GoP	and	other	armed	groups	 in	order	to	stay	safe	and	be	as	
cost-effective	as	possible,	SCI	staff	apparently	remained	unaware	of	who	might	be	
excluded	in	this	process:	those	too	poor	or	too	scared	of	the	Pakistani	authorities	to	
move	too	far	away	from	the	FATA	border	and	families	from	tribes	the	GoP	accused	
of	 supporting	 the	 Talibans.	 The	 project’s	 humanitarian	 triage	 failed	 by	 its	 own	
standards,	but	may	well	have	been	interpreted	as	a	success	by	the	GoP	in	its	wider	
attempt	to	silence	those	challenging	its	power	in	the	FATA.	
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Chapter	8	
Conclusion	
Interpreting	impartiality	
This	 dissertation	 contributes	 to	 a	 critical	 analysis	 of	 the	 politics	 of	 impartiality	
through	 the	 analysis	 of	 practices	 of	 humanitarian	 triage.	 In	 so	 doing,	 I	 neither	
denounce	 the	 injustice	 of	 distribution	 logics	 in	 humanitarian	 settings	 nor	 justify	
humanitarian	 inequities.	 I	 do	 not	 argue	 that	 the	 aid	 practitioners’	 claim	 to	 assist	
people	 ‘on	 the	 basis	 of	 needs’	 is	 a	 lie;	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 a	 claim	 that	 can	 be	
interpreted	 in	many	different	ways	 that	 are	all	 but	 self-evident.	 The	 rationale	 for	
using	 the	 expression	 ‘humanitarian	 triage’	 to	 speak	 about	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
impartiality	 is	 interpreted	by	 individuals	 embodying	 institutions	was	 not	 to	 argue	
that	 one	 actor	 can	 be	more	 impartial	 than	 others,	 nor	 that	 impartiality	 is,	 for	 all	
that,	meaningless.	The	three	NGOs	implemented	assistance	projects	attempting	to	
care	for	people	affected	by	the	war	or	the	floods	(in	the	case	of	Solidarités),	and	all	
three	 did	 so	 without	 choosing	 to	 aid	 people	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 race,	 religious	
beliefs,	 class	 or	 political	 opinions	 and	 following	 a	 certain	 logic	 of	 proportionality.	
Ultimately,	 impartiality	 does	 differentiate	 those	 actors	 who	 claim	 to	 use	 it	 from	
those,	such	as	armed	groups	or	states,	who	 involve	themselves	openly	 in	political	
and	military	battles.	In	that	sense,	the	claim	of	impartiality	is	a	distinctive	feature	of	
humanitarian	actors	in	politically	polarised	crisis	settings	which	makes	the	study	of	
the	practices	of	these	actors	worthwhile.		
Médecins	 Sans	 Frontières,	 Solidarités	 International	 and	 Save	 the	 Children	
International	displayed	three	different	interpretations	of	impartiality	through	three	
versions	 of	 humanitarian	 triage.	 The	 variations	 in	 their	 approaches	 show	 that	 a	
universally	 fair	 version	of	 impartiality	does	not	exist.	 Impartial	assistance,	at	 least	
on	paper	for	MSF	as	an	institution	in	Pakistan	in	2011,	could	be	categorised	overall	
as	deontological,	 i.e.	prioritising	 the	 ‘war	wounded’	 regardless	of	how	many	 they	
were,	 who	 they	 were	 and	 where	 they	 came	 from.	 More	 specifically,	 it	 meant	
standing	 by	 those	 marginalised	 by	 the	 ‘Global	 War	 On	 Terror’.	 In	 practice,	 the	
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organisation	did	 indeed	manage	 to	overcome	 local	 suspicions	 and	negotiate	with	
key	stakeholders	such	as	mullahs	and	Pakistani	military	in	order	to	set	up	a	hospital	
that	could	potentially	treat	wounded	people	from	the	neighbouring	Bajaur	Agency.	
The	outcome	of	MSF’s	humanitarian	triage,	however,	was	that	they	treated	mainly	
ordinary	 domestic	 injuries	 and	 took	 care	 of	 complicated	 deliveries	 in	 Pashtun-
populated	areas	of	Pakistan,	operating	with	a	high	level	of	respect	and	tolerance	for	
local	power	relations	which	were	dominated	by	males	and	religious	people.		
	 Solidarités	International’s	policy	interpretation	of	impartiality	was	also	duty-
based,	 focusing	 on	 ‘the	 most	 vulnerable’.	 Yet	 in	 practice,	 as	 Solidarités’	 field	
managers	did	not	attempt	 to	 renegotiate	 their	 contractual	obligations,	 they	were	
caught	 between	 their	 observations	 in	 the	 field	 (people’s	 primary	 requests	 for	
shelters	 and	 their	 lack	 of	 access	 to	 underground	 water)	 and	 their	 bureaucratic	
interpretation	of	 the	priorities	 (reaching	 the	 target	of	130,000	beneficiaries	being	
provided	with	sustainable	access	to	safe	water	and	sanitation	infrastructure).	They	
did	not	select	people	on	the	basis	of	who	they	were;	their	humanitarian	triage	was	
mainly	 driven	 by	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 best	 use	 of	 their	 own	 technical	 WASH	
expertise,	the	feasibility	of	a	potential	activity,	and	its	efficiency.	Consequently	they	
excluded	 those	needing	 shelters	 and	 some	of	 the	poorest	with	 no	 access	 to	 safe	
water.	At	the	implementation	level,	Solidarités’	interpretation	of	impartiality	mainly	
followed	a	consequentialist	ethic,	prioritising	the	number	of	people	helped.		
On	 paper,	 Save	 the	 Children’s	 policy	 appeared	 both	 deontological	 and	
maximalist:	 deontological,	 i.e.	 prioritising	 the	 ‘unregistered’	 IDPs	 not	 included	 by	
the	UN	agencies,	and	maximalist,	i.e.	maximising	the	number	of	people	helped	with	
the	amount	of	time	and	money	the	organisation	had.	The	organisation’s	focus	was	
on	addressing	all	types	of	needs	in	those	areas	with	the	highest	density	of	IDPs.	In	
practice,	 however,	 SCI’s	 humanitarian	 triage	 was	 highly	 constrained	 by	 the	
organisation’s	risk-averse	security	management	(which	excluded	areas	with	a	high	
density	 of	 IDPs),	 and	 was	 mainly	 driven	 by	 the	 maximalist	 approach	 of	 a	 multi-
sector	 response	 that	 activities	 had	 to	 prove	 their	 efficiency	 (food	 distribution	
subcontracted	by	the	WFP,	primary	health	care,	education	for	all).	
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The	intricacies	of	humanitarian	triage	practices	
Despite	 summarising	 these	 versions	 of	 humanitarian	 triage	 in	 only	 three	 small	
paragraphs	above,	I	attempted	throughout	the	dissertation	to	show	the	complexity	
of	 humanitarian	 triage	 considering	 that	 it	 is	 commonly	 produced	 through	 self-
organisation	of	various	influences	forming	logics	interacting	with	each	other.	These	
influences	 can	 emerge	 from	 the	 choices	 humanitarian	 practitioners	 make	 at	 all	
levels	 of	 the	 organisation	 from	 those	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 professional	 hierarchy	 to	
those	 made	 on	 a	 daily	 basis	 in	 the	 field	 by	 individuals	 who	 can	 be	 mistakenly	
depicted	as	 simple	executers.	 I	 hope	 to	have	 shown	 that	 influences	happen	both	
ways:	 choices	 made	 at	 the	 top	 often	 influence	 the	 macro	 triage	 (such	 as	
geographical	 choices),	 and	 choices	made	 at	 every	 level	 of	 implementation	 create	
logics	 which	 influence	 micro	 triage.	 I	 showed	 that	 these	 choices	 were	 not	 only	
directly	about	whom	to	prioritise	 for	assistance	or	how.	Sometimes	choices	made	
about	 seemingly	 peripheral	 issues	 or	 domains	 also	 have	 a	 strong	 influence	 on	
humanitarian	triage:	the	desire	not	to	be	confused	with	other	aid	actors	 (MSF)	or	
temporarily	 keeping	 information	 from	 the	donor	 instead	of	 seeking	 its	 support	 in	
adjusting	 initial	 agreed-on	 objectives	 (Solidarités)	 or	 trying	 to	 avoid	 all	 potential	
risks	 for	 the	 organisation’s	 personnel	 (SCI)	 were	 peripheral	 choices	 that	 formed	
important	 triage	 logics.	 In	 this	dissertation	 I	have	 tried	 to	 show	how	some	of	 the	
choices	 made,	 which	 might	 seem	 peripheral,	 were	 actually	 instrumental	 in	
determining	triage	logics.	
Policy	and	implementation:	the	overrated	power	of	labelling	
While	unpacking	the	various	steps	of	the	practice	leading	to	prioritising	people	and	
type	of	 response,	 I	 showed	 that	 there	was	a	 first	 interpretation	of	 impartiality	 at	
the	 policy	 level,	 and	 successively	 a	 second	 one	 at	 the	 project	 implementation	
stage.215	A	significant	difference	between	the	two	stages	of	interpretation	was	that	
some	labels	and	categories	of	people	central	to	policy	could	sometimes	disappear	
at	 the	 level	 of	 implementation,	 making	 only	 a	 rhetorical	 appearance	 in	 project	
documents	and	reports.	
																																																						
215	 I	 am	 purposely	 not	 opposing	 policy	 to	 practice	 here	 but	 to	 ‘project	 implementation’	 as	 I	 also	
consider	policy-making	as	a	set	of	practices.	
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	 Actors’	 policy	 documents	 state	 their	 priorities	 in	 terms	 of	 categories	 of	
people	(the	war	wounded,	the	most	vulnerable,	the	non-registered),	priority	areas	
(close	to	the	conflict,	north	Sindh,	areas	with	the	highest	density	of	IDPs),	and	types	
of	approaches	 (secondary	health	care,	water,	sanitation	and	hygiene,	multi-sector	
integrated	 approach).	 Consistently	 with	 the	 assumption	 that	 resource	 allocation	
should	be	done	on	the	basis	of	evidence	collected	about	‘needs’	(Knox	Clarke	and	
Darcy	2014),	these	actors	carried	out	‘needs	assessments’	and	translated	them	into	
policies	 stating	who	 they	 intended	 to	 prioritise	 and	 how.	 Yet	 some	discrepancies	
and,	 sometimes,	 contradictions	 between	 policy	 and	 implementation	 could	 be	
identified.	MSF’s	policy	prioritised	‘war	wounded’,	yet	mostly	took	care	of	women	
needing	complicated	obstetrical	 care.	Solidarités’	policy	emphasised	 its	priority	 to	
assist	 ‘the	most	vulnerable’,	yet	people’s	vulnerabilities	were	not	examined	in	the	
implementation	process.	SCI	policy	stated	that	non-registered	IDPs	in	the	areas	that	
hosted	the	highest	number	of	them	should	be	prioritised,	acknowledging	that	their	
paramount	need	was	for	food	and	shelter;	yet	they	ended	up	banning	themselves	
from	areas	with	high	IDP	densities	for	‘security	reasons’	and	instead	prioritised	child	
protection	and	education,	and	food	aid	for	the	‘registered’	IDPs.	As	argued	by	Geof	
Wood,	 “the	 process	 of	 labelling	 is	 a	 relationship	 of	 power”	 (Wood	 2007,	 20),	 in	
which	 aid	 recipients	 are	 “objectified”216	 (Eyben	 2007,	 33).	 Yet	 in	 the	 projects	 I	
studied,	the	INGOs	did	not	always	use	the	same	categories	at	the	implementation	
stage	 as	 they	 used	 in	 their	 policy	 documents.	 For	 instance,	MSF	 did	 not	 exclude	
people	 because	 they	were	 not	 ‘war	wounded’,	 and	 Solidarités	 did	 not	 include	 or	
exclude	according	 to	most	of	 the	 categories	 they	 stated	 in	 their	policy	document	
(‘the	 most	 vulnerable’,	 women,	 children,	 disabled	 persons	 and	 the	 elderly).	
Categories	are	an	instrument	of	the	power	that	humanitarian	actors	have	to	state	
in	 their	 policy	 document	 who	 should	 be	 included	 and	 who	 not,	 yet	 my	 study	
showed	 they	were	 not	 the	main	 drivers	 of	 humanitarian	 triage	 for	 INGOs	 at	 the	
implementation	stage	despite	practitioners	claiming	that	 ‘needs	assessments’	and	
																																																						
216	The	term	‘object’	is	here	used	in	contrast	with	the	definition	Eyben	gives	of	‘subject’:	someone	
we	 understand	 and	 relate	 to	 as	 a	 complete	 human	 being	 like	 ourselves,	 as	 distinct	 from	 an	
‘objectified’	other.	Thus	I	am	using	the	term	in	a	quite	different	way	from	‘subject’	 in	the	sense	of	
being	 subjected	 to	 authority	 (for	 example,	 ‘colonial	 subjects’)	 or	 to	 Foucault’s	 disciplinary	power”	
(Eyben	2007,	44	footnote	2).	
	 287	
‘vulnerability	 criteria’	 are	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 impartial	 assistance.217	 The	 use	 of	
categories	at	the	policy	level	was	employed	as	political	leverage	concerning	all	the	
stakeholders	 involved	 in	supporting	the	project:	 the	organisation’s	board,	head	of	
programmes,	staff	at	various	levels,	the	donor,	Pakistani	authorities,	etc.	Categories	
were	 used	 as	 a	 common	 language	 by	 those	 involved	 in	 the	 production	 of	 what	
Mosse	 calls	 ‘good	 policy’,	 i.e.	 “policy	 that	 legitimises	 and	 mobilises	 political	 and	
practical	support”	(Mosse	2005,	230).	Yet	at	the	implementation	stage,	faced	with	
the	 messy	 reality	 of	 various	 actors	 with	 various	 and	 changing	 interests,	 the	
humanitarian	 practitioners	 did	 not	 use	 them.	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	 synthesise	 what	
mattered	most	 in	the	study	of	humanitarian	triage	at	 the	 implementation	stage,	 I	
list	the	six	main	factors	in	the	following	section.		
Six	important	factors	shaping	humanitarian	triage	
As	mentioned	 in	chapter	3,	 sociological	 studies	of	medical	 triage	show	that	many	
non-clinical	 factors	 influence	 medical	 triage	 (Eisenberg	 1979;	 Clark,	 Potter,	 and	
McKinlay	1991)	including	doctor-patient	interaction	and	the	doctor’s	relationship	to	
his	 profession,	 to	 the	 health	 care	 system	 in	 general	 and	 the	medical	 institutions	
with	 which	 he	 has	 a	 relationship.	 Similar	 factors	 emerged	 in	 my	 study.	 Some	
appeared	important	for	all	three	INGOs	and	potentially	for	all	humanitarian	actors:	
first	 the	 organisation’s	 history;	 second,	 the	 relationships	 those	 representing	 the	
organisation	 promote	 to	 other	 actors	 of	 the	 humanitarian	 configuration;	 third,	
staff’s	daily	relationships	and	the	influence	of	‘strategic	groups;,	fourth,	the	ability	
of	practitioners	 to	challenge	 ‘invisible	 rationing’;	 fifth;	 the	power	of	humanitarian	
practitioners’	normative	assumptions;	and,	sixth,	the	moral	imperative	of	efficiency.	
As	 these	 six	 factors	 are	 not	 the	 only	 ones	 that	 influenced	 triage,	 I	 reiterate	 the	
necessity	to	have	organised	this	thesis	around	the	three	ethnographic	accounts	and	
not,	 for	 instance,	 thematically	 around	 such	 factors	 which	 would	 have	 made	 it	
almost	impossible	to	render	the	complex	story	of	each	triage.	In	the	next	sections,	I	
																																																						
217	This	may	also	contrast	with	bigger	development	institutions	such	as	those	mentioned	by	Rosalind	
Eyben	who	 argued	 that	 “by	 pointing	 out	 to	 the	 econometricians	 that	 people	 as	well	 as	 countries	
should	be	differentiated,	 social	 analysts	offered	 them	 the	opportunity	 to	 classify,	map,	 count	and	
compare	more	 different	 units	 of	 abstraction.	 (…)	 These	 categories	 of	 people	 became	 reified	 and	
subjected	to	measurement.	(…)	thin	in	description	and	thick	in	prescription	(Apthorpe	2003)”	(Eyben	
2007,	36).	
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illustrate	the	 importance	of	each	of	the	following	factors	with	elements	extracted	
from	 the	 ethnographic	 accounts	 (chapters	 5,	 6	 and	 7),	 but	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 too	
many	repetitions	of	the	three	previous	chapters,	I	will	not	each	time	use	examples	
from	each	of	the	three	INGOs.	
The	organisations’	history	
The	way	staff	interpret	the	historical	trajectory	of	their	organisation	in	the	country	
(or	 regionally)	 impacts	 on	 humanitarian	 triage.	 In	 2011,	MSF	 staff	were	 still	 very	
aware	that	their	organisation	had	returned	to	Pakistan	in	2004	to	work	in	Pashtun	
areas	 in	 order	 to	 reconnect	 with	 Afghan	 Taliban.	 This	 was	 later	 pushed	 to	 the	
background	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Timergara	 project	 as	 the	 conflict	 between	 the	
Pakistani	armed	forces	and	the	Pakistani	Taliban	became	the	primary	reason	to	stay	
close	 to	 the	 FATA.	 Yet,	 while	 I	 was	 in	 the	 field,	 another	 project	 in	 line	 with	 the	
historical	trajectory	of	maintaining	the	MSF	network	with	the	Taliban	was	being	set	
up:	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 hospital	 in	 Karachi,	 a	 city	 sheltering	many	 poor	 and	 people	
displaced	 by	 the	 2010	 and	 2011	 floods,	 but	 also	 a	 city	 where	 it	 was	 possible	 to	
organise	meetings	 with	 the	 Taliban	 leadership.	 I	 briefly	 visited	 the	MSF	 office	 in	
Karachi	and	members	of	the	team	explained	their	reason	for	having	a	presence	in	
such	 a	 big	 city	where	Pashtun	networks	were	 rooted	–	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 their	
networking	strategy	for	the	whole	Afghanistan	Pakistan	region.	The	Solidarités	case	
shows	 how	 much	 the	 staff	 interpretation	 of	 the	 organisation’s	 trajectory	 in	 the	
country	influenced	humanitarian	triage.	Solidarités	staff	never	challenged	the	initial	
assumption	 that	 the	 priority	 was	 to	 provide	 access	 to	 water	 and	 sanitation	
infrastructures	 in	north	Sindh,	yet	 this	was	merely	 inherited	 from	the	past:	 it	was	
rooted	in	Solidarités’	2009	refusal	of	US	government	funds	to	support	their	work	in	
KPK.	 Subsequently,	 Solidarités	 found	 it	 more	 difficult	 to	 work	 in	 KPK	 as	 a	
newcomer,	compared	to	other	actors	who	had	started	assisting	people	in	2009	and	
hence	 knew	a	 little	more	 about	 the	 region.	 Solidarités	 staff	 had	 found	a	niche	 in	
north	Sindh	in	the	aftermath	of	the	2010	floods	and	continued	to	work	in	the	same	
locations	that	they	had	previously	rather	than	considering	if	other	locations	might	
need	them	more.	Finally,	the	accusations	against	SCI	that	one	of	the	organisation’s	
previous	country	directors	had	been	involved	in	helping	the	CIA	(despite	the	lack	of	
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any	 solid	proof)	 significantly	 influenced	 SCI’s	 room	 for	manoeuvre	with	 regard	 to	
the	Pakistani	authorities,	and	with	the	general	public	in	Pakistani	that	had	seen	the	
US	 operation	 against	 Osama	 bin	 Laden	 as	 a	 blatant	 breach	 of	 their	 national	
sovereignty.	These	accusations	created	a	perceived	history	of	the	organisation	that	
influenced	 their	 approach	 to	 security	 and	made	 them	 fear	 for	 their	 staff’s	 safety	
more	than	they	would	have	in	the	absence	of	the	allegations.	
Relationships	to	other	actors	of	the	‘humanitarian	configuration’	
The	way	that	staff	promote	a	certain	type	of	relationship	to	other	aid	actors	and	to	
the	 “humanitarian	 configuration”	 has	 an	 important	 influence	 on	 humanitarian	
triage,	and	such	influences	appeared	in	the	three	cases	as	much	more	complex	than	
just	donors	manipulating	 INGOs	 to	promote	 their	political	 agenda.	 It	 is	 striking	 in	
the	case	of	MSF	whose	top	managers	(members	of	Cell	4	at	the	head	office	and	the	
head	 of	 mission	 in	 Pakistan)	 promoted	 a	 strict	 distinction	 between	 their	
organisation	 and	 all	 other	 international	 aid	 actors.	 The	 view	 and	 pride	MSF	 staff	
had	in	being	different	from	other	actors	influenced	humanitarian	triage	not	only	in	
the	 decision	 not	 to	 use	 institutional	 donors’	money	 in	 Pakistan	 but	 also	 because	
maintaining	 this	 difference	 meant	 that	 they	 explicitly	 aimed	 to	 be	 and	 do	 what	
others	did	not.	 SCI	 staff,	 in	 turn,	 saw	 their	organisation	as	one	of	 the	 leading	aid	
agencies	 in	 Pakistan.	 The	 objective	 of	 reaching	 20%	of	 all	 people	 affected	 in	 any	
disaster	 contributed	 to	 positioning	 SCI	 as,	 at	 least,	 one	 of	 the	 five	 biggest	
responders.	 The	 effect	 on	 SCI	 humanitarian	 triage	 was	 a	 pressure	 for	 ‘coverage’	
that	 greatly	 influenced	 activities	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 chapter	 7.	 The	 food	
distribution	SCI	 carried	out	as	 a	 subcontractor	of	WFP	with	 their	own	beneficiary	
lists	 (validated	by	the	GoP)	exemplifies	 the	academic	critique	that	 INGOs	serve	as	
the	“left	hand	of	empire”218	(Agier	2010,	29).	The	relationship	Solidarités	had	with	
its	 European	 donor	 was	 also	 a	major	 influence	 on	 its	 humanitarian	 triage.	 Yet	 it	
																																																						
218 Agier	borrows	 the	metaphor	 from	Pierre	Bourdieu	“who	called	 social	workers	of	a	nation	 ‘‘the	
state’s	left	hand’’	whose	disaffection	springs	from	the	hopeless	character	of	their	work,	involving	as	
it	does	the	never-ending	response	to	the	social	and	cultural	damage	done	by	the	‘‘right	hand’’	of	the	
state	committed	by	policymakers	applying	the	economic	principles	of	cost-effectiveness	and	return	
on	investment	to	public	affairs.	See	Pierre	Bourdieu,	 ‘‘The	Abdication	of	the	State,’’	 in	Bourdieu	et	
al.,	 The	 Weight	 of	 the	 World:	 Social	 Suffering	 in	 Contemporary	 Society,	 trans.	 Priscilla	 Parkhurst	
Ferguson	et	al.	(Stanford,	Calif.:	Stanford	University	Press,	1999)”	(Agier	2010,	43).	
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played	 out	 in	 a	 subtler	way	 than	 the	 donor’s	manipulation	 or	 the	 INGO’s	 hidden	
agenda.	 As	 chapter	 6	 showed,	 Solidarités	 field	 staff	 misinterpreted	 their	 donor’s	
expectations	 and	 attempted	 to	 reach	 the	 ‘target	 number	 of	 beneficiaries’	 at	 all	
costs,	while	the	donor	representative	expected	the	organisation	to	raise	any	issues	
and	 had	 proven	 in	 the	 past	 to	 be	 flexible	 about	 amending	 initial	 contracts.	 Of	
course,	Solidarités	 took	the	EU	money	and,	as	such,	helped	“metropolitan	states”	
govern	“the	borderlands”	(Duffield	2001,	308),	yet	it	would	be	difficult	to	show	that	
the	outcome	of	Solidarités’	humanitarian	triage	in	north	Sindh	practically	served	an	
EU	political	agenda	in	Pakistan.	
Staff	daily	relationships	and	the	influence	of	strategic	groups	
The	daily	 relationships	of	 the	 INGOs’	 staff,	 forming	 into	 ‘strategic	 groups’,	has	an	
influence	on	humanitarian	triage.	I	showed	that	triage	was	not	only	about	scientific	
‘needs	 assessments’,	 or	 donor’s	 dependency	 but	 was	 also	 shaped	 by	 power	
relationships	 among	 those	 who	 implemented	 activities	 in	 the	 field.	 It	 may	 be	
imperceptible	on	a	daily	basis,	in	particular	by	the	actors	themselves,	yet	with	some	
distance	interests	shared	by	some	groups	can	be	distinguished	and	linked	to	sorting	
logics.	 Within	 MSF	 the	 tension	 and	 balance	 between	 the	 strategic	 influence	 of	
political	 staff	 and	 the	 clinical	 influence	of	medical	 staff	was	 significant	 in	 forming	
the	Timergara	humanitarian	triage	as	chapter	5	showed.	Questioning	whether	one	
strategic	group	has	more	 influence	than	others	can	help	detect	certain	 logics:	 the	
role	 ‘Security’	 played	 in	 the	 shaping	 of	 the	 SCI	 Khyber	 IDP	 response	was	 key,	 as	
demonstrated	in	chapter	7.	
The	unquestioned	origin	of	scarcity	
Actors	justify	practices	of	triage	by	referring	to	various	forms	of	resource	scarcity	or	
environmental	constraints.	These	are	very	often	taken	as	facts,	yet	as	Lachenal	et	
al.	 (2014,	 24-25)	 argue	 they	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 socially,	 politically	 or	
economically	produced.	Questioning	the	origins	of	scarcity	and	constraints	justifying	
humanitarian	triage	allows	the	analysis	of	whether	and	how	actors	negotiate	them.	
When	 actors	 do	 not	 attempt	 to	 increase	 their	 room	 for	 manoeuvre	 and	 fail	 to	
negotiate	 upon	 certain	 constraints,	 these	 become	 another	 blind	 spot	 of	
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humanitarian	 triage.	 Shedding	 light	on	 this	blind	 spot	helps	 to	explain	what	 is	 an	
acceptable	exclusion	for	a	humanitarian	actor.	
Given	MSF’s	 strategic	objective	 to	assist	people	as	close	as	possible	 to	 the	
conflict	and	if	possible	 in	the	FATA,	the	organisation’s	main	constraints	were	first,	
insecurity	 and	 second,	 the	GoP’s	 restrictions	 regarding	 access	 to	 certain	 areas	 of	
the	countries.	Both	elements	are	often	grouped	in	the	humanitarian	grey	literature	
under	 the	 blur	 banner	 of	 ‘access’	 (Hubert	 and	 Brassard-Boudreau	 2010;	 OCHA	
2013).	As	described	 in	 chapter	5,	MSF	 invested	a	 significant	 amount	of	 resources	
(time,	 people	 and	 funds)	 in	 negotiating	 ‘access’,	 and	 in	 so	 doing	 challenged	 the	
main	elements	that	could	have	pushed	the	organisation	to	exclude	areas	that	were	
among	 the	 most	 difficult	 to	 access	 in	 Pakistan.	 MSF	 was	 not	 the	 only	 INGO	 to	
identify	 and	 challenge	 the	 ‘access’	 constraint	 as	 the	 example	 of	 the	 Norwegian	
Refugee	Council	proves	(NRC	2012).	
SCI	 approached	 insecurity	 in	 a	 very	 different	 manner	 and	 its	 staff	
internalised	danger	as	an	inflexible	constraint.	In	doing	so	the	organisation	reduced	
(as	demonstrated	in	chapter	7)	the	scope	within	which	they	considered	who	should	
be	prioritised	for	assistance,	and	this	acted	as	a	significant	blind	spot.	I	do	not	argue	
that	 they	 were	 unjustifiably	 cautious.	 My	 point	 is	 that	 the	 situation	 of	 those	
excluded	by	 security	measures	was	 not	 considered	 or	 debated	 among	 SI	 staff,	 in	
interviews	or	in	documents.		
For	Solidarités,	the	biggest	constraint	was	 its	contractual	commitment	to	a	
restricted	(emergency	WASH)	and	technically	ambitious	response	over	a	12-month	
period.	The	Solidarités	field	team,	instead	of	acknowledging	problems	as	they	arose	
and	attempting	to	open	negotiations	with	the	donor,	stuck	rigidly	to	the	plan	and	
attempted	to	reduce	the	discrepancies	between	what	was	in	the	proposal	and	what	
was	possible	or	actually	requested	by	people	affected	by	the	floods.	
The	‘othering’	power	of	normative	assumptions	
The	INGOs’	staff	had	normative	assumptions	about	what	was	good	for	the	intended	
beneficiaries,	and	this	was	sometimes	reinforced	by	their	limited	relationship	with	
people	affected	by	conflict	and	floods.	These	assumptions	significantly	played	out	in	
the	 daily	 implementation	 of	 the	 projects	 as	 they	 remained	 unquestioned	 and	
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sometimes	considered	as	universal	 truths.	These	assumptions	 relied	partly	on	 the	
staff’s	interpretation	of	how	their	organisation	was	doing	things	and	what	it	had	to	
offer	(in	terms	of	expertise),	and	partly	on	their	own	values.	
An	example	common	to	the	three	organisations	were	activities	of	health	or	
hygiene	promotion	premised	on	the	shaky	assumption	that	‘if	you	tell	people	how	
to	 change	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 their	 health	 or	 hygiene,	 then	 they	 will	 change’.	
Regardless	 of	whether	 the	 staff	 actually	 believed	 that	 assumption	was	 true,	 they	
implemented	 these	activities	without	 challenging	 their	 relevance.	The	example	of	
Solidarités	 staff	 constructing	 latrines	 in	 an	 area	 where	 people	 were	 used	 to	
practicing	open-defecation	also	shows	that	 in	spite	of	their	doubts	about	whether	
people	were	going	to	use	the	latrines,	they	built	them	as	it	was	what	they	usually	
did	 when	 faced	 with	 the	 absence	 of	 latrines.	 For	 Rosalind	 Eyben,	 people	 at	 the	
receiving	end	of	a	project	become	“objectified	other[s]”	to	whom	aid	practitioners	
forget	“to	relate	to	as	complete	human	being[s]	like	[themselves]”	(Eyben	2007,	44	
footnote	2),	‘othering’	them	in	the	process.	It	seemed	at	least	that	the	very	idea	of	
what	 they	 have	 to	 offer	 blinkers	 aid	 practitioners	 and	 prevents	 assessment	 on	 a	
case-by-case	basis	of	what	would	really	be	adequate	for	each	specific	situation.219	
Values	 promoted	 by	 the	 organisation,	 but	 also	 seemingly	 shared	 by	 its	 staff	
impacted	the	implementation	of	some	activities.	Another	example	of	the	influence	
of	normative	assumptions	is	the	belief	of	SCI	staff	that	‘education	in	emergency’	is	a	
priority	for	IDPs	who	have	difficulties	in	accessing	food	or	paying	their	rent,	and	is	a	
priority	for	children’s	safety	even	though	schools	had	been	a	primary	target	of	the	
Pakistani	Taliban’s	attacks.	
The	moral	imperative	of	efficiency	
In	her	book	The	Mantra	of	Efficiency:	From	Waterwheel	to	Social	Control,	 Jennifer	
Karns	 Alexander	 explains	 that	 while	 the	 concept	 of	 efficiency	 was	 an	 ancient	
“philosophical	 concept	describing	 agents	 and	 causes	of	 change”	 (Karns	Alexander	
2008,	 3),	 its	 meaning	 modified	 around	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 as	 to	 mean	 “a	
technical	measurement	of	the	performance	of	machines.	It	moved	into	economics	
and	then,	early	in	the	twentieth	century,	into	more	common	use”	(Karns	Alexander	
																																																						
219	For	more	on	this,	see	Naudet	(1999).	
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2008,	3)	associated	to	scientific	management,	labour	organisation,	productivity	and	
progress	 in	 industrialising	 Western	 Europe	 and	 the	 United	 States.	 She	 does	 not	
discuss	efficiency	in	the	international	aid	world,	yet	through	her	historical	analysis	
of	various	examples	she	shows	how	“many	people	continue	to	believe	efficiency	to	
be	good,	on	 its	own	and	 in	and	of	 itself”	 (Karns	Alexander	2008,	147),	whereas	 it	
was	historically	and	socially	constructed	at	the	expense	of	those	constrained	by	 it	
(industrial	workers),	and	as	an	“attempt	to	control	a	changing	situation,	by	bringing	
it	 into	 conformity	with	 a	 vision	 of	 how	 the	world	works”	 (Karns	 Alexander	 2008,	
163)	 -	 or	 should	 work,	 as	 if	 it	was	 a	machine,	 instead	 of	 adapting	 flexibly	 to	 the	
uncertainty	of	the	world.	
In	 the	 aid	 sector	 efficiency	 is	 widely	 accepted	 as	 a	 moral	 imperative	 and	
drives	actors	to	prioritise	the	number	of	people	assisted	over	the	quality	or	quantity	
of	 what	 is	 provided	 for	 each	 person:	 indeed	 as	 explained	 by	 the	 Independent	
Evaluation	Group	of	the	World	Bank,	“the	assessment	of	efficiency	focuses	on	ratios	
such	 as	 the	 number	 of	 lives	 saved,	 the	 number	 of	 children	 vaccinated	 (…)	 per	
thousand	dollars	invested”	(IEG-World	Bank	2007,	65).	The	quest	for	efficiency	has	
consequently	impacts	on	the	definition	of	results	as	our	case	studies	demonstrate.
	 The	 study	 of	 how	 Solidarités	 and	 SCI	 projects	 were	 being	 implemented	
showed	that	efficiency	was	equated	with	helping	as	many	people	as	possible	and	
hence	 was	 perceived	 as	 a	 moral	 imperative.	 Staff	 accepted	 the	 idea	 that	 their	
financial	 resources	were	 limited	 and	 that	 they	had	 to	 assist	 as	many	 as	 possible	
even	 though	 it	meant	 excluding	 those	 that	 needed	 intensive	 expensive	 care.	 For	
instance,	 SCI	 promoted	 primary	 health	 care	 that	 enabled	 the	 organisation	 to	
include	 as	 many	 people	 as	 possible.	 I	 was	 told	 that	 costly	 drugs	 (such	 as	 those	
needed	 for	 the	 treatment	 of	 chronic	 diseases)	 could	 not	 be	 distributed	 in	 the	
framework	 of	 this	 project	 as	 it	 was	 ‘too	 expensive’.	 It	 was	 the	 same	 for	 people	
needing	surgery	or	intensive	care:	they	were	referred	to	Peshawar	private	hospitals	
but	 with	 no	 allowance	 ensuring	 they	 could	 pay	 for	 treatment.	 The	 Solidarités	
project	 did	 plan	 to	 implement	 expensive	 technical	 solutions	 for	 people	 to	 have	
long-lasting	access	to	water,	yet	 for	 the	same	 level	of	 investment	 in	an	expensive	
infrastructure	they	prioritised	densely	populated	areas	over	remote	hamlets	where	
only	very	poor	people	lived,	hence	selecting	on	a	cost	per	beneficiary	ratio.	SCI	and	
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Solidarités	projects	exemplify	 the	 type	of	exclusion	 that	efficiency	produces:	 they	
excluded	 those	who	were	 the	 sickest	 (SCI)	 or	 the	 poorest	 (Solidarités).	 Efficiency	
veils	 the	 fact	 that	 for	more	people	to	be	assisted,	cheaper	assistance	(in	 terms	of	
quality	of	what	is	being	provided)	or	more	densely	populated	areas	are	prioritised	
(to	benefit	from	economies	of	scale).	
	 The	 moral	 imperative	 of	 efficiency	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 mechanics	 of	 a	
‘results-based’	 project	 management	 style.	 Both	 the	 Solidarités	 and	 SCI	 projects	
showed	how	the	need	of	 field	officers	 to	measure	 their	own	progress	 triggered	a	
monitoring	 of	 the	 advancement	 of	 their	 activities	 and	 number	 of	 ‘beneficiaries	
reached’.	 Field	 officers	 get	 direct	 satisfaction	 from	 acknowledging	 the	 amount	 of	
work	achieved,	which	they	cannot	be	blamed	for,	especially	when	one	has	a	‘target’	
and	 pressure	 (even	 if	 self-imposed)	 to	 reach	 this	 target.	 Even	 if,	 in	 the	 logical	
framework,	 the	 target	 is	 tied	 to	 a	 ‘result	 indicator’	 that	 aims	 to	 measure	
improvement	for	the	intended	beneficiaries,	 it	 is	translated	into	a	series	of	means	
and	activities	needed	to	reach	the	results	and	these	activities	can	be	quantified	and	
easily	 followed	 up.	 ‘Monitoring’	 activities	 tend	 to	 blinker	 humanitarian	 workers	
about	 the	 effect	 of	 their	 actions	 on	 people.	 Efficiency	 is	 widely	 seen	 as	 non-
ideological	 and	 apolitical,	 even	 though	 it	 ends	 up	 excluding	 people	 by	 the	 same	
logic	as	the	for-profit	corporate	sector,	driven	by	the	logic	of	maximising	returns	on	
investment	 to	ultimately	 increase	profits.	 If	 efficiency	was	 the	major	 logic	driving	
humanitarian	 triage,	 Walmart	 could	 indeed	 start	 competing	 with	 the	 biggest	
humanitarian	actors	(Hopgood	2008).	
MSF’s	humanitarian	triage	provides	an	example	of	an	organisation	opposing	
efficiency.	 Secondary	 health	 care	 has	 a	 much	 higher	 cost	 per	 beneficiary	 than	
primary	health	care.220	The	choice	to	work	in	areas	close	to	the	conflict	was	costly	
because	 of	 the	 long	 and	 continuous	 networking	 that	was	 needed	 to	 acquire	 and	
maintain	 acceptable	 access	 for	 field	 teams.	 Additionally,	 financial	 objections	 to	
certain	 choices	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 they	 were	 too	 expensive	 were	 perceived	 as	
																																																						
220	 Secondary	 health	 care	 is	 an	 expensive	 part	 of	 health	 systems	 because	 of	 the	 sophisticated	
equipment	 that	needs	 to	be	acquired	by	a	hospital	 in	order	 to	 function,	 for	example	 sterilisation,	
blood	banks,	safe	waste	management,	and	because	of	the	number	of	health	personnel	needed	for	
one	patient	requiring	an	operation	and	post-operative	care.	
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politically	incorrect	within	the	organisation,	as	far	as	I	observed	in	meetings.	When	I	
questioned	 top	MSF	managers	 about	 their	 resource-consuming	 choice	 to	work	 in	
areas	close	to	the	FATA,	they	opposed	the	cost-effective	logic	saying	that	it	would	
alter	 their	 ‘commitment’.	 They	 did	 not	 mention	 whether	 they	 referred	 to	 their	
commitment	to	treat	war	victims,	their	commitment	to	be	different	from	other	aid	
actors	(as	in	‘do	what	others	would	not’),	or	an	ideological	commitment	not	to	yield	
to	a	 logic	 that	was	 typically	corporate.	Each	was	a	sufficient	 reason	not	 to	 favour	
efficiency,	and	my	study	showed	they	were	committed	to	all	three.	
Implications	for	future	research	and	practice	
Within	 the	 research	 field	of	humanitarian	action,	 this	 research	 is	 novel	 in	 several	
respects.	First,	it	is	original	in	its	subject,	what	impartiality	means	in	practice	in	the	
context	 of	 humanitarian	 action,	 which	 has	 barely	 been	 discussed	 and	 studied	 in	
spite	 of	 its	 centrality	 for	 humanitarian	 practitioners.	 Second,	 it	 is	 original	 in	 its	
method	 that	 brought	 together	 elements	 from	 three	 bodies	 of	 literature	 –	 the	
development	 studies	 literature	 about	 humanitarian	 action,	 the	 anthropology	 of	
development,	 and	 the	 medical	 anthropology	 and	 sociology	 –	 in	 order	 to	
conceptualise	 ‘humanitarian	 triage’	 as	 the	 visible	 side	 of	 impartiality	 and	 study	 it	
ethnographically.	Third,	in	so	doing	my	research	provided	thorough	descriptions	of	
humanitarian	practitioners	 at	work,	 relying	on	empirical	material	 from	diversified	
sources:	 five	years’	 first-hand	experience	of	 the	practice,	 in-depth	 interviews	with	
over	 fifty	 actors	 of	 the	 humanitarian	 arena	 and	 several	 months	 of	 ethnographic	
encounters,	observations,	and	interviews	done	within	three	different	organisations.	
This	 section	 discusses	 the	 potential	 for	 other	 research	 agendas	 related	 to	 this	
dissertation	and	identifies	implications	of	this	research	for	humanitarian	actors.	
Implications	for	future	scholarship	
I	hope	that	my	research	contributes	to	the	already	widening	scope	of	anthropology	
of	 development	 to	 conflict	 and	 disaster	 settings.	 I	 also	 hope	 to	 have	 bridged	
development	 studies	 macro	 debates	 on	 humanitarian	 action	 that	 constitute	 the	
bulk	of	the	literature	on	humanitarian	action	and	the	anthropology	of	development	
scholarship	grounded	in	ethnographic	fieldwork,	often	focused	on	different	actors	
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than	those	studied	in	this	dissertation	but	no	less	relevant	for	the	questions	posed	
in	 crisis	 settings.	 As	 a	 native	 French	 speaker	 I	 attempted	 as	much	 as	 possible	 to	
introduce	 French	 scholarship,	 some	of	which	 remains	 unknown	 in	 debates	 taking	
place	 in	English.	A	few	research	 ideas	are	sketched	out	below	that	would	address	
critical	questions	not	covered	in	this	thesis.	
Whereas	this	research	concentrated	on	secular	international	NGOs,	the	field	
could	be	extended	to	other	humanitarian	actors,	and	to	other	conflict	and	disaster	
settings.	 Similar	 research	 focused	 on	 other	 humanitarian	 actors	 providing	 relief	
such	as	national	NGOs	or	international	but	of	non-western	origins	(such	as	BRAC	for	
instance)	 or	 faith-based	NGOs	would	 certainly	 identify	 other	 important	 elements	
influencing	humanitarian	triage,	as	well	as	influences	similar	to	those	I	emphasised	
in	this	research.		
Changing	 the	 comparative	 focus	 from	organisations	 to	 geographical	 areas,	
similar	 research	 could	 be	 undertaken	 within	 the	 same	 organisation	 in	 different	
geographical	areas	and	point	to	what	may	be	common	across	the	various	contexts	
or	 fundamentally	 different	 from	one	 context	 to	 the	 other	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 ethical	
claims,	 constraints,	 interests	 and	 main	 logics	 influencing	 humanitarian	 triage.	 It	
would	 be	 particularly	 interesting	 to	 compare	 projects	 implemented	 by	 European	
INGOs	 in	 Europe	 and	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 current	 context	 of	 migrations	 of	 people	
towards	 Europe:	 will	 European	 INGOs	 challenge	 their	 own	 governments’	 sorting	
logics?	Will	 they	 take	 funds	 and	 accept	 the	 constraints	 that	may	 be	 attached	 to	
them?	Will	these	NGOs’	triage	logics	differ	significantly	when	they	are	implemented	
in	their	own	country,	continent	or	elsewhere?	These	are	questions	 I	would	 like	to	
address	or	see	others	do	so.		
Another	line	for	further	investigations	would	be	to	focus	on	the	perspective	
of	the	 intended	beneficiaries	of	humanitarian	triage.	Ethnographic	perspectives	of	
those	at	 the	 receiving	end	of	 international	assistance	are	not	 rare	 (Pottier	1996a;	
Pottier	1996b;	Agier	2002;	Mosse	2005;	Agier	2011),	yet	 they	could	be	multiplied	
and	compared	from	the	angle	of	humanitarian	triage,	in	particular	in	an	attempt	to	
identify	 the	 major	 differences	 of	 perception	 between	 aid	 agents	 and	 recipients	
about	what	is	‘fair’	triage	and	about	what	is	‘needed’.	
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Just	 as	 impartiality	 was	 a	 founding	 claim	 of	 humanitarian	 actors,	 their	
accountability	 to	 those	 they	 attempt	 to	 help	 has	 been	 widely	 promoted	 as	 a	
principle	that	should	be	followed	in	order	to	solve	the	issue	of	asymmetrical	power	
relations	between	those	who	help	and	those	who	are	helped.	This	topic	has	been	
the	subject	of	a	lot	of	attention	from	practitioners	(Egeland	2005;	HAP	International	
et	al.	2015)	as	well	as	academics	(Edwards	and	Hulme	1995;	Slim	2002),	yet	to	my	
knowledge	there	has	been	 little	ethnographic	work	on	the	practices	concealed	by	
the	rhetoric	of	accountability.	Using	a	socio-anthropological	approach	to	empirically	
study	 the	various	practices	humanitarian	actors	devised	 to	hold	 themselves	more	
accountable	 (community	 feedback	 exercises,	 complaint	 mechanisms,	 etc)	 would	
help	explain	how	 they	work	 (rather	 than	whether	 they	work),	what	 they	produce	
when	 implemented	and	what	 is	ultimately	at	 stake	 in	 these	claims	or	 requests	of	
‘downwards	accountability’.		
Policies	of	impartiality	and	practices	of	humanitarian	triage	
I	 hope	 to	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 as	 impartiality	 is	 neither	 pre-defined	 nor	
universal,	there	is	little	chance	that,	as	argued	by	some	humanitarian	practitioners	
(Knox	 Clarke	 and	 Darcy	 2014),	 collecting	more	 and	 better	 evidence	will	 result	 in	
more	or	better	impartiality.	Instead,	what	Binder	et	al.	called	a	“justified	partiality”	
(Binder,	 Koddenbrock,	 and	 Horváth	 2013,	 24)	 that	 “consciously	 contribute[s]	 to	
unintended	global	inequities	and	accept[s]	the	side	effect	as	unavoidable”	(Binder,	
Koddenbrock,	 and	 Horváth	 2013,	 26)	 could	 also	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 policies	 of	
impartiality	 based	 on	 the	 premise	 that	 there	 is	 no	 consensus	 about	 what	 ‘true’	
impartiality	 is.	 In	 line	 with	 Mosse’s	 argument	 that	 good	 policies	 are	
unimplementable	(Mosse	2004),	these	policies	would	only	be	the	starting	point	for	
the	 promotion	 of	 greater	 organisational	 reflexivity	 in	 the	 implementation	 phase.	
Such	a	 reflexive	attitude	would	help	 identify	 sorting	 logics,	whether	originating	 in	
their	 staff’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 organisational	 trajectory,	 their	 relationships	
to/with	other	actors	in	the	humanitarian	configuration,	the	emergence	of	‘strategic	
groups’	amongst	 them	or	 their	own	normative	assumptions.	Humanitarian	actors’	
continuous	 questioning	 of	 ‘invisible	 rationing’,	 i.e.	 what	 pushes	 them	 most	 to	
exclude	 people,	 could	 make	 them	 challenge	 these	 constraints	 or	 accept	 the	
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parameters	 of	 their	 own	 triage.	 An	 option	 explored	 by	 the	 literature	 studying	
medical	 triage	 was	 to	 involve	 the	 intended	 beneficiaries	 in	 making	 these	
inclusion/exclusion	 calls.	 From	 the	 debate	 about	 the	 non-medical	 influences	 in	
triage	practices	emerged	a	theoretical	framework	referred	to	as	“accountability	for	
reasonableness”	(Daniels	2000,	1300).	This	approach	relies	on	the	hypothesis	that	
in	morally	“pluralist	societies	we	are	 likely	to	find	reasonable	disagreement	about	
principles	 that	 should	 govern	 priority	 setting”	 and	 that	 “in	 the	 absence	 of	
consensus	on	principles	a	fair	process	[emphasis	added]	allows	us	to	agree	on	what	
is	 legitimate	 and	 fair”	 (Daniels	 2000,	 1300).	 What	 this	 theoretical	 framework	
establishes	then	is	that:	
Key	elements	of	fair	process	will	involve	transparency	about	
the	grounds	for	decisions;	appeals	to	rationales	that	all	can	
accept	 as	 relevant	 to	 meeting	 health	 needs	 fairly;	 and	
procedures	 for	 revising	 decisions	 in	 light	 of	 challenges	 to	
them.	(Daniels	2000,	1300)		
The	 ‘accountability	 for	 reasonableness’	 framework	 is	 hence	 presented	 as	 a	
democratic	 approach	 to	 triage,	 relying	 on	 transparency	 and	 flexibility	 of	 the	
decision-making	 process	 and	 aiming	 (like	 impartiality)	 at	 fairness.	 Fairness	 is	 not	
considered	 as	 having	 a	 stable	 universal	meaning,	 but	 rather	 as	 relying	 on	 shared	
values	of	 individuals	having	a	 stake	 in	 the	decision.	 The	 interpretation	of	 fairness	
changes	therefore	with	individuals,	their	relationships	and	the	general	environment	
of	the	decision.	Public	engagement	exercises	in	some	US	states	showed	that	it	was	
possible	to	get	people	who	are	at	the	centre	of	triage	processes	to	question	their	
vision	of	what	would	be	a	 fair	prioritisation	process	 from	 their	perspective	 in	 the	
case	 of,	 for	 instance,	 a	 disaster	 or	 a	 pandemic	 (Leichter-Flack	 2014,	 69).	
Humanitarian	practitioners	could	certainly	benefit	from	other	experiences	of	triage	
in	 the	medical	 and	public	 sector,	 approaching	humanitarian	 triage	 like	 a	 complex	
process	 influenced	by	diverse	and	dynamic	 sorting	 logics.	 The	 invisibility	of	major	
factors	 influencing	 humanitarian	 triage	 invites	 humanitarian	 organisations	 and	
those	 representing	 them	 to	 set	 up	 reflexivity	 frameworks	 in	 order	 to	 collectively	
identify	what	 in	 their	 own	 practices	 and	 beliefs	 produce	 the	 triage	 logics	 leading	
them	to	eventually	include	and	exclude	people.	
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Appendices	
Appendix	1	List	of	Interviewees	–	MSF	OCB	
  Project / Location 
International/ 
National Gender Position 
1 Islamabad National M Ex HR Coordinator Deputy 
2 Islamabad International F Human Resources Coordinator 
3 Dargai International M Field Coordinator 
4 Karachi International F Field Coordinator 
5 Badin International M Field Coordinator 
6 Islamabad International M Human Resources Support - Cell 4 
7 Islamabad National M Deputy Medical Coordinator 
8 Islamabad International M Head of Mission 
9 Islamabad International M Medical Coordinator 
10 Islamabad International M Technical and Logistics Coordinator 
11 Islamabad National M Deputy Finance Coordinator 
12 Islamabad National M Data Manager 
13 Islamabad National M Watchmen Supervisor 
14 Timorgara/ Badin National F 
Hospital Hygiene Manager / Health 
Promoter 
15 Dargai National M Medical Focal Point Assistant 
16 Timorgara/ Badin National M ER Doctor 
17 Timurgara International M Field Coordinator 
18 Dargai National F 
Mother & Child Health Nurse 
Supervisor 
19 Timurgara International M Medical Focal Point 
20 Timurgara International F Midwife 
21 Timurgara National M Field Coordinator Assistant 
22 Timurgara National M Medical Focal Point Assistant 
23 Timurgara National M Administrative Assistant 
24 Timurgara National M Logistician Assistant 
25 Timurgara International F Field Coordinator 
26 Timurgara International M ER Doctor 
27 Timurgara National F Mother & Child Health Nurse 
28 Timurgara National M Post Operation Room Supervisor 
29 Dargai International F Medical Doctor 
30 Dargai National M ER Nurse Supervisor 
31 Dargai/Timurgara International F Health Promotion Supervisor 
32 Dargai National F 
In-Patient Department Nurse 
Supervisor 
33 Dargai National M Security Focal Point 
34 Dargai International M Logistics responsible 
35 Dargai International F Medical Focal Point 
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36 Dargai National M Field Coordinator 
37 Dargai National M Watchmen Supervisor 
38 Brussels HQ M Cell 4 Coordinator 
39 Brussels HQ M Medical Referent Cell 4 
40 Brussels HQ F Human Resources Manager Cell 4 
41 Brussels HQ M Operations Director 
42 
Brussels HQ M Ex Operational Medical Coordinator (newly Operations Director) 
43 Brussels HQ M Executive Director 
44 Brussels HQ F Communications Director 
45 Brussels HQ M Medical Director 
46 Brussels HQ M Logistics Director 
47 Brussels HQ M Logistics  
48 Brussels HQ M Human Resources Director 
49 ex Afghanistan International M Ex Afghanistan Head of Mission 
50 Brussels HQ F Cell 4 Communication Officer 
51 ex Islamabad International M Ex Medical Coordinator 
52 Swat International M ER Doctor 
Source:	the	author	
	 334	
Appendix	2	List	of	interviewees	–	Solidarités	International	
  Project / Location 
International/ 
National Gender Position 
1 Paris International M Desk Logistician Manager 
2 Islamabad International M Head of Mission 
3 Islamabad National M Deputy Administrative Coordinator 
4 
Shaheed 
Benazir Abad National M 
Hygiene Promotion & Distribution 
Team Leader 
5 
Shaheed 
Benazir Abad National M Sensitization Technician 
6 
Shaheed 
Benazir Abad National M Watchman 
7 
Shaheed 
Benazir Abad National M Water Officer 
8 
Shaheed 
Benazir Abad National M Distribution Officer 
9 
Shaheed 
Benazir Abad National M Administrator 
10 
Shaheed 
Benazir Abad National M External Liaison Manager 
11 
Shaheed 
Benazir Abad International  M Project Manager WASH 
12 
Shaheed 
Benazir Abad International F Logistician 
13 Islamabad International F Administrative Coordinator 
14 Mehar International F Logistician 
15 Mehar International F Administrator 
16 Mehar International M Sanitation Project Manager 
17 Mehar International M Water Project Manager 
18 Mehar International F 
Hygiene Promotion and DRR Project 
Manager 
19 Mehar International M Logistician Coordinator 
20 Mehar International M Field Coordinator 
21 Mehar National F Program Manager Assistant 
22 Mehar National M Water Project Manager Assistant 
23 Mehar National M Sanitation Project Manager Assistant 
24 Mehar National M Administrative Assistant 
25 Mehar National M Logistician Assistant 
26 Mehar National M Driver Responsible 
27 Mehar National M Water Officer 
28 Mehar National M Sensitisation Technician 
29 Mehar National M Information Manager 
30 Mehar National F Hygiene promotion Team Leader 
31 Mehar National M Sanitation Officer 
32 Mehar National F Community Mobilisation Officer 
33 Mehar National F Community Mobilisation Officer 
34 Paris HQ F Desk Manager 
35 Paris HQ F Desk Programmes Supervisor 
36 Paris HQ F Desk Finance Manager 
37 Paris HQ F Desk Assistant 
38 Paris HQ F Desk Finance Officer Assistant 
39 Paris HQ M WASH Referent  
40 Paris HQ F Human Resources Referent 
41 Paris HQ F Financial and Administrative Director 
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42 Paris HQ M Programmes Director 
43 Paris HQ M Executive Director 
44 Paris HQ F HR Director 
45 Paris HQ F 
Programmes Technical Quality 
Supervisor  
46 Paris HQ M Logistician Department 
47 Paris HQ F Director of Communications 
48 Paris HQ M Founding Director 
49 Paris HQ F Internal Audit 
50 Paris HQ M HR Operational Referent 
Source:	the	author	
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Appendix	3	List	of	interviewees	–	Save	the	Children	International	
  Project / Location 
International/ 
National Gender Position 
1 Islamabad International M Country Director 
2 Islamabad International F Education Cluster Co chair  
3 Islamabad International F Nutrition Advisor 
4 Islamabad National M Human Resources Manager 
5 Islamabad National M Senior Finance & Grants Manager 
6 Islamabad National M Grants Manager 
7 Islamabad National M Media, Communications & Advocacy Specialist 
8 Islamabad National M Health & Nutrition Specialist 
9 Islamabad National M Health Manager 
10 Islamabad National F Senior Shelter & NFI Operations Coordinator 
11 Islamabad National F Senior Human Resources Officer 
12 Islamabad National M Child Protection Specialist 
13 Peshawar National M Child Protection Coordinator 
14 Islamabad National F Senior Manager Disaster Risk Reduction 
15 Islamabad National M Education Specialist 
16 Islamabad National M Senior Food Aid Coordinator 
17 Islamabad National M Child Protection Coordinator 
18 Islamabad National M 
Director Emergency Field Program 
Implementation 
19 Islamabad National M Finance Manager 
20 Islamabad National M Food Aid Specialist 
21 Islamabad National M Monitoring & Evaluation Manager 
22 Islamabad National M Education Manager 
23 Islamabad National F Food Security & Livelihood Specialist 
24 Peshawar National M Senior Human Resource Officer 
25 Peshawar National M Education Coordinator  
26 Peshawar National M Health Coordinator 
27 Peshawar National M Senior Finance Officer 
28 Peshawar National M  Response Manager 
29 Peshawar National M Monitoring Evaluation And Learning Coordinator 
30 Peshawar National F Media, Communications & Advocacy Coordinator 
31 Peshawar National M Food Security & Livelihood Program Assistant 
32 Peshawar National M Food Aid Coordinator 
33 Peshawar National F 
Senior Monitoring Evaluation And Learning 
Officer 
34 Peshawar National M Senior Food Security Livelihood Coordinator 
35 Peshawar National M Male Community Mobiliser 
36 Peshawar National F Community Mobiliser 
37 Peshawar National F Breast Feeding Counsellor 
38 Islamabad International F Development Director 
39 Islamabad National M Security Director 
40 Islamabad National M Logistics Director 
41 Islamabad National M Coordinator Safety & Security ERRP 
42 Peshawar National M Security Coordinator 
43 Islamabad National M Food Security & Livelihood Director 
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Appendix	4	List	of	External	Interviewees	
  Organisation Type of actor Pakistani? Gender Position 
1 OCHA UN No F Head Coordination Unit 
2 OCHA UN Yes M WASH Cluster lead 
3 UNDP UN No M Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit 
4 UNICEF UN No M WASH Cluster Coordinator 
5 WFP UN No F Inter Agency Relations Coordinator 
6 FAO UN No M Agriculture Cluster Coordinator 
7 UNHCR UN No F Protection Cluster Coordinator 
8 Al Khidmat Pakistani NGO Yes M President for FATA 
9 PPHI Pakistani NGO Yes M Public Health Specialist 
10 PPHI Pakistani NGO Yes M Regional Programme Director 
11 PPHI Pakistani NGO Yes M Programme Director 
12 Sahrad RSP Pakistani NGO Yes M Chief Executive Officer 
13 Sungi Pakistani NGO Yes M Director Programme Operations 
14 Ministry of Health Pakistani Authority Yes M Medical Superintendent 
15 Ministry of Health Pakistani Authority Yes M Ministry of Health Doctor 
16 PDMA Pakistani Authority Yes M Executive Director 
17 PDMA Pakistani Authority Yes M Director of Relief Operations 
18 Health System reform Unit 
Pakistani 
Authority Yes M Coordinator 
19 Health Department 
Pakistani 
Authority Yes M District Focal Person 
20 Thesil Municipal Administrator 
Pakistani 
Authority Yes M Thesil Municipal Administrator 
21 
Public Health and 
Engineering 
Department 
Pakistani 
Authority Yes M District Officer PHED 
22 PDMA Pakistani Authority Yes M 
District Disaster Risk 
Management Coordinator 
23 Economic Affairs Department 
Pakistani 
Authority Yes M Section Officer 
24 NDMA Pakistani Authority Yes M Member Operations 
25 People Non State Authority Yes M Landlord 
26 People Non State Authority Yes M Head & Doctor of the Village 
27 MSF OCP Management No F Project Coordinator 
28 ICRC International Organisation No M Head of Sub-delegation 
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29 ICRC International Organisation No M Water & Habitat Coordinator 
30 ICRC International Organisation No F 
Multilateral Affairs/Humanitarian 
Coordinator Delegate 
31 IOM International Organisation No F Shelter Cluster Coordinator 
32 MSF Sweden INGO No M MSF Evaluator 
33 MSF OCP INGO No M Deputy Head of Mission  
34 PHF INGO No F Policy & Advocacy Officer 
35 CRS INGO No M Chair of PHF 
36 HI INGO No M Head of Mission 
37 NRC INGO Yes F Head of Mission 
38 DRC INGO No M Country Representative 
39 MSF OCP INGO No F Field Communications Advisor 
40 MSF OCP INGO No M Head of Mission 
41 MSF OCA INGO No M Head of Mission 
42 ACF US INGO Yes M Deputy Country Director 
43 ACTED INGO No M Country Director 
44 MDM INGO No M Head of Mission 
45 Oxfam GB INGO No F Country Director 
46 Concern Worldwide INGO No F Country Director 
47 Secours Islamique France INGO No M Country Director 
48 Islamic Relief Worldwide INGO Yes M Country Director 
49 Muslim Aid INGO   M Country Director 
50 Red R INGO No   Country Program Manager 
51 World Vision INGO Yes M Health and Nutrition Manager 
52 USAID/OFDA Donor No M Program Officer  
53 ECHO Donor No M Senior Technical Adviser 
54 ECHO Donor No M Technical Assistant 
55 
Department	for	
International	
Development 
(UK) 
Donor No M Representative 
56 CIDA Donor No M First Secretary Development 
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